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Abstract
Over a very short period conditions for the Russian population in Latvia have 
changed dramatically. From being representatives of the majority nationality enjoying a 
special status in the Soviet multinational empire, Russians have become a national 
minority in a Latvian nation-state. The thesis focuses on the implications of these 
changes for the ethnic identity of Russians living in Latvia; the changes are analysed 
through the perspective of ethnopolitical developments in the country.
An examination of relevant western and Latvian scholarly literature on ethnicity 
and nationality issues provides the theoretical framework within which to discuss the 
Russian question in Latvia. Conceptual issues are clarified and various explanations for 
the phenomenon of ethnicity are considered. The relationship between ethnicity and the 
political sphere is also examined. After this theoretical introduction, the thesis looks at 
Latvia's Russian question in a historical context. The history of the Russian population 
in Latvia is examined, with special attention being paid to the role of historians in the 
formation of public opinion on historical issues as well as to relevant topics from the 
period of Latvian independence in the interwar period. Soviet nationalities policies in 
general and in Latvia in particular are then discussed, and the role of the Russian 
nationality in the Soviet empire is analysed.
The responsibility for nationalities policies in Latvia was gradually transferred 
from the centre in Moscow to Latvia itself. The thesis therefore analyses Latvian 
nationalities policies in the period from 1988 to 1993. The main part of the thesis, 
however, focuses more directly on the Russian population itself. A major survey 
"Russians in Latvia 1992" was conducted by the author in cooperation with Latvian 
sociologists, and it is used extensively for the analysis of Russians' perceptions of their 
own role in Latvia. Apart from data on the general socio-economic and demographical 
characteristics of the Russian population, the survey provides information about 
Russians' evaluation of a wide range of issues, including political attitudes, interethnic 
relations, links with the historical motherland, Russia, citizenship, language and many 
more. The thesis contains an analysis of Russians' organisational structures and 
political activities in Latvia, and the experiences and opinions concerning the formation 
of a Russian party in the country are also discussed.
The main findings of the thesis are finally put into a theoretical framework. 
Both the intensity and content of Russian ethnic identity are here accounted for. 
Similarly, the question of the prospects for integration and/or assimilation of the 
Russian population is crucial in the final analysis. Also, in line with the ethnopolitical 
perspective, the thesis looks at various models of conflict resolution in ethnically 
divided societies and assesses their applicability to Latvia.
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Introduction
Introduction
After the breakup of the Soviet Union the question of the nearly 25 million 
Russians living outside the Russian heartland is potentially one of the most explosive 
issues facing the new (and restored) post-Soviet states. In all these states except 
Armenia, Russians make up more than 5 per cent of the population, and the sudden 
change of status of the Russians, from being a majority nationality with a special status 
in the Soviet multinational state to that of ethnic minorities in what are normally 
implicitly or explicitly defined as nation-states or national states, is likely to have 
important implications for regional stability. All the Soviet successor states were in the 
process of redefining the concepts of statehood and nationhood, and one of the 
challenges of the new governments (including the Russian) in this respect would be 
how to deal with the Russian question. The Soviet republics had often been considered 
by the Russians to be just another part of the Soviet Union and therefore '-'their" 
national territory.1 Were the new states their states as well, or did they "belong" first of 
all to the titular nationalities? Moreover, did the Russian government have a right, or 
even an obligation, to intervene in internal developments in the Soviet successor states 
in order to protect ethnic Russians who, often against their own will, had been isolated 
from their historic homeland?
The Russian question was not, however, a question only of high-level politics, 
but for each individual Russian it was a question of how to adapt to the new situation in 
which they found themselves. Reactions to radical change were different from one 
individual to another, and would often depend on former affiliation to the republic or 
territory in which they lived. A crucial question was therefore how the ethnic identity of 
these Russians would be affected by ethnopolitical change and how this would 
influence their cultural and political identification both with their present state of 
residence, as well as with their ethnic homeland, Russia.
This question is the main focus of this thesis, and it deals mainly with the 
Russian population in Latvia. There are several factors which make Latvia's Russian 
population a particularly interesting case to study. Firstly, Russians have a long history 
in the region, and even though most of the Russian population moved to Latvia after the 
Second World War, a relatively large proportion of Russians living in the country today 
have lived, or are descendants of Russians who have lived, in the region for several 
generations. Many Russians can still remember living in an independent Latvia, and 
others have parents or grandparents with such memories. The heterogeneity of the 
Russian population in terms of ethnic identification is therefore likely to be larger than 
for Russians in most of the other former Soviet republics, where only a very limited 
number of Russians have any pre-Soviet memories.
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Secondly, although the Russian population in Latvia is numerically relatively 
small - it makes up less than 4 per cent of the total Russian population in the 'near 
abroad' - when seen as a proportion of the total population in Latvia it is very large 
indeed. According to the 1989 census Russians in Latvia made up 34 per cent of 
Latvia's population, which put Latvia in second place among the Soviet republics in 
terms of the proportion of Russians; only in Kazakhstan did Russians make up a larger 
proportion (38 per cent). As pointed out above, most of the Russian influx has taken 
place in the period after the Second World War: according to the 1935 census only 9 
per cent of the population was Russian. Similarly, the share of Latvians fell from 76 
per cent in 1935 to 52 per cent in 1989. There can be no doubt that the demographic 
situation in Latvia has a strong impact on the way in which the Russian question in the 
country is being approached, and the ethnopolitical importance of this question for the 
state-(re)building process in Latvia can hardly be overestimated.
Thirdly, the legal status of most of the Russians in Latvia has not yet been 
defined. Only a minority of Russians have so far been granted Latvian citizenship, as 
they were not citizens, or direct descendants of citizens, of the Latvian Republic in the 
interwar period. Most Russians will, however, most probably have a chance in the 
future to apply for Latvian citizenship, which they can obtain through a naturalisation 
process. Those who are not citizens of Latvia can apply for Russian citizenship, which 
they will be granted automatically if they are not citizens, and have not applied for 
citizenship, of another state.2 The questions of citizenship and of who actually 
"belongs" to the state are therefore particularly relevant for the case of Latvia.
As the title of the thesis suggests, the Russian population in Latvia is discussed 
through the perspectives of their ethnic identity and ethnopolitical developments in the 
country, and the thesis particularly analyses the relationship between the two. The 
thesis, thus, makes extensive use of relevant scholarly literature on ethnicity and 
ethnopolitical issues, which provides for the theoretical framework. This framework is 
outlined in the first chapter of the thesis, where conceptual questions are clarified, the 
phenomenon of ethnicity analysed, and the relationship between ethnicity and the 
political sphere discussed. Chapter 1 further contains a discussion of relevant Latvian 
literature in the field, which contrasts with the western scholarly analysis and shows the 
development in dealing with ethnic issues among Latvian scholars in the period from 
the early 1980s until the present.
Although the main focus of the thesis is the period from the formation of the 
Popular Front of Latvia in October 1988 until the elections to the new’ Latvian 
parliament, the Saeima, in June 1993, some discussion of issues further back in time is 
required, as present developments to a large extent are influenced by events in the past. 
Thus, Chapter 2 looks at the history of the Russian population in Latvia. This includes
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a discussion of the w ay in which different historians have interpreted the role of Russia 
and Russians in Latvian history, and the subsequent effect on the interpretation of 
historical issues on the Russian population itself and their perception of their own role 
in Latvian society. Some relevant issues from the period of Latvian independence in the 
interwar period are also discussed in this chapter.
The Latvian ethnic scene is in many respects a legacy of Soviet nationality 
policies, and the third chapter of the thesis deals with those aspects of these policies 
which affected the Russian population in the Soviet Union in general, and in Latvia in 
particular. This leads on to an analysis in Chapter 4 of Latvian ethnopolitics in the 
period from 1988 onwards, when political forces in Latvia gradually came to determine 
nationality policies in the country: policies which again set the framework within which 
Russian residents in Latvia were now confined.
The chapters following deal more exclusively with the Russian population in 
Latvia itself: Chapter 5 presents and discusses a number of sociological characteristics 
of the Russian population which can be important factors in explaining their ethnic 
identification. There is then a chapter analysing Russian affiliations with their state of 
residence, Latvia, and their ethnic homeland, Russia. Chapter 7 looks at the political 
attitudes of the Russian population, particularly in relation to questions such as Latvian 
independence and citizenship legislation. The organisational activities of the Russian 
population in the indicated period are also reviewed and analysed in a separate chapter. 
Chapters 5 to 8 make extensive use of the results of a survey (called "Russians in 
Latvia Survey, 1992") which was conducted by this author in cooperation with 
sociologists from Latvia in the spring of 1992. Appendix 1 gives some more details of 
the survey methodology, while the questionnaire itself is reproduced in Appendix 2. 
Other sources of information include Latvian newspapers and journals, as well as 
interviews with politicians and other officials, journalists and scholars.
The final chapter puts the findings of the thesis into a theoretical framework as 
outlined in Chapter 1. This opens up for a discussion of the applicability of various 
models of regulation of interethnic conflict in multiethnic societies for the case of 
Latvia. The discussion draws both on particularities of Latvian ethnopolitics and 
characteristics of the Russian population living in Latvia w'hich are discussed 
throughout the thesis.
It should be stressed that the thesis deals only with issues which are directly or 
indirectly related to ethnicity and/or Latvian ethnopolitical developments. There are, 
however, a number of issues which could be said to belong to the latter category, but 
unfortunately, due to limitation of space, these cannot be addressed in totality in this 
thesis. I have reasoned that it is better to concentrate on some aspects and discuss them 
in more detail than to bring in as many relevant aspects of the issue as possible without
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being able to provide a thorough discussion. This is why I do not look in any detail, for 
example, at the questions of the reactions in Russia or the West to the ethnopolitical 
situation in Latvia. Economic developments in Latvia which can influence the 
interethnic climate in the country are referred to but not analysed in full, whilst the 
importance of the continuing presence of Russian armed forces in Latvia receives only 
minimal attention. Although all these questions might have some influence on ethnic 
identification among Russians and, particularly, ethnopolitical developments in Latvia,
I believe that a more thorough discussion of these issues would not have altered any of 
the main conclusions of the thesis.
It should be noted that there is no systematic discussion of events that have 
taken place in the period after the elections to the Saeima in June 1993. Only some 
events after that time are discussed in the text and, where this is thought to be 
appropriate, developments after June 1993 are briefly referred to in separate footnotes.
. During my work.on this thesis I have.benefited from help and support* as well 
as a variety of perspectives as to how to approach the topic, from a very large number 
of people, and I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to all of 
them.
First of all I would like to thank my two supervisors, Stephen White and Martin 
Dewhirst, for extremely valuable advice and comments on each of the draft versions of 
my chapters. Both supervisors have been available whenever I have needed advice and, 
considering their tight schedules, I have been delighted by the rapid feedback and 
priority given to my work. The supervisors have also had complementary functions: I 
received much advice from Stephen White about how to write and structure a Ph. D. 
thesis, and his professionalism and great insights in the field have given me confidence 
in my work. Martin Dewhirst was indispensable in supplying materials on the topic 
from a great variety of sources, and he is also the one who has removed most of the 
language mistakes and improved my English.
I would also like to thank former and present students and staff at the Institute 
of Soviet (Russian) and East European Studies for their help and support. I apologise 
for all the tedious interruptions of the work of my colleagues with questions usually 
related to English vocabulary or grammar. Special thanks are due to Rene Beermann for 
his hospitality, Kay McWalter for responding to all my practical requests, Tanya Frisby 
for her humorous Russian classes, Cathie Mooney for never reprimanding me for the 
mess on and around my desk, Margery McMahon for the language corrections to one 
of my chapters, Tauno Tiusanen for sharing his Baltic newspapers, and last, but not 
least, Ase Berit Gr0deland for giving me the opportunity to express in Norwegian both 
the joys and frustrations over my work.
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My computer skills have improved during the work on this thesis thanks largely 
to Ingrid Grafen, who also spent much time helping me to arrange the survey tables and 
in some respects knows this thesis better than I do myself.
My stays in Latvia have naturally had an enormous significance for the way in 
which I look upon the Russian question there. Being in Latvia during the January 
events in 1991 and the aborted August Coup later the same year has added perspectives 
that are of value not only for this thesis. Richard Baerug deserves thanks for 
encouraging me to go to Riga in the first place, and for letting me use the facilities of 
the Ziemeivalstu informacijas birojs (Nordic Information Office) during my later stays. 
His colleagues there have also been very helpful. My teachers of Latvian at the Faculty 
of Foreign Languages of the University of Riga not only taught me the beauties of the 
Latvian language but they also took a personal interest in their students which I have 
never encountered elsewhere. My gratitude goes to all of them, although I will mention 
only a few.by name: Valentina Gurtaja, Maija Brede, Andrejs Veisbergs and leva 
Zauberga. They are certainly not to blame that I still confuse the Latvian participles; 
leva even gave me private lessons during sightseeing in London.
Andrejs Linkevics at the Latvian Writers' Union was a very good administrator 
and adviser during my first stays in Latvia and put me into contact with many useful 
and interesting people. He also provided me with materials which I would not have 
been able to find elsewhere. The cooperation with the sociologists of Socio: Azii 
Ivanov, Boris Slavsky and Ilarion Ivanov, made it possible to carry out the 1992 
survey of which I make extensive use in my thesis. I am very grateful to them and also 
to all those who in some way or another were involved in the survey. One of them is 
Vladimir Men'shikov at the Pedagogical Institute of Daugavpils, who also contributed 
to the success of my two stays in the city. Arturs Kursltis has continuously sent me 
Latvian newspapers, which has made it possible for me to keep up to date with events 
in the country. Another person who has been extremely helpful in solving practical 
problems in Riga, and to whom I am most grateful, is Margarita Javica. Warm thanks 
also go to all the other friends I have made in Latvia since I was first there in the 
summer of 1989, and who patiently and enthusiastically have discussed the subject of 
my thesis with me.
In the middle of my work period I was lucky to have the chance to work for 
seven months as research assistant under Graham Smith at the University of 
Cambridge. This gave me the opportunity to discuss my topic and work with an area 
specialist who has also insights into ethnopolitical theory. My colleague Richard Mole 
was also very helpful during my stay in Cambridge, and Jane Wills gave me much 
practical advice in the use of SPSS for Macintosh.
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One of my main sources of inspiration has been Pal Kolst0 at the University of 
Oslo, who has many interesting publications on subjects related to my thesis. Pal has 
also been my main link with Norwegian specialists in my field. Terje Mathiassen and 
Brigita Silinga from the same university were very helpful and flexible in making it 
possible for me to take the exam in Latvian at the university while at the same time 
studying in Glasgow.
There are a number of other people who in different ways should be given 
credit for their contributions to the work on this thesis. I will mention some (in 
alphabetical order): Yurii Abyzov, Aina Antane, Ilga Apine, Peter Duncan, Barry 
Fielder, Rasma Karklins, James G. Kellas, Merethe Kvernr0d, Joseph McCormick, 
Miroslav Mitrofanov, Susan Norbom, Vigdis Nygaard, Abigail Regan, Talis 
Tisenkopfs, Boris Tsilevich, Oleg Vovk and Kathie Young. There is always the danger 
of having overlooked someone, and I wish to apologise to anyone who does not appear 
on this list but who should have been, there. Their contributions have, however, not 
been unnoticed. I would also like to thank my family, and friends who have not been 
directly involved with my thesis, for all their support.
I have received financial support from the Foreign Office of the British 
Embassy in Norway and from Norsk Forskningsrad (the Norwegian Research 
Council, formerly NAVF). This thesis would hardly have been written without their 
generous support, and I am very grateful to both institutions.
Although I have had the privilege of much good help and advice, I accept that I 
alone can be held responsible for any errors or shortcomings in this thesis.
Finally, a note on transliteration and spellings. The scheme used by the journal 
Europe-Asia Studies has served as a guide-line for transliteration from Russian. 
Latvian fonts and characters are usually used for Latvian words. Exceptions are names 
that are familiar to English-speaking readers in another form, such as Riga (not Riga). 
Instead of transliterating Latvian names when written in Russian, their Latvian form is 
adopted when familiar to this author (Krumins, not Krumin'sh). The present official 
names are used for the former Soviet republics. For space considerations, when there 
are quotations in Russian a translation is usually not provided, as I expect that the thesis 
will be read first of all by people with a knowledge of this language; quotations in 
Latvian or other languages, however, have been translated into English.
Brubaker (1994), p. 68.
-The text o f the Russian law on citizenship was printed in Russkii Pul', 12 September 1992, p. 3.
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CHAPTER 1
1. Ethnicity and the Nationality Question in Scholarly 
Literature
On the 25th of January 1992 Latvian TV invited to a discussion on the subject 
"Is there a Russian question in Latvia?". All the programme participants agreed that the 
answer to this question had to be positive, but their views differed substantially when 
they were asked what should be understood by the "Russian question". One of the 
differences was reflected in the interpretation of the term "Russian". Whereas some of 
the participants emphasised that they by "Russians" understood the whole "Russian- 
speaking population" in Latvia, others were more concerned with issues regarding the 
so-called "real Russians"; those who are Russians by nationality.
The example above indicates that when we write about "Russians in Latvia", 
people may interpret the term "Russians" differently. One must therefore at the start of 
the thesis clarify who are considered to be Russians. However, the choice should not 
be arbitrary, and should be based on the scholarly literature in this field. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide the theoretical framework, within which the "Russian question" in 
Latvia can be discussed. In the first part of the chapter there will be an examination of 
some of the Western literature in the field, with a discussion of relevant terms that are 
widely used. The way in which the phenomenon of ethnicity is analysed by different 
scholars will be examined, and I will to some extent concentrate on questions related to 
ethnic (or national) identity, which is the most important concern of this thesis. 
Towards the end of the chapter I shall look at the way in which scholars in Latvia 
analyse or have analysed nationality issues. This section will not only contrast with 
Western analysis, but will also point to the changes that have taken place in Soviet and 
Latvian scholarly literature in the field since the early 1980s.
1.1.  Ethnicity - the Conceptual Framework
Nationality issues are analysed by scholars in a large number of social and other 
sciences; by historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers 
and others.1 One of the problems concerning nationality issues is that they to a large 
extent have developed their own terminology, so that scholars in many cases write 
about the same phenomena but use a different vocabulary. In other cases the concepts 
being used have different meanings to different scholars, sometimes even within the 
same science. In this thesis reference will be made to theories from a number of 
different fields, and also from different countries and scientific traditions, and it is 
therefore necessary to clarify some of the concepts that are most widely used. I will
13
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start with concepts related to ethnicity, since ethnic relations and ethnic identity are the 
main focus of this thesis.
In a study of 65 works dealing with aspects of ethnicity and of 27 different 
definitions of the term ethnicity from dictionaries and theoretical studies, Isajiw 
examined its common features.2 He found that the attributes that were most often 
mentioned were common ancestry, and the same culture, religion or language. He 
suggested that most definitions asserted an ascriptive, involuntary nature of the 
phenomenon. The factor of mutual recognition and identification was another recurring 
aspect in most definitions.
The number of definitions of the terms related to ethnicity has increased 
substantially since Isajiw carried out this study, especially since the mid-1970s, when 
research on ethnicity started flourishing.3 One of the most controversial topics in the 
area centres on the nature of the criteria that define ethnicity. Both objective and 
subjective criteria have been used in defining the term. Those who use objective criteria 
usually define ethnicity in terms Of religion, language, race, geographic location, a 
common history, culture and the like.4 They may include a cultural, territorial or 
biological content or a combination of these.5 Subjective definitions emphasise the 
socio-psychological aspects or the affective ties of ethnicity. Ethnic membership is here 
seen mostly as a subjective belief or a presumed identity.6 However, a majority of 
scholars now see a combination of subjective and objective criteria as essential for 
explaining ethnicity. Burgess, among others, recognised that subjective criteria are of 
great importance, but that they need to be based on some objective group realities. She 
provides a definition of ethnicity with both subjective and objective variables: Ethnicity 
is
the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, 
based on an identity with and/or a consciousness of group 
belonging that is differentiated from others by symbolic 
"markers" (including, cultural, biological, or territorial), and is 
rooted in bonds of a shared past and perceived ethnic interests.7
In works on ethnicity one of the problems has been to come to an agreement on 
how to use the term "ethnic group". There has been a tendency that ethnic group and 
minority have become synonymous. This has been common among some American 
sociologists and political scientists. Thus in the "Dictionary of Modem Sociology" 
ethnic group is defined as: "a group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of 
identity which exists as a subgroup of a larger society".8 Most scholars do, however, 
seem to agree that the ethnic group need not be a subordinate part of a larger society but 
may also be the dominant element in a state, or may extend across a number of states. 
In this thesis the term "ethnic group" will also be used in this broader sense. Thus, 
Russians in Latvia will be regarded as an ethnic group (ethnos) whether they are 
representatives of the dominant nationality in the Soviet Union, as was the case until
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recently, or a minority nationality in a Latvian state, which is the reality today. The fact 
that no formal distinction is made between the terms being used does not, however, 
indicate that I disregard the difference between the two statuses of the Russians in 
Latvia, and one of the main aims of the thesis is to analyse what this change has meant 
for their ethnic identity.
Brass argues that ethnic groups should be distinguished both from interest 
groups and from classes. Ethnic groups, unlike interest groups, are concerned with 
cultural matters, symbols and values, and also with issues of self-definition. He states 
further, that even though ethnic groups often act as interest groups pressing demands 
upon the state, some ethnic groups are completely internal to the community, and there 
are also ethnic groups with only potential political significance.9 Ethnic groups and 
classes are also distinguished in Brass' analysis. The former is seen as a more variable 
category since it is defined in relation to "cultural markers, practises or behaviour 
patterns and as potentially whole societies".10
McKay and Lewins have examined some definitional and conceptual problems 
surrounding the usage and interrelationships of the terms "ethnicity", "ethnic identity", 
and "ethnic group".11 They support the view that the individual and group level of 
analysis should be kept separate, because "a high level of ethnic identification does not 
necessarily entail group formation and group formation does not necessarily involve a 
high level of ethnic identification among all individuals".12 In other words, the 
consciousness level of individual group members may vary widely, and the level of 
interaction between the members does not necessarily reflect the level of ethnic identity 
in the group.
McKay and Lewins argue that "ethnic group" should be distinguished from 
"ethnic category". They criticise the frequent usage of "ethnic group" to include 
individuals who share certain "objective" characteristics such as religion, race, or 
national origin or some combination of these, without having a sense of belonging to 
the ethnic group or much interaction with their fellow ethnics. Only individuals who do 
regularly interact with fellow ethnics should, according to McKay and Lewins be 
regarded as belonging to an "ethnic group". On the other hand, individuals with certain 
common demographic characteristics but without this interaction belong to an "ethnic 
category".
McKay and Lewins also make a distinction between "ethnic awareness" and 
"ethnic consciousness". Ethnic awareness exists when an individual is aware that he or 
she possesses certain ethnic characteristics but where these characteristics are no more 
relevant to him or her than the other social characteristics which make up the individual. 
Ethnic consciousness exists when the ethnic characteristics assume considerable 
importance, and a "we" versus "them" mentality exists in relation to other ethnic 
groups. Thus, "ethnic consciousness" is more intense than "ethnic awareness".
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The typology developed by McKay and Lewins, based on the discussion 
above, has two dimensions; ethnic structuration and ethnic identity. The first dimension 
is divided into ethnic groups and ethnic categories whereas the other dimension is 
divided into ethnic awareness and ethnic consciousness. By dichotomising the two 
dimensions an individual can fall into four different categories, as shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Ethnic Identification and Structuration
Type of structuration
Ethnic category Ethnic group
(Low) (High)
Ethnic awareness (I) (II)
(Low) Minimal cell Moderate cell
identification
Ethnic
consciousness
(High)
(HI) 
Marginal cell
(IV) 
Maximum cell
Source: Martinelli (1986), p. 198; McKay and Lewins (1978), p. 423.
De Vos and Romanucci-Ross criticised the model of McKay and Lewins 
because they found it to be too rigid.13 They claimed that the degree of ethnic identity is 
on a continuum informed by a high degree of complexity, and cannot be categorised 
into two groups. Phyllis Martinelli tested a number of ancestry Italian Americans in an 
attempt to determine if the types delineated in McKay and Lewins model could be 
distinguished.14 Her study did not fully confirm the McKay and Lewins typology, 
since only three of the four groups were distinguishable. Martinelly argued, however, 
that there are some differences between those who belong to an ethnic category and 
an ethnic group and between "those whose identity is strongly rooted in their ethnicity 
and those for whom an ethnic identity is only one of several strands that constitute the 
self".15
In this thesis I shall attempt to identify the level of ethnic stratification and ethnic 
identity among Russians living in Latvia. The degree to which there is a sense of 
belonging to a Russian ethnic group will be analysed, and the importance to Russians 
of ethnic characteristics will be examined. However, the variables that could be used to 
classify Russians into the four different groups according to the McKay and Lewins
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model would, in my view, be too arbitrary to make such a classification justifiable. As 
long as one is aware of the different levels of ethnic stratification and identity, I also see 
no reason for the strong division between ethnic groups and categories, and between 
ethnic consciousness and awareness, at least for the purposes of this thesis.
In a large number of studies on nationality questions, and particularly in the 
study of nationalism, scholars have attempted to provide accurate definitions of the 
terms "nation" and "nationality". There must here be a brief comment on the ambiguous 
meanings of these terms, since some of the literature has relevance for this thesis.
"Nation" has often been used as a synonym for a state or its inhabitants, and 
"nationality" has been used to indicate citizenship. Although this usage has been 
criticised by a large number of scholars in the field of nationality questions, the 
distinction between state and nation is not always clear.16
One of the most prominent scholars in the field of nationalism, A. Smith has 
defined nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common 
myths ah historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members."17 According to this definition, Russians in 
Russia constitute a nation, but Russians in Latvia lack features such as a common 
economy with the required mobility for members as well as the same legal rights and 
duties as Russians living in Russia. They can therefore not be considered part of a 
Russian nation.
Smith has developed his definition of nation from two components in line with 
Meinecke's distinction between the Staatsnation and the Kulturnation . The first 
component is what Smith calls the Western concept of a nation based on historic 
territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of the members, and 
common civic culture and ideology.18 The second component is a non-Western and 
ethnic conception of the nation, the distinguishing feature of which being its emphasis 
on a community of birth and native culture. According to this second concept an 
individual remains a member of one's national community whether he stays in the 
community or emigrates to another. As one can see, Russians in Latvia would fit into 
this ethnic conception of a nation.19
It must be mentioned that there are scholars who define nation in more strictly 
socio-cultural terms than Smith does, and who use the concept in a way in which 
Russians in Latvia would easily fit in.20 In Russian and also in Latvian language the 
terms nation (natsiyaJ m cij$ and nationality (natsional'nost'/ t^ utjba(nacjonaUtdte))do 
not have the connotation of having something to with the state that the terms often do in 
English. Soviet scholars have, however, had similar difficulties in defining the terms as 
their Western counterparts have, and they have for example not agreed on the question 
of whether a group of people living apart from the ethnic group to which they belong
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can be regarded part of this nation21 The relationship between the words natsiya and 
natsional'nost' is described in the English version of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia:
The term natsional'nost' which signifies a common ethnicity, is 
only one of the factors contributing to a nation or to nationhood.
Thus, natsional'nost' is a narrower concept than "nation". The 
distinction between the two concepts helps explain why a group 
of people who are of the natsional'nost' of a particular nation but 
who do not live on its territory are not members of that nation.22
Some of the concepts and terms used by scholars when writing about 
nationality issues have now been discussed. There will also be some more conceptual 
discussions when I will deal with Latvian scholarly works on nationality issues 
towards the end of this chapter. I have defined the concept "ethnic group", and argued 
that Russians in Latvia belong to such an ethnic group, but I still have not fulfilled the 
task which was set out in the beginning of the chapter; to define who should be 
considered Russians in Latvia. Some scholars, among them De Vos and Romanucci- 
Ross, argue that, strictly used, "nationality" is indistinguishable from "ethnic group".23 
There will, however, in this thesis be a slight difference in the usage of the two 
concepts. "Nationality" will be used as an operalisation of the term "ethnic group", but 
due to certain considerations the two concepts do not completely overlap one another:
If one in line with the majority of contemporary Western scholars in the field 
argues that ethnic groups can only be self-defined, one must consider as belonging to 
the Russian ethnic group all those who regard themselves as Russians. However, there 
are some complications concerning how to proceed from this to an operative definition, 
for example how to choose respondents for our survey. In the Soviet Union the rule 
was that when children got their passports at the age of 16, their official nationality was 
always indicated. This nationality was automatically the same as the nationality of the 
parents. Only children of mixed marriages could choose their nationality, but it had to 
be the nationality of one of the parents.24
The censuses and our survey do not ask for the official nationality when people 
are asked to report their nationality. Still, there will be people who expect that when 
they are asked about their nationality, they should report the official one. For a majority 
of people one would expect that the official nationality and the self-defined one would 
be the same, but this is not necessarily always the case, and I will give three examples 
to illustrate this. First, there are people in Latvia who regard Russian as their mother 
tongue, interact in a Russian environment and have a sense of belonging to a Russian 
culture, but whose parents are of another nationality. Such people will often report this 
other nationality to the census-takers, but would, if asked about national identity, 
regard themselves as Russians.25 Second, it is not possible not to report any 
nationality, which means that people without any ethnic awareness are forced into a 
nationality category. Third, there is no category for Soviet nationality, since Soviet
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nationality has never been recognised as a nationality on its own. There is, however, 
reason to believe that for a considerable number of individuals in Latvia there was (and 
for some still is) a Soviet identity which was stronger than the identity of belonging to 
any of the nationalities. In Yugoslavia there was another approach to this question, 
because people had the option to report a Yugoslav nationality to the census-takers.26
In the first example above there are people who, according to our definitions, 
should be regarded as belonging to the ethnic group of Russians, but who are not 
regarded as Russians in the censuses or our survey.27 This may be a weakness, but it 
would be technically difficult to include these people in our survey, since it is partly 
based on information from the census of 1989, and it is impossible to identify, based 
on this census, who should be regarded as Russians among those who are reported to 
belong to other nationalities (and similarly who among those reported as Russians 
should not be considered as such). The second and third examples include people who, 
strictly based on the definitions above, should not be regarded as Russians . However, 
these are groups that are of particular interest for our thesis, in that they are considered 
in censuses as Russians but have no or a very low degree of ethnic identity. One would 
therefore lose interesting information if they were not included in our survey, and they 
were included in the census anyway. Even though these groups do not fit into the 
definition which was given of ethnic group, they will be considered as belonging to the 
Russian nationality. With the considerations above in mind, I will for this thesis define 
nationalities as administratively recognised ethnic groups, and Russians will be 
regarded as those who report Russian as their nationality to the census-takers and in the 
questionnaires for our survey.
There could be good arguments for writing about the "Russian-speaking 
population" instead of Russians, and many scholars analyse ethnic relations in Latvia 
by dividing the population into Latvians and non-Latvians. However, since this thesis 
is very much concerned with questions related to ethnic identity, there are certain issues 
where we are interested in the Russian ethnic group as such, for example their relations 
to what is regarded their historic homeland, Russia, and also questions connected with 
being the largest nationality in a Soviet multinational state and seen as an "elder brother" 
for the other nationalities. A large part of the thesis will deal with questions that concern 
other nationalities in Latvia to the same extent as they concern Russians, at least from 
the point of view of these nationalities. When dealing with organisations such as 
Interfront and the Communist Party, it is not always easy to establish on basis of the 
surname whether a statement comes from a Russian, or for example a Belarusian or a 
Jew. From the context it should, however, be clear if it is important to keep to the 
definition of Russian in a stricter sense, and I do not believe that these inconsistencies 
will cause any further problems in the thesis.
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1.2.  Ethnicity - the Phenomenon
The phenomenon of ethnicity has by many people been regarded as paradoxical. 
The "liberal expectancy", a term introduced by M. Gordon, has been based on the idea 
that urbanisation would promote assimilation, and modem technology would lead to a 
convergence of economic and social systems.28 The implication was an expected trend 
towards the world consisting of a relatively small number of homogeneous nation­
states. The liberal expectancy has its parallel in the "radical expectancy", typically 
identified with Marxism and Marxist scholars. Marxists have regarded class as the 
relevant unit of analysis, and class is usually seen as having a much greater influence 
on the development of political and social systems than ethnic factors. The affective ties 
of ethnic groups were by most Marxists expected to disappear as class consciousness 
would unite individuals regardless of their ethnic background.
Despite predictions of the eradication of ethnicity in the modem age, there is 
empirical evidence suggesting that ethnicity has become more and more important, at 
least up to date. The number and intensity of ethnic conflicts have increased, and 
ethnicity has to some extent become a legitimate principle of political organisation.29 In 
the following section the question of how ethnic identity and a sense of ethnic solidarity 
comes into being will first be examined. Further, I will look at the relations between 
ethnicity and the political sphere, and particularly attention will be paid to questions 
centring around ethnicity in states having a multinational character.
There have traditionally been two differing approaches to explaining ethnicity. 
The first, called the primordial approach, takes' the view that ethnicity is something 
primordial and ascriptive and suggests a link between ethnicity and kinship.30 The 
strong affectional links among people having common ancestry are emphasised, and 
ethnicity is seen as "a real and tangible quality with a real and tangible existence on its 
own".31 Some scholars, among them Van den Berghe, give a biological and genetic 
explanation for the existence of these primordial attachments 32
The other approach, called the circumstantial, or the situational, recognises that 
an individual may have dual, or multiple, identities, and that the importance that an 
ethnic group member assigns his or her own ethnicity can change over time.33 
Researchers have found through empirical research that although people sharing ethnic 
identities usually hold to a myth of common descent, this myth is often of low 
biological validity.34 Circumstantionalists see ethnicity as a rational group response to 
social pressures and a basis for group action, especially when none other exists.35 
Patterson, for example, argues that ethnicity is a chosen form of identification and that
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"ethnic loyalties reflect, and are maintained by, the underlying socio-economic interests 
of group members".36
There are certain problems connected with the two approaches. Both sides have 
argued that the other side is restricted as to the range of ethnic behaviour it can explain: 
The primordial approach can, it is said, explain the persistence of ethnic identity over 
time, but is less able to explain why the intensity of ethnic identity can change and 
fluctuate and also be distributed differently within a group. The circumstantial 
approach, on the other hand, can explain the reason for fluctuation of ethnicity over 
time, but tends to ignore the affective significance of ethnic ties.37
Richmond has argued that the notion of ancestral links should not be abandoned 
all together 38 However, he suggests that ancestral links may be putative (attributed) 
rather than determined by actual genetic connections or acquired during early 
socialisation. Since ethnic group membership and identity are strongly related to 
culture, and cultures are in a constant state of flux, so will also membership and identity 
change and fluctuate over time, sometimes become more inclusive, at other times more 
exclusive. He argues that the difficulty in reconciling the primordial and the 
circumstantial approaches has been caused by a too simplistic and unitary view of 
culture.
G. M. Scott Jr. claims that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and 
that ethnic attachments can be both primordial and circumstantial at the same time. He 
offers a synthetic model based on the oppositional approach originated by Edvard 
Spicer 39 According to this approach opposition is required for an ethnic group to have 
a strong identity and sense of solidarity. Ethnic groups can survive over longer periods 
living in relative isolation, but without their identity being challenged, it will likely be 
taken for granted to the point that is is considerably weakened.40
Primordial sentiments are, according to Scott, "tied to the circumstances under 
which they are aroused or maintained", and his argument is that this most often occurs 
"when the members of an ethnic group face opposition from another group on the basis 
of their ethnic distinctiveness" 41 When Spicer used his opposition approach to explain 
only persistent identity systems, Scott argues that opposition also can explain 
fluctuating ethnicity. Such fluctuating ethnicity along with fluctuating primordial 
sentiments are seen as results of the circumstance of fluctuating opposition.42
This thesis is concerned with the degree of ethnic consciousness and ethnic 
group solidarity among Russians living in Latvia. I support the view that ethnic 
boundaries and identities are situationally defined43, since there is strong evidence 
indicating this, but do not disregard the affective ties of ethnicity. One hypothesis in 
this thesis is that a sense of group consciousness exists at least among a majority of the 
Russians in Latvia, and that the intensity of this consciousness has increased over the 
last few years. In line with Scott's model, one could explain an increase in intensity
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level of Russian ethnic identity as a consequence of an opposition to manifestations of a 
higher intensity of Latvian ethnic conciousness.
However, one would need to investigate thoroughly before such conclusions 
can be made. Many scholars emphasise that ethnic identity should be seen as only one 
out of many identities making up an individual.44 It is not unlikely that opposition to 
Latvian ethnic mobilisation could have the effect among Russians that other forms of 
group solidarity would intensify, for example internationalist and Soviet sentiments. 
Apart from analysing the intensity of ethnic identity, I shall in this thesis also look at 
alternative forms of identity formation among Russians in Latvia. One should not 
exclude the possibility that the intensity of two or more forms of identity can increase 
simultaneously, which for example could result in people feeling more "Russian" and 
more "Soviet" at the same time. I believe that identity formation among Russians in 
Latvia can not be fully understood without analysing particularities with the Soviet 
regime and Soviet nationality policy, which will be examined in further detail in the 
next chapter.
The next focus of examination is the relationship between ethnicity and the 
political sphere. The traditional way of dealing with ethnic politics, was to see politics 
as a dependent variable, and the political sphere as acting in relation to already existing 
ethnic divisions.45 Some scholars have challenged this approach. Cynthia H. Enloe, 
for example, considers it a rather passive notion of politics which implies that political 
actors have the limited task of managing the ethnic conflicts in a society.46 She refers to 
empirical evidence suggesting that politics in itself can be an autonomous force which 
can create the sense of ethnic belonging of the individuals, and she also believes that 
politics can delineate social divisions between ethnic communities.47
A number of scholars have analysed the relationship between a multinational 
state and its ethnic minorities, a subject which also has relevance for our thesis. One 
could maybe argue that Russians in Latvia should not be treated as a typical ethnic 
minority. They are in many respects in a special situation since their ethnic group 
constitutes a majority in another adjacent state. Since such ethnic groups can often 
count on support from their ethnic homeland, their demands to the authorities would be 
expected to carry extra weight.
Thomas Hylland Eriksen explicitly refers to the case of the Russians in Latvia 
when he analyses the relations between a nation-state and their ethnic minorities.48 He 
is aware of that the Russians in Latvia have some peculiarities that it shares with a few 
other ethnic groups, but he does not see their situation as principally different from that 
of other ethnic minorities. I support Eriksen in this view, and will throughout the thesis 
consider Russians in Latvia a minority group. By minority a strictly numerical 
definition is employed, and the concept does here not have any connotations to position 
in the social structure.49
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Eriksen describes three major strategies which can be employed by the nation­
state to deal with their ethnic minorities, not taking into account genocides, deportations 
of whole populations or removal of existing borders.50 These are all strategies that will 
affect the ethnic sentiments of the group affected. The first strategy is to assimilate the 
ethnic minority. This strategy is characterised by an attempt to reduce or preferably 
destroy the ethnic identity of the minority group by force or by the use of other means. 
The aim is to replace this identity with the identity of the majority nationality of the 
state. Assimilation can take place through language policies, education, mass media etc.
A second strategy is characterised by dominance, or in some cases forced 
segregation. In this case the state does not attempt to assimilate the minority groups but 
at the same time deprives them of the political rights of the dominant group.51 The third 
strategy is for the state to distant itself from a nationalistic ideology either by 
establishing a federative state characterised by regional self-government or by 
advocating a multi-cultural ideology for the state, where citizenship is not connected 
with a particular ethnic identity.
Eriksen also points to the paradox that a nation-state can be accused of injustice 
both if it promotes equality as well as if it promotes difference between the ethnic 
groups:
If the state emphasises that all citizens should have the same 
duties and rights it could lead to the minorities getting the 
impression that the distinctive characters of their culture is not 
being respected and that they are discriminated against and 
disqualified because of their culture.[...] But if the state rather 
emphasises the right to cultural differences on their territory, 
members of minorities would feel that they are discriminated 
against out of opposite reasons.52
The implication of a policy where all ethnic groups have the right to preserve their
cultural distinctiveness can sometimes be that large segments of the population are
deprived of taking part in the competition for resources.
I will give one example to illustrate Eriksen's point In Latvia there have always 
been separate Russian and Latvian schools. If Latvian authorities were now to abolish 
the division between Latvian and Russian schools, it could make Russians complain 
about their situation being worsened, since it would be more difficult for the Russians 
to preserve their cultural distinctiveness. If, on the other hand, Russians were 
encouraged to go to Russian schools, with less emphasis on Latvian language and 
culture, and at the same time fluency of Latvian were a prerequisite for getting a higher 
position in Latvian society, such policy would also meet strong opposition from 
Russians.
Eriksen is quite clear in his preference for the third strategy referred to above. 
He gives evidence of the destructive potential of combining ethnic identity with the 
formidable power represented by the modem state.53 There are also other scholars
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arguing the case that a state consisting of many nationalities should be based on cultural 
pluralism and political accommodation. Lijphart has provided a model for how a state 
can cope with problems of extreme "cultural pluralism".54 In the final chapter of the 
thesis we shall look closer at his model of "consociational democracy" and see how 
applicable it is to the situation in Latvia. "Majoritarian democracy" and "ethnic 
democracy" are alternative models which also will be discussed in the final chapter.
The position of Russians in Latvian ethnic stratification will depend on the 
characteristics of the group itself and also its actual place in the stratification system. A 
traditional way of classifying ethnic groups has been to distinguish between 
subordinate and superordinate ethnic groups. Some scholars noted the analytical 
difference between a politically superordinate group being in majority or minority in a 
society, between economic and political domination, and also of different degrees of 
interaction within and among the ethnic groups in the respective societies. We will now 
look at some models where these and other factors have been integrated.
Motyl uses the term "ethnic power" to describe the "combination of resources 
that position a given group in the ethnic hierarchy or region".55 He is aware that 
ethnicity unlike class carries no connotation of power per se, but he argues that ethnic 
groups can still possess certain characteristics of a nonethnic nature, and that these 
characteristics give the groups involved different amounts of resources. The power of 
the ethnic group is therefore related to, but not identical with class power.
The author further argues that ethnic groups can be compared along several 
power dimensions, and he suggests the following; demographic size, social 
development, communications capacity, and organisational capacity. One should 
emphasise that Motyl here operates on the group level of analysis, and that the position 
of the individual is not necessarily reflected by the position of the group as a whole.
Based on an operalisation of the different dimensions, Motyl classifies the 
ethnic groups into three different types; the hegemonic group, which is dominant in all 
or nearly all categories; the dominant group, dominating in a majority of categories; and 
the balanced group, possessing approximately the same degree of ethnic power as the 
other groups in the society involved.
Rothschild compares three models according to which a society may stratify 
their ethnic groups.56 The first model is characterised by a categorical correspondence 
of ethnic superordination and subordination in all spheres of a society ; political, social, 
economic, and cultural. There are structural and, when required, coercing sanctions 
enforcing the hierarchical arrangements. The second model is one of parallel ethnic 
segmentation which implies that "each ethnic community is internally stratified by 
socio-economic criteria and each has a political elite to represent its interests vis-d-vis 
the the corresponding elites of the other ethnic segments". In the third model, the cross- 
patterned reticulated, ethnic groups and social classes "cross-populate" each other. One
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can find members of an ethnic group within each economic class and sector of society, 
but it is likely that there is some overrepresentation and underrepresentation of ethnic 
groups within the different economic classes and in the political leadership.
Both the vertical-hierarchical and the parallel-segmental model are regarded as 
ideal-schemes that do not exist in pure form in real life. By being more realistic, 
Rothschild considers the reticulate model to be the superior of the three to analyse 
developed multiethnic societies. The most important is that it allows for and even 
expects "diagonal, asymmetrical, and (..) changing cross-correlations between ethnicity 
(...) and class, status and power distributions (.,.)."57 Rothschild emphasises that 
"even though the third model facilitates transactions across ethnic boundaries", the 
model does not "assume (...) ethnic assimilation or even a high level of mutual 
ethnocultural sympathy".58 At the contrary, the interethnic relations may well be more 
competitive in this than the two other models, since people from different ethnic groups 
have access to the same rewards, but the actual or perceived discrepancies in the 
possibilities of gaining these rewards may cause ethnic conflict
As we see, one can not analyse ethnic relations in Latvia by simply establishing 
which group is superordinate and which group is subordinate. Motyl's model points to 
the importance of taking into account more than one dimension when analysing the 
relative position of different ethnic groups in a society. However, for our thesis it is 
also important to look at stratification within an ethnic group, and Rothschild's model 
provides a tool by which one can analyse the correlations both between and within 
ethnic groups.
Lieberson brings in another aspect of ethnic relations which is useful for our 
thesis, and that is the distinction between ethnic groups that are territorially based on the 
one hand and extraterritorial and dispersed groups on the other.59 He particularly looks 
at differences between societies where a migrant population dominates an indigenous 
population and societies where there is subordination of a migrant population by an 
indigenous (racial or) ethnic group. Whereas the indigenous population will usually 
have an established and stable organisation prior to the arrival of the migrants, migrants 
are as a rule required to make some institutional adaptions in view of the presence of the 
indigenous population. As a contrast "when the migrant population is superior in terms 
of technology (particularly weapons) and also more tightly organised than the 
indigenous group, the necessary conditions for maintaining the migrants' political and 
economic institutions are usually imposed on the indigenous population".60
Francis makes a similar analytical point when he distinguishes between primary 
and secondary ethnic groups.61 Primary ethnic groups are national minorities which 
became minorities in the course of territorial annexation, whereas secondary ethnic 
groups are a result of large-scale migration. This is an essential difference since the 
primary ethnic group usually will continue to represent comprehensive subsocieties that
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are capable of satisfying all social needs of their members whereas secondary ethnic 
groups are able to do so only in a limited way. The latter group is therefore more 
receptive to influence from the closest majority nation, whereas primary groups tend to 
be more concerned with retaining their ethnic identity.
As we argued above, it is not always easy to establish which ethnic group is 
superordinate and which is subordinate in a society, and the distinction made by 
Lieberson does not facilitate this task. I do, however, find it useful to look at the 
position of the migrant group in Latvia over time, both in political, economic, 
demographic and socio-cultural terms. In this connection it is again necessary to 
analyse the particularities of the Soviet state which in many respects is different from 
other empires in that it was not only based on "conquest, dynastic accumulation and 
economic aggrandisement but also on a distinctive ideology of Marxist 
internationalism".62 Also, even though Russians in Latvia have many of the 
characteristics of a secondary ethnic group, Russians in Latvia cannot be classified as 
immigrants in the usual understanding of the term, and it is not possible fully to 
appreciate the special status of the Russian population in Latvia and the rest of the 
Soviet empire without familiarity with Soviet nationalities policies (to be discussed in 
Chapter 3).
1.3.  Latvian Scholars on Ethnic Issues
The following section deals with scholarly works on ethnic issues published in 
Latvia since the early 1980s. I shall concentrate on five works which have been 
published in Latvia during that period; two of them were written in the early 1980s, the 
third is based on articles published in the spring of 1988, the fourth was published in 
1990, while the last is a political science text-book published in 1993. There are several 
reasons why such a literature survey is included in this thesis. It will, hopefully, clarify 
how different concepts and phenomena in the field have been interpreted by scholars in 
Latvia, and can shed light on differences between Latvian and Western scholars. 
Further, the survey will show the development which has taken place in the field over a 
relatively short time period, which also reflects the changes in other spheres of Latvian 
society. An interesting observation is that although there are radical differences between 
the five works, some scholars are involved in two, three and even four of them, either 
as contributors or on the editorial board. It should be noted that in Latvia most works 
on nationality issues have combined a theoretical and a practical approach, and although 
this chapter is mostly concerned with theoretical aspects, there will also be reference to 
some of the practical illustrations when they related to major concerns in this thesis.
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The first work to be examined is a dictionary from 1981 published by the 
Latvian Academy of Sciences, which had the aim of analysing concepts, phenomena 
and processes in the field of nationality relations.63 Although the dictionary is 
published in Latvian, the counterparts to the Latvian concepts in Russian are always 
referred to, and the dictionary is based on Soviet research in the field. The authors see it 
as one of their aims to clarify if there are any diverging views among socialist scholars 
in the area, and to indicate their own position in such cases. There is very limited 
reference to Western works in the book except, of course, the works of Marx and 
Engels. When the authors discuss more controversial issues, they usually argue that 
their position is the one which is most in line with the works of the so-called "classical 
Marxists", including the works of Lenin.
The dictionary gives one concept which is meant to include all different forms 
of ethnic group formations; the socio-ethnic community ( sorialetaiska koplba / 
sotsiaVnoetnicheskaya obshchnost'). This concept, the authors argue, points to the 
dialectical unity between socialecbnbmic arid ethnic factors underlying the existence of 
all ethnic communities. Socialeconomic factors are seen as the basis for all social 
phenomena and processes (including ethnic) and are regarded both stronger and more 
dynamic than ethnic factors. As ethnic factors are mentioned language, ethnic territory, 
culture, way of living, traditions and national psychology.
One form of socio-ethnic community is the nation ( m dja! natsiya J  The nation 
is defined as a stable, historically developed form of human community which is 
organised on the basis of common economic life, territory and language, combined 
with certain cultural and psychological traits. This definition is more or less identical 
with a definition provided by Stalin in 1913.64 Concepts of nationhood used by most 
Western scholars have often been critisised in Soviet literature for being "idealistic" 
since they, in the scholars' view, reject or do not fully appreciate the role of objective 
factors as essential features of a nation. In the debate in the journal Voprosy Istorii on 
the conceptual and methnodological framework for the field of nationality questions, 
which was referred to in a note in the preceding section, some scholars criticised the 
part of Stalin's definition of nationhood concerning a common "psychological make­
up" as a constituent part, and claimed that national self-consciousness is not a 
permanent feature of nationhood that applies in the post-revolutionary setting.65 Other 
scholars paid more attention to the social function of the nation, and treated nations as 
"integral socio-ethnic organisms" 66
The Latvian dictionary is in line with the majority of Soviet scholars in that 
objective factors dominate in the definition of nationhood. The nation is not seen by the 
authors as a biological or racial community, but as a product of the historic 
development of society. Nations are not an eternal form of human community but a 
historically temporary phenomenon, and therefore linked with the stage of social
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development. They are seen as the most widespread forms of ethnic communities in the 
stages of capitalism and socialism. Since the mode of production underlies the structure 
of the nation there are also differences between capitalist and socialist nations, and the 
latter are characterised by socialist, friendly relations between the classes and social 
strata.
The authors claim that ethnic factors do not immediately disappear under 
socialism, but that such factors develop on a different basis and acquire a qualitatively 
new content. The question about at which stage national factors finally will disappear, 
if ever, was for a long time one of the most controversial questions in Soviet scholarly 
debates on the nationality issue.67 In the Latvian dictionary the authors argue that even 
though the eradication of nations will not take place in the near future, national factors 
will inevitably lose their meaning in the long run.
National identity ( nacionalaapzina! natsional'noe soznanie) is explained in the 
dictionary as a part of the general social identity and seen as an important social reality. 
National identity includes national feelings, national psychology, national self-identity, 
and national ideology. The authors argue that if one does not fully appreciate the 
existence of a national identity it can influence negatively attempts of strengthening the 
unity of the people, and thereby reduce the efficiency of international up-bringing. They 
also claim that anti-communists try to ascribe national identity to nationalism and 
chauvinism, and consider it a task for progressive forces to achieve a state in which 
proletarian internationalists ideas take root in the identity of working people of all 
nationalities.
While the Latvian dictionary illustrates the theoretical framework within which 
Soviet scholars on nationality issues to a large extent operated, the next book I will 
refer to gives an example of how this theory was applied when explaining actual 
phenomena in this sphere. One year after the publication of the dictionary the Institute 
of Scientific Communism of the University of Latvia published a collection of articles 
where the emphasis was put on defending the nationality policy of the CPSU against 
alleged falsifications by the Western "bourgeoisie".68 Z. N. Mironova analyses works 
of contemporary sovietologists and claims that contemporary sovietology is 
characterised by such distortions as to oppose the phenomena of patriotism and 
internationalism.69 She criticises the tendency of sovietologists to ignore the 
significance of patriotism and national factors in the works of Marx and Engels. The 
aim of such sovietologists is, according to Mironova, to bring the reader to believe that 
Soviet patriotism is not at all related to the phenomenon as it was interpreted by Marx 
and Engels. In Mironova’s view, sovietologists deliberately confuse patriotism and 
nationalism, and ignore the class approach to patriotism which was the basis for the 
classical marxist-leninists in their analyses of the subject.
28
CHAPTER 1
Mironova argues that in accordance with real patriotism, the Soviet country is 
the motherland (rodina) of the Soviet people. Soviet patriotism includes both pride of 
one's own nation and loyalty to the "progressive forces” of that nation. Still, the basis 
for a socialist fatherland (otechestvo) is, in Mironova's view, the state structure. Thus 
the common pride of the Soviet man is regarded deeper and broader than the natural 
national feelings of the different peoples (narodov) making up the Soviet country:
Oh o  B o b p a jio  b  c e 6 e  B ee  J iy q m ee , h to  co3,qaHO T p y a o M , 
oT B aroH , TBopnecKHM  reHHeM m h jijih o h o b  h  m h jijih o h o b  
COBeTCKHX JHOflefi.
As common features of Soviet people of all nations and nationalities, Mironova 
points out Soviet patriotism, love of the socialist rodina (motherland), loyalty to the 
Party, collectivism, a communist attitude to work [sic!] and "irreconcilability towards 
any kind of deviation from the communist morality". This is all seen as the basis for the 
new human community: the "Soviet people".70
. . . The Latvian republic is subject to particular attention in Mironova's analysis. 
She refers to statistics indicating that a majority of the Latvian population knows 
Russian, and argues that this does not imply that Latvian language is withering away, 
since almost all Latvians report Latvian to be their mother tongue. Mironova points to 
the larger increase in the number of newspapers and journals in the republic published 
in Latvian compared to Russian, which in the author's view is evidence of a high level 
of national identity among Latvians. The increasing level of knowledge of Russian 
should, argues Mironova, rather be seen as a favourable phenomenon, which facilitates 
international communication and make Latvians familiar with achievements in socialist 
and world culture and science, and not be interpreted as an artificial imposing of 
Russian language.71
In the same work M. Krumina writes about the phenomenon of nationalism, 
and analyses the reasons for the survivals of this phenomenon in Soviet society. 
Nationalism, in Krumina's view, stems from capitalist ownership over the means of 
production, where the exploiting classes breed hatred and mistrust among different 
nationalities in order to distract attention from the real injustice in society.72 In a society 
of developed socialism, like Soviet society, the social and economic basis for 
nationalism is, according to Krumina, eliminated. She claims that the friendship 
between all the nationalities in the multinational Soviet fatherland (dzimtene) grows 
stronger and stronger, and she also refers to the formation of a new human community, 
the Soviet people.
However, Krumina admits that even in the Soviet Union there are people who 
on certain occasions maintain nationalist or chauvinist views, positions and 
traditions.73 What, then are the reasons for the continued existence of such 
nationalism? Krumina criticises scholars who see the survival of nationalism as a
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consequence of the lack of congruence between the principles of nationalism and the 
way society actually is organised. Such theories are, in Krumina's view, both incorrect 
and extreme. Similarly, she does not agree with scholars who explain the phenomenon 
in terms of subjective factors, for example that human consciousness lags behind social 
realities. Although she agrees that there can be conservative elements in the human 
character, she believes that the survival of nationalism are nevertheless to be explained 
by objective factors.
Krumina pays much attention to forces struggling against socialism, and she 
believes that the pernicious propaganda of bourgeois ideology is an important factor in 
explaining why nationalism has not disappeared. Bourgeois nationalists, according to 
Krumina, try to find "weak points" among the socialist countries with the aim of 
weakening the unity of the working people. The survival of nationalism can also partly 
be explained as a consequence of insufficient education in internationalism and "the 
spirit of friendship between the peoples". However, despite these admitted 
manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism in the Soviet Union, Krumina is 
optimistic about the prospects for further rapprochement between the Soviet 
nationalities. In this connection she appreciates the "unselfish" help of the Russian 
people.74
The next work to be examined is a collection of articles on nationality policy 
collected from the journal Kommunist Latvii in the spring of 1988.75 In this book it is 
acknowledged that there are indeed negative aspects concerning the relations between 
different nationalities in the Soviet Union, and the authors admit that most works on 
nationality questions have been based on the mistaken assumption of an absence of 
problems in the area. It is further stated that perestroika exposed these problems and 
also provided the necessary conditions for solving them.76
However, when it comes to the question of how to solve the problems, there 
are no really radical suggestions in the work. There should, according to the editors, be 
found a balance between the interests of the multinational union state and every 
national-state formation. Most of the authors in the book also claim that Leninist 
principles for nationality policies should be restored in all respects. Nationality 
problems should, it is argued, be solved peacefully without causing any damage to the 
"unitary Soviet people". Such problems can only find their solution through a 
harmonisation of national and international interests and by renewing socialism. It is 
further seen as possible by means of education and self-education to develop the 
qualities of both a healthy national identity and international maturity. The editors thus 
seek consolidation and unity between all Soviet nations and peoples - in the present and 
for the future.
I. Apine is concerned with historical questions as a source of identity for Soviet 
people and believes that the concealments, distortions and falsifications of historic
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events that have taken place since the 1930s have contributed to distrust of history as a 
scientific discipline. In her article Apine analyses the democratic traditions of the 
different nationalities in Latvia77 Her main research is concentrated on the activities of 
the communists and social-democrats in the period of Latvian independence or, in 
Apine's words, "bourgeois Latvia".
Foreigners do often mistakenly, according to Apine, seem to believe that the 
internationalism of communists has no national aspects. She argues that working 
people do have natural national feelings, but that these feelings go together with the 
programme of liberation from the national yoke and national inequalities. On this 
background she argues that one must acknowledge the existence of a national identity:
f lp o i i i J i H  T e  B p e M e H a  K o r a a  o a h o  j m u i b  y n o M H H a H H e  
n O H H T H H  « H a U H O H a J I b H O e  C a M 0 C 0 3 H a H H e »  B H 3 H B 3 JIO  
n o f l 0 3 p H T e j ib H o e  O T H O iu eH H e h  o b m e c T B O B e f lH  y x o f l H j m  
o t  a H a j iH 3 a  B n o j i H e  p e a j ib H H X  h b j i o h h h  H a iiH O H a jib H O H  
>K H 3 H H , f l a b b l  H e  n p O C J I H T b  J I I O f l b M H  C 
HaiJHOHaJIHCTHHeCKHM H 3 a B a p eH H H M H ...........................................................................................
This national identity can, according to Apine, be used in the interests of socialist 
society.
As one aspect of national identity Apine points to a people's awareness of its 
history. National identity can in many cases act as the historic consciousness, or as the 
social memory of a people. With reference to other scholars, Apine claims that changes 
have taken place lately in the formation of national identity (presumably the Soviet 
Union). The increasing level of education of the population and higher qualifications 
among workers causes an increased interest in own and other peoples' history. Apine 
argues that the more historically educated a people is, the higher the level of its 
international maturity.
These considerations make Apine suggests some practical measures to increase 
the knowledge of historic questions among the population in Latvia. She does not 
support the idea that education in Latvian schools should be absolutely identical for 
Russian and Latvian children. Latvian youth has, for example, to be "armed" with 
knowledge about the "treacherous anti-national position of the Latvian bourgeoisie". 
Similarly, Apine describes a lack of knowledge about Latvian history among Russian- 
speaking youth in the republic. One example is the widespread belief that Latvia had no 
industry before 1940. Russian youth should also, in Apine's view, be told more about 
the participation of Latvian workers and communists in the October Revolution and the 
struggle against the German fascists during the Second World War. The most important 
in this respect, according to Apine, is to improve the quality of historical research.
In 1988 many scholars still considered one of the main duties of the Party to 
"strengthen the friendship between the peoples and to perfect national relations". 
Jelgava second party secretary A. Kirse argues that bombastic internationalist slogans
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do not always reflect reality, and her article deals with ways of solving problems of 
internationalist upbringing.79 Her aim is to "create immunity against nationalist 
psychology and bourgeois nationalist propaganda".80 One of the aspects of 
internationalist upbringing which is stressed by the author is the free development of 
the national language combined with an increased influence of Russian as an important 
means of international communication. Kirse believes that lack of knowledge of 
languages could cause outbursts of national conflicts. She argues that knowledge of 
Russian is not only an advantage as a means of communication in a multinational 
environment, but it also opens up access to all sorts of scientific and political 
information, and the possibility of getting acquainted with the culture of other Soviet 
nationalities as well as world culture. The author also argues that Russian-speakers 
should learn Latvian, and she complains about the lack of qualified teachers of Latvian 
in Russian schools. As an example of how to improve this education Kirse mentions 
for example that more excursions to places related with revolutionary activities and 
military glory should be organised..............................................................................
The next work to be examined here is a collection of papers presented to a 
conference under the title "Democratisation and National Rights" arranged by the 
Latvian Academy of Sciences in Riga in 1990.81 The papers centred around 
terminological discussions, the relation between the "rights of the nation" and "human 
rights" as well as questions directly concerning nationality issues in Latvia.
Broiiss1 paper brings up conceptual, methodological and juridical questions in 
the field of nationality processes 82 He operates with a terminology which to a large 
extent corresponds with the terminology of the dictionary of 1981 in which Broiiss also 
was involved. However, instead of using the concept of socio-ethnic community, 
Broiiss operates with ethnosocial communities (etnosocialas kopabas^dxA thereby pays 
more attention to the ethnic aspects of the concept. Broiiss further defines two concepts 
which were also referred to in the dictionary: national groups ( nadonaiasgrupa$ and 
extraterritorial national groups (ekstedtoridJnsnadom U asgrupas) and explains the 
differences between these concepts. Ethnosocial communities, which can be both 
nations (m djas) and ethnic groups (tautibas) are historically relatively stable, 
unalterable and densely concentrated. These communities have, according to Broiiss, 
different qualities depending on their level of development, but Broiiss does not explain 
which features are necessary for an ethnosocial community to be called a nation. 
Although many national groups have existed for relatively long time periods, they are 
characterised by having been cut off from coethnics or being in diaspora. Such national 
groups are living in an environment where there is one other nationality which is 
dominant and/or there are many different nationalities living on a certain territory, and 
they are therefore subject to pressure for assimilation or merger with the other 
nationalities. Extraterritorial national groups usually consist of people from one
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nationality who for a time have come to live and/or to work in a state dominated by 
other nationalities, people who for example have emigrated or been deported.
Broiiss argues that the term ethnosocial community should be distinguished 
from the term nationality (m daaalitate) since the latter is most often used to describe 
the belonging of an individual or a group to an ethnos. He also emphasises the danger 
of misusing the concept, since in international law nationality is used in the meaning of 
belonging to a state or of citizenship.
Although not all nations have been recognised as nationally sovereign, every 
nation has, according to BroliSs, the right to self-determination through the formation of 
independent statehood or through voluntary participation in a union with other nations 
of a federative or confederative kind. Broiiss seems to imply that all ethnosocial 
communities have the same right, although he sees it as practically impossible to fulfil 
this right for all ethnic groups. In BroliSs' interpretation of international law, national 
groups cannot claim any right to territorial autonomy, even though they in some 
occasions are granted the right to political autonomy over a specific district; The right to 
cultural national autonomy on a non-territorial basis is, however, universal.
Broiiss admits that it can be difficult to define on a practical level the ethnosocial 
communities and national groups that live on a certain territory. Nevertheless, he gives 
his own view of the national composition of Latvia: there is only one nation living in 
Latvia, and that is the Latvians. As ethnic group BroliSs lists the Livs, the Jews and the 
Gypsies. There is also a large number of national groups living in Latvia: Russians, 
Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Lithuanians, Estonians, Crimean Tatars and others. 
Extraterritorial national groups are people of Vietnamese, Polish, Angolian, Cuban and 
other nationalities who work and study in Latvia in accordance with the laws of the 
government.
Nationalism is in the Soviet tradition seen as an appaling evil, but in a paper 
elaborating on the phenomenon by Ausma Medne the concept is given a much more 
positive content.83 Medne argues that common origin, language, culture and territory 
are facts that characterise peoples and nations, and that nationalism is a positive, 
emotional reaction to these facts, as expressed in love for, loyalty and the feeling of 
belonging to one's people, and, metaphorically, as communal bonds. However, 
nationalism is not seen as an ultimately positive force, and Medne recommends a 
distinction between aggressive and peace-seeking nationalism, claiming that the Latvian 
people pursue the latter. In an excursion through the history of the phenomenon of 
nationalism Medne stresses the importance of Herder's theories in the field, and in her 
view these theories are the most useful as a basis for the modern peace seeking 
nationalism.
Medne positively evaluates the heritage of Herder, especially his ideas of 
cultural nationalism, the great role he gave to language for the existence of a people, the
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notions of an organic unity of the people, and also his attitude to the individual which 
should not be subordinated to the people as a whole.
Thus, Medne does not see nationalism as a temporary, but rather as a viable, 
persistent and popular phenomenon, which is not going to disappear as a consequence 
of rapid scientific and technological development. She holds that it is not possible 
artificially to create nations, but instead of using the example of the Soviet Union, she 
refers to events in Europe after the First World War and the case of Yugoslavia.
Medne uses a methodology proposed by Karl Deutsch to test the stability of a 
nation by looking at its endurance in coping with national catastrophies, national defeats 
and deep economic crises. The test confirms, in the author's view, the stability and the 
cultural viability of the Latvian people, and this stability is seen as a most important 
prerequisite for the right of a people to independent national statehood.
A topic which has been widely discussed in scholarly, and also popular, 
debates in Latvia in the field of nationality questions, is the relationship between human 
rights and the rights of a nation. Medne also briefly deals with this question in her 
paper. Since language, according to Medne, is a necessary means to every individual 
for development of their abilities, human rights are not a sufficient guarantee for the 
individual. There must also be guarantees for the protection of the language, culture and 
way of living. This protection is best guaranteed through independent statehood. Not 
only the individual, but also every people is, as Medne sees it, unique. If a people is 
not disturbed in its development, this is a guarantee both for the well-being of the 
people itself, but will also be reflected through the contribution of the people to the 
community of peoples.
Another scholar who deals with the relationship between human rights and the 
rights of the nation is Vorontsov.84 He argues that the categories of the individual and 
the nation have their own specific characteristics with corresponding rights, and that it 
would be incorrect to subordinate one of them under the other. In his paper Vorontsov 
lists some international declarations from the United Nations where these rights are 
formulated. His interpretation of these declarations is that human rights and their 
guarantees are a basis for any democratic society. However, as he sees it, in some 
concrete historical situations these rights can be restricted for the sake of the 
preservation of the integrity of the nation. The rights of the nation are among others the 
right to own territory, culture and language as well as the possibility for economic 
activities.
In a situation where, due to for example migration processes, a considerable 
part of the population lives outside of their national homeland there arises the conflict, 
described by Vorontsov, between the aspirations of some nations to preserve their 
identity, also through legal actions, and the rights of every individual who can be 
restricted as a result of such actions. Vorontsov argues that laws aimed at protection of
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the nation, such as the introduction of official language, restriction of migration and the 
right of voting should be seen as emergency measures, without which humanity could 
lose one of their most important elements: nations and peoples.
While one does not have to go back further than the late 1980s to be able to 
identify an official Soviet approach to ethnic issues, an approach to which very few 
scholars took the risk of not adhering, in Latvia today there is a much more open debate 
on such issues and substantial disagreements are being expressed among specialists in 
the field. Still, some views are more commonly held than others and, more importantly, 
the state needs to be able to interpret concepts and phenomena related to ethnic issues as 
a basis for its nationalities policies. In Chapter 4 we shall look at Latvian nationalities 
policies as expressed in legislation and its implementation, and we shall see that 
legislators make use of local research on ethnic issues. Even though one cannot talk 
about an official approach to these issues today, we shall now examine a political 
science textbook published in Riga in 1993 which shows what Latvian students are 
taught about these subjects.85 This textbook should therefore give a representative 
picture of the position held by a majority of Latvian researchers in this field in the post- 
Soviet period.
The textbook does not depart greatly from the conceptual framework which was 
outlined in the dictionary which was examined above from the early 1980s and refined 
by Broiiss in 1990. One of the authors of the textbook, Ilga Apine, acknowledges the 
different traditions in the use of concepts in the field, and admits that the Latvian usage 
is in line with an East European tradition where the cultural aspects of a nation are 
emphasised. The differences between the adjectives "ethnic" and "national" are also 
explained in the book:
"Ethnic" involves only language, culture and self-identity, while
"national" includes a socio-economic component.86
Apine presents a definition of various types of "ethnic communities" (ethnoses). A 
"nation" is defined as a people living in its historical motherland (Ukrainians in 
Ukraine, Latvians in Latvia, etc.). An ethnic group (etniska grupa) is a small 
community living in an ethnically alien environment, and the textbook author mentions 
as examples Estonians in Abkhazia and Livs in Latvia.87 Moreover, an "ethnographic 
group" or a "subethnos" is defined as a part of a nation with a distinctive mode of life 
(for example in terms of language), such as Latvia's Latgalians. Finally, a national 
group or national minority is an ethnic community which belongs to an ethnos, the 
majority of which lives outside its "appropriate" state formation (such as Russians, 
Belarusians, Ukrainians, Jews, Estonians, etc., in Latvia).88 The conclusion the author 
comes to is that among the 108 ethnoses represented in Latvia, there is only one nation: 
the Latvian.
35
Ch apter  l
This conceptual framework is referred to again when Apine attempts to stipulate 
the rights of various ethnic communities. Ethnic communities have, according to the 
author, rights that are different from the rights of the individual, and for the nation they 
are linked to the preservation of a national identity, language, culture, environment and 
territory. While the nation has the right to self-determination, including the right to form 
an independent state, other ethnic and national groups have the right to national cultural 
autonomy (see Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis). Independent statehood is, according to 
Apine, not a goal in itself, but only an independent national state will give the nation the 
guarantee that its rights are being observed.
Apine asks the important question of what should be done if a nation wants 
independent statehood, while the national groups living in the historical territory of this 
nation are against such independence. Similarly, what should be done if the Latvian 
nation, through legislation, changes its language policies so that the Latvian language is 
proclaimed the state language, to be used in all spheres of society, at the same time as 
many Russians, whether out of conviction or indifference, argue that this is not 
democratic? The author asks if this could not be seen as a conflict between the rights of 
a nation and human rights.
An answer is not explicitly given to these questions, however. The author 
acknowledges that there can be conflicting interests between ethnic communities, and it 
is up to the political scientists and politicians to find solutions to these problems and in 
a democratic manner to seek an agreement on each occasion about what should be given 
priority. Implicitly, however, the answer seems to be clear to the author in the case of 
the Russians in Latvia. After some reflections on the Russification which took place in 
Latvia after the Soviet annexation, and on the need to improve the situation for the 
Latvian nation, the author states:
If a person in his/her historical fatherland loses the opportunity 
to use his/her mother tongue, then this is not only a violation of 
the rights of a nation, but also of the human rights of the 
individual. [...] It must further be emphasised that the loss of a 
people or a language, however small they may be, is a loss for 
the whole of humanity.89
It is now time to sum up the main findings from this survey of Latvian 
scholarly literature on ethnic issues. Let us first look at the development which has 
taken place in terms of the range of topics open to discussion. The first two works 
which were examined were written at a time when debates in the Soviet Union in this 
field were very restricted. Although scholars were allowed to express diverging views 
on certain issues, there were clear rules as to what could and what could not be written. 
These two works can be regarded as clearly representative of the Soviet views at the 
time. The main differences among Soviet scholars centred around the questions of the 
importance of an ethnic identity and whether or not ethnic differences would disappear
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in the future. In Latvia one could find representatives of different views on these 
questions. It is noteworthy, however, that the 1981 dictionary, despite its emphasis on 
proletarian internationalism, acknowledges national differences and makes it quite clear 
that national identity is a social reality. This, and the fact that the ultimate goal of merger 
(sliyanie) is played down, can be seen as a message to the indigenous population, 
assuring them that there is no threat to their national existence.
Reference to contemporary Western scholars, however, is minimal in these two 
works, and when Western works are referred to, it is mainly to point to their erroneous 
(and dangerous) analysis. The strong attacks on Western scholars leave no doubt 
against whom the "ideological struggle", used in the title of the second book, was to be 
directed.
By 1988, however, a certain development had taken place in Latvian scholarly 
literature in the field. Even though the articles examined here are not as outspoken as 
some other articles that were published in the Latvian unofficial press at the time, they 
illustrate that substantial changes had taken place since the early 1980s, and they also 
give an indication of how the Latvian Communist Party was trying to accommodate the 
pressure in society for real change. Since many positive references are given to the 
activities in the nationality sphere of the Soviet Communist Party, the work can also be 
seen as an example of a Latvian Communist Party manifesto at a time when the Party 
still seemed to believe that it could guide national sentiments in a desired direction. It is 
noteworthy that in this book such concepts as "the Soviet people", "international 
upbringing" and "bourgeois nationalism" have not yet been abandoned, and Leninist 
principles for solving the nationality question are acclaimed by most of the authors. 
Against this background it seems plausible to suggest that a majority of the Latvian 
scholars who specialised in the field of ethnic issues were adapting to the changes 
taking place rather than actively contributing to them.
Substantial changes in scholarly analysis were, however, soon to come, and by 
1990 Latvian writings on ethnic issues had gone through a metamorphosis. 
Characteristic of the 1990 collection of papers is first of all the complete absence of 
references to Marxist-Leninist writings and to Communist Party policies. Even though 
many of the scholars have not completely abandoned traditional Soviet terminology, the 
concepts that are used in these papers have acquired a new content. Moreover, the 
range of topics open to analysis has been broadened significantly, and there do not 
seem to be any formal limits as to what can be written. For example, Medne's 
discussion of nationalism and her evaluation of Herder would have been unheard of 
just a few years earlier.
There are also, however, certain common features in the works by Latvian 
scholars on ethnic issues which we have examined. The first is the conceptual 
framework, where Latvian scholars as a rule hold to the cultural interpretation of
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nationhood. A nation is hardly ever used as a synonym for the state. In this respect 
Latvian scholars are more consistent than scholars in the west, who have not been able 
to agree upon a common definition of nationhood. There is, however, the problem that 
when Latvian scholars interpret international documents containing, for example, 
guide-lines for the rights of the nation, they tend to see the nation as a cultural unit and 
not, as is often the case in international legislation, as a state formation. This is, for 
example, one of the problems with Vorontsov's analysis focusing on the rights of a 
nation. In the textbook published in 1993 the differences between the Western and 
Eastern concepts of a nation have been acknowledged, but there is no sign that Latvian 
scholars are about to abandon their well-established terminology which serves as a 
basis for much of Latvian analysis of ethnic issues and is used, inter alia., in Latvian 
ethnic minority legislation.
Latvian scholarly literature in this field also tends to be adjusted to the 
ethnopolitical situation in Latvia (sometimes the former Soviet Union) at the time of 
publication. Examples are usually derived from the Latvian ethnic scene and the works 
often aim at providing a scholarly "scientific" analysis of current problems. As such, 
scholarly literature serves a practical purpose. One advantage of this approach is the 
usefulness of the analysis for decision-makers and legislators, who are provided with a 
theoretical foundation for their decisions. It is also common to meet references from 
scholarly literature in the public debate on ethnic issues. However, there are also certain 
disadvantages. Scholarly analysis in Latvia can sometimes become somewhat detached 
from general trends in works on ethnicity, and scholars often select topics which are 
useful for the political points they are trying to make, while contradictory or 
complementary research has a tendency to be overlooked. Let me give one example: 
Latvian scholars arguing the case for Latvian independent statehood and basing their 
argument on the assumption that all nations should have the right to independent 
statehood tend to ignore the problem of which of the many peoples in the world, many 
of whom live in what they regard as their historical fatherland and have all the features 
of a nation, should have the right to self-determination, including independent 
statehood.
The Russian population in most of the contemporary (post-Soviet) Latvian 
scholarly literature is treated as a "national group" or "national minority" with the 
cultural rights of such ethnic communities. Scholars have not on the whole adopted the 
view which is quite commonly held in some political circles in Latvia that only those 
non-Latvians who lived in Latvia before 1940 and their direct descendants should be 
regarded as ethnic minorities and thus be entitled to the corresponding rights. However, 
it is clear from the literature that it is the Latvian nation, ethnic Latvians, who have the 
ultimate claim to Latvian nationhood and are seen as the subjects in the nation-building 
process.
38
CHAPTER 1
iSome of the more general works on ethnicity, nationality issues and nationalism which have been 
used in this study are Barth (1968), Glazer and Moynihan (1985), De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1982), 
van den Berghe (1981), A. D. Smith (1986 and 1991), Gellner (1983), Deutch (1966), Anderson 
(1983), Brass (1991), Kellas (1991) and Rothschild (1981).
2Isajiw (1970).
3Connor (1987).
4See e.g. Greeley, A. (1974).
5Burgess (1978).
6See e.g. Stone (1976)
7Burgess, op. cit., p. 270.
8Hoult, T. F.(ed.): Dictionary o f Modern Sociology, Littlefield, Adams, p. 135.
9Brass, P. (1985), pp. 10-11.
10ibid., p.
1 ^cK ay, J. & Lewins, F. (1978).
12ibid., pp. 417-18.
13De Vos, G. & Romanucci-Ross, L. (eds.) (1982), pp. xiii-iv.
14P. Martinelli (1986).
15ibid., p. 208...............................................................................................................................................
16See discussion in W. Connor (1978) and in Kreja and Velimsky (1981), chapter 3.
17Smith, A. (1991), p. 14.
18ibid., p. 11.
1 ^ For a similar distinction between different concepts of nation, see also Macartney (1968).
20See e.g. H. Seton-Watson (1986) who defines nation as 'a community of people who believe 
themselves to share a cultural heritage'.
21See the debate in the Soviet journal Voprosy Istorii in 1966 (nos. 1, 4, 5, 9 and 12) and 1967 (nos.
2 and 3) billed as a "Discussion of the Concept: The Nation", where different views were expressed 
among Soviet scholars on, among others, the definition of nationhood.
2^Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Macmillan edition), Vol. 17, 1973, p. 356.
23De Vos & Romanucci-Ross, op. cit.
24See McAuley, M. (1984). In the same book, however, Rutland argues that there was some room for 
Soviet citizens to change their nationality. See Rutland (1984), p. 161.
25In the Russian Society of Latvia (Russkaya Obchshina Latvii - ROL) (see chapter 8) members can 
be of any nationality as long as they identify with Russian culture. See SM-segodnya, 22 November 
1990, p. 2.
26However, in 1981 only 5.4 per cent of the population reported Yugoslav as their nationality. D. 
Rusinow (1985), p. 160.
27Zaslavsky has pointed to the same problem in (1980), pp. 47-48.
28M. Gordon (1975).
29See Rothschild (1981), p.31.
30A typical example is H. Issacs (1975).
31 See Motyl, A. J. (1987), p. 20.
32Van den Berge, P. L. (1981).
33Examples of scholars who subscribe to the circumstantial approach are: Patterson (1975) and 
Horowitz (1975).
34See Enloe (1980), p. 5.
35See Burgess, op. cit., p.267.
3^Patterson, op. cit., p. 305.
37See Scott, G. M. jr. (1990).
3 8Richmond, A. H. (1988), pp. 143-144.
39Spicer, E. (1971).
40Scott, op. cit., p. 168.
41ibid„ p. 167.
42ibid., pp. 163 and 167-68.
43Barth, F. (1969).
44See e.g. De Vos and Romanucci-Ross, op. cit., p. xiii. There can also be several layers of ethnic 
identity: see Arutiunov and Bromley (1978), p. 11.
39
Ch apter  l
45Examples of scholars who have dealt with ethnic questions in this way are Lijphardt (1968) and 
Nordinger (1972)
46Enloe (1980), p. 7.
47ibid. pp. 7-8.
48Eriksen, T. H. (1991a), p. 483.
49There are also differing views on whether Russians and other nationalities who have arrived in Latvia 
after the Soviet annexation, due to their late or illegitimate arrival, can be considered to be ethnic or 
national minorities and therefore enjoy the rights of national cultural autonomy. The question of the 
rights of minorities will be discussed later in the thesis.
50Eriksen, op. cit., p. 482-83.
5 ^ ee  Hechter's chapter on Internal Colonialism in Tiryakian and Rogowski (1985).
52Eriksen, op. cit., p. 484. [Author's translation from Norwegian.]
53ibid, p. 485 [author's translation from Norwegian].
54Lijphart, A. (1977). See also Kellas (1991), pp. 135-142.
55Motyl, op. cit., p. 28.
56Rothschild, op. cit.
57ibid., p. 84.
58ibid., p. 82.
59Lieberson, S. (1961).
60Lieberson, ibid., p. 904.
6 Francis, E. K. (1976), pp. 6-8.
62Sakwa, R. (1990).
63I. Apine et al. (1981).
^4Stalin's definition of a nation: "A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of people, 
formed on the basis of a c o m m on language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup 
manifested in a common culture". Stalin (1950) [the definition was published in 1913], p. 16.
65See P. M. Rogachev and M. A. Sverdlin, Voprosy istorii, no. 1, 1966.
66M. S. Dzhunusov, Voprosy istorii, no. 4, 1966.
67On this debate, see for example P. Duncan (1988).
68F. Rajevska eta l. (eds.) (1982).
69Z. N. Mironova (1982).
70ibid., p. 15.
71ibid. pp. 17-18.
72Krumina(1982), p. 23.
73ibid., p. 27.
74ibid., p. 29.
75V. Brokan (ed.) (1989).
76ibid., p. 4.
77I. Apine (1989).
78ibid., p. 21.
79A. Kirse (1989).
80ibid., p. 97.
8 1 Apine and Vebers (eds.) (1990).
82J. Broiiss (1990).
83A. Medne (1990).
84A. Vorontsov (1990).
85E. Semanis (ed.) (1993). The section called 'The Rights of National and Ethnic Groups" (NaaondJo 
un etniskogrupv tiesibas) (pp. 58-67) was written by Ilga Apine.
86ibid., p. 59.
87With the large number of concepts denoting various ethnic communities, it is rather strange that 
there is no conceptual distinction between Estonians in Abkhazia and indigenous Livs living in their 
historical fatherland which happens to be in the state of Latvia.
88It is a mystery to me why the author does not consider the Estonians in Abhazia a national minority 
or national group, because I can see no analytical difference between them and Estonians living in 
Latvia.
40
CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 2
2. Russians in Latvia: Historical Perspectives
2.1.  Introduction
Since this thesis deals mainly with relatively recent developments, space 
constraints do not permit a very detailed account of the history of Latvia or of the 
Russian population living there.1 However, recent developments are not unaffected by 
events in the past, and past events tend to influence current perceptions. Some 
reflections on the historical background of the Russian population in Latvia is therefore 
regarded as crucial in order to understand Russians' reactions to the many changes that 
have taken place in Latvia over the past few years. It is true that only a minority of the 
Russians living in Latvia today have families which have lived in Latvia for more than a 
few generations. However, the Russian presence over many centuries in what today is 
Latvia and the long influence of Russia in the region still have important implications 
for Russians1 sense of affiliation to the territory.
Instead of providing a conventional chronological survey of the history of the 
Russian population in Latvia, I have chosen a somewhat different approach. The 
chapter may appear somewhat unbalanced, as some issues receive much more attention 
than issues that perhaps would seem to be of much greater importance for the situation 
of Russians living in Latvia today. Let me therefore explain the reasoning behind the 
selection of topics for discussion in this chapter.
Firstly, one of the main aims of the chapter is to give some general background 
information about the Russian population in Latvia from a historical perspective. Since 
there are already a number of accounts of Latvian history in English which also 
consider ethnic issues, this chapter will deal in more depth with issues that have been 
discussed less thoroughly in English-language sources. This is why I shall not look 
here at a number of important issues, such as for example the background to the secret 
protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty. Also, the period from the Second World 
War up to the Latvian atmoda (reawakening) which got underway in the late 1980s will 
not be analysed in this chapter, as the most important aspects of this period will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 in the sections about Soviet nationality policies in Latvia. The 
first and second sections of this chapter deal with the period before Latvia gained 
independence after World War I, while the third section looks at specific issues from 
the independence period.
Secondly, I want to show in this chapter how historians writing about Latvia 
have differed (and still differ) in terms of the significance they assign to the Russian 
influence in the region. This means that I will pay considerable attention to issues 
which have been subject to conflicting interpretations; some of these issues still 
continue to be controversial. These issues will be discussed most thoroughly in the first
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section of the chapter. This section also implicitly problematises the links between what 
historians write about Russian influence in Latvia in ancient times and the messages 
they want to put forward about the justification for the presence of Russians in Latvia 
today.
Thirdly, although the period of Latvian independence lasted only 20 years, it is 
perhaps the period in Latvian history which is most often referred to in political debates 
in Latvia today. Experiences from the independence period have been brought up by 
different groups in Latvia, by some to point to the good treatment of non-Latvians in 
that period, by others to indicate that Latvian independence is a threat to ethnic 
minorities. The relevance of this period for the present process of nation-building in 
Latvia should not be underestimated. In the third section of this chapter I shall look at 
the experience of granting national cultural autonomy to the ethnic minorities, since this 
model has often been referred to by Latvian authorities as a model to follow today. I 
shall also briefly look at political activities and organisational life among Russians 
during this period. Although the situation in Latvia is not the same as it was 70 years 
ago, and Russians living in Latvia today have very different socio-economic 
characteristics from those of the Russians living in Latvia at that time, such a discussion 
at least gives an illustration of how Russians in Latvia in the past adapted themselves to 
independent Latvian statehood.
Fourthly, since history plays a crucial role in forming and maintaining ethnic 
identities, I shall discuss in the final section of the chapter how Russians themselves 
living in Latvia today interpret historical issues and assess their own role in Latvian 
society in a historical perspective. This section will be based on materials from the 
"Russians in Latvia" survey of 1992. It must also be emphasised that while Latvians, 
because of the still living memory of the independence period, have had a greater 
variety of historical interpretations to choose from, most Russians have usually been 
presented only with official Soviet historical accounts. Moreover, it was never in the 
interests of the majority of Russians in Latvia to question the Soviet interpretation of 
Latvian history, since in Soviet historiography the Russian presence in the republic was 
not only justified, but Russians were given a very prominent role. Today there is a 
variety of sources from which to be informed about historical facts, but in the same 
way as changing one's ethnic identity tends to be a slow process, the same can be said 
about adapting oneself to a completely different understanding of history. This is likely 
to be particularly true of the Russians in Latvia who have little to gain from the 
rewriting of history which has taken place over recent years.
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2.2.  The Origins of the Russian Presence in Latvia
A historical question which has not been uncontroversial is whether Balts and 
Slavs have common origins. Some historians, both from Russia, Latvia and the West, 
have argued that the Balts and the Slavs originate from one separate people, which later 
ramified into Baltic and Slavic tribes.2 The authors of a three-volume work on Latvian 
history by the Academy of Sciences in Latvia, published in 1952, produce evidence of 
the alleged common origins of the Baltic and Slavic peoples.3 Others find such a theory 
to be incorrect, and base their argument on, among others, linguistic differences 
between the Balts and the Slavs.4 Without attempting to evaluate the correctness of the 
different positions here, we shall soon see that debates which discuss Slavic origins in 
the Baltic area are still very topical in Latvian newspapers and other mass media.
There is similarly some controversy over the question of the degree of Russian 
influence in Latvia in the time before German expansion into the area. One Russian 
historian writing in the period of Latvian independence, V. Preobrazhenskii, claims that 
there were close contacts and good relations between Russians and Latvians at that 
time.5 He argues that the two peoples influenced each other strongly, both culturally 
and linguistically, and provides a long list of words common to the Latvian and 
Russian languages. Preobrazhenskii also gives examples from Latvian folklore to show 
the positive attitudes of Latvians towards Russians. He concludes that:
(...) y JiaTHiiieH k pyccKHM coxpamumcb nyBCTBa 
6jih3octh h cHMnaTHH, nero Hejib3H CKa3aTb 06 hx 
oTHouieHHH k 3aMopcKHM npHiuejibuaM-HeMijaM.6
Some of the same arguments can be found in official Soviet historical accounts, 
although they tend to have a more vulgarised form and typically stress what they 
describe as the age-old friendship between the 'great' Russian and the Latvian peoples. 
In the work of the Academy of Sciences referred to above, 'bourgeois nationalists' are 
criticised for 'hiding the old cultural links and deep roots of age-old friendship' 
between the Russians and the Latvians and for contradicting the 'historical truth' by 
emphasising the 'Western orientation' of the local culture.7 Both linguistic and 
archeological findings are used to prove these close cultural links.
According to the authors of this work, Latvians and Russians were united in the 
struggle against foreign aggression:
ZlpeBHejiaTHincKHe mieMeHa b o^ HHOHKe He MorjiH 6h 
ycneillHO COnpOTHBJIHTbCH paCUIHpeHHK) 3TOH aaTCKO- 
uiBeacKOH arpeccHH, ecjiH 6bi 3a hx ciihhoh He cTOHJia 
Moryqan KneBCKan Pycb - caMoe xpynHoe rocyaapcTBo b 
EBpone.8
And:
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B M eC T e  C baJITHHCKHMH HapOflHOCTHMH npOTHB  
(Jeo/ia^bHO-KaTOJiHHecKOH a r p e c c H H  b o p o j ic n  bcjihkhh 
pyccKHH H a p o a , KOTopoMy npHHa,qJie)KHT peiuarom an p o jib  
b  npHOCTaHOBJieHHH a a j ib H e f ln ie r o  npoflBFDKeHHH Ha 
BOCTOK pa36oHHHHbHX 6aH £ KpeCTOHOCIjeB 9
The political links with Old Rus1 are therefore seen as an important factor for 
the "progressive development" of the old Latvian tribes.10
A later revised work from 1971 by the same institution does not differ 
substantially from the work referred to above.11 This work also highlights the 
enormous Russian cultural influence on Latvian culture. The political links between Old 
Rus' and the old Latvian tribes are strongly emphasised, and the authors argue that for 
a period Old Rus' dominated most parts of Latvian territory politically, and also that 
Zemgalians and Kurs paid tributes to the princes of Old Rus1.12 Since the eastern Slavs 
are seen to have been more developed than the Latvians economically, politically and 
culturally, they are considered by the authors to have had a great progressive influence 
oh the non-Slav nationalities.13
Latvian Emigre historians give a picture of the period up to the 13th century that 
differs considerably from the official Soviet historical accounts. Alfred Bilmanis argues 
that the Slavs have no more claim to original settlement of the Baltic lands than do the 
Germans or the Finns.14 According to Bilmanis, the Slavs of Novgorod managed to 
establish a spearhead in the originally Latvian fortress of Pleskava (Pskov), but that 
was the farthest penetration of the Slavs into originally Latvian territory at that time.15 
He claims that there is a 'natural geographical border' containing a system of lakes, 
rivers, swamps and marshes between the territories of the Latvians and the Slavs, 
which has continued into modem times.16
Instead of praising any friendship between the Latvians and the Russians, 
Bilmanis refers to a large number of fortified castles in Latvia that formed a planned 
defense system directed against the eastern Slavs.17 Both Russians and slavicised 
Vikings attacked Latvian settlements, but without much success. Another Emigre 
Latvian, Arnolds Spekke, acknowledges that the Russian principalities of Polotsk, 
Novgorod and Pskov exercised considerable pressure on the Latvians from the 10th to 
the 11th century. However, he limits this pressure to only the eastern parts of Latvia 
and territories along the Daugava river.18 According to Spekke there are comparatively 
few Latvian words borrowed from Russian.19 Spekke also points to the absence of 
Russian relics found in excavations on Latvian territory, even in areas that have often 
been thought to have been dominated by Russians.20
A. Klive uses a stronger vocabulary in his argumentation that Latvia de facto 
has been dependent on Russia only for a short time:21
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....Latvians [, Lithuanians and Estonians] have lived on the
Baltic shores for thousands of years  None of them has
anything in common with the Russians.22
He emphasises the chequered relations with the Slavs:
In order to safeguard external independence Latvia [and Estonia] 
for centuries fought a number of bloody wars against the 
aggressive expansion of Slavism.23
Klive also argues against the view that the Latvians and the Russians were 
united in the struggle against foreign aggression:
Not desiring to ask for Russian assistance, the heroic fighters 
surrendered to the [German] invaders' superiority in 1290.24
His contempt for the Russians is expressed inter alia in the following passage:
These people [the Great Russians] were not interested in 
cultivating their land, but instead started imperialistic wars and 
searched for new territories outside their borders.25
The question of.the degree of. Slavic, influence in the Baltic area is still 
controversial and is occasionally discussed in the Latvian media. In an article in the 
Interfront newspaper Edinstvo, A. Fomenko argues that contemporary Russians are 
no less rooted in this area than are contemporary Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians:
Haiim npeflKH cJiaBHHe >khjih 3/iecb Koiyta hh o xaicoM 
npttopHTeTe xopeHHOH HaijHH h noMHHy He 6mjio: 
CJtaBHHCKHe KHH3bH H IIJieMeHHbie BOKflH MyZJbl H JIHBH O 
TaKHx BbicoKHX MaTepnnx He paccy^aajm 26
I will also refer more extensively to a debate in the local Daugavpils newspaper 
Dinaburg, because it illustrates the main views on the issue and also shows how 
debates about history are used in the present political struggle. The debate started with 
an article written by a candidate of history, V. Vasilev.27 He argued that Slavic tribes, 
the ancestors of the Russians, lived on the coast of the Baltic Sea long before this sea 
was called the Baltic in the 11th century. Their golden age was, according to Vasilev, 
approximately 1000 years B. C., and after that they were gradually pressed to the east 
and south by German tribes. Later, in the 11th and 12th centuries, the direct ancestors 
of the Russians came back to the Baltic area, when Slavic tribes settled amongst the 
eastern Baltic and Finno-Ugric tribes. The relations between the Slavs and these tribes 
had, according to Vasilev, a peaceful character. There were no wars between the tribes, 
which is explained by a number of factors, the most important being the vastness of the 
territory and the low density of the population. Vasilev further points to the close 
association between Balts and Slavs in terms of language, religion and way of living.
In the second half of the 9th century Russian statehood was established and 
this, combined with the later adoption of Christianity, favoured the development of 
culture and the economy. Russians were therefore, Vasilev argues,
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(...)  Ha 6 o j i e e  b m c o k o m  y p o B H e  p a 3 BHTHH n o  oTH om eH H io k  
n pH 6 ajiTHHCKHM nJieM eHaM , npefebmaBiiiHM b n 3b inecT B e.
Vasilev writes that a large-scale movement from Old Rus' towards the Baltic 
coast took place at this time and that the Baltic area thus came under influence of 
Russian princes. The Russians were also, according to Vasilev, the first to make the 
Balts familiar with Christianity and with written language, although
(...)  H acH JibH o b xpHCTHaHCKyio B e p y  H e o 6 p a m a jm .
Doctor of History R. Denisova has many critical remarks to make on Vasilev's 
article.28 Her main proposition is that the origins of Russian settlement in Latvia are to 
be found in the period of Peter the Great. She argues that Vasilev, without any basis in 
serious research, is trying to disinform readers who are not familiar with ancient Baltic 
history.
She starts by examining Vasilev's argument that the ancestors of the Russians 
lived near the Baltic Sea in ancient times, and claims that this is erroneous. The group 
of people in question spoke an Old-European and not a Slavonic language, and their 
territory never reached the shores of the Baltic Sea, according to Denisova. She also 
criticises Vasilev's claims that the first Russian state appeared in the eastern part of the 
Baltic area, and argues that the first Russian state was Kievan Rus'. Denisova finds 
other inaccuracies in the article, but her main objection to Vasilev is that
( ...)  B ( ...)  «KpaTKOM 3K C K ypce» B HCTOpHK) OCTaJIHCb 
He3aMeneHHbiMH KopeHHbie >KHTeJiH BajiTHH. O hh 3 /jecb  KaK 
6 h  OTCyTCTByiOT. HM O T B efleH a pOJIb CTOPOHHHX 
H abjitoaaTeJieft. Ho B eflb, BajiTHH - KopeHHan teppH T opH H  
jiaTbiineH, JiHTOBueB h  3CTomjeB.
In Denisova's view, Vasilev wants to provide scientific support for the case for 
a longstanding Slavic presence on the Baltic coast by "proving" the existence of ancient 
Slavic and Russian roots in the Baltic area. Her article thus ends with an appeal:
He 6 y tfe M  nOJIHTH3 HpOBaTb flpeBHIOK) HCTOpHK). OCTaBHM 
3 T y  o b jia c T b  b Be^eHHH c n e u H a jm c r o B . O h h  H a ocH O B am iH
C B O H X  H C C J ie f lO B a H H H  HHKOITta H e C T aH yT  fleJ ia T b  
CneKyJIHTHBHHX B H B O flO B .
The editors of the newspaper comment upon the polemics of the two 
historians.29 They point to the difficulties for the ordinary reader in making judgements 
about the reliability of the authors' often contradictory arguments and conclusions. The 
editors argue that scholars usually make use of only some of the available sources, and 
that political and ideological considerations are often decisive in determining their 
selection. This is the case both for Vasilev and for Denisova
In the editors' view, Denisova is right when she criticises Vasilev for paying 
too little attention to the indigenous peoples of the Baltic area. However, Denisova can 
also be blamed for neglecting the "geographical and ethnic proximity" between the Balts
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and the proto-Slavs. The editors further do not agree with Denisova that Slavic tribes 
did not live on the shores of the Baltic sea in ancient times, and they refer to Western 
historians who claim that these tribes were indeed Slavic. Denisova's attacks on Vasilev 
could therefore just as well be directed against herself, since she does not refer to 
controversial views and arguments that do not support her own theories.
The editors think it would be futile to base conclusions about the ethnic 
situation in Latvia today on the ethnic composition of various tribes living in Latvia 
more than one thousand years ago:
n o  npOIlieCTBHH MHOrHX THCflHeJieTHH, BeKOB h  JieT 
TOBOpHTb O TOM, KpOBb KdKHX HMeHHO flpeBHHX IIJieMeH H 
HapoflOB TeneT b x<HJiax coB peM em iH X  JiaTHineH, pyccKHX, 
b e j ia p y c o B  m o>kho jm nib  B ecbM a npe,qnojio)K H T ejibH O . 
ZlocTOBepHO to j ib k o  o ^ h o  - m h o th x . B K oraje ^ B a /tu a T o ro  
B e x a  rn ecT a n  r p a $ a  b n a c n o p T e  B o o b m e  b h tj ih ^ ih t  
aHaxpoHH3MOM. P eajib H oe 3HaqeHHe n p H o b p era io T  coB ceM  
HHbie noHHTHH - HauHfl, H3HK, x y jib T y p a .
It would, of course, be crucial for a historian writing about these issues to 
establish which of these historians (if any) are right in their presentation of historical 
events and developments. For the concerns of this thesis, however, such an evaluation 
is not seen as very important. What I want to show through referring to this debate is 
the way in which historians in Latvia use historical issues in support of their political 
outlooks. Since the general public has no opportunity to control the information which 
is presented to them, they will tend to select the information which is mostly in 
conformity with the information they want to obtain. As we shall see in later chapters, 
Russians and Latvians tend to use very different sources for obtaining information, 
including information about historical issues. Not all newpapers or history text books 
present two or more sides of an issue, as Dinaburg did in this case. There is, thus, a 
danger that Russians and Latvians will have completely different information about 
historical issues and interpret such issues in radically different ways, lacking even 
knowledge about the main argumentation used by people with a different view. For 
future generations much will depend on the teaching of history to the younger 
generations: the syncronisation of history textbooks in both the Latvian and the Russian 
languages and the success in educating students how to obtain and evaluate various, 
and often conflicting, pieces of information.
2.3.  Russians in Latvia before World War I
Latvian history from the 13th century until independent statehood was gained 
after World War I is often divided into several periods. The period from the 13th 
century until 1561 is called the period of the Livonian state; from 1561 to 1629, the
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Polish period; and from 1629 to 1710, the Swedish period. In the 18th century Latvian 
territory was gradually incorporated into the Russian empire, where it remained until 
1918 (see Maps 1 and 2, Appendix 3).30
There are no exact figures for the number of Russians living in Latvia ['Latvia' 
is here and later sometimes used for the present territory of the Republic of Latvia] 
during the long period of foreign domination. Most of the Russians who lived on the 
territory in the 10th and 11th centuries were forced out after the German conquest. 
However, although the Germans sought to eradicate traces of Russian influence and the 
Orthodox faith, they wanted at the same time to keep up trade links with Russia. Such 
links even intensified over the following centuries, notably with the Polotsk, Vitebsk 
and Smolensk regions. There were therefore all the time some Russians in Latvia 
engaging in trade. In the 14th century a suburb of Russian merchants with their own 
churches and trading centres existed in Riga, and there were also Russian settlements in 
other Livonian centres.31
The authorities in Riga attempted to gain a monopoly on trade to and from 
Russia, and restrictions were put on traffic on the Daugava river. However, Russians 
living in Riga enjoyed the same rights as other inhabitants, and Russian merchants were 
in a favourable position since they were free to conduct trade with Russia as well as 
with other countries through the Baltic Sea. Russian merchants were often used as 
mediators between their kinsmen in the east and Livonian Germans.32
Being a Russian in Livonia, however, also involved a certain amount of risk. 
There were frequent attacks on Russian land and cities near the Livonian-Russian 
border, and Russians also attacked Livonia at times. In periods when such attacks took 
place Russians suffered heavily.33 According to historian A. A. Pommer, conditions 
were particularly difficult after Russian troops under Ivan III entered Livonia in 1481 
and 1501-02 34
When most parts of Latvia came under Polish influence in the 16th century, 
trade between Livonia and Russia became almost negligible. Relations between Poland 
and Russia were hostile, and this affected Livonian links with Russia. However, at the 
same time a large number of Russians came to Latvia. The deteriorating conditions in 
Russia at that time, due partly to the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish interventions as 
well as to the activities of the oprichnina introduced by Ivan the Terrible, made many 
Russian peasants leave their homeland. This was the first wave of escapees from 
Russia to Latvia.35
In the 17th century the local political situation changed again. Livonia and Riga 
came under the Swedish Crown, the eastern region Latgale remained under Polish rule, 
and the Duke of Courland became a vassal under the Polish king. The position of 
Russians in these states varied considerably and depended to a certain extent on the 
relations between the respective state and Russia.
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The majority of Russians lived in Latgale. The main reason for this was the split 
in the Russian Orthodox Church in the second half of the 17th century. The so-called 
Old Believers were persecuted in Russia, and a large number escaped in different 
directions. Those who came to Latvia were usually from the districts of Novgorod and 
Pskov. There were also other reasons for leaving Russia, such as to escape from cruel 
treatment by landowners, from imprisonment, and from recruitment into the armed 
forces.36 The Polish authorities in Latgale not only permitted the escapees to settle in 
areas close to the Russian borders, but they even granted Russian farmers certain 
privileges. Polish landowners usually regarded Russians as a cheap labour force and 
welcomed the escapees. The landlords were in constant need of additional workers on 
their lands, partly because of losses in battles and epidemics in the region from 1650 
onwards.37
There were also other reasons why the largest number of Russians was to be 
found in Latgale. This area is geographically close to Russia and the small communities 
consisting predominantly of Old. Believers.attracted other Russians to settle there. The 
Old Believers' Church attracted believers also from the Orthodox Church, which lacked 
a strong organisation, church buildings and priests in the region. The church is 
probably the most important factor in explaining why Russian culture has been 
preserved to such an extent, retaining the Russian language and traditions. The Old 
Believers strictly regulated the life of their congregation, and marriages between Old 
Believers and people of other religious communities were not allowed. Old Believers 
claim today that there were never any conflicts between them and the local, native 
population, although they usually lived quite separately and the Old Believers did not 
always know the local language. They explain this by referring to the difficult history 
of the Latvians, which made them responsive to the "separatist" tendencies of the Old 
Believers.38
The Duke of Courland, Jacob (1642-1682), gave Russians permission to settle 
along the left bank of the Daugava river (in the region where J3cabpils is situated 
today). The Russians who settled there were predominantly engaged in the trade which 
took place on the river. The Orthodox believers came under influence of the Jesuit and 
Uniate Churches, and in the 18th century the majority of Russians in this region were 
members of the Uniate Church.
In Riga and in Livonia the Swedes tried to eradicate all traces of Russianness. 
Buildings and churches which had belonged to Russian merchants were destroyed. At 
the same time the links between the Russians in Livonia and those living along the 
Daugava river were cut off, due to the wars between Sweden and Poland.
The exodus of escapees continued after Russia gained control over Livonia as a 
result of the Great Nordic War (1710-21). However, in the Lifland guberniya 
(province) (this was the name of one of the Baltic provinces of the Russian empire)
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there was now a risk that the escapees would be handed over to Russia, especially after 
commissions were set up to find and take back to Russia escapees who had hidden in 
the Baltic provinces. In Courland the government seldom interfered with the 
landowners, and escapees were safer there than in Livonia.39 Russians who settled in 
areas where there was no existing Russian community became much more easily 
assimilated with the Latvians. Today one can meet many Latvians with Russian names, 
and some of them have Russian ancestors from this period.
After the first division of Poland in 1773 Latgale became part of the Russian 
empire, and in 1795 (the third partition of Poland) the same happened to Courland. 
This meant that the whole of present Latvian territory was now under the Russian Tsar, 
and the number of legal immigrants from Russia proper increased. There were traders 
and petty bourgeoisie (meshchan'e), peasants who had bought their freedom, and 
officers and soldiers who remained in the territory after the Great Nordic War.40 It 
was, however, only in the second half of the 19th century that the number of Russians 
coming to Latvia in a legal way exceeded the number arri ving illegally 41
The Russian peasants who settled on the land of German and Polish 
landowners had, with a few exceptions, the same legal status as the local peasants.42 
Russians who established their own communities in the cities and villages were in a 
special category. One example is the Russian colony in Riga; the Moscow "Vorstadt” 
(suburb). Russians were not allowed to settle in the centre of Riga, and there were strict 
restrictions as to what goods they could sell, and to whom. The Russians also had a 
special court and administration. Under Catherine II the implementation of the General 
City Statute of 1785 improved the conditions for urban Russians, since they were now 
allowed unrestricted participation in all forms of trade and could also take part in the 
administration of the towns. The reform was, however, abolished just a few months 
after the death of Catherine II, and the Russians were again deprived of their right to 
trade freely.
The administrative boundaries of the Baltic provinces did not correspond to the 
local ethnic boundaries. The Latvians lived in Kurlandskaya and Liflyandskaya 
gubernii (the Courland and Lifland provinces), but the latter province also included the 
southern part of today's Estonia with a predominantly Estonian population. Latgale, the 
eastern part of Livonia, was administered as part of the Vitebsk guberniya, and did not 
enjoy the same limited degree of autonomy as did the other two provinces 43
Serfdom was abolished in the province of Courland in 1817 and in Lifland in 
1819, and the Baltic provinces thereby preceded the abolition of serfdom in Russia by 
more than 40 years. This did not, however, give the peasants the right to buy land. 
Only further agrarian reforms between 1840 and 1860 made it possible for the peasants 
gradually to consolidate their position. In Latgale, where most of the Russian peasants
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lived, the abolition of serfdom did not take place until 1861, since Latgale was still part 
of the province of Vitebsk.
In the 1840s there was a tendency among Latvian peasants to convert to the 
Orthodox faith.44 They hoped that by taking the religion of the Tsar and the Russian 
people they would improve their legal and economic status and be supported against the 
tyranny of their German landowners. The German authorities considered this trend to 
have been instigated by the Orthodox clergy.
The growing economic strength of the local peasantry led to a revival of Latvian 
national feeling. In the last part of the 19th century the Tsarist government pursued a 
policy of Russification caused by the desire to turn the region into a culturally integral 
part of the Russian state.45 The policy of Russification was not really aimed at 
increasing the number of Russians in the region. In Latgale, however, after the Polish 
uprising in 1863, the Tsarist government wanted to increase Russian ownership of land 
at the expense of the Polish landowners. Russian peasants now had the chance to buy 
land in the region, and a significant number of Russian peasants from the eastern parts 
of Russia took out bank loans and bought plots of land.
This policy of Russification was aimed primarily at the local German elite, but it 
unwittingly facilitated the emergence of the Latvian state. The idea of establishing an 
independent state of Latvia was put forward openly during the 1905 uprising. The 
turmoil in Russia soon spread to the towns in the Latvian territories, and in the final 
phase the action moved from the towns to the countryside. The 1905 uprising showed 
the strength of the Latvian reaction to German and Russian economic and political 
pressure at the time.
The Russian population in Latvia as a whole increased in this period. The 
policies of Russification meant that it became more important to place Russians in 
administrative positions, and, since Russian became of greater importance in education, 
there was a demand for Russian teachers. It is, however, difficult to say how much of 
the increase can be ascribed to the policies of Russification. The reforms in the 1860s 
were also important, because all people were now granted the right freely to move 
around in the empire. Both industry and trade developed more rapidly in the Baltic 
gubernii than in most other parts of Russia. The uneven development increased 
geographic mobility, and there was a migration of Russians into the Baltic territories in 
this period, especially into the cities. There were also many Russians, predominantly 
Old Believers, who moved from Latgale to the provinces of Lifland and Kurland, and 
especially to Riga.
The first universal census of the population of the Russian empire was carried 
out in 1897. This census defined nationality in terms of a person's mother tongue. 
Thus all those living in Latvia who reported Russian to be their mother tongue, which 
was the case with many Jews and Belarusians, were considered to be Russian by
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nationality. Zavarina has pointed to the inaccuracy of the figures when only mother 
tongue is used to define nationality. In order to reduce such inaccuracies, she combined 
the entry on mother tongue with another question in the census, the one on religious 
affiliation, and considered as Russians people who reported Russian to be their mother 
tongue and who belonged either to the Russian Orthodox Church or to the Old 
Believers.46 The number of Russians in Latvia when using only the indication of 
mother tongue was almost 155,000, whereas when a combination of the two factors is 
used the number is reduced by nine thousand.
Table 2.1 gives the number of Russians (according to mother tongue and 
religion) in different parts of Latvia in 1897. Only those parts of the provinces of 
Lifland and Vitebsk which belong to the present Latvian republic are included in this 
table.47
Table 2.1: Russians in Latvia 1897
Guberniya
Orthodox and 
"Edinovertsy"* Old Believers Total
As % of total 
population in 
province
Lifland 36,526 10,458 46,984 6.2
Kurland 15,270 8,089 23359 3.5
Vitebsk** 28301 46,974 75,275 15.0
*"Edinoverie" is the name of an Old Believer sect which reached an organisational compromise with the 
official Orthodox Church.
** Includes only Dvinskii, Rezhitskii and Lyutsinskii uezdy (districts).
Source: Zavarina (1986), p. 40.
In 1897 the Russians made up just over 8 per cent of the population in Latvia 
(as defined by one criterion only; see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3) and thereby comprised 
the second largest nationality. The majority of Russians were concentrated in the 
Latgalian uezdy (districts) and in some cities (notably Riga, with more than 43,000 
Russians).
Some interesting information is revealed by looking at the national composition 
of Riga separately. The proportion of different nationalities in Riga has changed very 
much from one period to another, and only rarely have Latvians made up a majority of 
the inhabitants of their capital. For example, from the end of the 18th until the middle of 
the 19th century 40-46 per cent of Riga's population was made up by Germans. In the 
same period the proportion of Latvians decreased, from approximately one third in 
1767 to less than 19 per cent in 1844. The share of Russians, however, increased from 
14 per cent to more than 30 per cent.48 From the second part of the 19th century the 
proportion of Latvians started to increase, because many Latvians moved to the city
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from the countryside. Although the proportion of Russians decreased to 17 per cent in 
1881 (and remained so in 1897), the actual number of Russians in Riga continued to 
increase, and reached 43,000 in 1897.49
The industrialisation of the Baltic area continued into our century, and by 1913 
the number of Russians in Latvia had increased by 70,000. The major part of this 
increase was caused by a natural population growth; the mechanical increase of 
Russians was on average 1600 people each year.50
2.4 .  Russians in Latvia in the Interwar Period
In recent debates about whether or not Latvia should again become an 
independent state (or rather restore its independent statehood), one of the issues which 
was often raised concerned the prospects for ethnic minorities in an independent Latvia.. 
Supporters of Latvian independence tended to emphasise the liberal minority legislation 
of the Latvian republic in the interwar period.51 Opponents of such independence, on 
the other hand, often argued that there had been many violations of the rights of the 
national minorities in the Latvian (sometimes called "bourgeois") republic, particularly 
after authoritarian rule was introduced in 1934.52 After briefly summing up the 
demographic development of the Russian minority in the independence period, I shall, 
in this section, look at the minority legislation of the Latvian state. I shall also examine 
the actual implementation of this legislation, with a focus on the Russian minority. 
Moreover, in the second part of the section I shall discuss the political activities and 
social organisations of the Russian minority in the same period.
2.4 .1 .  Demographic Developments
The population of Latvia, totalling 2,552,000 in 1914, had decreased to
1.596.000 in 1920, a drop of 37 per cent.53 No other countries lost such a large share 
of their population during World War I. This war, the Russian Revolution and the Civil 
War also reduced the number of Russians in Latvia significantly. There was a mass 
evacuation of Russians in 1915 and 1916. Thus, in 1920 there were only 91,500 
Russians left (5.9 per cent of the total population).54 In Riga the number of Eastern 
Slavs (most of whom were Russians) was reduced from 89,000 in 1913 to 12,000 in 
1920.55
By 1925 the number of Russians had increased to 154,000 (8.5 per cent of 
Latvia's population) 56 The number of Russians continued to increase, and reached
168.000 in 1935, but their proportion of the population in Latvia changed very little in
54
CHAPTER 2
the period from 1925 to 1935 when it was 8.8 per cent (see Figure 3.1 in the next 
chapter).
The largest part of the increase of Russians in the period up to the census in 
1935 was caused by a natural growth. There were also a significant number of emigres, 
mainly refugees, coming from Russia, particularly in the first years after the formation 
of the Latvian republic. Some of the Russians who had left during World War I were 
now returning to Latvia. Moreover, some of the increase was caused by several 
thousand Jews registering as Russians, which counted in part for a drop in the total 
Jewish population by 1935.57 There were also others who changed their nationalities in 
the various censuses, due to assimilation and/or lack of self-identification with a 
particular nationality. Still, relatively few Russians assimilated to the Latvians. The 
Belarusians, living predominantly in the border regions of Latgale and being 
predominantly Catholics, had a much greater tendency to be assimilated to the 
indigenous Catholic population.58 One should, however, also mention that several 
sources regard the census results, of 1935 as somewhat inaccurate.5? For example the 
demographers Me2gailis and Zvidrii^S give a figure for the number of Belarusians in 
Latvia which is larger than indicated by the official results of the 1935 census.60
In 1930 approximately three quarters of the Russians in Latvia were peasants, 
living in compact settlements along the Soviet frontier, predominantly in Latgale.61 
They were Orthodox and Old Believers in about equal proportions.62 In 1938 there 
were about 15,000 Russian workers in various enterprises, 3000 merchants, and the 
same number of Russians working in the transport sector. There were a further 2000 
Russian representatives of the so-called "free professions”, while 600 worked in 
hospitals and 2600 had other professions.63 The proportion belonging to the 
intelligentsiya was smaller for Russians than for both Germans and Jews. The overall 
majority of Russians in Latvia during the independence period were either always 
citizens of Latvia or were granted citizenship after 5 years of residence in the 
republic.64
2 .4 .2 . Ethnic Minority Legislation
The Latvian state was constituted as an independent, democratic republic, with a 
distinctly national character. Nevertheless, the question of guarantees for the rights of 
the minorities was considered essential by the authorities. Thus, along with the 
"Declaration of Independence" of 18 November 1918 the National People's Council 
also issued a "Political Platform" where the rights of national minorities were 
recognised in both political and cultural terms. The fourth part of this platform reads as 
follows:
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"Rights of the National Minorities:
1. The National Minorities send their representatives to the 
Constituent Assembly and legislative authorities according to the 
principle of proportional representation.
2. The national minorities which are represented in the National 
People's Council65 take part in the Provisional Government 
(based on the principle of Coalition for the formation of the 
Government).
3. The cultural and national rights of the national groups are to 
be guaranteed in the Constitution.66
In the first draft of the constitution bill the general principle of equality before 
the law was established, and the document also authorised the different national groups 
to use their own language in speech and writing and to set up autonomous 
corporations.67 However, some problems arose. The Social Democrats and the 
Latgalians had objections to the part of the draft which contained stipulations about the 
rights of the minorities, and this part was therefore never passed. Even if these 
objections were not linked to the questions about the rights of the national minorities, 
the result was that the Latvian constitution lacked even general regulations on such 
rights.68
There was, however, some legislation on minority rights in Latvia already, 
quite independent of the constitution.69 A statutory law on cultural autonomy was 
passed 18 December 1919, and was based on the Declaration of Policy issued by the 
Latvian State Council 18 November one year earlier. Equal cultural, political and 
economic rights were granted to all national minorities. The minorities obtained 
permission to establish their own school departments within the National Ministry of 
Education, and the nationalities were provided with the right to administer their own 
schools. The head of each minority's school administration was to represent his 
nationality in all cultural questions. He also had the right to participate as an adviser in 
Cabinet sessions concerning his nationality's cultural affairs. The school administration 
was to determine the types of schools, as well as the syllabuses and standards for 
examinations to be used in their schools; the only restriction on their curicula was the 
compulsory teaching of Latvian history, geography and language. The national schools 
were to receive financial support from the state budget in accordance with the number 
of pupils.
There were, however, some limits to school autonomy. The law defined the 
status only of Russian secondary schools. The Russian department under the Ministry 
of Education could not therefore influence decisions concerning primary schools, for 
example the opening of new schools, the selection and appointment of teachers, etc.70
Latvia was obliged, as a member of the League of Nations, to give additional 
guarantees to national minorities. In September 1920 the League called for an explicit
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assurance from the Latvian government that it would protect the interests of national 
minority groups on its territory. Discussions over this matter lasted for almost three 
years, but in July 1923 the Latvian representative to the League submitted a Declaration 
in general terms, accepting the principles of the guarantee article of the League.71 
However, the Declaration also contained a proviso to the effect that 'any legislation 
enacted for the protection of minorities would have to conform to the constitution and 
could not be allowed to prejudice the requirements of Latvian sovereignty or the social 
needs of the majority group'.72 The League of Nations Council, which was authorised 
to deal with all forms of complaints from the minorities, accepted these terms, and 1 
September 1929 the League assumed responsibility for the welfare of all minority 
groups in Latvia.
Laws and regulations by the state and local authorities were published only in 
Latvian. Until 1932 there was no separate language law, but laws often had special 
paragraphs about language usage. One law of 6 December 1918 on the establishment of 
judicial, institutions,.for example, stipulated that the language to be used in the courts 
was to be Latvian, but one would also have the right to use Russian and German in 
certain circumstances.
It would not be correct to say that there were no tensions in the relations 
between the various ethnic groups in Latvia in the period of parliamentarian democracy 
which lasted from 1920 to 1934. There were, indeed, certain tensions which sometimes 
came up to the surface. Some Orthodox Russians, for example, complained about 
specific Latvian policies which they felt where directed against their religion.73 There 
were also complaints about the expression of anti-Russian attitudes in the Latvian press 
in the mid 1920-s 74 Certain local policies of the Latvian government were also 
frequently attacked, in particular its policies towards the Latgalian region, where most 
of the Russians lived.75 There was also discontent with the financing of Russian 
schools, which were said to receive too few resources, which forced a number of them 
to close down. A certain degree of tension is, however, unlikely to be avoided in any 
multiethnic society, and Latvia was no exception. It seems, however, that the ethnic 
minorities had channels through which they could express their grievances. Compared 
with many other European states, Latvia in the 1920s could be seen as an example to be 
followed in the treatment of ethnic minorities, perhaps surpassed only by Estonia, 
where the rights of such minorities were even better secured.
Even before the introduction of authoritarian rule in 1934 there were some 
indications that policies were moving in a more ethnocentric direction. In 1931 the 
minister of education Kenins initiated a struggle for "Latvian cultural unity" directed 
against the minorities' self-administration over their own schools. Fierce attacks 
appeared in the Latvian press about 'minority privileges'.76 In 1932 a law, 
"Regulations about Official Language", was issued, where the right to use languages
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other than Latvian was considerably restricted. At the same time Russian was taken off 
the list of compulsory subjects in Latvian schools.77 However, the minister did not 
succeed in putting an end to school autonomy, and he was removed in 1933.
The situation changed radically, however, with the introduction of authoritarian 
rule under Karlis Ulmanis in 1934.78 While the first part of the independence period 
had been characterised by nation-building efforts through parliamentarian methods with 
a well-developed system for the protection of ethnic minorities, during the period of 
authoritarian rule many of the rights of the ethnic minorities were withdrawn. If the 
goal in the 1920s had been a "Latvian Latvia (latvisku Latvija) ", after 1934 one of the 
dominant slogans was "Latvia for the (ethnic) Latvians (Lanya -LanLesem) " .79 The 
minorities lost their right to autonomy over their schools, and their influence over 
cultural matters became only of a consultative kind. The number of Russian schools 
was significantly reduced. Parents in ethnically mixed marriages could no longer 
choose which schools their children should attend.80
. . . Although many publications which the authorities considered to be "unreliable 
or subversive" were forced to close down, the largest, and often critical, Russian- 
language newspaper Segodnya continued to publish, probably because the newspaper 
enjoyed a wide circle of readers outside Latvia and the authorities wanted to avoid 
possible negative reactions from abroad.81 Other newspapers and journals were 
prohibited, however, such as the journal Zakon i Sud which was closed down in 
1938. In the economic sphere the Ulmanis government also took certain Latvianization 
measures.82 It became more difficult for representatives of the ethnic minorities to find 
work at the Latvian-dominated state-owned enterprises.
Against this background one could say that the experiences of the ethnic 
minorities in the independence period were mixed. Those who today are worried about 
Latvian nationalism will not have any problem in finding manifestations of such 
nationalism during this period, particularly if they concentrate on the last years before 
the Soviet annexation. In debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the 
desirability of independent Latvian statehood arguments were put forward to show that 
Latvian independence would be a threat to the ethnic minorities living in Latvia.83 
However, it must be emphasised that there were not many European countries which 
had a better developed system than Latvia in the interwar period for the protection of the 
interests of ethnic minorities. Moreover, in the light of the treatment of ethnic minorities 
in the Soviet Union and many other countries in the late 1930s and 1940s, the Latvian 
record certainly looks quite good. Even though one should not paint the independence 
period in unrealistically bright colours, there are indeed traits in Latvian legislation of 
the time which could also be useful today. In a later chapter we shall examine the way 
in which the concept of cultural autonomy for the ethnic minorities is being 
implemented in Latvia at present. However, perhaps the most important lesson from the
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independence period in terms of minority rights would be that such rights tend to be 
best protected under parliamentarian and democratic rule, combined with relatively 
stable socio-economic conditions.84 Whenever there is a threat to democracy, because 
of economic of political chaos, for example, independent statehood in itself is not likely 
either to solve or to aggrevate the ethnic tensions which have a tendency to increase in 
such a situation. In Chapter 4, which examines Latvian nationality policies, we shall 
look at how the idea of cultural autnonomy for the ethnic minorities is being 
implemented in Latvia at the present time.
2 .4 .3 . Russian Political Activities and Social Organisations (1920- 
1940)
The national minorities in Latvia were granted representation in the Saeima 
under the electoral law. The Russian share of representatives in the Saeima. varied from 
3 to 6 percent, which was significantly less than the Russian share of the population. 
Table 2.2 lists the different minority parties that were represented in the Saeima (the 
total number of deputies in the Saeima was 100) and the distribution of deputies from 
these parties in the period from 1922 to 1934. As can be seen from the table, Russians 
were split between many different parties. This is also seen as one of the reasons for 
the relatively low number of Russian representatives in the Saeima. The Russians were 
not a homogeneous group, but were split in terms of religion, economic interests and 
ideological convictions. The divisions were particularly deep between the large body of 
Russian farmers and the small elite of Russian officials and merchants.85 It was 
therefore difficult for these parties to consolidate on one political platform, and they 
often fought among themselves.86
It has further been argued that Russians did not have a high level of political 
culture, and also that their national identity was weakly developed.87 Many Russians 
therefore did not bother to vote, or they voted for parties which were not considered to 
be parties established particularly for the Russian minority and which did not aim at
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Table 2.2: National Minority Parties in Parliament 1922-1934
1922-25 1925-28 1928-31 1931-34
(%) (%) (%) <%)
Old Believers 1 2 2 2
Greek Orthodox Russians 0 2 2 2
Union of R. Municipal Employees 1 1 2 1
Russian Farmer Union 0 0 0 1
Russian National Democrats 1 0 0 0
Russian Parties Total 3 5 6 6
Germans 6 5 6 6
Jewish Parties Total* 5 4 4 5
Poles 1 2 2 2
Total 15 16 18 19
* Includes: Agudas Israel, Misrachi, Ceire Zion 
Source: Kavass and Sprudz (1972).
defending the interests specifically of the Russian community. One can question 
whether voting for such parties should be regarded as a sign of lack of national identity, 
but a significant number of Russians voted for left-wing parties for social reasons, and 
the representation of the parties of the Russian minority was thereby lower than it could 
have been. In an article in the Latvian Russian newspaper Slovo, campaigning for unity 
among the Russian minority, Beglotsvetov wrote in 1927:
( . . .  P ) y c c K o e  MeHbiiiHHCTBO a a j ie i c o  H e H c n o j ib 3 0 B a j io  
CBOHX H3bHpaTeJIbHHX IipaB , HTO flOJDKHO 6bITb O TH eceH O  
HCKJHOHHTeJIbHO Ha CHeT p a 3 p 0 3 H e H H 0 C T H  pyCCKO H  
ob m ecT B eH H ocT H  h  c /ia b o c T H  rpa)K ,qaH C K oro ^ o j i r a  n e p e z i  
CBOHMH COpOflHHaMH.88
According to Beglotsvetov there were no discriminatory policies that caused the 
underrepresentation of Russians in parliament:
( . . .  P l y c c K o e  H a c e j ie H H e  TUi t b h h  y c T y n a e T  a o  f lB y x  
T p e T e f l npH H a,zyie>K aiiiH x e M y  n o  n p a B y  M ecT  n p y r H M  
HaiiHOHajibHOCTHM .... h  -  H e n o  q y x co H , a  h c k jiio h h teJibHO  
n o  CBOefl CObCTBeHHOH BHHe 89
After some initial success in cooperation among the minority parties, it was 
soon obvious that the heterogeneous parties held conflicting opinions. A Minority 
Committee which had been established in May 1920 to supply the deputies with 
materials such as translations of Latvian documents soon experienced financial 
problems as the members did not pay their membership dues, and the office was closed 
one year later.90 In 1926 the 16 representatives of minority parties joined forces again 
over demands in school and national questions; but again the alliance did not last long.
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It seemed that a minority bloc in parliament could function only in times when there 
was a danger to minority positions.
However, even though there was not always political unity among the minority 
representatives, the many factions and coalitions in the Saeima often made their votes a 
decisive factor, and the parties used this power to draw political concessions from the 
other parties. This is how Bilmanis, himself a prominent Latvian politician in the 
Latvian republic, interprets the role of the minority bloc in the Saeima:
Their lack of interest in Latvian national unity, their desire to 
improve their own position at all costs, [...], led them to [give] 
their votes in the Saeima to whichever bloc had the most to offer 
them in return. [...].[Through] an unexpected [temporary] 
alliance, the national minority parties and the Left Wing bloc 
gained a working majority in parliament over the agrarian group, 
even though the latter represented a larger segment of the 
population. In exchange for their support, the Latvian Socialists 
supported the demands of the national minorities for such 
concessions as economic privileges, [...] and [fewer] obstacles 
....................to the acquisition of Latvian citizenship.91
There were also a large number and variety of social organisations among 
Russians in the interwar period.92 The first wave of the establishment of Russian 
societies can be dated as far back as the 1850s and 60s, when there was a great interest 
among local Russians in their culture and traditions. Russian organisational life became 
even more active during the years of Latvian independence, however, particularly 
before the introduction of authoritarian rule in 1934. The centre of Russian 
organisational activities was naturally Riga, as it was here that the largest part of the 
Russian intelligentsia was living.
Of the many organisations which existed in the independence period I shall 
mention only a few of the most influential.93 One of the first organisations to be 
founded (first in 1918, and after an interruption again in 1919) was the "National- 
Democratic Union" (NDU -Natsional'no-Demokraticheskii Soyuz ), which declared its 
aim to be to utilise the newly acquired freedom to unite the local Russian population for 
the realisation of its political, social and material interests. One of the central tasks of 
the organisation soon became to help Russian emigres arriving from Soviet Russia. The 
NDU did not succeed in uniting all Russians, as it was mainly the intelligentsia which 
took part in its activities. Moreover, the first split in the organisation came as early as 
June 1920, leading to the foundation of the "Russian Society in Latvia" . Although the 
two organisations had similar goals, they did not cooperate, and a fierce rivalry 
developed between them, often characterised by mutual accusations. In the end the 
NDU came out as the stronger of the two, but in 1923 it was forced to split into two 
organisations, as the new law on social organisations required a differentiation between 
political and non-political organisations.
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One of these successor organisations, the "Russian National Union in Latvia" 
(RNUL - Russkii Natsional'ny Soyuz v Latvii ), concerned itself mainly with political 
issues. The organisation was not as influential as its predecessor, however, and 
although it was quite active in nominating candidates for the Saeima and the Riga 
Duma (city council), it never succeeded in having one of its candidates elected to 
parliament. Still, the organisation attempted to influence the deputies in the Saeima by 
referring to its authority as representing the interests of Latvia's Russian community. 
From 1928 onwards the position of the organisation gradually weakened.
The second of the NDU successor organisations was called the "Russian 
National Association" (RNA - Russkoe Natsional'noe Ob"edinenie ). Although the 
RNA did not completely distance itself from politics, it was engaged first of all in 
cultural, educational, legal, religious and health issues and was also involved in 
charitable activities. Several smaller organisations joined the RNA on its foundation, 
and it continued to grow. Feigmane writes that to a considerable extent the RNA 
succeeded in uniting the heterogenous Russian community, although its success should 
not be exaggerated.94 The organisation was active in protesting against the school 
reforms proposed by the Minister of Education, KeninS, in the early 1930s. It was also 
politically active in lobbying in the Saiema, and particularly in trying to influence the 
voting of the Russian deputies. Its activities continued after Ulmanis had introduced 
authoritarian rule. By 1938 the RNA had become an umbrella organisation for 27 
smaller organisations; the organisation was prohibited in 1940 by the Soviet authorities.
The level of activity of most Russian organisations was considerably reduced 
after 1934, as a result of the new political climate in the country. Organisations with a 
political profile were forced to close down. The state also started to interfere with the 
internal activities of other social organisations, which now came under the 
administration of the Ministry of Education. The political department of the Ministry of 
the Interior also started to interfere in the activities of the social organisations. The 1938 
law "On Unprofitable Organisations and Unions" also complicated the situation for 
many of the organisations, as all societies had to be reregistered. During this process 
some of the organisations were forced to merge, while others had to change their 
names. In spite of all this, Russian organisational life continued until the fatal events of 
1940. As was stated in the introduction, however, these events and the events that 
followed will not be examined in this chapter.
2.5 .  Russian Perceptions of the Role of Russians in Latvian Society
Robert Jervis argues that what one learns from key events in international 
history is an important factor in determining the images that shape the interpretation of
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incoming information.95 In the first section of this chapter we pointed to different 
interpretations of Latvian history and we emphasised the different views on the role of 
Russians and the Russian influence in Latvia. During the Soviet period most Russians 
had access only to the official Soviet view on historical events in Latvia, and since most 
Russians arrived in Latvia after its incorporation into the Soviet Union they did not 
have any memories of independent Latvia or easy access to such memories of family 
members who had lived in Latvia during the independence period of the interwar years. 
Unofficial views were presented as remnants of bourgeois nationalism, untruthful and 
unacceptable.
From the late 1980s, however, the policies of glasnost' encouraged the 
expression of alternative interpretations of historical events. Progressive Latvian 
newspapers started to print articles on history which would have been unheard of a year 
or two earlier. These articles challenged many of the beliefs about the historical past 
which a majority of Soviet people had had no opportunities to question. In this 
connection the.role of the Russian people at various junctions of Latvian history also 
became open to new interpretations. From being presented as a 'big brother' of the 
other Soviet nationalities deserving respect for the contribution made to Latvian 
economic prosperity, it was now often held that there was in fact no economic 
prosperity in Latvia and that Russian immigration had retarded rather than speeded up 
Latvian economic development.
Russian reactions to the reinterpretation of historical events have not been 
uniform. Some Russians have insisted on not letting the old truths go, and have fiercely 
resisted any new ways of assessing their role in Latvian society. Others take a humbler 
position by considering the interpretation of Latvian history to be a task for the Latvians 
in which they do not want to interfere. The 1992 "Russians in Latvia" survey contained 
a number of questions related to the role of Russians in Latvia and is useful as a tool for 
assessing Russians' evaluation of their own positive and negative contributions to 
Latvian progress.
A list of ten statements was presented to respondents, and they were asked to 
indicate to which extent they agreed with each of them. The list of statements and the 
distribution of answers are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Some of the questions were related 
to the interpretation of historical events. Almost half the respondents were indecisive on 
the question of whether Russians and Russia had consolidated the land of the Latvians 
into one state. Still, more Russians were inclined to agree than to disagree with this 
statement. There was less hesitation regarding the question of whether Russians had 
contributed in helping Latvians to fight against and free themselves from the Nazi 
occupation during World War II. Two thirds of the respondents fully agreed with such 
a proposition, while only a minuscule number indicated that they disagreed. Similarly,
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Figure 2.1: Historical Questions
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Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
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this way. The highest number of points received by any of our respondents was 41. 
After systematising the results the following conclusion emerged:
This scale can be used as a tool for analysing how various groups of Russians 
evaluate their own role in Latvian society. It is therefore important to establish whether 
there is a relationship between this variable, which can be labelled "evaluation of the 
Russians' role in Latvia", and other variables about which the survey provides 
information. Some important findings were made by using crosstabulation, and 
statistical significance tests were employed to control whether these findings were 
significant.
We could not prove that there is a relationship between the gender of the 
respondents and their evaluation of the Russians' role in Latvia. Neither did type of 
occupation96 seem to be of importance for Russians' evaluation of this question. The 
impact of differences in terms of size of family income was also too small to be 
statistically significant.
The variable for the evaluation of the Russians' role in Latvia was, however, 
strongly related to a number of other variables. The ethnic composition of the family of 
the respondent proved to be one very important factor. Russians with a Latvian spouse, 
for example, were almost four times more likely to be associated with a hesitant or 
negative evaluation of the Russians' role in Latvia than were Russians who were 
married to a Russian or other Slav. Similarly, only one third of Russians with a Latvian 
father or mother gave a very positive evaluation of the Russians' role in Latvia, while 
the same was true of more than half of those, both of whose parents were Russians.
There was also significant regional variance, which is illustrated in Table 2.3. 
In general, Russians in cities were much more likely to give a positive evaluation of the 
Russians' role in Latvia than were Russians in rural districts. This was particularly 
evident in the case of Riga, where 64 per cent of the respondents were found in Group 
1. Russians in Latgale were much less positive, as shown by the table. Russians in 
Latgale have on average lived in Latvia longer than Russians in other Latvian regions, 
and the length of stay in Latvia is another factor which correlates with the variable in 
question. Of particular importance for the responses was whether or not the respondent 
was bom in Latvia. Russians who were born in Latvia and whose parents had also 
lived in Latvia and not moved to the republic were more hesitant or negative than other 
respondents in their evaluation of the Russians' role there. The most positive 
evaluations came from Russians who had arrived in Latvia during the last 15 years.
Group one: Very positive (10 to 19 points) 
Group two: Positive (20 to 29 points) .....
51 percent 
38 per cent 
11 per centGroup three: Hesitant or negative (30 to 41 points)
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TABLE 2.2: Relations Between Evaluation of the Russians' Role in 
Latvia and Type of Settlement
Evaluation of the Russians' Role in Latvia:
N = 591
Group 1 
Very positive 
(%)
Group 2 
Positive 
(%)
Group 3 
Hesitant or Negative 
(%)
Cities (total) 58 32 10
Riga 64 29 7
Latgalian cities 41 37 22
Other cities 54 40 6
Rural districts (total) 33 52 15
Latgale's rural districts 37 47 16
Other rural districts 32 54 14
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
The better a respondent knew Latvian, the more likely s/he was to have a 
generally critical attitude towards the Russians contribution to Latvian progress. 
However, the correlation was not as strong as for the other variables mentioned above. 
It is also interesting that it was the best educated Russians who were most positive in 
their evaluation of the role of Russians in Latvia. While four in ten Russians with only 
primary education fell into Group 1, the same was true of more than six in ten Russians 
with higher education. Similarly, a respondent with higher education had half the 
likelihood of falling into Group 3 as compared to a person with primary education. This 
is, perhaps, somewhat surprising, because one would expect that Russians with a 
higher education would have read more history and be more familiar with alternative 
interpretations, and therefore would be less categorical in their evaluation of the role of 
Russians in Latvia.
A positive evaluation of the role of Russians in Latvia was more common 
among the older age-groups than among young respondents. Young Russians seemed 
to be more receptive to new interpretations of historical events than were Russians in 
the older generations who are often less flexible and tend to be less willing to 
reconsider what they have regarded as historical truths.
To conclude, the responses to the questions in the questionnaire indicate that 
most Russians have a very positive evaluation of their own role in Latvian society. 
Although one could register some hesitancy regarding whether Russians had 
"consolidated the land of the Latvians into one state" and also regarding the Russians' 
contribution to Latvian cultural progress, there was little doubt among the majority of 
Russians that they had liberated the Latvians from German occupation and also that 
they had contributed to the rebuilding and progress of the Latvian economy. These are
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propositions which have been repeatedly and uncritically put forward in Soviet 
accounts of Latvian history: in the mass media, school text books and political 
speeches. It is not unlikely that one of the reasons why Russians are so reluctant to give 
a more self-critical assessment of their own historical role in Latvia is that they are 
afraid that this could put the whole legitimacy of their presence in Latvia into question. 
We have, however, seen that to a considerable extent the evaluation of historical topics 
is related to other variables, the most important of which seemed to be the ethnic 
composition of the family of the respondent, type of settlement and region of residence, 
level of education, language knowledge and age. It would, of course, have been 
interesting to compare the responses which Russians gave to these questions with 
responses given by ethnic Latvians, which are likely to differ substantially. However, 
since our survey included only Russians there was no possibility of making such a 
comparison. The institutes which organised the survey, however, plan to conduct a 
similar survey in the near future with the important difference that it would have a 
representative sample from the entire population of Latvia. This would .enable us. to. 
make comparisons between the responses given by different ethnic groups living in 
Latvia to the questions discussed here, as well as to observe whether Russians' 
responses have changed since our survey was conducted.
Historical arguments are used extensively in political statements and debates in 
Latvia (and elsewhere), and although most historians would agree that there is a need 
for objectiveness and truthfulness, our excursion shows that the presentation of history 
tends to be influenced by the message the historian seeks to convey. Historians, thus, 
have had, and continue to have, a great impact on forming public opinion about 
historically related issues and, as the section about the Russian role in Latvia in ancient 
history showed, in particular concerning issues which ordinary people do not normally 
have the opportunity to evaluate themselves. Glasnost' opened up the opportunity to 
present alternatives to the official Soviet view on Latvian history. Although there is no 
reason to believe that the writing of history will not be influenced by the historians' 
personal outlook and opinions, the fact that there is now more openness about historical 
issues and more room for diverse interpretations of an event at least gives people an 
opportunity to make their own judgements. There is a risk, however, that this freedom 
could be used first of all to select sources which confirm already existing opinions and 
prejudices. On the other hand, one cannot expect people to change deep-rooted attitudes 
and historical outlooks overnight, particularly if alternative interpretations do not accord 
with a person's material or social interests.
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3. Soviet Nationality Policy until the Mid-1980s
3.1 .  Introduction
In the first chapter the relationship between ethnicity and the political sphere 
was examined, and I supported the view that there is an interaction between the two, so 
that changes in the political sphere influence ethnic identification and also that ethnic 
processes have an impact on politics. One can therefore assume that the ethnic identity 
of Russians in Latvia is influenced by the nationality policy which has been conducted 
there, and I believe that an understanding of their situation requires familiarity with the 
peculiarities of this policy. In this thesis nationality policy will be used in a broad sense 
to include all policies (or absence of policies) which affect certain national groups or 
national relations, whether the effects are intentional or not.
This chapter and the following one deal with nationality policy; both in the 
Soviet Union in general, and specifically in Latvia. There seems to be agreement that 
the nature of the nationality problem has shifted markedly through time, and that there 
is a need for historical periodisation.1 This chapter looks at nationality policy in the 
period up to the mid 1980s. Even though Latvia became a part of the Soviet Union as a 
result of the events just before and during World War II, and was therefore subject to 
Soviet nationality policy for a shorter time than most of the other Soviet republics, a 
brief account of the roots and the historical background of this policy is nevertheless 
seen as essential. There will then be an examination of some of the main principles 
underlying Soviet nationality policy. However, whereas most authors have analysed 
the nationality issue in the Soviet Union mainly by looking at its significance for the 
stability of the Soviet regime, the aim is here to discuss aspects that are of significance 
for the formation, maintenance or eradication of ethnic identity, especially among 
Russians. Particular attention will therefore be paid to the special status of the Russians 
in the Soviet empire.2 Soviet nationality policy more specifically towards Latvia, and its 
implications, will be dealt with in the last section of this chapter, with a discussion of 
the alleged planned russification and sovietization of the republic caused by, among 
others, the large influx of Russian immigrants there. Then, in the next chapter, the 
emphasis will be on more recent developments.
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3 .2 .  Soviet Nationality Policy 
3 .2 .1 .  Background and Principles
In the autumn of 1917 the Bolsheviks began to take control of most territory of 
a large multinational empire, and a new practical nationality policy had to be devised. 
This policy could not be based solely on Marx's and Engels's writings on the 
nationality question. Connor claims that Marx and Engels never attempted a detailed 
exposition of the questions of nations and nationalism, and that they never gave a clear 
answer to what would happen to nations in the postcapitalist period.3 In the Manifesto 
they wrote that the nation would survive the revolution, at least for a time, but the 
question of whether all national differences between the nationalities faced 
extermination has been subject to different interpretations. This is, as has already been 
pointed out, reflected in the writings of Soviet scholars, and is also indicated in public 
announcements from Soviet leaders.
On the way to communism, Marx and Engels had to recognise both the 
existence as well as the significance of the nation, and of the class struggle within 
national boundaries. In this connection nationalism could be used in the interests of the 
working class movement. Demands for national independence could be supported as 
long as they stimulated the ripening and fall of capitalism, and had to be com batted if 
they delayed this development.4
It was the task of the Bolsheviks to adopt Marxist theory to the conditions of the 
multinational Russian empire. Lenin declared that all nations have the right to self- 
determination, and he emphasised that he had in mind the right to secession and the 
formation of independent states, and not simply national cultural autonomy as advanced 
by the Austrian social democrats.5 That Lenin affirmed the right to secede does not 
imply that he would advocate secession, and he argued that the interests of the 
proletariat were best served by the existence of large states, which offered the 
maximum potential for economic development.6 This view was also shared by Stalin. 
Even though Stalin asserted in 1913 that the victorious communists would introduce a 
policy of 'national equality', this did not apply to all nations. Whereas 'such crystalised 
units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and so forth' would be granted 
regional autonomy, Stalin explicitly denied such an autonomy to smaller nations such 
as the Latvians.7
There is good reason to believe that the established principle of national self- 
determination increased the support for the Bolsheviks among the non-Russian 
nationalities in the period between February and October 1917, when the liberals and 
their coalition partners were more indifferent to national demands.8 When the 
Bolshevik party became the ruling party, however, difficulties arose as to how to
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reconcile the absolute principle of the nation's right to self-determination and the 
security interests and the territorial integrity of the new state. The doctrine was adjusted 
to these new conditions. Self-determination was redefined as a right only for the 
proletariat. Some scholars write about the differences over this issue between Lenin and 
Stalin.9 However, even if their views on certain issues were divergent, all the 
Bolsheviks considered that partial political demands such as the nation's right to self- 
determination were relative, and that such demands had to be rejected when they were 
opposed to the general socialist movement.10
When the USSR was established in 1924, a federal state structure was adopted, 
and the right of the minorities to secession was recognised. Further, the class unity of 
the new socialist state was preserved by the unitary party's monopoly of power. The 
guiding principle of Soviet federalism was, as Stalin put it, to be "national in form but 
socialist in content". However, there were very few governmental institutions 
commonly associated with federations elsewhere. For example, the deputies for the 
Russian Federal Parliament, the Congress of Soviets, were elected on the basis o f . 
population, and there was no upper chamber of the legislature to provide the ethnic 
units with representation without regard to size.11 The creation of the People's 
Commissariat of Nationalities, led by Stalin, in 1917 was the only measure taken which 
recognised potential problems between ethnic minorities.12
The nationality policy of the 1920s was nevertheless conducted in a 'relatively 
tolerant climate'.13 The Soviet leadership declared that Russian chauvinism was the 
main problem in nationality relations, and initiated a programme of developing the 
cultures of the non-Russian nationalities. A policy of elite cooptation or 
"indigenisation" (korenizatsiya ) was put into practice, where members of the non- 
Russian nationalities were recruited into government and party positions.14 Schools 
using the local languages were set up and the use of these languages promoted in most 
spheres of society. This policy was in line with the 'dialectics' of nationality relations 
as they were seen by the Bolsheviks, where each nation and nationality was to be given 
opportunities for full national self-realisation (flowering/rart.yver). Simultaneously, on 
the basis of a common social structure and through "mutual enrichment", a 
rapprochement (sblizhenie ) of nations and nationalities would take place, before there 
was an eventual merger (sliyanie).
However, as Stalin consolidated political power, the nationality policy gradually 
changed. By the early 1930s ideological uniformity started to be imposed on all national 
cultures. The collectivization of agriculture with the liquidation of the kulaks 
(raskulachivanie) had enormous implications both for Russians as well as for non- 
Russian national minorities. National elites were arrested and often killed, and under 
Stalin's rule entire nationalities were deported from their traditional homelands. It 
should, however, also be emphasised that there were indeed people who genuinely
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believed that it was time to move on from the epoch of the flowering of national 
cultures to a more internationalist outlook.15 From the mid-1930s Stalin openly started 
praising the Russian people for its historical and contemporary qualities. Its role as an 
"elder brother" in the "Soviet family of nations" was expressed on several occasions, 
perhaps most articulately in Stalin's toast to the Great Russian People at the Victory 
Parade in front of the Kremlin in June 1945.16
Soviet nationality policy in the post-war period contained several elements, and 
only those aspects that are of particular concern to this thesis can be discussed here. 
There was a relaxation of the policy of mass overt coercion after Stalin's death, and the 
subsequent leaders relied more on institutional structures to prevent the voicing of 
nationalist sentiments. Khrushchev does not seem to have been particularly sympathetic 
to ethnic claims.17 He promoted a campaign against religion, and his educational 
reform of 1958 eliminated the obligatory study of the native language in the non- 
Russian regions.18 His plan of dividing the country into economic regions 
(sovnarkhozy) was also perceived as a threat by the national minorities which had their 
own union republic.19
Despite the fact that on several occasions the nationality problem in the Soviet 
Union was officially declared to be "solved", and Brezhnev in the 1970s announced 
that a new entity, the "Soviet people" (sovetskii narod j  had been created, the Soviet 
leaders nevertheless had to recognise that national self-assertion among non-Russians 
as well as Russians was becoming increasingly visible. Nationality policy under 
Brezhnev and his successors was characterised by the attempt to find a proper balance 
between repression and tolerance.20 The leaders would use coercion against national 
dissent when there was a perceived threat to the stability of the regime, whereas they 
would tolerate manifestations of national sentiments when such a threat was not seen as 
imminent.
The Soviet leaders had, indeed, a series of coercive measures at their disposal to 
use against uncontrolled outbursts of national sentiment. The KGB, the militia and the 
armed forces all played a major role in the repression of national dissent.21 Implied 
coercion, in the form of the persistent implicit threat to activate these institutions, is also 
likely to have prevented a larger number of demonstrations with a national character and 
other unofficial manifestations of ethnic demands. An efficient censorship of the press 
was another aspect of this policy, where the only articles on nationality questions to be 
admitted were those denouncing nationalism and praising "internationalist" attitudes and 
actions.
Even though mass overt coercion was utilised on occasion as a means of 
controlling national dissent, such a policy did not go well with the picture of a "happy 
family of nations", and could be used only if there was no alternative. The leadership 
had to rely on other means to contain nationalist sentiments. A more subtle way of
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exerting influence on the development of nationality relations was to encourage 
migration, particularly of Russians, into non-Russian republics and areas. Since 
Russians and other Slavs, for reasons to be discussed below, were thought to be more 
loyal to the regime than the other nationalities, many seemed to believe that a 
considerable number of Russians in the union republics would have a stabilising effect 
on the local populations. The need to obtain a propiska (residence permit) for 
settlement in a certain area was a means by which migration could be directed to areas 
approved by the authorities. However, the Soviet leaders do not seem to have utilised 
this policy efficiently22. This could be interpreted as if Russian and Slavic migration 
was a natural process solely determined by socio-economic developments, without any 
monitoring from above. However, the localisation of industry in areas where there was 
a need to import raw materials, energy and labour in order to produce goods which then 
would be transported to markets a long distance away form the place of the production, 
is at least an indication of a somewhat different agenda.23 We shall discuss this 
question in some more detail in the section " below dealing with nationality 
policies in Latvia.
The significance of Soviet federalism for the formation and maintenance of 
national identity must also be commented upon. Scholars of ethnicity in multiethnic 
states have argued that the convergence of ethnic and administrative boundaries can 
facilitate politicisation of ethnicity. In the competition for the allocation of social values 
there is a tendency that when ethnicity is identified with political structures, demands 
are aggregated on ethnic rather than functional lines.24 It is, on the basis of such 
findings, relevant to ask whether Soviet federalism has had this effect.
Let us first consider some arguments weighing against such an evaluation. 
First, Soviet federalism in practice allowed only a very limited degree of autonomy to 
the federated nationalities.25 The supremacy of the central state and government was 
always insisted on, and although the state structure was supposed to accommodate 
differences in culture and interests between the nationalities, the more important party 
was by definition unitary and based on centralist principles. Second, the adoption of a 
federal constitutional structure was useful in containing nationalist sentiments. The 
granting of a right to secession gave the nationalities the impression that the federal 
arrangements were voluntary. As has already been noted, Soviet policy in practice 
recognised the legitimacy of national identity within the framework of the Soviet state, 
and in the 1970s and 80s the merger of nationalities was either not mentioned or 
relegated into the distant future. Since national identity did not seem to be fading away, 
the federal structure could be used to channel national sentiments into areas that were 
not perceived to be a threat to the regime's stability, and thereby prevent a politicisation 
of ethnicity.
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Probably the most important part of this policy was the new emphasis on 
cooptation of national elites. Whereas the central state and party institutions were 
dominated by Russians and other Slavs, the highest posts in the national republics 
would usually be held by the indigenous nationality. This would give the local 
population the impression of being ruled by their own nationality, but at the same time 
the central leadership had several means by which they could exert control: The leaders 
would usually be carefully selected by the central leadership, and even though some 
local leaders were accused of localism (mestnichestvo), most of these leaders would be 
loyal to the regime and the central leadership to which they owed their high positions. 
One of the intentions behind this policy was therefore to use the national elites as an 
instrument for conveying the political will of the central Soviet leadership to the non- 
Russian periphery. The centre also had the control mechanism through the Second 
Secretary of the republican Central Committee who would usually be a Russian or at 
least a Slav.26
Even.though, federalism was the established principle, the Soviet leadership a t. 
the same time promoted a policy of consensus based more on social than on national 
criteria. An important part of this policy was the promotion of the use of the Russian 
language in nearly all spheres of society, a policy which could facilitate the cultural 
assimilation of the nationalities.27 According to Michael Rywkin, Russian was 
assumed to be the linguafranca 'not only as an instrument of communication, but as a 
device for integrating all the nations of the USSR into one "Soviet People" '.28 Indeed, 
the number of non-Russians who were reported to know Russian increased 
considerably according to the censuses.29 A policy of economic equalisation 
(uravnilovka) of the national republics was also promoted, aiming at reducing national 
differences. People could, when reading statistical material organised according to the 
federal division, ascertain that the relative economic development in terms of material 
living conditions was proceeding faster in most of the union republics than in Russia 
proper, and this could also be confirmed by personal observation by those who had 
been to other parts of the country.30 Educational progress and economic development 
of the republics were believed by many to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
overcoming antagonistic national differences.
There are, however, other arguments and evidence indicating that the federative 
structure of the USSR facilitated rather than prevented politicisation of ethnicity. 
However formal and symbolic the institutions and the administrative framework of the 
national territories were, they provided a base where ethnic sentiments easily developed 
and could be expressed. Both the party and the state were organised according to the 
same territorial-administrative divisions (although there was no Russian Communist 
Party). In the absence of other autonomous subsystems in the social and economic 
spheres, the republican state and party structures became the only channels available for
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aggregation and articulation of national interests.31 Conflicts over investment and 
resource allocation between the republics were often seen as nationality conflicts, even 
though many of the political battles were fought undercover. Carrere d'Encausse points 
to an increasing conflict in the party leadership between the technocrats, who would 
often support claims from the republics based on economic rationality, whereas the 
established central political elite was not willing to give up any of its decision-making 
power.32 The Party gradually became less homogeneous, and the room for differences 
was utilised by local elites with national, regional or even strictly personal interests.
The policy of the cooptation of national elites also had effects which could cause 
national discontent. In several cases there was dissatisfaction among the elite of the 
predominantly Russian settler community, often counting on support from the other 
non-indigeneous nationalities.33 On some occasions the Russian elites in the republics 
would demand a larger or proportional representation in the local political leaderships. 
The federative structure, combined with the recording and publication of the nationality 
of all cadres, could sometimes make it difficult to reconcile, the conflict between the. 
titular nationalities wanting control over their territory, and other nationalities arguing 
the case for 'fair' representation in the political leadership.
It is also doubtful whether the policy of cultural and economic equalisation 
between the republics actually contributed to a harmonisation of nationality relations. 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, the proposition that modernisation, urbanisation and 
equalisation would lead to ethnic sentiments' withering away has proved wrong. On the 
contrary, there is reason to believe that there is a connection between modernisation of 
society and the increased level of ethnic identity. Instead of facilitating integration, 
modernisation can serve as a framework for ethnic sentiments. Modernisation policies 
seem to have had similar effects in the Soviet Union as in other multiethnic developing 
societies. As groups come into contact and competition with one another, ethnic 
differences are perceived. This heightens the feeling of ethnic identity of all the groups 
involved, and generally results in animosities and tensions. Greater geographical 
mixing of the various ethnic groups may even increase the level of ethnic identity.34 It 
is correct that many republics experienced economic progress under Soviet rule, and 
although the Russians were still better off than most of the other nationalities, the gap 
was being reduced. This did not, however, have the effect that these nationalities were 
satisfied with the state of affairs. Many non-Russians believed that their economic 
perspectives would have been considerably brighter without the interference from the 
centre. The growing dissatisfaction among the Russians themselves can also be seen as 
a result of perceived relative deprivation, and even though they were politically 
dominant, they were faced with increased competition from formerly subordinated
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groups. The question of the special position of the Russians will be discussed more 
thoroughly below.
To conclude, the federative system did not prevent, and in some respects seems 
to have facilitated, a politicisation of ethnicity. Especially when the legitimacy of the 
Soviet regime started to be openly questioned, the already established administrative 
organisation of the state, largely along ethnic lines, was probably a contributing factor 
in explaining why much of the opposition to the regime centred around nationality 
issues. However, it is not certain that any other form of organisation of the large 
multiethnic state would have been more successful in dealing with the nationality issue, 
and the Soviet leadership may have had a limited choice. After all, whether it was 
mostly due to outright or implied coercion, flexibility and tolerance of national 
differences, or economic progress; the Soviet Union for a long time had more success 
than many other multiethnic states in containing nationalist sentiments.35
3.3 .  The Russians and the Soviet State
Russian national identity takes many different forms, and the spectrum of 
religious, cultural and specifically nationalist attitudes among Russians is very broad 
and varied. Soviet leaders always had to take the responses of the Russians into 
account when devising a nationality policy, due to the large number and historical role 
of this nationality. At the same time, the policies of the Soviet regime have undoubtedly 
influenced and to some extent changed Russian national identity. It is hardly possible 
fully to comprehend the situation of the Russians living in Latvia today without some 
familiarity with the special role of the Russians in the Soviet empire. There is therefore 
a need for a brief discussion of the interrelationship between Soviet policies and the 
status of the Russians in the Soviet Union.
The multiethnic Soviet society, being a legacy of the Russian empire, was 
characterised by a dominant plurality core (the Russians) and an aggregate of peripheral 
groups.3 6 This opened up the way for tension between Marxist-Leninist theory on the 
national question, emphasising equality between all nationalities, and the reality of a 
historically and numerically dominant nationality, which traditionally had viewed itself 
as entitled to hegemony. When the multiethnic character of the Soviet Union was 
accepted through the formation of more or less homogeneous federal subdivisions, the 
relations of power between the union republics would necessarily have to be grossly 
asymmetrical. The dominant position of the Russians could easily awaken fears among 
subordinate groups about their very existence. Thus, when the Soviet leadership after
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Stalin sought to maintain cohesion without relying on continual repression, they had a 
difficult task.37
The legitimacy of the Soviet regime relied most of all on the loyalty of the 
Russians, and the provision of some form of concessions to Russian national feeling 
was seen as needed for their support. The result was that Russian nationalism was 
progressively integrated into the ideology. The party selected items from the Russian 
cultural and historical heritage that would serve the dynamics of the Soviet state through 
their nationalistic value. Soviet history before the Revolution became Russian history, 
and the continuity between the Russian and the Soviet empires was thereby 
emphasised. Thus, the state formed a necessary alliance with nationalism, called it 
"Soviet patriotism" (whereas real patriotism was stigmatised as "bourgeois 
nationalism"), and used it to try to legitimate the Soviet state among the Russians.38 
The victory in the Soviet War against Germany, "the Great Fatherland War", is also an 
important factor in explaining the legitimacy of the Soviet regime and the Communist 
Party among a significant proportion of the Russian population. R; G. Suny even states 
that with the Great Fatherland War, Russia (rodina) and the Soviet Union became one 
indivisible polity, and that the war became its part of the "foundation myth" of Soviet 
power 39
There are many factors suggesting an advantageous inequity for Russians in 
Soviet life. Although many Russians claim that they have always been ruled by 
foreigners40, when looking at the relative representation of the different nationalities 
within the party, KGB and military elites, one finds that there was a clear 
overrepresentation of Russians in the leaderships of all these institutions. Whereas the 
Russians in 1970 comprised 53.3 per cent of the USSR population, Russians made up 
60.9 per cent of the Union-wide party membership, 57.2 per cent of the Central 
Committee membership, and 56 per cent of the Politburo and Party Secretariat 
membership. 72.5 per cent of the members of the Council of Ministers and all but one 
Central Committee secretaries were Russians in 1972 41 However, as Panning states, 
even if the representation were ethnically representative for the USSR population, non- 
Russians would still perceive the Russians as dominant.42 Despite the policy of 
indigenisation of national elites, the Russians were also represented in large proportions 
high up in the hierarchy in the union republics, whereas the other nationalities (with the 
exception of Ukrainians and Belorussians) would usually be confined to their own 
national territory.43
The status of the Russian language is another sign that Russians had a 
privileged position in Soviet society. There is much evidence indicating that a very 
good knowledge of Russian was a prerequisite for occupying higher positions, and 
there was a tendency to make Russian the language of instruction not only in higher but 
also in secondary education. There is, of course, the case to be made that in a vast
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country like the Soviet Union it is essential to have one official language of 
government, and since more than half the population reported Russian to be their 
mother tongue, it seems natural that this language should be Russian. It has, however, 
also been argued that the great efforts made to ensure that non-Russians knew Russian 
were for their own good, since the non-Slavic population would benefit most from a 
fluent knowledge of Russian which would enable them to be more competitive with 
native speakers of Russian. W. B. Kory, arguing this point, admits that linguistic 
assimilation is the first and probably the most important step in the assimilation 
process.44 Linguistic russification policies can therefore just as well be seen first of all 
as serving the interests of the Soviet regime. The language policies were, however, also 
in the interests of the Russian population migrating to, or simply spending their 
vacations in, different parts of the Soviet Union. They could be certain that their 
language, and not the local one, would be used as the means of communication.
The particular relationship between the Russian nationality and the Soviet 
regime.is.also.illustrated by other factors. For example, of all the Soviet national 
republics, only the Russians were not granted separate party organisations and 
institutions.45 The Russian republic got their own newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya, as 
late as in 1956 46 Whether this should be seen as discrimination47, or rather a sign of 
their privileged position in the all-union party48, it all the same indicates that the 
Russians were not treated just like any other nationality.
Despite the advantageous position of the Russians in many spheres of Soviet 
life, many Russians had the feeling of being used by the regime. Their advantages 
could in many occasions also spell difficulties for the Russian ethnic group. It is open 
to question whether the Russian oligarchy in the Soviet leadership, distant and detached 
as it was from the general Russian population, should be considered its representatives. 
Nevertheless, the overrepresentation of Russians in the leadership was a reason why 
the other nationalities identified Russians with the Soviet regime, and it partly explains 
the hostility they often met in the union republics. There are numerous examples 
showing how the Russians themselves became victims of the policies of the regime. 
For all the nationalities there was an understanding that aggressive manifestations of 
ethnic self-assertion could not be accepted, but this applied even more to the Russians 
than to most of the other nationalities because of the very size of the Russian ethnic 
group. A successful nationality policy enjoying the support of all the nationalities 
would require restraint on the dominant ethnic group. Many romantic traditional and 
religious symbols of Russian ethnocentrism were suppressed, since they would 
increase the "alienness" of Russian culture for the non-Russian ethnic groups of the 
Soviet Union. Only those aspects of Russian tradition and sentiment that the authorities 
believed could infuse life into the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism were tolerated 49 
The destruction of Russian Orthodox churches was an assault on the Russian nation as
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well as on the church, and the systematic obliteration of the traditional names of ancient 
towns and regions cut off whole generations from their cultural heritage. As Denitch 
notes, the former "prison of nationalities" had become 'a prison for the ethnic Russians 
themselves'.50
As long as there was economic progress, it seems that for a majority of 
Russians these drawbacks were compensated for by the benefits provided by the 
regime. The flood of rhetorical praise for Russian virtues, the glorification of Slavonic 
messianic accomplishments, and the extension of the language were all parts of the 
'pleasure of dominance'. Western scholars have often stated that the notion of a "Soviet 
people" never became a social or psychological reality, and this is correct if we 
understand the term to mean that national identities would wither away. However, even 
if the "Soviet people" never became an objective reality for the whole population, at 
least a considerable number of Russians, whom we are interested in here, had a sense 
of pride in belonging to the Soviet state. It is important in this connection to recall the 
difference between the individual and group level of analysis which was referred, to. in 
chapter 1. For a number of Russian individuals there is likely to have been a subjective 
sense of belonging to a Soviet people, even if the concept was treated with the utmost 
suspicion by most non-Russians. Soviet "patriotism" was often combined with a 
national pride in being Russian, and there is reason to believe that national pride and 
Soviet patriotism could, as put by Azrael, in fact co-exist and be mutually 
reinforcing.51 Research on ethnicity has shown that various communal loyalties can 
operate in different yet complementary spheres of social life, and so there is no 
necessary contradiction between Russian national identity and a sense of belonging to 
the "Soviet people" 52
For many Russians the pride in being Soviet diminished with deteriorating 
social conditions, when discrepancies between growing expectations and the reality 
broadened. Rampant alcoholism, higher mortality rates and serious environmental 
problems were indications that the Russian nation itself was in danger. The Russian 
village was in a dismal state, and living conditions for many of those who went to the 
cities for a better life, often without a propiska, were not much better. Modernisation 
policies sponsored by the Soviet regime were often blamed. The decline in the ability of 
official Marxism to generate support for the Soviet system, combined with the greater 
liberties permitted under glasnost' and the increased level of expression of national 
sentiments among the other nationalities can explain the growth of Russian 
ethnocentrism.53
Russian ethnocentrism takes many different forms, and the distinction I will 
make here is an oversimplification both of the many groups involved and of individual 
positions. Nevertheless, Russian ethnocentrism can be divided into two broad groups 
which in my view illustrate its main aspects. The first group recognises the Soviet state
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as the legitimate heir of the Russian empire, but rejects Marxist-Leninist ideology, or 
pays less attention to ideologies as such, which they judge by their usefulness to the 
state.54 The second group conceives Russian ethnicity as basically cultural or spiritual 
in nature, and the main concern is the preservation of Russian national culture rather 
than the Soviet state.55 There are signs that the influence of both these groups increased 
in the 1980s, but their relative importance and support are hard to evaluate.
The more than 25 million Russians of the former Soviet Union living outside 
the RSFSR and making up 18.5 per cent of the total Russian population deserve special 
attention.56 Table 3.1. shows the distribution of Russians in the various union 
republics of the (former) USSR from 1959 to 1989 and the proportion of Russians 
seen in relation to the total population of each republic. Relatively little research has 
been carried out to investigate whether there are any distinguishing features that make 
these Russians different from those living in their traditionally ethnic homelands in 
terms of ethnic identity.57 Consequently it is important to emphasise that the 
considerations below are aimed at pointing to factors that are seen as decisive to explain, 
possible differences, and that they will not give an exhaustive answer about the extent 
to which such differences exist. There is, however, a hope that this thesis, in dealing 
particularly with one group of these Russians, can fill some of the gaps existing in 
research on this subject.
There are several factors that indicate that the Russian population in non- 
Russian areas had the ability to maintain its ethnic identity. First, the Russians were 
usually confined to the largest cities58, and the concentration of Russians in the major 
cities of the Union republics made Russians comprise more than 20 per cent of the 
population in all the capitals, with the exception of Tbilisi and Erevan.59 The Russians 
who moved to these cities therefore usually came to an established Russian or Russian- 
speaking environment, where they met with other Russians in their neighbourhood and 
their work place. It was not always necessary to interact with the indigenous 
population, and when such interaction took place, it was usually implied that Russian 
was the language of communication. The Russians also had enough Russian-language 
newspapers, periodicals and programs on radio and TV to manage without knowledge 
of the local language. The high geographical mobility of the Russian migrant population 
should also be emphasised. Many Russians did not move to another republic on a 
permanent basis, but were searching all the time for other places to move to where there 
were better material and social conditions. This made them less inclined to get rooted in
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Table 3.1: Russian Population in the USSR
Republic
1959 1970
Russian population of republic Russian population of republic
total
(1000s)
as share of 
total Russian 
population in 
the USSR
<%)
as share of 
total 
population of 
republic 
(%)
total
(1000s)
as share of 
total Russian 
population in 
the USSR
(%)
as share of 
total 
population of 
republic
(%)
RSFSR 97864 85.8 83.3 107748 83.5 82.8
Ukraine 7091 6.2 16.9 9126 7.1 19.4
Belarus 659 0.6 8.2 938 0.7 10.4
Uzbekistan 1091 1.0 13.5 1473 1.1 12.5
Kazakhstan 3974 3.5 42.7 5522 4.3 42.4
Georgia 408 0.4 10.1 397 0.3 8.5
Azerbaijan 501 0.4 13.6 510 0.4 10.0
Lithuania 231 0.2 8.5 268 0.2 8.6
Moldova 293 0.3 10.2 414 0.3 11.6
Latvia 556 0.5 26.6 705 0.5 29.8
Kirgizstan 654 0.6 31.6 856 0.7 29.2
Tajikistan 263 ' 0.2 13.3 344 0.3 11.9
Armenia 56 0.1 3.2 66 0.1 2.7
Turkmenistan 263 0.2 17.3 313 0.2 14.5
Estonia 240 0.2 20.1 335 0.3 24.7
Total 114114 129015
Republic
1979 1989
Russian population of republic Russian population of republic
total
(1000s)
as share of 
total Russian 
population in 
the USSR
(%)
as share of 
total 
population of 
republic
(%)
total
(1000s)
as share of 
total Russian 
population in 
the USSR
(%)
as share of 
total 
population of 
republic
(%)
RSFSR 113522 82.6 82.6 119866 82.6 81.5
Ukraine 10472 7.6 21.1 11356 7.8 22.1
Belarus 1134 0.8 11.9 1342 0.9 13.2
Uzbekistan 1666 1.2 10.8 1653 1.1 8.3
Kazakhstan 5991 4.4 40.8 6228 4.3 37.8
Georgia 372 0.3 7.4 341 0.2 6.3
Azerbaijan 475 0.3 7.9 392 0.3 5.6
Lithuania 303 0.2 8.9 344 0.2 9.4
Moldova 506 0.4 12.8 562 0.4 13.0
Latvia 821 0.6 32.8 906 0.6 34.0
Kirgizstan 912 0.7 25.9 917 0.6 21.5
Tajikistan 395 0.3 10.4 388 0.3 7.6
Armenia 70 0.1 2.3 52 0.0 1.6
Turkmenistan 349 0.3 12.6 334 0.2 9.5
Estonia 409 0.3 27.9 475 0.3 30.3
Total 137397 145155
Source: Compiled using data from Arutyunyan (1992), p. 19.
84
CHAPTER 3
the republic they moved to, and the local culture, history and traditions often did not 
affect or even interest them. With the exception of a few closed cities, the whole 
territory of the Soviet Union represented one single labour market.60
The maintenance of Russian identity was also facilitated by the educational 
system, where Russian children usually would attend Russian-language schools. 
Whereas the schools in the local languages, which were attended mainly by the 
indigenous population, would to a certain extent reflect local conditions, Russian- 
language schools were more or less identical all over the Soviet Union. Instead of 
emphasising the history of the region, general Soviet history was taught, which for the 
pre-revolutionary period would mean the history of Russia.
All this meant that for Russians moving to a new place of residence within the 
Soviet Union there was a familiar environment to which they could easily adapt. 
Republican borders were seen as symbolic, and only to a minor degree affected 
considerations about where to move. Only rarely did Russians assimilate to other 
nationalities, and when it happened it was mainly children of mixed marriages between 
a Russian and a representative of the indigenous population who at the age of 16 
indicated the indigenous nationality in their passport.61 Since there were also 
considerable numbers of non-Russians who migrated out of their national territories, 
these nationalities would usually use the Russian language and send their children to 
Russian schools, and there was therefore a tendency for these nationalities, and 
especially the Ukrainians and Belorussians, to assimilate to the Russian population. 
The internal passport system delayed this process somewhat, but the trend could be 
seen by looking at intermarriages, where there was a strong tendency for children of a 
non-indigenous parent and a Russian to choose Russian as their nationality.62
However, even though Russians in the union republics were able to maintain 
their ethnic identity, there are also signs that the content of this identity changed 
considerably. Modernisation and, particularly, urbanisation detached many Russians 
from their traditional homelands, and thereby from the continuity with the past. Such a 
group of people was likely to be more receptive to the continued ideological emphasis 
by the Soviet authorities upon the supposed unity of the "Soviet people". Instead of 
focusing on distinctly Russians concerns and problems, it was implicitly understood 
that Russians should ensure the stability and the welfare of the entire multiethnic state. 
The limits within which they could maintain their separate group identity were 
restricted 63 Russian identity and pride were to be satisfied through their role of being 
"first among equals", and especially those Russians living in the non-Russian republics 
would ensure that Russian attentions and energies were kept focused on the union-wide 
level.
The social role of Russians in the non-Russian republics was not limited only to 
representing statehood. In some regions, in more recent years most notably in Central
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Asia and Kazakhstan, Russians were important agents of modernisation, and were 
often seen as representatives of a more developed culture in backward and traditionalist 
regions.64 The social role of Russians in this region was naturally very different from 
their role in the Baltic republics, where modernisation had taken place at a much earlier 
stage and where Russians tended to regard the local cultures as more developed than 
their own. The actual living conditions of Russians also varied significantly from one 
republic to another, and even within the republics, determined by historical 
circumstances as well as by the social characteristics of the Russian population living 
there.
The fact that relatively few Russians outside Russia were fluent in the local 
language, and that they tended to integrate socially mostly with fellow Russians or 
other Slaves, does not imply that they had not been influenced by the local nationalities 
and their way of living. On the contrary, there is evidence showing that Russians in the 
republics often adopted values and norms of nationalities living in their local 
environment which distinguished them from Russians of the cpre:group..Russians in. 
the Baltic, for example, often felt themselves to be more westernised but also more 
reserved than their coethnics in Russia.65 There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence 
of Russians from the republics moving or travelling to the Russian Federation and 
feeling complete strangers there. At the same time, the local populations in the republics 
were usually more positive towards Russians who had lived there for a long time and 
adopted local customs, traditions and culture than towards Russians who had arrived 
more recently. In 1978 Matthews Pavlovich suggested that the Russian diaspora was in 
the process of acquiring an identity of its own, different from the Russian core group in 
Russia.66 However, although Russians lost contact 'not only with their former social 
milieu, but also with the traditional mores of Russian society', this does not seem to 
have been enough to create a sense of common identity among Russians in, for 
example, Latvia and Kazakhstan, as opposed to the identity of Russians in Russia 
itself. If Russians adopted a different identity, it was more likely to be as "Russians in 
Kazakhstan" or "Russians in Latvia" and not as much as a Russian diaspora or 
"Russians outside Russia".
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, differences between the Russian core 
group, living in traditionally Russian areas of the RSFSR, and Russians living in other 
union republics became more evident. Their reactions to the political changes and the 
many manifestations of ethnic sentiments among the non-Russian nationalities tended to 
take somewhat diverging forms. As a result of increasing ethnocentrism in the union 
republics the ethnic awareness among both groups of Russians increased as well. 
However, to Russians in the republics such an awareness was more often linked to the 
status of being non-indigenous or "Russian-speaking" than to a sense of belonging to a 
more narrowly defined Russian ethnos. Russians in Russia tended to focus mostly on
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internal Russian problems and were more concerned with the deteriorating state of 
Russia and with how to improve it, whether inside or outside a Soviet framework.67 
There was, thus, often deep discontent among core-group Russians with the empire in 
its present form. They tended to think that Russia had wasted too many resources on 
the material support of the Soviet peripheries, with the result that living conditions in 
the republics had become considerably better than in Russia itself.68 Russians living in 
the RSFSR were therefore inclined to take the position that Russia could no longer 
afford to subsidise the union republics economically. This opinion was intensified by 
what Russians believed to be a lack of gratitude among people living in the republics 
for the support they had received from Russia and a tendency to blame Russia and 
Russians for all the misfortunes which had taken place during the Soviet period.
There can be no doubt that the preservation of the Soviet Union was regarded as 
an important issue also by a large proportion of Russians living in the RSFSR. They 
were often proud of belonging to an empire which inspired a sense of greatness 
through belonging to a world super-power. However, this question was. usually not of. 
the same overriding importance to them as it was to the majority of Russians living in 
the republics. Russians in the republics tended to see their well-being as dependent on 
the continued existence of the Soviet state and the symbolic character of the borders 
between the republics. They were therefore more inclined than their coethnics in Russia 
to take an 'internationalist' position. Moreover, Russians often depended upon all- 
union structures as their source of income, and many were afraid that their future 
physical and material security would be threatened were their republic to become 
independent.
It should again be emphasised that the intention of this examination of Soviet 
nationality policy has been to provide a general picture of the conditions for the 
formation, persistence, transformation and eradication of ethnic identity among 
Russians in the Soviet Union. This is seen as necessary for an understanding of the 
situation of the Russians living in Latvia today. In such a general discussion major 
regional and individual differences and peculiarities have to be overlooked. The next 
section, dealing with Soviet nationality policy specifically towards Latvia, will 
accordingly consider these further issues in more detail.
3.4 .  Soviet Nationality Policy in Latvia
When the importance of Soviet nationality policy for ethnic identity in Latvia 
has been discussed in western literature, most scholars have concentrated on the 
implications for the Latvian ethnic group. This section, examining nationality policy in
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Latvia up to the mid-1980s, puts more emphasis on those aspects of this policy which 
are seen as likely to have influenced the Russian population living (or moving) there, 
and particularly the content and level of their ethnic self-consciousness. The analysis 
will focus on policy developments in three areas: industrialisation and immigration; 
cadre policies; and education. At the end of the section there will be an assessment of 
the impact of these policies on ethnic identification among Russians in the republic.
3 .4 .1 .  Industrialisation and Immigration
Immediately after World War II the Soviets began extensive industrialisation in 
Latvia. The republic, which already had a developed industry before the war, provided 
favourable conditions for capital investment: The level of education and training was 
higher that in most other parts of the Soviet Union, the republic represented a skilled 
labour reserve and, compared to other industrialised areas, relatively little of the well- 
developed infrastructure had been destroyed during the war.
The rapid large-scale industrialisation facilitated the integration of Latvia into the 
Soviet Union. The centralised system of planning and management was an important 
aspect of this integration, as also was the collectivization of agriculture. Centralised 
control continued into the late Gorbachev era, and figures from the early 1980s suggest 
that all key enterprises and the majority of the larger plants and factories were 
subordinated to all-union ministries or Union-republic ministries with supervising 
agencies both in Moscow and in Riga. Less than 15 per cent of industry was directly 
controlled by republican ministries.69
Industrialisation was accompanied by a large influx of immigrants, 
predominantly Russians and other Slavs. This immigration, together with low 
birthrates among Latvians, significantly changed the national composition of the 
republic, as can be seen from Figure 3.1. In 1935 the Russian share of the population 
in Latvia was 8.8 per cent, but by 1959 the share had increased to 26.6 per cent and in 
1989 it was 34.0 per cent. The total number of Russians was 4.4 times higher in 1989 
than in 1935. The share of Latvians went down from 77.0 per cent of the population in 
1935 to 62.0 per cent in 1959 and was as low as 52.0 per cent in 1989.70 It is 
noteworthy that the number of Latvians is actually lower than it was before the war. 
Immigration was particularly large in the years immediately after the war, and the
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Figure 3.1: Changes in Nationality Composition of Latvia 1897-1989
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deportations of Latvians to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union further contributed to 
intensify the changes in the national composition of the population. After Stalin's death 
in 1953, immigration largely stopped, which Misiunas and Taagepera explain as a wait- 
and-see attitude on the part of people and officials.71 In some years the outflow from 
the republic even surpassed the inflow. The leadership of the republic instituted 
registration requirements for those living in the cities, and there were also requirements 
for a knowledge of Latvian for many positions. However, in 1956 and 1957 many of 
the Latvians who had been deported just before, during and after the war returned, 
which may be one explanation why the influx of immigrants in 1956 exceeded that of 
the six preceding years combined. The new influx of immigrants, combined with the 
newly acquired republican economic powers resulting from the reforms in the mid 
1950s, is seen as one of the reasons for the nationally orientated policies that were 
articulated and implemented in the following years.72 Republican leaders, among them 
the Deputy Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, Edvards Berklavs, openly 
questioned the policy of continuous industrialisation and the mechanical growth of the 
population accompanying it.73 The Berklavs group suggested cutting back production
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in the machine building and diesel industries and increasing investments in light and 
food industry instead.74
During the purge in 1959 the party condemned these efforts to reduce the influx 
of immigrants and characterised them as a result of 'national isolation which created 
obstacles for the development of the forces of production'.75 Immigration was again 
encouraged; the annual number of immigrants can be observed in Figure 3.2. It is 
noteworthy that the number of people moving to Latvia from other republics in the 
period from 1959 to 1988 was markedly higher than the natural increase. Immigration 
accounted for 51.2 per cent of the total population growth in 1959-69, 66.7 per cent in 
1970-78 and 58.1 per cent in 1979-88 76 The Kosygin economic reforms required 
increased production through greater efficiency rather than through an increase in 
workers, and Latvian planners had considerable success in accomplishing this by 
setting maximum labour limits for all Riga industries, for example. Nevertheless, the 
population influx did not slow down, and according to Juris Dreifelds, this can partly 
be explained by. the increased demand for labour in the rapidly growing service 
sector 77
The immigration of Russians continued in the 1960s and 1970s, and the net 
immigration rate amounted at times to almost 1 per cent of the existing population per 
year. The net immigration rate is based on the difference between the number of 
immigrants and emigrants. In the 1960s and 1970s approximately 50 per cent of the 
immigrants came from the RSFSR, 15 per cent from Belorussia, 14 per cent from the 
Ukraine and 7 per cent from Lithuania 78 Many of the newcomers did not stay in Latvia 
for a long time, and the actual number of immigrants was from 1960-65 on average 
almost 48,000 a year, whereas almost 32,000 left the republic, giving an annual net 
growth of almost 16000 a year (see Figure 3.2). At the same time the rate of natural 
increase dropped from 6.7 per thousand in 1960 to a low of 1.0 per cent in 1979. The 
mechanical population growth was thereby higher than the natural increase of the 
population from 1960 to 1988. Even though the net immigration rate was lower in the 
1970s and 1980s than it was in the 1960s, immigration remained high until the end of 
the 1980s, and in 1990 net immigration was, for the first time since the 1950s, 
negative.
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Figure 3.2: Annual Net Im m igration to Latvia (1950-1992).
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There is some disagreement among scholars regarding the question of whether 
the large influx of Russians into Latvia was caused by a deliberate policy devised by the 
Soviet authorities for russification purposes, or whether this immigration can be 
explained by strictly socio-economic factors. Some do not believe that there was a 
planned policy for the russification of Latvia, and argue that the immigration was 
caused by an acute demand for labour supply in industry, caused by the low birth rates 
in Latvia. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence to support such an opinion. For 
example, immigration was larger in Estonia and Latvia than it was in Lithuania, and 
there seems to be no rational reason why the Soviet authorities would want to russify 
only two of the three Baltic republics. The lower number of immigrants to Lithuania 
can be explained by different socio-econom ic conditions in the three republics. 
Lithuania had not undergone the same level of industrialisation as the two other 
republics before the war, and the priority of the Soviet authorities was to invest in areas 
where the expected return on investment would be the highest. When industrialisation 
in Lithuania started to expand after Stalin's death, the republic also had a sufficient
year
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supply of labour from its large rural population, since Lithuania for a long time had a 
much higher birth rate than both Latvia and Estonia.79
Apart from in the late 1940s, when some of the immigration into Latvia was 
involuntary, in the form of functionaries assigned and forced labour dispatched to the 
republic, most of the immigration was voluntary. Such immigration can be explained 
by the favourable social and material living conditions in the republic compared to many 
other republics of the Soviet Union.80 It is usually acknowledged that the Baltic 
republics enjoyed the highest standard of living in the Soviet Union81, and the Baltic 
republics also attracted many citizens from other republics by their more Western 
atmosphere and way of life. These republics were commonly referred to in the rest of 
the Soviet Union as "sovetskayazagranitsa" (the Soviet abroad).
Many analysts still believe that there were motives other than considerations of 
pure economic profitability underlying the policy of large-scale industrialisation. 
Latvian emigre A. Side in 1965 argued that one of the concealed aims behind the 
industrialisation of Latvia was to enable a Russian labour force to flow into the 
republic.82 He is supported by Lubova Zfle, who argues that the policy of the 
Communist Party was aimed at the destruction of the national identity of all Soviet 
nationalities, and Russians were used for this purpose when they were sent into all the 
republics in order to Russify them. The party leaders, according to Zfle, believed that a 
sizeable Russian section of the population in each republic would be a stabiliser which 
would lessen the national identity of the indigenous population and suppress outbursts 
of nationalist sentiment.83 Misiunas and Taagepera argue that the industrial proletariat 
was seen by the Soviet leadership as superior to the peasantry and more supportive of 
the Soviet regime, and they therefore believe that one of the aims behind 
industrialisation in the Baltic area was to stabilise the former independent countries.84
What, then, is the evidence suggesting that the influx of Russians was part of a 
deliberate policy of russification, other than the proposition that a large Russian 
settlement in Latvia was politically very convenient for the authorities? Writers on the 
subject have usually not denied that, given the location of large-scale industry in Latvia, 
there was a need for labour supplies from outside. However, the economic rationale 
behind the location of so much industry in Latvia, where there was a lack of labour, 
raw materials and energy, and usually a long distance from the markets where the 
products were sold, has been questioned. One example of 'ill-fated' policies was the 
building of a giant textile mill in Ogre, a small town not far from Riga. Nearly all the 
workers were reported to be non-Latvians who had been imported mainly from Russia 
and the two other Slavic republics. The mill obtained nearly all its raw materials from 
Central Asia or from overseas, and the production was sold primarily outside the 
republic.85 The cost of many of the projects in terms of ecological and environmental 
destruction was, according to critics, not integrated into the favourable figures that the
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Soviet authorities and local party leaders would refer to when they were supplying 
evidence of rapid economic growth in the republic. The events of the late 1950s also 
indicate that republican leaders, had they been in control, would have devised another 
policy with more emphasis on the light and food industries and production for the 
republic's home market.
The system of so-called orgnabor " (organised recruitment of labour), which 
took place in the three Slavic republics in order to tempt workers to settle in Latvia, is 
another indication of intentional russification. Job vacancies in Latvia were often better 
advertised in Russian cities than in the republic itself. It is not seen as a coincidence that 
it was the Slavic population, thought to be the most loyal to the Soviet regime, which 
was subject to such recruitment initiatives.86
It is hardly possible fully to evaluate the degree to which the large influx of 
Russians into Latvia was part of a deliberate policy of russification of the republic. 
What is clear, however, is that migration processes are not immune to politics, since 
different policies in this area, with a different pace of industrialisation, different 
requirements on residence permits, and a different recruitment policy would certainly 
have had an impact on the number of immigrants. As we have seen, there is evidence 
suggesting that immigration to Latvia was a natural process in many respects, since 
very few Russians were sent into the republic by force. At the same time few if any 
measures were employed by the Soviet authorities to restrict such immigration, and it 
therefore seems that a high number of Russians and other Slavs in Latvia was seen in 
Moscow official circles as a desirable development.
Scholarly differences on questions of migration have also been reflected in 
popular attitudes among the population of Latvia. According to Dzintra Bungs, the 
perceptions of migration among Latvians and non-Latvians have been vastly different. 
Whereas most newcomers to Latvia (predominantly Russians) would see migration as a 
normal process 'associated with the chance to improve their standard of living and 
enjoy a more westernised way of live', Latvians, in contrast, 'associate migration with 
all those policies from Moscow that fostered the russification of Latvia'.87 In the same 
article, however, Bungs refers to an opinion poll conducted in 1989 where 79.1 per 
cent of the respondents said that migration should be halted.88 This suggests a negative 
attitude to migration not only among Latvians, but also among a large number of non- 
Latvians and even among people who had earlier immigrated to Latvia themselves. 
Shortages in housing and consumer goods, which have often been perceived as a result 
of the increasing mechanical growth of the population, have affected Latvians and 
Russians alike. Differing popular views on the question of migration should therefore 
be explained not so much by nationality differences as by the interests of individuals 
connected with opportunities for free settlement in all parts of the (former) Soviet 
Union.
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3 .4 .2 .  Cadre Policies
In an analysis of nationality policy in Latvia one cannot overlook the importance 
of cadre policies, since it is often assumed that the more strongly a nationality is 
represented in the leadership, the more responsive the leadership would normally be to 
the ethnopolitical claims of that nationality. Some caution must, however, be exercised 
in order not to arrive at hasty conclusions about nationality representation and actual 
political influence. As Rasma Karklins has noted, Soviet biographical data about the 
nationality of people in leadership positions are based on their administrative 
identification in their internal passports, and do not necessarily reflect their self- 
identification. Moreover, even if a leader identifies with a certain nationality, his 
ethnopolitical profile may not correspond to his ethnic identity.89 We have already seen 
that the Soviet regime relied on cooptation of native elites in the republics, and a high 
level of representation of the indigenous nationality may merely signify that such a 
policy has been successful. At the same time there are many cases where seemingly 
well coopted native elites have become advocates of national causes, and on such 
occasions it seems that the share of national leaders in the leadership has played a 
significant role. Some statistical material on nationality representation in the leadership 
of Latvia is therefore useful, but the following examination of cadre developments in 
Latvia will also introduce factors illustrating that the share of the different nationalities 
in the Latvian leadership has not always reflected ethnopolitical influence.
At the time of the annexation of Latvia, its Communist Party was negligible, 
with only one thousand members.90 By 1946 the number had increased ten times, and 
approximately half of the members were Latvian.91 A large proportion of these 
Latvians were, however, so-called "Russian Latvians"; i.e, Latvians who were children 
of the old Latvian Bolsheviks, educated and socialised in the Soviet Union, and 
returned to Latvia after Soviet control was established there. Most of these Latvians, 
estimated to be about one hundred thousand people92, were considered to be 
particularly loyal to the Soviet regime. They often did not know the Latvian language, 
and were unfamiliar with Latvian culture and traditions. According to Juris Dreifelds, 
many of them seemed to be ’more russified than the Russians'.93 Such "Russian 
Latvians" were considered by the Soviet authorities to be very suitable for filling key 
positions, because they would give the impression that a large part of the leadership 
was indigenous, whereas they were much easier to integrate into the ruling apparatus 
than native-born Latvians. Their loyalty to the Soviet cause was the most important 
qualification for their appointments, and made cooptation an easy task. It should,
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however, be emphasised that there was a big variation in the social composition and 
political outlook of the "Russian Latvians".94
Due to the lack of indigenous cadres in Latvia, during the first years of Soviet 
rule most of the leaders were brought in from other parts of the Soviet Union. Thus, at 
the beginning of 1953 the share of Latvians in the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Latvia was 38.9 per cent, in the Latvian Council of Ministers 43.9 per cent; 
and 34 per cent of the Party's district and city committees' secretaries were Latvians.95 
Were it not for the "Russian Latvians", the Latvian share would have been even lower. 
However, destalinisation brought radical changes in the composition of the republic's 
elite. Latvians started to join the Party, and Russian functionaries were gradually 
pushed out. Towards the end of 1958 the most important decision-making body in the 
republic, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, had out of ten 
members, only one Russian 96 At the same time there was a shift of emphasis from the 
"Russian Latvians" to the indigenous group of old communists who had remained in 
Latvia during the years of independence. The new forces in the local ruling apparatus 
promoted policies that were not approved by or were even opposed to the policies of 
the central Soviet leadership.
After the attempts at reform by the "Berklavs group" were stopped, the local 
ruling apparatus was purged periodically until 1962, and the new leaders were in many 
respects different from the leaders in the late 1950s. The purges had made the new 
leaders reluctant to articulate national interests explicitly. The privileges and relatively 
high level of social security provided to the elite of functionaries as long as they did not 
'experiment' were also important.97 The "Russian Latvians", who were preferred by 
the Soviet leadership, became more influential again. In the 1970s the Party leader, the 
Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet were all 
Latvians who had come from Russia with a minimal knowledge of Latvian.98 The 
share of Latvians in the top political leadership of the republic went down. In the early 
1970s only 42 per cent of the seats in the Central Committee of the party were occupied 
by Latvians99 Still, many party and government positions retained a high 
representation of Latvians; 73 per cent of district chairmen and 71 per cent of the 
Council of Ministers had Latvian names, and 72 per cent of the members of the 
Supreme Soviet were Latvians.100 It has not been established how many of these 
Latvians were actually bom in the republic or spoke Latvian. A study from Riga in 
1967-68, however, suggested that people bom outside Latvia were proportionally 
better represented in higher positions in the republic, and similarly the locally bom were 
underrepresented in leadership positions.101
There are no exact figures for the share of Russians in the Latvian Communist 
Party, but the share of Latvians has been suggested in figures from 1966 and 1973, 
indicating that respectively 33 and 43-46 per cent of Party members were Latvians.102
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The percentage of the population in Latvia that was recruited to Communist Party 
membership continued to be lower than the USSR average, but this does not seem to 
apply to the Russians living in the republic. Even though no accurate data are available 
for explaining the low level of Party membership among Latvians, various reasons 
have been suggested. First, there was never a large communist movement in Latvia, 
and despite the fact that the Communist Party was traditionally larger here than in 
Estonia and Lithuania, it seems that the interest among Latvians in Party membership 
was low. This lack of interest may also be explained by a lower degree of legitimacy 
for the Soviet regime among Latvians than among other nationalities living in the 
republic. Second, since admission to the Party was regulated, there can also have been 
a lack of candidates that were seen as worthy of becoming members. Moreover, 
compared to most of the other nationalities living in Latvia, Latvians more often live in 
the countryside, where the number of Party members was usually lower than in urban 
areas.
The subjective evaluation of cadre policies is also of great importance. 
However, there is very little material on the different nationalities' perceptions of the 
representation of their own and other nationalities in leading positions. In an interesting 
survey of predominantly Jewish and Russian emigrants to the United States from 1979 
to 1982 Rasma Karklins found that the respondents perceived that Russians had better 
access to government and Party positions in the RSFSR, and the same applied to the 
titular nationalities of their respective republics. However, Latvia was one of the two 
republics where Russians were seen as holding an equal or even superior position.103
There are many reasons why different nationalities tend to view cadre policies 
differently, and, as Karklins notes, what is regarded as just is often subjective and 
dependent on context.104 In the case of Latvia, Russian and other immigrants have 
tended to favour proportional representation, using arguments of equality. Latvians, on 
the other hand, have been inclined to argue that they, as the indigenous nationality, 
should have some overrepresentation. This has been of particular importance to many 
Latvians, since their share of the population has decreased in their own republic, and 
many have felt a threat of national extinction.
3 .4 .3 .  Education
The educational system is generally acknowledged to be one of the most 
important state instruments for socialisation, and policies in this sphere undoubtedly 
influence both national identity and nationality relations. In the period of Latvian 
independence there was a 12-year school system and, as was described in Chapter 2, a 
considerable number of different schools for ethnic minorities, and also many private
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schools. The Soviet reorganisation was aimed at the integration of schools in Latvia 
into the Soviet 11-year school system. Private and national schools were closed, and 
schools in the republic were divided into schools with Russian or Latvian language of 
instruction respectively. Drastic revisions were introduced in the curicula, where 
"unsuitable subjects" were dropped.
The Khrushchev school reform of 1958 suggested that the formerly compulsory 
second language training in all schools was to be made optional.105 This implied that 
the Latvian language would become a voluntary subject in Russian-language schools, 
whereas Latvians would no longer be obliged to study Russian. In Latvia there was 
great opposition to this reform, and the nationally-minded republican leaders defended 
the compulsory study of Latvian as well as of Russian. They feared that the local 
language would be dropped by many pupils in the Russian-language schools, were 
they given the choice. At the same time Latvian children who did not choose Russian- 
language schools would have problems in obtaining higher education and in the army, 
and their career opportunities in general would be reduced.106 Latvia was thus one. of. 
the two republics (the other one was Azerbaijan) which did not at first pass the law 
proposed by Khrushchev. On the contrary, in March 1959 the Supreme Soviet of 
Latvia increased the number of compulsory hours for the study of the Latvian language, 
as well as of Latvian literature, history and geography for the Russian-language 
schools.107
However, education policies in Latvia were aligned with education policies in 
the rest of the Soviet Union after the purge of the "Berklavs group". Training in a 
second language became voluntary, and the study of Russian was given a more 
preferential treatment throughout the school system. In Russian-language schools the 
number of hours for studying Latvian was gradually decreased, whereas in Latvian- 
language schools more time was devoted to Russian than to the native language.108 A 
10-year curriculum was introduced in 1964 in all Latvian schools, but in 1965 the 11- 
year curriculum was reintroduced in Latvian schools where the language of instruction 
was not Russian. However, most of the extra time was reported to be allocated to the 
study of Russian.109 There is little statistical material on the number of pupils who 
opted out of either Russian or Latvian language lessons. The material available clearly 
indicates, however, that the majority of Latvians did study Russian.110 There seems to 
have been considerable pressure on Latvians to become bilingual, both because of the 
better prospects for the future for those who knew Russian, and because of the 
psychological pressure which was put on those "bourgeois nationalists" who did not 
study the language of "internationalist communication".111 Russians did not come 
under the same pressure to study Latvian, although knowledge of Latvian was 
recommended. Latvian received, for example, less attention in Russian schools in 
1972-73 than did any other "foreign language" available.112 The low number of
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Russians who reported knowledge of Latvian in the censuses of 1970 and 1979 
indicates that teaching of Latvian in Russian schools was not taken seriously. For 
example, whereas 47 per cent of Latvians reported fluency in Russian in 1970 and 60 
per cent in 1979, only 18 and 22 per cent respectively of Russians reported a 
knowledge of Latvian.113 In the Russian-language schools very little time was devoted 
to study of the local history, geography and culture, and many pupils in these schools 
also regarded such topics as 'of no use in practical life'.114
Both Russians and Latvians would normally attend a school with instruction in 
their mother tongue, although this tendency was stronger for Russians than for 
Latvians. However, members of other nationalities had only the choice between 
schools using the Latvian or the Russian language. In Latvia a majority of such children 
would attend Russian-language schools, which parents often preferred since they were 
regarded as a means of broadening career opportunities for their children on an all- 
union level.115 With the socialisation potential of the school system, these children 
were not only subject to Russian influence in linguistic terms, but the schools often 
defined the environment for social interaction. What developed was a Russian-speaking 
community, consisting of many different nationalities, but with common group 
characteristics in terms of value system, outlook and social norms. This community, 
although dominated by Russians, was only to a minor degree centred around a 
traditional Russian national culture, and the schools emphasised 'internationalist' 
attitudes. The school system therefore facilitated linguistic, and to a certain extent 
cultural, assimilation between Russians and other nationalities. However, since 
Latvians would usually have their own schools, where they interacted in a 
predominantly Latvian environment, the school system at the same time contributed to 
the preservation of a Latvian national identity.
Another aspect of the school policy of the 1960s was an increasing number of 
so-called mixed schools (smeshannye shkoly). In spite of the name, these schools do 
not signify that Russian and Latvian pupils attended the same classes, as formal 
teaching periods were held separately for each language group. In 1967 out of a total of 
1500 schools, 240 of them were mixed, i.e. bilingual116, but these schools tended to 
be larger than other schools, so the share of children attending such schools was 
higher.117 The experience of these mixed schools was, indeed, mixed. The idea was 
that closer contact between pupils and teachers of different nationalities would further 
'internationalism', and officially such schools were often declared to be a great 
success.118 Most observers today, on the other hand, believe that mixed schools as 
they were practised in Latvia did not facilitate any friendship between the 
nationalities.119 The presence of two separate groups within the same school building 
often intensified the pupils' perception of two antagonistic groups; ''we” against 
"them". This also corresponds with the findings which were referred to in the first
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chapter, that greater contacts between ethnic groups under certain conditions tend to 
strengthen rather than lessen ethnic identity, and may strain group relations.
3.5.  Conclusion: Soviet Nationality Policy and the Effect on Russian 
Ethnic Identity in Latvia
It is, of course, difficult to assess the precise impact of the policy trends 
discussed in this chapter on the national identification of Russians in Latvia. 
Nevertheless, some aspects of these policies appear to have worked for the maintenance 
of a Russian identity. The large and increasing number of Russian immigrants into the 
major Latvian cities prevented a dramatic change of environment for the majority of 
those Russians who arrived in the republic, and Russian-language schools, almost 
identical to the schools in the rest of the Soviet Union, further facilitated their children's 
socialisation into such a Russian environment.
Russians living in Latvia were continuously praised for their contribution to the 
considerable achievements of the republic. The role of the Russians in the liberation of 
Latvia from Nazi occupation has been particularly emphasised. Many Russians, thus, 
gradually became convinced that their presence in the republic was also to the advantage 
of the Latvian nation.120 Since they were treated as an "elder brother" of the other 
nationalities, many Russians also developed a sense of being "masters" of the republic 
and of the whole country.121 A privileged status for the Russian language and a high 
proportion of Russians in the Party leadership were therefore regarded as a natural state 
of affairs.
Figures for intermarriage, language use and demographic changes which will be 
presented in later chapters further indicate the maintenance of a Russian national identity 
in Latvia. However, the content of this national identity seems to have changed 
significantly. The reasons for such changes, which first were discussed on a union- 
wide level, also seem to apply to Latvia. Many Russian immigrants coming to Latvia 
lost their attachment to their ethnic homelands, their religion and their cultural 
traditions. An 'internationalist' outlook and attitudes were expected by Russians in 
exchange for a relatively privileged position in the republic. Even though most 
Russians continued to identify themselves as Russians in the censuses, many of them 
did not, in practice, regard themselves primarily as representatives of the Russian 
nation, but rather as representatives of the Soviet state.
Some analysts have, correctly, argued that ethnic Latvians in the republican 
leadership did not necessarily represent the interests of their nationality.122 It should, 
however, be emphasised that this also seems to be the case with Russians and ethnic
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Russian leaders, both in Riga and in Moscow. There was often pressure on all leaders 
to enact policies intended to weaken any and all national identity. Many Russians 
undoubtedly gained from the policies of the leadership, but the same can be said about a 
large number of Latvians who were loyal to the regime. There are cases of Russians in 
Latvia and in the other Baltic republics who were recruited into work in local industry 
and also were offered new flats, whereas many indigenous people had to wait for 
twenty years or more to get an apartment.123 On the other hand, it has also been argued 
that many Latvians deliberately avoided employment in industry, where there would 
often be obsolete equipment, a lack of catering - and other facilities, and often 
monotonous work and inconvenient shifts.124 If we disregard material living 
conditions, both Latvians and Russians also suffered from the policy of sovietisation 
and the attempts to create an 'internationalist', socialist, secularised culture. This culture 
naturally contained more elements from Russian than from Latvian culture, due to the 
dominant position of the Russians in Soviet society. However, in so far as Russian 
culture was promoted, it was a crippled and impoverished version of it.
This chapter has for the most part dealt with Soviet nationality policies in the 
pre-Gorbachev era. During this period the ethnic composition of Latvia changed 
dramatically, and this is one of the main reasons why ethnopolitical issues are of such 
major importance in Latvia today. The reforms under Gorbachev were crucial, since the 
new freedoms could be exploited by the national leadership in the union republics to 
seek greater autonomy from Moscow. However, it would lead too far to discuss in 
detail the changes which took place in Soviet nationality policies under Gorbachev, and 
even more so as the main trends of these policies should already be familiar to the 
readers of this thesis. For our purposes I therefore believe it is more appropriate now to 
proceed to nationality policies in Latvia from the late 1980s onwards, although one 
should bear in mind that these policies, at least initially, were designed within the 
context of Gorbachev's reforms.
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4. Latvian Ethnopolitics 1988-93
4 .1 .  Introduction
With the formation of popular movements in the Baltic States in the late 1980s 
and the gradual decline in the influence of the Communist Party, both within the 
republics themselves and in Moscow, the ethnopolitical situation in the three countries 
changed dramatically. The popular movements were soon to test, and on several 
occasions to stretch, the limits of glasnost' and perestroika. Initially the setting up of 
such popular movements had been encouraged by Moscow as a basis for promoting the 
cause of economic reform in the region. However, what started off as relatively modest 
requests for changes within the system soon developed into a movement for 
fundamental social transformations and, ultimately, independent statehood. Such 
transformations clearly went far beyond the changes Gorbachev had envisaged when he 
initiated the reforms. The new freedoms were soon to be taken for granted, and it 
proved to be impossible for Moscow to control the course of events.
This chapter deals with Latvian nationality policies in the period from the first 
initiatives for the foundation of a popular front in the early summer of 1988 and the 
elections to the new Latvian parliament, the Saeima, five years later. The new 
nationality policies in Latvia had a great impact on ethnic identification among Russians 
in the republic. Such policies were undoubtedly influenced by tactical considerations 
concerning how to win support for the movement and the degree to which it was 
feasible to challenge Moscow, but there can similarly be no doubt that in most respects 
the agenda for the nationalities policies and the direction in which to proceed were 
defined in Latvia itself. Latvian nationality policies will therefore for the greater part in 
this chapter be treated as an autonomous force, and programmes and political actions 
will be analysed in accordance with their face value, with only a few references to 
possible hidden agendas and tactical considerations. This also seems to be the best 
approach in order to understand how Russians themselves perceived the changes taking 
place in Latvian society.
In this chapter there is no attempt at providing a comprehensive account of all 
events related to nationality policies in Latvia in the above-mentioned period, as this 
would lead too far. Instead, the chapter seeks to discuss some of the main elements of 
these policies by focusing on certain relevant issues. One should, however, not 
completely ignore the time factor, because nationalities policies in Latvia changed 
significantly over this period. This also makes it appropriate to ask whether a 
periodisation of Latvian nationality policies at this time can be attempted.
The first section of the chapter looks at the background to the emergence of the 
Popular Front (Latvijas Tautas Fronte - LFT ), and seeks mainly to address the
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question of what role the ethnic factor played in the LTPs quest for self-determination. 
This section will focus on the tension between an ethnic and a territorial concept of the 
state in forming Latvian nationality policies. A central question concerns whom the LTF 
leaders and activists considered to be the "real owners" of Latvia.
Citizenship has emerged as perhaps the most hotly contested issue in Latvian 
politics over recent years, and the second section focuses on the citizenship debate in 
Latvia. The question of who should and who should not become a citizen affects all 
ethnic groups but, since Russians make up the largest group of non-citizens, the issue 
is politically most problematic and has the greatest disruptive potential among the 
Russian diaspora. The section will, thus, concentrate mainly on the ethnic dimension of 
the citizenship issue.
Section three deals with three other relevant ethnopolitical issues in Latvia in 
this same period. I shall first look at the language issue by focusing on the language 
law of 1989 and subsequent amendments to this law. Then the section examines the 
idea of national cultural autonomy and Latvian legislation in this field. Finally, the 
questions of entering of nationality (ethnicity) into Latvian passports and of the right 
freely to choose one's nationality will be discussed.
Throughout the chapter a general trend towards the radicalisation of Latvian 
ethnopolitics can be appreciated. In the concluding section of the chapter I shall 
therefore present some theories as to why such a movement in an ethnocratic direction 
has taken place in Latvian ethnopolitics.
4.2 .  The Popular Movement and Nationality Issues
Although the structural conditions for the politicisation of nationalism had been 
present in Latvia for a long time1, it was Gorbachev's reforms from above which made 
it possible for a popular movement with nationalist aspirations to emerge. Starting in 
1986, a period of national awakening can be identified, when the Latvian population 
used the policies of glasnost' to rediscover its history and to express its grievances 
publicly. The emphasis on demokratizatsiya in Gorbachev's programme of reforms 
was particularly welcomed by the Latvian population, who attached a great deal of 
emotional significance to the period of "democratic rule" in the interwar period.
The authorities in Moscow seem at first to have been sympathetic to, and even 
to have encouraged, the idea of setting up organisations in the Baltic republics which 
could boost radical economic and social reform, since the three republics were regarded 
as the most likely to implement such reforms successfully. The founding of the Popular 
Front of Latvia took place in October 1988, a few months after a similar popular
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movement had been founded in Estonia. As in Estonia, the creative intelligentsia played 
an important role in the process of setting up the organisation, and a plenum at the 
Writers' Union of Latvia in June 1988 spurred the establishment of a Popular Front in 
Latvia.2 The goal of the LTF was to press for radical reforms, but it was emphasised 
that such reforms would take place within the framework of all-union perestroika.
The nationality policy of the LTF was outlined in the programme adopted at the 
first congress.3 It is worth noting that the name of the movement was deliberately 
chosen so that it would reflect territory rather than ethnicity. The LTF thought it to be 
necessary completely to revise the nationality policies which were being practised, 
which were said to be based on Stalinist dogmas and doctrines. The movement came 
out in support of basing nationality relations on the Leninist principles of self- 
determination and equality among nations within the Soviet Union.4
The special status of the Latvian nation in Latvia was emphasised in the 
programme: the
H<£>/1 HCXOflHT H3 T o ro , HTO JiaTHIHCKHH HapO^l HMeeT B 
p e c n y b jiH K e  c t a f y c  k op eH H oft HaitHHi h6o /laTBH H  
HBJIHeTCH HCTOpHMeCKOH T eppH TO pH eH  JiaTHHICKOrO 
H a p o a a , eflHHCTBeHHHM MecTOM b M n p e, r ,q e  M oryT  
COXpaHHTbCH H p a 3BHBaTbCfl JiaTHUICKaH HaiJHfl, H3HK H 
jiaTHiucKafl K yjib T yp a .5
Against this background the programme stipulated that, in accordance with the national 
self-determination of the Latvian people, there should be a proviso which guaranteed a 
majority of ethnic Latvians in all local and republican councils in Latvia. It was 
implicitly understood that the "non-natives" would have to accept the priority of the 
natives, and that these "non-natives" were to play a less important role than ethnic 
Latvians in the process of self-determination.
Although the role of the Latvian language and culture were emphasised in the 
LTF programme, the movement was also concerned with the "ethnic interests" of other 
nationalities. In this connection, the self-preservation of the various nationalities living 
in Latvia was seen as dependent upon the republic's sovereignty. Uncontrolled 
immigration was attacked, in the context of the critical demographic situation in the 
republic. It was stressed that no nationalities would be deported from the republic. 
However, the programme at the same time read that the
H<£>71 npH 3H B aeT  npaBHTenbCTBO JlaTBHHCKoft CCP k  
coTpyflHHM ecTBy c npaBHTejibCTBaMH f lp y r a x  pecnybjiH K  c  
TeM , h t o 6 h  Ha npHHHHne aodpoBOJibHOCTH noMOHb 
>KepTBaM CTaJIHHCKOH HaUHOHaJIbHOH nOJIHTHKH BepHyTbCH  
Ha CBOK) pOflHHy.6
Although the LTF was open to all nationalities, there was an overwhelming 
majority of Latvians at its founding congress.7 At this congress some of the resolutions 
were perceived by many non-Latvians as evidence that the organisation was first of all a
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pressure group for ethnic Latvians. In resolution No. 8, for example, which was aimed 
at restricting Russian immigration, Russians were described as 'a huge mass of badly 
qualified and uncultured people', and as such posing a direct threat to vital Latvian 
interests.8 Similar attitudes were expressed by some, but far from all, leading LTF 
spokesmen, and this may have been one of the reasons for the low support for the 
organisation among Russians and other non-Latvians in its first year of its existence. A 
poll taken in late 1988 indicated that the LTF enjoyed the support of 74 per cent of 
ethnic Latvians but of only 10 per cent of Russians in the republic.9 The membership of 
the organisation was not exclusively Latvian, though: non-Latvians made up 10-15 per 
cent of the members of the LTF.10
There were also many LTF spokesmen who thought the pro-Latvian bias to be 
unfortunate, and who tried to integrate the national minorities under the LTF umbrella. 
In November 1988 Latvia's Association of National-Cultural Societies (in Russian it 
went under the acronym ANKOLn ) was set up under the auspices of the front. One 
month later the LTF, in cooperation with the Communist Party of Latvia, took the 
initiative to set up a Nationalities' Forum, seen as a setting in which the various 
nationalities living in Latvia could express their grievances and discuss their problems 
and concerns.12 It was believed that by taking an interest in the cultural development of 
the national minorities one would expand the support base for the Front and avoid a 
political split between the Latvian and non-Latvian parts of the population.13 These 
initiatives were also commonly used for propaganda purposes as evidence that the 
presence of a popular front, far from being harmful to the interests of the Russian- 
speaking population, actually ensured the protection of the interests of the ethnic 
minorities.
The Front, moreover, sought to reach non-Latvian Russian-speakers through its 
weekly newspaper Atmoda, which was published in both Latvian and Russian. 
Although the main bulk of the materials in the two editions was identical, the Russian 
edition contained articles which were aimed specifically at informing the Russian part of 
the population about Latvian history, culture and traditions: issues which it was thought 
that many Russians in Latvia were not too familiar with.14 Similarly the Russian edition 
contained articles which dealt with topics such as the Russian Orthodox Church, 
ancient Russian traditions and Russian national identity.15
This first period of the LTF's existence was characterised by an intense national 
awakening among the Latvian population. What is interesting, in this connection, is that 
a similar national awakening was also expected from the other nationalities living in 
Latvia. National nihilism was seen as an evil, and to possess a strong national identity 
was regarded as the natural state of a human being, although during the years of Soviet 
rule such a national or ethnic identity had been under great pressure.16 The situation for 
Russians was thought to be particularly difficult: it was argued that the Soviet regime
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had succeeded in depriving large segments of the ethnic Russian population of their 
ethnic identity, and that a majority of Russians therefore did not possess such an 
identity.17
This lack of ethnic identity also explained why so many Russians had left their 
"homeland" and moved to other areas of the USSR where material living conditions 
were better. As a well-known Latvian poet, Knuts Skuenieks, put it:
... MHe n p eflC T aB jraeT C fl, h t o  pyccK H H  H a p o a  H3 Bcex 
OCTaJIbHbIX H a X O flH T C fl B CaMOM IIJiaHeBHOM nOJIOXCeHHH.
Bo t  CBH^eiejibCTBO TOMy: ceftH a c  okojio  6 0  m h jijih o h o b  
(sic) - a  t o  h  6 o j ib iu e  ( s i c ! )  - p yccK H X  >KHByT 3a  
n p e^ ejia M H  C B oefl p o a h h n .  HaM x a x  M aJioM y H a p o a y  
xaxceT C H  n p o c T O  HenoHHTHW M T a x o e  n o B a j ib H o e  
OTcyTCTBHe 3 JieM eH TapH oro naipH O TH 3Ma. ... (Mh) B c e -  
TaKH p a ccM a T p H B a eM  H aitH O H ajibH iiH  a cn eK T  x a x  
o n p e a e j ie H H y io  $ o p M y  p e a j ib H o r o  caM O BbipaxceH H H  
H ejioB exa , KOJiJieKTHBa.18
A common view among both Russians and Latvians supporting the LTF and the idea 
of Latvian sovereignty was that the question of Latvian independence should.be decided 
exclusively by the Latvian nation itself (ethnic Latvians). Consequently, Russians 
living in Latvia should support the Latvians in their struggle for such sovereignty, or at 
least not interfere.19 In line with Lenin's principles on the national question, the 
struggle of small nations for their national self-determination was considered to be both 
legitimate and justified. There were also analysts who based their arguments in support 
of Latvia's or the Latvians' right to self-determination - sometimes it was specified that 
this was the exclusive right of the indigenous population of Latvia - on international 
principles which were stipulated in documents of the United Nations and other 
international organisations.20
The signals given to the ethnic minorities were thus from the very start not 
uniform, and there appeared to be certain tensions between nationalist radicals and more 
centrist LTF leaders in their approach to the Russian question. The fact that there were, 
indeed, forces in Latvian politics that would like to see most Russian immigrants leave 
Latvia was exploited in parts of the Russian-language press, which often cited the most 
extreme articles in Latvian nationalist newspapers in order to discredit the popular 
movement as a whole.21
There were two additional events in Latvia which made Russians more cautious 
about supporting the popular movement. Many Russians felt uneasy about the initiative 
in the spring of 1989 of some pro-independence organisations to found a movement of 
citizens of the interwar Republic of Latvia and their direct descendants with the aim of 
conducting a referendum among such citizens on independence.22 Although the 
citizens' committees did not receive full backing from the LTF, many LTF leaders
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refused to distance themselves from the Committee and its political goals, and Russians 
often did not differentiate between the two movements.
The second shock to many Russians was the surprising move of the Popular 
Front leadership in late May of the same year to call for a discussion of whether 
"sovereignty" within the Soviet Union, which had been the official goal of the 
movement, should not be replaced with a demand for full political independence from 
the USSR.23 Many Russians were unprepared for this step, and the radicalisation of 
the movement and the general mood among the Latvian population convinced a greater 
number of Russians that if Latvia were to become an independent state, their own role 
in this state would be one of second-class citizens.
However, by the summer of 1989 the LTF put more emphasis on gaining the 
support of the ethnic minorities for the independence struggle, so that the popular 
movement would become a real mass movement. They were quite successful in this 
respect, and some Russians who had formerly been sceptical of the popular movement 
now became convinced that an independent Latvia would become a democratic state 
where the interests of all nationalities were going to be protected. The LTF leadership 
emphasised that although the organisation was in favour of full independence for 
Latvia, it gave priority to the parliamentary route, through the elections to the republican 
Supreme Council in the spring of 1990, in order to achieve this goal.24 All permanent 
residents of Latvia would have the right to take part in these elections.
A publication on interethnic relations of July 1989, 'The Latvian Popular 
Front's ideological platform, based on the idea of creating an independent and 
democratic Latvia, for the consolidation of various nationalities living in Latvia', gives 
an illustration of the more conciliatory approach to the ethnic minorities.25 Although it 
was still stated that the Latvian nation was the "carrier" (nositeV) of Latvian 
sovereignty, this was the only reference of a special status of ethnic Latvians in the 
statement. At the same time, all citizens of Latvia who supported the idea of the 
formation of an independent Latvian state, regardless of their nationality, were referred 
to as the guarantors (garanty) of Latvian sovereignty.
The statement stressed the economic problems facing the republic, and it was 
claimed that these problems would have the best chance of being solved in an 
independent and democratic Latvia. The traditions from the interwar Republic of Latvia 
were referred to and used as evidence that an independent Latvian state would respect 
the rights of national minorities, such as the right to national cultural autonomy. 
National minorities were also directly encouraged to join the popular movement:
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H4>71 (HapotfHbm  4>p o h t  /laTBHH) cqH T aeT , h t o  H a n b o jie e  
Haae>KHOH r a p a H T H e fi c o b ju o f le H H H  n p a B  B c e x  
HaqHOHcuibHHX r p y im  HBJineTcn yn acT H e npHHa^Jie^camHX 
k hhm  a h h  b (obteyagieH H H , p a3pa6oT K e h  ocym ecTBJieHHH  
nporpaM M H  C03flaHHH IIOJIHTHMeCKOH, 3KOHOMHMeCKOH, H 
n p a B O B O H  OCHOBH He3aBHCHM OrO JlaTBHHCKOrO  
r o c y ^ a p c T B a .26
After assurances that a liberal approach to the question of Latvian citizenship would be 
chosen (see next section), it was concluded in the statement:
H<$»/! 3aB ep n eT  B c e x  >KHTejieH ./laTBHH, h t o  Ha Tpy^HOM  
nyTH  k He3aBHCHMocTH JlaTBHH b y a e T  nocjieflO B aT ejibH O  
npH^ep)KHBaTbCH ZieMOKpaTHHeCKHX MeTO^OB fleHCTBHH 27
There are likely to be several reasons why the Popular Front leaders found it 
necessary to put so much emphasis on reassuring the national minorities about their 
position in an independent Latvia. One of the reasons was probably that the popular 
movement initially received support mainly from ethnic Latvians, while Russians 
tended to be sceptical of, or at least indifferent to, the movement. At the same time it 
was acknowledged by Latvian politicians thait if Latvia were to gain independent 
statehood, which had now become the ultimate goal, they would have to count on 
support from the ethnic minorities, given the demographic situation in Latvia.28 By 
promoting policies which took into account the interests of the national minorities and 
by demonstrating that the LTF was indeed a popular movement which enjoyed support 
from all national groups in Latvia, it was hoped that this would increase the legitimacy 
of the Latvian claims for independence both in Moscow and with the international 
community.
After the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its secret protocols had become familiar 
to the public, the rhetoric of the independence movement slightly changed as well. 
While it had been common to argue the case for independence by referring to the 
Leninist principle of national self-determination, the focus was now changed to 
territorial and legal issues. It was argued that the logical conclusion of the illegal 
incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union was the "calm restoration" of the Republic 
of Latvia. Latvians had a claim to their own state, not so much because they constituted 
a nationality with the right to self-determination, but rather because the Latvian state de 
jure had never ceased to exist. When a parliamentary commission in Moscow which 
had been set up in the summer of 1989 to look into the historical background of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact concluded that the incorporation of the Baltic republics into 
the Soviet Union had not taken place in accordance with international law, this legal 
argument gained even more legitimacy.29 Ironically, however, although there was a 
tendency to abandon purely ethnic arguments, the legal status of the (predominantly 
Russian) immigrants who had arrived in Latvia in the Soviet period now became open 
to question. At first there was little reason for alarm, as it was only the citizens'
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committee and a few related organisations which made this point, and usually not very 
explicitly, while leading Popular Front spokesmen emphasised that Latvian 
independence would be in the interests of all the people of Latvia, regardless of 
nationality.30
In the elections to the Latvian Supreme Soviet (later that year to be renamed 
Council) in March 1990, a majority of the elected candidates had been supported by the 
Popular Front. In many of the districts where the LTF candidates had been successful, 
there was a majority of non-Latvian voters.31 The success of LTF candidates in the 
elections was an indication of a general trend among the Russian population towards 
increased support for the independence cause (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue). While democratic principles continued to be emphasised in the 
period leading up to independence, particularly within the LTF leadership, there were 
also forces within the organisation, often at a grassroots level, inspired by the 
arguments of the Citizens' Committee movement, whose nationalist aspirations on 
several occasions came up to the surface.
The independence struggle tended to be presented by LTF spokesmen not as a 
conflict between different nationalities:
This is by no means an ethnic or social conflict. If one examines 
who forms the core contingent supporting the opposition, one 
could characterise the conflict as one between civil society and 
representatives of the military complex.32
Such a description was intensified during the January 1991 events, when the Latvian
mass media carried films and photographs from the barricades in Riga, where Russian
democrats were seen joining their Latvian brothers and sisters in their struggle against a
totalitarian regime based in Moscow.
Considerable support for independence among Russians in Latvia, as 
demonstrated in the March 1991 poll on independence and the seeming victory of 
Russian democrats in the aborted August coup of the same year, made both Latvian 
and, particularly, Western observers optimistic about the prospects for ethnic harmony 
in Latvia once the goal of Latvian independence had been achieved. Erik Rudenshiold, 
for example, thought there was a general willingness among Latvian politicians to 
guarantee the rights of all ethnic groups, and he wrote in an otherwise well balanced 
account of Latvian ethnopolitics:
The short duration, surprising quiescence and sudden reversal of 
the August cabal left most Latvian residents relieved and ready to 
move from an ethnic to a national agenda.33
Nils Muiznieks arrived at similar conclusions:
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There appeared to be a willingness on both sides to come to 
mutually acceptable agreements (....)• The prospects for 
peaceful resolution of (....) conflicts appear positive, given the 
past lack of bloodshed in the region, the emergence of political 
pluralism and a vibrant independent press, and the severing of 
links between the local pro-Soviet movement and Soviet security 
forces.34
Although there have still not been any serious incidents of inter-ethnic violence 
in Latvia, it would, in my view, not be correct to say that mutually acceptable 
agreements on crucial issues have so far been worked out.35 Developments after 
independence was restored have rather had the opposite outcome, where distrust has 
been created among Russians towards Latvian politicians and politics in general 36 It 
seems reasonable to argue that the citizenship issue has been the most important factor 
in intensifying interethnic tensions in Latvia. The following section will therefore 
examine this issue in more detail.
4 .3 . The Citizenship Issue
There were calls for a separate Latvian citizenship even before the founding 
congress of the Popular Front, but initially the idea was for the creation of Latvian SSR 
citizenship to go along with Soviet citizenship as a means by which immigration could 
be halted 37 At the founding congress of the LTF in October 1988, delegates discussed 
citizenship-related issues, but refrained from adopting actual resolutions on citizenship 
itself.38 The idea of a Latvian SSR "non-state" citizenship was disregarded by many 
Latvian politicians, and particularly by the Citizens' Committee, whose spokesmen 
considered it merely an attempt to legalise the occupation and incorporation of Latvia 
into the USSR 39 However, after full independence had been declared to be the ultimate 
goal of the popular movement, the question arose as to who should be entitled to 
citizenship of such an independent Latvian state. This question soon became one of the 
most, it not the most, controversial issues in Latvian politics, and suggestions as to 
how the issue should best be solved have taken up a great amount of space in Latvian 
newspapers over the last few years.
Although the number of proposed solutions to the problem of citizenship has 
been very large, it is still possible to identify three main models of such solutions which 
illustrate the main differences in the citizenship debate. The important factor in 
differentiating between the models is their answer to the question of who should 
constitute the initial community of citizens. Closely interlinked is the question of who 
should have the authority to make decisions on the citizenship issue. In addition the 
question of naturalisation of new citizens has been of considerable importance, but as
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will be seen, there is no uniform view on this question among the supporters of any of 
the three models.
The first model will be called the 'option of restored pre-1940 citizenship', and 
was first identified with the Citizens' Committee of Latvia, but gradually gained 
ascendancy also among large segments of LTF activists. The "zero option" model, 
which is the most liberal of the three, was supported by prominent Latvian politicians, 
but was later abandoned by a majority of them, and came to enjoy support first of all 
among Russian-dominated organisations and parties. In their purified form, the two 
models mentioned could be labelled "ideal-type" models, because they have more or 
less fixed answers as to who should automatically be regarded as citizens of Latvia. 
The third model can be placed between the two "ideal-type" models, and contains some 
form of compromise solution between the two. In the following I shall examine each of 
the three models separately.
4 .3 .1 . The "Restored pre-1940 Citizenship" Option
The formation of the Citizens' Committee in Latvia did much to radicalise the 
citizenship debate in the republic. By registering the names of all the citizens in the 
inter-war republic and their descendants, the Citizens' Committee advocated a 
conception of political community based firmly on descent. The idea behind the 
registration was to conduct a referendum on independence among pre-war citizens and 
their descendants, as it was claimed that they continued to be the only citizens of Latvia 
and were therefore the only persons who had the right to participate in the restoration of 
the Latvian state. There were, indeed, strong legal arguments in support of their views. 
If one accepted the generally recognised view that the incorporation of Latvia into the 
Soviet Union had been illegal, one could argue that the country was under no obligation 
to accommodate those who had settled in Latvia during the years of Soviet rule.40
Although there can be no doubt that the small size of the Latvian nation and its 
weakening ethnodemographic position was an important factor in determining the 
position taken by the Citizens' Committee on the citizenship issue, it was continually 
stressed that the initial community of citizens was to be defined in territorial, not in 
ethnic, terms. About one quarter of the citizens of the interwar Republic of Latvia had 
been non-Latvians, and there were no political initiatives which sought to exclude them 
or their descendants from Latvian citizenship. The most important thing for the citizens' 
movement was strict adherence to the Latvian constitution, Satversme.41
The Citizens' Committee also held the view that only the Saeima, which was to 
be elected by the pre-war citizens and their direct descendants, had the authority and 
legitimacy to give guide-lines for naturalisation of new citizens and to adopt new
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citizenship legislation. The Supreme Council was regarded as a "body of the occupying 
regime" and had no right to decide on questions of such vital importance.42 The 
proponents of this model had different opinions on which law should eventually be 
adopted by the Saeima, but there were relatively few who advocated that the law on 
citizenship from the interwar republic should be reinstated. However, this question was 
considered by many right-wing politicians to be of secondary importance, as long as 
there was a strict adherence to the principle that the ultimate decision was to be made, 
directly or indirectly, by what was regarded as the only true citizenry of Latvia.
Significant segments of the Citizen' Committee and the Latvian National 
Independence Movement (LNNK - Latvijas Nacionalas Neatkaribas Kustiba) 43, 
however, openly identified the survival of the Latvian nation as the primary goal. To 
them, strict adherence to the constitution was only a means by which this goal could be 
achieved. A political and cultural environment dominated by ethnic Latvians was seen 
as essential in preserving the Latvian nation from extinction 44 Ethnic arguments were 
sometimes used in the propaganda for the "restored citizenship" model. At the Latvian 
Citizens' Congress it was thus stressed that there should be an "ethnically pure attitude 
towards citizenship, there should be no hypocrisy, there is nothing shameful in 
Latvian-like Latvia" 45 Several spokesmen for the movement argued that if the non­
native proportion of the population exceeded 25 per cent, this would pose a long-term 
threat to the Latvian nation 46 It was subsequently argued that such considerations 
should be taken into account when working on Latvian citizenship legislation. 
According to Mariss Grinbalts, one of the leaders of the citizens' movement in Latvia, 
this could be done by introducing a system of quotas with regard to the acquisition of 
citizenship:
Pa3MepH KBOTH CJieflOBaJIO 6bl paCCHHTaTb TaKHM 
o6pa30M, qTobbi obecneqHTb onpe^ejieHHHfl y^ejibHHH 
Bee jiaTHineH cpe,qH rpa^aaH. Tax xax b 1940 ro a y  
JiaTbllHH COCTdB JLHJIH IipHMepHO TpH HeTBepTH OT BCeX 
JiaTBHHCKHX noflflaHHbix, t o  exceroflHyio KBOTy mo>kho 
BHCHHTaTb, eejm pa3flejiHTb cyMMy ecTecTBeHHoro h 
MexaHHqecKoro npnpocTa JiaTbmieft b npeflbmymeM roay  
Ha TpH 47
What, then, would be the status of Russians and other immigrants according to 
the "restored pre-1940 citizenship" model? One of the leaders of the Latvian National 
Independence Movement in an interview in the Russian-language newspaper SM- 
segodnya claimed that Russian immigrants would not even have the status of second- 
class citizens; they would be 'nobodies'48 Russians who had arrived in Latvia after the 
Soviet annexation had arrived illegally, according to international law and the 1927 
Latvian law on immigration. They were thus seen as illegal immigrants with no legal 
rights in the Republic of Latvia.
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The citizens' movement referred to international conventions which prohibit an 
occupying force from moving its citizens to territories it has occupied.49 Since such 
illegal actions had already taken place, it was claimed that it was the responsibility of 
the occupying state (the Soviet Union) to remove their citizens from occupied Latvia. 
This involved the "repatriation" of Russian immigrants to their "homeland".50 As was 
stated in a resolution to 'Latvian citizens' published in the Citizens' Congress 
newspaper 'Pilsonis' (Citizens):
The departure to their fatherland of the colonists will cause some 
temporary problems for the Soviet Union; for Latvia it is a 
question of life or death.51
The fate of the "colonists" themselves was not mentioned in the resolution.
4 .3 .2 . The "Zero Option" Model for Citizenship
Since the "zero option" citizenship model was supported by a majority of 
Russians and spokesmen for the Russophone population, it will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7, which examines the political attitudes of the Russian population in 
Latvia. However, it is necessary briefly to present the model already in this chapter, as 
it had a certain influence on Latvian nationality policies, at least in the first stages of the 
period of analysis, and also because it gives a fuller picture of the whole range of views 
in the citizenship debate.
The "zero option" model for citizenship was first put forward by Juris Bojars 
when he advocated the introduction of Latvian citizenship for all the inhabitants on the 
territory of the Latvian SSR at the time.52 The zero option implied that there should be 
no requirements for obtaining Latvian citizenship, except for having a residence permit 
in Latvia. After Latvian independence was recognised by Russia and the rest of the 
international community, a Latvian SSR citizenship alongside a Soviet citizenship was 
no longer feasible, and the "zero option" most often came to be understood as the 
granting of Latvian citizenship to Soviet citizens who resided in Latvia permanently 
before or on the date of independence (considered to be either 4 May 1990, when 
independence was declared through a transition period, or 21 August 1991, the day of 
the declaration of full independence).
The "zero option" had somewhat different meanings to advocates of this model. 
While some of them argued that citizenship should be granted automatically to all 
permanent residents on one particular date, others held the view that Latvian citizenship 
should be obtained only by people who applied for it.53 Supporters of the "zero 
option" model also held fundamentally different views regarding the question of 
whether citizenship should also be granted to personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces.54
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Moreover, it could also be argued that a certain residence requirement is compatible 
with the "zero option" model. Since the model is linked to permanent residence, this 
concept must be given an operationable definition, and the concept could, for example, 
be residence in Latvia over a certain number of years.55 Since a majority of Russians 
according to a number of opinion polls were in favour of the "zero option" model for 
citizenship but at the same time supported certain residence requirements for obtaining 
such citizenship, it seems plausible to suggest that such residence requirements did not 
contradict the main principles of the "zero option" model.
Crucial for the proponents of the "zero option" model was the need for an 
immediate settlement of the issue. It was argued that the elections to the Supreme 
Council of 1990 had been free and fair, which had also been confirmed by international 
observers. Since the Supreme Council was seen as a democratically elected body, it 
was also claimed that it should have the authority to adopt a law on citizenship. The 
argument put forward by national radicals that deputies to the Supreme Council had 
been elected from military electoral districts was not seen as relevant, as these deputies 
had been stripped of their mandates in the late summer of 1991.56 For a more detailed 
discussion of the arguments which have been put forward in favour of the "zero 
option" model, I refer to chapter 7.
4 .3 .3 . Towards a "Compromise Solution"?
It has been argued from both ends of the spectrum in the citizenship debate that 
any departure from the pure models would imply unacceptable violations of 
fundamental principles which cannot be open to negotiation. The very concept of 
"compromise" in the citizenship debate has therefore been criticised. I agree that the 
concept can have some unfortunate connotations, particularly because it seems to 
suggest a willingness to find mutually acceptable solutions to the issue among its 
adherents, while the actual situation has been that such a willingness for a great part has 
been absent. However, in the absence of a better term, solutions to the citizenship issue 
which involve some form of combination of elements from the two other models will 
here be called "compromise solutions". Latvian citizenship should not, according to this 
model, be granted to all those who settled in Latvia in the post-war period, but at the 
same time some settlers should have a chance to become citizens if they qualified 
according to certain requirements.
Many of the LTF spokesmen were initially in favour of adopting some form of 
the "zero option" for citizenship.57 The statement of July 1989 which was referred to in 
the last section also contained some reference to the citizenship issue which, despite the
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10-year residence requirement, must be classified as a "zero option" solution. It was 
here stated that
(o c h o b o h ) r p a ^ z ia H C T B a  /la T B H H  H B JineT C H  c B o b o ^ H o e  
B O J ieH 3 i> H B J ieH H e  e e  a c H T e j ie n ,  H e3aB H C H M O  o t  hx  
H a itH O H a J Ib H O C T H , C O IJH aJIb H O H  H p e J I H r H 0 3 H 0 H  
npHHa^Jie/KHocTH, noflflep^HBatonjHX H^eio He3aBHCHMOCTH 
/la T B H H  H TOTOBblX IipO B O flH Tb 3 T y  H ^ e io  B 5KH3Hb. H<t>/1 
B H C T y n a e T  3 a  n p e ^ o c T a B J i e H H e  r p a i f c a a H C T B a
He3aBHCHMOH /laTBHHCKOH peC IiybjIH K H  BCeM  nOCTOHHHHM  
^CHTejiH M  /la T B H H , npo>K H BfflH M  H a  e e  T e p p H T o p H H  K 
M O M eH Ty p e r n c T p a u H H  r p a ^ a H C T B a  H e M e H e e  1 0  J ieT .58
A swift radicalisation of the popular movement and of Latvian politics was to 
follow, and this radicalisation became particularly visible in the autumn of 1991, just 
after independence had been declared and recognised internationally. Thus, when the 
Supreme Council of Latvia adopted a resolution on citizenship in October 1991, it 
rejected the "zero option" model, while the "compromise solution" which was adopted 
was in effect much more restrictive towards the immigrant population than previous 
statements of leading Latvian politicians had been indicating.59
The Supreme Council resolution was called "On the Renewal of the Republic of 
Latvia's Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalisation".60 Although it 
was stated that the citizenship law of 23 August continued to exist, the large 
immigration into Latvia of USSR citizens had not been agreed in any treaty between the 
Republic of Latvia and the USSR, and there was therefore a need for new regulations 
on citizenship which would 'eliminate the consequences of the USSR's occupation and 
annexation of Latvia and (...) renew the legal rights of the community of citizens of the 
Republic of Latvia'.61 The 'USSR citizens' living in Latvia were not regarded as 
members of the community of Latvian citizens, and in this respect the resolution could 
be seen as leaning towards the "restored pre-1940 citizenship" option.
However, since the Supreme Council regarded itself as a legitimate body of 
power in the period of transition to independence, a majority of deputies claimed that it 
had the competence to resolve the citizenship issue. The parliament, thus, adopted 
guide-lines for the naturalisation of new citizens. Some groups would upon request 
automatically be granted citizenship. They included persons who were not citizens of 
the interwar Republic, but who had arrived legally in Latvia before 17 June 1940 and 
were now living and had permanent residence in Latvia.
Most Russians, however, had arrived in Latvia after the Second World War, 
and if they lived and had permanent residence in Latvia they would be granted 
citizenship only if they fulfilled a number of strict requirements. These included 
knowledge of Latvian at a conversational level, renunciation of previous citizenship, at 
least 16 years of residence in Latvia, and knowledge of the Latvian constitution. In 
addition they would be required to swear an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Latvia.
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The resolution further stipulated that citizenship would not be granted to persons who 
had 'turned against the Republic of Latvia's independence1, using anti-constitutional 
methods; persons who had been imprisoned for 'premeditated criminal acts', persons 
who were serving in the Soviet Armed Forces or state security services; persons who 
had 'spread chauvinism, fascism, communism or other totalitarian, as well as social 
class, dictatorial, ideas'; persons who were registered in medical institutions for drug 
abuse and/or as chronic alcoholics; persons who lived without a legal source of income, 
and others.
A compromise solution somehow presupposed that the Supreme Council was 
competent to resolve the citizenship issue, and this was the main difference from the 
"restored citizenship" model. It was thus expected that a law on citizenship would be 
adopted relatively quickly, with naturalisation of new citizens starting before the 
elections to the new Saeima. The Supreme Council passed a draft law on citizenship on 
its first reading in November 1991 with only few amendments from the citizenship 
resolution adopted one month earlier.62 However, the law would acquire legal force 
only after a second reading.
In the meantime the Supreme Council adopted legislation which gave citizenship 
automatically also to persons who had not been citizens of Latvia in 1940 or their 
descendants. According to a Supreme Council resolution of 28 October 1992, persons 
who had lived permanently in Latvia before 1914 (and as such would have been entitled 
to citizenship according to the citizenship law of 1919) but who had not "formally" 
been registered as citizens, and their direct descendants, were to be considered citizens 
of Latvia.63 Although this did not involve post-war immigrants, it was still seen as a 
break with the principle that decisions which involved changes of the size of the 
community of citizens of Latvia could be taken only by a Saeima elected by citizens of 
Latvia or, alternatively, a referendum among the "true citizens" of Latvia.
In the winter of 1993 a majority of deputies in the Supreme Council voted in 
favour of a proposal that ethnic Latvians, whether or not they had been citizens of other 
states, should have the right to Latvian citizenship if they wanted it. They would, 
however, as a rule have to renounce their former citizenship. This was the first time in 
the citizenship debate in Latvia that the acquisition of citizenship had been explicitly 
linked to ethnicity.64 The Ravnopravie (Equal Rights) faction in the parliament (see 
chapter 8) voted in favour of the proposal, although its deputies deplored the fact that 
ethnicity could be used as a principle for granting citizenship. According to Tatyana 
Zhdanok, a prominent Ravnopravie spokeswoman, the faction would support any 
proposals which implied that the present community of citizens would be broadened.65 
National radicals, on the other hand, although generally in favour of measures which 
would increase the Latvian share of the population, were strongly opposed to this 
concrete proposal. They thought that it would undermine the principle that only the new
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Saeima (elected by "true citizens") was competent to take measures which would 
change the present community of citizens.66 Before this resolution was put into effect, 
it was decided to consult international organisations in order to confirm that the 
proposed amendments did not break with the norms of the international community. 
This was seen by some deputies as a way deliberately to avoid further discussion of the 
issue until the new Saeima was elected in June of the same year.67
By acknowledging that Latvia should not be considered a new but a restored 
state, more and more politicians came to support the idea that the logical conclusion of 
this was that the same applied to the citizenship question, so that citizenship should first 
be restored only to the original citizenry of the interwar republic. Although the Supreme 
Council had declared itself to be competent to resolve the issue, the majority of deputies 
in the parliament did not have an interest in passing citizenship legislation quickly, 
despite many assurances of the opposite, and they managed to retard the legislative 
process.68 Since there were no established guide-lines for the naturalisation of new 
citizens, the result was that only citizens of the interwar republic and their direct 
descendants would be entitled to take part in the elections to the new Saeima. This 
must be considered to have been a success for the national independence movement and 
the national radicals, whose main principles in the citizenship debate had gained 
ascendancy despite initially having been outvoted in the Supreme Council.
The resolution adopted on 28 October about recognising as citizens also persons 
who had lived in Latvia in 1914 was ignored by the Department for Citizenship and 
Immigration when it worked out guide-lines for the registration of the Latvian 
population. Certain amendments were therefore required so that it could come into legal 
force. On 5 January 1993 the Supreme Council, with a great number of deputies 
absent, voted against such amendments.69 This can be seen as another victory for 
nationalist forces in Latvia.70
4 .4 . Other issues
4 .4 .1 . The Language Issue
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Russian language enjoyed a privileged 
status in all the republics of the former Soviet Union. After Latvia was annexed by the 
Soviet Union, the area in which only the Russian language was used was artificially 
broadened. Russians did not have to learn Latvian in the same way that Latvians had to 
study Russian, and it was expected that interethnic communication would take place in 
the Soviet lingua franca. At the same time language continued to be perhaps the most 
important feature by which one ethnic group could be identified from others. Rasma
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K arklins has underlined the im portance of language, alongside with 
geographical/territorial belonging, for national identity in the former Soviet Union.71
In the awakening process the Popular Front soon came to identify as one of its 
main tasks the improvement of the status of the Latvian language in the land historically 
inhabited by Latvians. The Front thus advocated policies which would guarantee the 
use of Latvian as the language of official documents within the boundaries of the 
national republic, as well as the right of the indigenous residents to be able to speak the 
native language everywhere in their native land. However, the Russian language was 
also given a significant role in the early documents of the organisation. Thus, the first 
programme of the Popular Front read:
T p a ^ f la H e , o b p a m a n c b  b ro cy ^ a p cT B eH H H e opraH W , 
ynpeagieH H H , opraHH3airnH, npeanpH^rrHH /laTBHHCKofi CCP,
MOryT n0JIb30BaTbCH KaiC JiaTbHIICKHM, T a x  h  pyccKHM  
h 3 h k o m  h  n o jiy n a T b  cxJjHUHajibHHe flOKyMeHTH Ha jiio 6 o m  
H3biKe n o  C B oeM y B t ib o p y . B c c f e p e  c o ijH a jib H o r o  
o6cJiy)K H BaH H H  nOJDKHO obecneH H B aT bC H  CBObonHOe 
H cnojib30BaH H e jiaTbim cK oro h  p y c c K o r o  h 3H k ob .7 2 ......................................
On 5 May 1989 a language law was passed.73 Latvian was declared to be the 
official state language of Latvia. However, the Latvian language law was less 
categorical in its restrictions on the use of Russian than was its Estonian counterpart 
which had been passed in January of the same year.74 The choice between using 
Latvian or Russian in official and other public situations was not regulated by law but 
belonged to the speaker 75 The law provided for the use of Russian in all spheres of 
public activity except with regard to place names and labels on goods manufactured in 
Latvia It also included the legal provision of Russian as a language of communication 
among nationalities. However, the law contained elements which pointed to the 
supreme status of the Latvian language. Perhaps most importantly, the law stipulated 
that state employees would be required to learn the state language within a three year 
period, i.e., by 5 May 1992.
Subsequent instructions specified the demands for language proficiency for 
different groups of employees.76 The main principle was that language proficiency 
should be required to the extent that it was necessary in order to fulfil one's work tasks. 
Since the need for language proficiency varied from one job category to another, three 
different levels of language requirements were specified in the instructions. While only 
some basic understanding and elementary oral skills would be required from employees 
and service personnel with only limited interactions with the public, oral and written 
fluency would be required from employees who had broader contacts with the public, 
and from most employees with administrative work tasks.
The law was to come into force in May 1992, but at the end of March 1992 a 
large number of amendments to the law were adopted.77 The main difference from the
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"old" version was that all references except one which indicated a special role for the 
Russian language in Latvia had been removed. The exception was Article 8, which read 
that 'State Government and administrative bodies, institutions, enterprises, 
organisations must accept and must review documents submitted by residents in 
Latvian, English, German and Russian'. The state language could now be used in all 
written replies by an official to an individual, regardless of the language in which the 
official had been approached. However, it was also stated in the law that the above- 
mentioned institutions and their officials'may [author's italics] also provide a reply in 
the language in which the person has applied to them'.78
Although some deputies from the Popular Front fraction in the parliament 
claimed that the amendments to the law had been only minor and did not concern the 
basic principles of the law, critics on the contrary claimed that the parliament had in 
essence passed a new law, and deliberately done so only one month before the law was 
to come into effect.79 In the words of a Supreme Council deputy,
(B) n epB O M  3aK O H e p em >  rnjia 9 B B eaeH H H  p e a j i b H o r o .......................
BO BTOPOM peH b HfleT y>Ke O nOJIHOM 
BblTeCHeHHH pyCCKOrO H3bIKa H3 B cex  c $ e p .80
Another critic, B. Osipov, pointed to the fact that the first 1989 version of the 
law had contained a clause stipulating that it was the responsibility of the government to 
provide for the teaching of the Latvian language to the adult population. This clause 
which, according to Osipov, had never been implemented in practice, had been dropped 
from the amended version of the law.81
Boris Tsilevich ascribed the amended version of the law to the ethnocratic 
concept of the Latvian state.82 Latvia was, he claimed, seen as a state belonging the 
Latvians; the Latvians were consequently to be regarded as the masters on the Latvian 
land. All other nationalities were, in Tsilevich's view, regarded as aliens, who are 
obliged to 'adapt themselves to their masters' (podlazhivat'sya pod khozyaev). Indeed, 
the new introduction in the amended version of the law pointed in this direction. It was 
stated here that 'Latvia is the only ethnic territory [sic] in the world which is inhabited 
by the Latvian nation'.
Tsilevich admitted that the Latvian language had suffered during Soviet rule in 
Latvia. He had therefore been in favour of introducing the Latvian language as the state 
language of Latvia, which would make it possible to use the Latvian language all over 
Latvian territory.83 However, Tsilevich thought that the situation had changed after the 
achievement of independent Latvian statehood. In this new situation some liberalisation 
of the language requirements should be expected, due to the fact that 48 per cent of the 
Latvian population regarded Russian as their mother tongue.84 Instead, a law had been 
adopted which had dramatically reduced the possibilities of using other languages, and 
the Russian language had been deprived of the status of a 'normative language'
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(defined as a language environment providing social and communicative functions).85 
The fact that the local authorities were not provided with the right to use Russian as a 
regional official language along with the state language, even in districts where the 
Russophone population makes up a majority, and where there are long traditions of 
large settlements of Russians (such as in Latgale in East Latvia), was also subject to 
criticism.
The language law was criticised for not containing clear criteria as to who 
would be required to pass a language test. According to the law such criteria were to be 
specified by a resolution of the Council of Ministers, which again referred to 
departmental instructions, but many sceptics claimed that they were highly arbitrary. 
There was widespread resentment of the fact that the level of Latvian required from 
particular groups of employees was constantly being raised, and that it did not 
correspond to the language knowledge actually required to fulfil individual work 
tasks 86 Examinations often focused on medieval Latvian history and culture and 
tended not to be connected with professional requirements.87...........................................
4 .4 .2 . National Cultural Autonomy
The Republic of Latvia's liberal legislation for its ethnic minorities in the inter- 
war period has often been presented as evidence that the national minorities would be 
much better off in an independent Latvia than they had been, and would ever be, in the 
Soviet Union. The idea of national cultural autonomy for ethnic minorities was one of 
the pillars of interwar nationality policies in Latvia (see chapter 4), and the LFT 
considered the experience from that period to be so positive that it wanted to adopt the 
same concept for an independent Latvia. This would, it was hoped, also increase the 
legitimacy of Latvian independence in the international community, and make national 
minorities more favourably inclined towards the independence cause.
Thus, on 13 March 1991 the Latvian Supreme Council adopted the "Law on the 
Free Development of National and Ethnic Groups in Latvia and the Right to Cultural 
Autonomy".88 The text makes use of Broliss's terminology which was referred to in 
Chapter 1. The law differentiates between the Latvian nation, the ancient Liv 
indigenous nationality (tautlba), and other ethnic and national groups currently living in 
Latvia (Paragraph 4). Equal rights are guaranteed for all residents of Latvia regardless 
of nationality, in accordance with international norms on human rights (Paragraph 1). 
Moreover, all nationalities and ethnic groups living in Latvia are guaranteed cultural 
autonomy and cultural self-administration (pasiraldiba).
According to Paragraph 5 of the law, people can freely organise their national 
societies and organisations, and the government is responsible for promoting their
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activities and for financial support. The law also reads that national and ethnic groups 
can send their own representatives to the Supreme Council's "Consultative Nationalities 
Council", and through its intermediary role participate in the process of drafting laws 
(Paragraph 7). The law, however, neither specifies the duties of this council, nor how 
it is to be formed.89
A number of paragraphs in the law deal with questions related to language, 
education and culture.90 There are provisions in the law for certain economic privileges 
for national cultural organisations. For example, these organisations do not have to pay 
taxes on their property and profits, and all gifts and contributions to such organisations 
are also exempted from taxes (Paragraph 14).
The law was passed without much debate, and it was unanimously adopted by 
the Latvian parliament, which was a rare event. The law has subsequently been 
evaluated positively by most commentators.91 There have, however, also been critical 
voices. One of the main critics of the law on national cultural autonomy is Boris 
Tsilevich.92 He acknowledges that the law has many positive aspects, but as a whole 
he sees it as a failure because of what he describes as several insufficiencies. Tsilevich 
criticises the lack of definitions of the terminology used in the law. The law operates 
with terminology used in traditional Soviet writings on nationality issues, where the 
terms "nation", "national group" and "ethnic group" have acquired meaning different 
from that in the West. Such terms should therefore, in Tsilevich's opinion, have been 
defined or explained in the law.
However, Tsilevich's main objection to the law is its declaratory form:
Top>KecTBeHHO npoB03rjiamafl onpe^ejieHHHe npaBa,
3aKOH He npeflycMaipHBaeT HHKaKHX rapaHTHH, HHKaKHX 
npoueayp, HopMaTHBOB, MexaHH3MOB peajiroauHH.
Various examples are provided to demonstrate how the implementation of the law 
depends on the good-will of the bureaucrats. The law stipulates the responsibility of the 
government to contribute materially to the activities of national cultural organisations 
but, according to Tsilevich different organisations are not guaranteed equal financial 
support. He gives examples of organisations which use every occasion to praise the 
Latvian government and therefore count on support from the authorities, while 
organisations less supportive of the policies of the government have to manage without 
such support.
More than two years after the law on national cultural autonomy was passed a 
Consultative Nationalities Council had still not been established, as the law had 
stipulated. No mechanisms for elections to this council had been adopted, and even if 
such a council were to be established, it would still have only a consultative function. 
Leading politicians in the parliament have opted for a mechanism whereby national 
cultural organisations elect representatives to this council, according to a principle of
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"parity" (i.e., irrespective of the size of the respective ethnic group), but no agreement 
has been reached, partly because the Russians want a larger number of 
representatives.93 Many spokesmen for the national minorities are also sceptical of the 
idea that the representatives are to be elected only from "non-political" organisations, 
and they point out that only a small part of the national minorities population in Latvia 
participates in such organisations (see Chapter 8). These spokesmen are therefore afraid 
that such a council would be used by the Latvian authorities only for propaganda 
purposes, to show to the world how "democratically" national minorities are treated in 
Latvia.94
According to Tsilevich, the term "autonomy" used in the law completely lacks 
content.95 Whereas Estonian and Latvian cultural autonomy in the period of 
independence involved some real self-administration over issues such as education and 
culture, no references are made to such arrangements in the Latvian law of 1991. 
Tsilevich points to the fact that of the 100 officials working in the Ministry of 
Education, only 3 belonged to any of the national minorities, and they did not occupy 
any of the most influential positions. This made it hard to talk of any autonomy over 
school issues. The same could be said about the area of culture, according to Tsilevich. 
Had national minorities had any autonomy in this field, it would have been impossible 
to close down one of the leading Russian theatres with an international reputation; the 
Riga Youth Theatre, he believed.96
The concept of cultural national autonomy from the first independence period 
has been adopted also in Latvian legislation, but although the actual implementation of 
the law is only in its initial phase, Tsilevich appears to be right when he argues that the 
practical content of this concept has changed somewhat from that of the Latvian 
Republic in the interwar period. We saw in Chapter 2 that the ethnic minorities in the 
1920s had a great degree of influence over their own schools, and the law on cultural 
autonomy of 1991 does not provide for any such school autonomy. A counterargument 
would, however, be that some form of standardised school system is in the interest of 
the ethnic minorities themselves, who will easier be integrated into a Latvian 
environment if they receive more or less the same type of education as Latvian children 
of the same age. The debate on this issue is likely to continue, as the law only stipulates 
the broad principles of national cultural autonomy, while much of the practical 
implementation of the law will have to be determined later.
4 .4 .3 . A Free Choice of Nationality?
The law referred to above on "The Free Development..." provides for the right 
of individuals at the age of 16 freely to choose nationality in accordance with their 
national identity ; nationality can also be changed.97 This is, as we have seen, different
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from the Soviet practice introduced in the 1930s where the individual automatically 
inherited the nationality of his/her parents. However, there is no specification in the 
Latvian law of whether an individual has the right to choose not to have any official 
nationality. In addition, the law does not state whether or not Latvia is to continue the 
practice from the Soviet period of registering nationality in the passport, such as was 
the case with the notorious "fifth point” in Soviet internal passports.
So far there are no indications that Latvian authorities intend to remove the 
statement of nationality from Latvian passports. Indeed, according to the "Law on the 
Registration of Residents" itself, each individual has to register his/her nationality for 
the official register of the population, and new passports that are issued all refer to the 
nationality (ethnicity) of the holder.98 The same concerns children as well. There were 
examples of parents who wanted to leave it to their children to decide their own 
nationality according to their self-consciousness, but they were not allowed to do so.99
If the Law on the Registration of Residents does not directly contradict the law 
on "Free Development", the latter law is directly contradicted by internal instructions 
elaborated in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, which was given the 
responsibility for the registration of the Latvian population.100 According to these 
instructions, individuals had to report the official nationality of their parents to the 
registration officials. Only if the parents were of different nationalities could the 
individual choose his/her own nationality, but they did not really have a free choice, as 
they would still have to choose the nationality of one of their parents:
(C )o B e p u ie H H O J ie T H e M y  j iH u y  H au H O H a jib H O C T b  
3anH C bIB aeT C H  KaK H auH O H ajibH O C Tb OflHOrO H3 
poflH T ejieft, cooTBeTCTBeHHO 3a im cH  b  n a c n o p T e . B st h x  
c j iy n a f lx  bo  BpeMH perH crpaitH H  M erorrb HauHOHajibHOCTb 
He pa3pem aeTC 5i.101
Another peculiarity in the instructions points to a lack of terminological consistency. 
When reporting nationality, ethnic Latvians were asked to put a cross in the appropriate 
box. It was further stated:
rpaacaaHHHy (-xe) ztpyroH HaimoHajibHocTH Haao BimcaTb 
noJiHoe Ha3BaHHe cooTBeTCTByiomero rocyaapcTBa (...).102
Nationality and citizenship here seem to be confused. It is obvious that this entry is not 
asking about citizenship, as citizenship is to be stated at another place in the form. It 
rather seems to be an expression of the idea that every nationality has an ethnic 
homeland which can be identified as a state. Critics of these instructions, however, 
rightly argue that this is not always the case. The instructions can therefore easily be 
read as if non-Latvians do not really belong to Latvia, whether they are citizens of 
Latvia or not.
It is worth noting that the registration of nationality is an uncommon practice in 
most countries, with the exception of Soviet and post-Soviet states, and that such a
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practice did not exist during the period of Latvian independence. In an interview with 
the author in February 1993, Andrejs Pantelejevs, the chairman of the Supreme Council 
Standing Commission on Human Rights and Nationality Questions, admitted the 
discrepancies between Latvian legislation and the instructions referred to above. He 
claimed, however, that identification of nationality had been requested by smaller 
national groups in Latvia, which allegedly would feel more secure if their nationality 
were officially registered. In Pantelejevs' view, these discrepancies would disappear 
when a new parliament was elected which had the authority to enforce the 
implementation of its own legislation. The Popular Front leader, Uldis Augstkalns, 
however, believed there would be a need to state nationality in Latvian passports in the 
foreseeable future, due to the continuing unfavourable demographic situation in 
Latvia103 Critics, on the other hand, including the present author, have argued that 
ethnic self-identity tends to be reinforced by the registration of an official nationality in 
the passport and other official documents, and believe that the Latvian practice in this 
area could serve artificially to strengthen ethnicity and to retard natural integration 
processes.104
4. 5.  Conclusions
To many Russians living in Latvia as well as to a number of western observers 
the radicalisation of Latvian ethnopolitics after the aborted August 1991 coup and the 
restoration of Latvian independence came as a big surprise. Before that time there had 
been widespread expectations that if Latvia again became an independent state, this 
would be the best guarantee of harmonious ethnic relations in the republic. This chapter 
has showed that these expectations have not, at least until the present, been fulfilled. 
Let us therefore look at some suggestions why independent statehood was unlikely to 
become a panacea for resolving multiethnic tensions in Latvia.105
One explanation, although unsatisfactory, would be that conflict will inevitably 
develop between ethnic groups living together in the same territory if there are no 
oppressive forces to prevent this from taking place. According to this theory, 
interethnic conflict did not develop in the Soviet Union because the regime could 
employ direct or more subtle means of coercion which deterred people from expressing 
their interethnic grievances. As soon as such forces are removed, the theory goes, latent 
interethnic tensions are free to manifest themselves.
There is, however, an abundance of evidence of ethnic groups that successfully 
coexist without being under any form of outside pressures. Even in Latvia, as we shall 
see (Chapter 6), tensions are mostly confined to the political level and there seems to be 
less tension in areas where personal interaction between different ethnic groups takes
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place. Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of the Latvian transition to 
independence has been the absence of interethnic violence. Thus, although one should 
not disregard the possibility that part of the explanation for the radicalisation of Latvian 
ethnopolitics can be found in the general liberalisation of political life which has also 
made it acceptable to express views that it was impossible to express openly before, 
one must also look for additional explanatory factors.
A related and somewhat more plausible explanation would be that Latvian 
politicians were not sincere when they talked about equal rights and the "zero option" 
for citizenship in the first phases of the independence struggle, and that their real 
intentions were all the time to strengthen the ethnic Latvian predominance.106 
However, since they thought the support of Russians and other ethnic minorities was 
needed in order to gain legitimacy for the independence cause, first of all in Moscow 
but also in the international community, they had to give some concessions to these 
groups. When independence had been regained, according to this theory, there was no 
longer any need for support from Latvia's Russian community, and the politicians 
could reveal their "true intentions". Some Russian critics who adhere to this theory 
believe that the ultimate goal of Latvian politicians is a Latvia free or almost free of 
other ethnic groups, and that only pressure from Russia, the international community or 
Russians living in Latvia themselves has prevented even more stringent measures from 
being introduced to implement their plans.
There are, however, strong arguments against such theories as well. Latvian 
politicians continue to take diametrically differing views on ethnopolitical issues, and it 
is unlikely that most of those politicians who do not agree with the national radicals in 
reality share all their political views. There have been suggestions that Latvian 
politicians from the outset of the independence struggle agreed on the ultimate goals, 
but that they deliberately split into various factions which could complement each other 
in order to achieve these goals. Conspiracy theories are popular in the post-Soviet 
states, but I believe one should be careful about accepting such theories uncritically. In 
my opinion, substantial and real political differences are being expressed on the Latvian 
ethnopolitical scene, not simply fabricated ones.
This is not to say that Latvian politicians have not taken tactical considerations 
into account. One of the main reasons for the radicalisation of the popular movement 
may be that this was seen as necessary by LTF politicians in order to regain some of the 
initiative from the LNNK and the Citizens' Committee movement, which seemed to 
have had considerable success in establishing their own powerbase in Latvian politics. 
A powerful Citizens' Congress could have posed a serious threat to politicians in the 
Supreme Council, and, by adopting parts of their political programme, LTF politicians 
may have hoped to avoid the risk that the electorate would abandon them. It is also 
possible that LTF politicians, many of whom had occupied leading positions in the
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Soviet period, found it necessary to play on anti-Russian sentiments in the population 
in order to distract attention from their own political past or from a poor economic 
performance.107
Another factor which may have contributed to the radicalisation of Latvian 
ethnopolitics is the speed by which Latvia gained de facto independence.108 Latvian 
politicians suddenly found themselves with political control, and if they earlier had 
believed that it would be necessary to give some concessions to Russia (the Soviet 
Union) for their independence, for example in the form of guarantees to the Russian- 
speaking minorities living in Latvia, such guarantees were no longer required. In this 
situation ethnopolitical radicalisation could also be used a way of weakening political 
opponents.
There are also observers who see the Bolshevik political culture of Latvia as one 
of the reasons for increasing ethnocentrism in Latvian politics.109 Such a culture is 
reflected in politicians regarding all political opponents as enemies and a threat to state 
security, and in a lack of ability or willingness of these same politicians to seek 
compromises. This argument should not be rejected, although one could argue that the 
lack of willingness to seek compromises with the opposition was also a characteristic 
feature of Latvian politics in the interwar independence period. Moreover, it can be 
argued that there indeed are political forces who represent a threat to Latvian state 
security, or who would pose such a threat in a crisis situation. This could be a good 
reason why Latvian politicians want to make sure that such forces are unable to 
influence political life in the country.
Unstable bilateral relations with Russia are another factor which is likely to have 
influenced Latvian ethnopolitics. Russia's involvement in Latvian political 
developments and its continual, and often exaggerated, stress on "gross violations" of 
the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia in the Russian press and 
international fora have created an atmosphere in which dialogue and cooperation have 
become more difficult. The linking of the questions of a withdrawal of Russian troops 
and the situation for the Russian-speaking population has also been badly received 
among Latvian politicians, who regard this as evidence that Russia will seek to retain 
political influence over internal developments in Latvia. In this situation many Russians 
in Latvia find themselves in a loyalty conflict. However, if they express sympathy with 
Russia's involvement, this is often interpreted as a sign that the Russian population 
cannot be fully trusted, and makes Latvian politicians even more convinced that political 
dominance of ethnic Latvians must be ensured in order to protect national interests. The 
result is more alienation among certain segments of the Russian population, and less 
trust on its part in Latvian politicians and politics.
Indeed, part of the explanation for the radicalisation of Latvian ethnopolitics 
described in this chapter can probably be found in the Russian population itself, or in
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the way this population is perceived by the ethnic Latvians in the country. Russians' 
involvement in Interfront and similar organisations which actively opposed the 
independence cause and initiated actions aimed at preserving the Soviet state and 
political system probably made many Latvians and Latvian politicians sceptical about 
providing all residents of the republic with full political rights. Such signals were 
intercepted and sometimes exploited by Latvian politicians, receptive as they were to the 
interests of their electorate. Although far from all Russians were sympathetic to the 
Soviet "loyalist" organisations in Latvia (as we shall see in later chapters), many 
Latvians perceived a threat that at least a substantial number of recent Russian 
immigrants would not respect Latvian independence, were a critical situation to emerge. 
In the next chapters of the thesis the Russian population in Latvia will be examined 
from a variety of angles, and I hope that the discussion will make it easier to assess to 
what extent the perceived threat from the Russian population was realistic, and whether 
Latvian ethnopolitics in effect increased rather than reduced the risk of interethnic 
conflict in the country.
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5. Social Characteristics of Russians in Latvia
As a result of the major changes that have taken place in Latvian society since 
the Second World War, Russians living in Latvia today have very different social and 
geographical characteristics compared to Russians who lived in Latvia during the years 
of Latvian independence. This chapter attempts to systematise information about the 
geographical distribution, occupational and age structure, educational level, language 
usage, citizenship, etc., in order to give a picture of the most significant characteristics 
of the Russian population in the country. There are two main sources used in this 
chapter. Data from the census of 1989 are extensively used.1 Although this involves the 
risk that some of it may now be dated, due to all the events that have taken place since 
then, this is on most occasions the most recent information available, and should give a 
relatively accurate picture of the situation as it was at the beginning of the Latvian 
"awakening" process. When more up-dated data exist and are considered reliable, there 
is also reference to such data. Moreover, the.chapter includes some material from the 
"Russians in Latvia" survey conducted in the spring of 1992. Information that is not 
provided in the census is included here, such as information about religious affiliations, 
living conditions, reasons for settlement in Latvia and length of stay there. This material 
also provides the opportunity of checking for possible relationships with other 
variables.
Although the chapter concentrates on information about the Russian population, 
it is useful for our purposes to compare the data concerning Russians with the 
corresponding data for other nationalities in Latvia. In order not to bring in too many 
figures that would complicate the analysis, emphasis will be put on comparing figures 
for the Russians with those of the largest and indigenous nationality in Latvia, the 
Latvians. Figures for other nationalities will be provided only when they are 
particularly unexpected or revealing for the major concerns of this thesis. Since the 
survey was conducted exclusively among the Russian population in Latvia, the scope 
for comparison between the nationalities is more limited when using material from the 
survey.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the geographical 
distribution of Russians in Latvia, by comparing the share of Russians and Latvians in 
different regions, as well as urban and rural areas, and also by examining the 
proportion of the Russian population living in these various types of settlements. Part 
one further contains information on the length of stay of Russians in Latvia, their place 
of birth and reasons for moving to the republic. Some more recent information about 
the distribution of citizens and non-citizens according to nationality is also included in 
this part. Age and gender structure of the Russian and Latvian populations is examined
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in part two. In this part there is also an examination of the marital structure, and 
particular emphasis will be put on patterns of intermarriage. Part three looks at the 
educational and occupational structure of Russians as compared with Latvians, and 
some indications of their material living conditions are also discussed. The last part 
deals with questions related to language usage, and particularly the degree of fluency in 
Latvian, and there is further an examination of the religious affiliations and activities of 
the Russian population in Latvia.
5. 1 .  Geographical Distribution, Length of Stay and Reasons for 
Moving to Latvia, Distribution of Citizens and Non-Citizens
According to the census of 1989 there were almost 2.7 million people living in 
Latvia. Just over 0.9 million, or 34 per cent, of them were Russians, whereas 1.4 
million (52 per cent) were Latvians. Other nationalities in Latvia included Belarusians 
(4.5 per cent), Poles (3.5 per cent) and Ukrainians (2.3 per cent). It should again be 
stressed that these figures are based on the self-identification which takes place when a 
respondent reports his or her nationality to a census-taker.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the percentage of Russians and Latvians in all 
municipalities of Latvia (see Map 3, Appendix 3), and these administrative districts and 
cities are listed under the region to which they geographically belong. The district 
borders and the borders of the regions do not always overlap, and in cases where a 
district territory is divided between two different regions, I have listed the district under 
the region in which the majority of the district population lives.2 One should also note 
that in this table Riga is treated separately, due to its large population and its special 
status as the capital city.
The tables show that whereas Latvians dominate numerically in most of the 
rural areas, the share of Russians is larger in urban areas, and is especially large in the 
seven biggest cities of Latvia, which are all independent administrative units.3 By 
adding up the population figures in all these cities, one finds that Russians make up 47 
per cent of the population in the largest cities, whereas 37 per cent are Latvians. It is 
noteworthy that Latvians do not make up a majority in any of these cities, and in four of 
the seven there are more Russians than Latvians.
The "most Latvian” city is Jelgava, where 49.7 per cent are Latvians and 34.7 
per cent Russians. In the Latgalian city of Daugavpils only 13 per cent of the population 
is Latvian and more than 58 per cent Russian. There are two factors explaining the large 
number of Russians in Daugavpils. Firstly, there is the general trend that most 
Russians live in the largest cities, and Daugavpils is the second largest city of Latvia
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Table 5.1: Geographical Distribution of Russians and Latvians in
Latvia
Total Russian Latvian Russians as Latvians as
population population population share of all share of all
Russians Latvians
in Latvia in Latvia
(1000s) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Kurzeme region
Ventspils district 15.7 8.2 85.9 0.1 1.0
Talsi district 50.0 5.0 89.8 0.3 3.2
Kuldiga district 41.0 8.0 84.4 0.4 2.5
Tukums district** 58.6 12.1 79.0 0.8 3.3
Liepaja district 54.3 9.2 79.2 0.6 3.1
Saldus district 39.5 7.0 80.7 0.3 2.3
City of Ventspils* 50.6 39.4 43.0 2.2 1.6
City of Liepaja* 114.5 43.1 38.8 5.4 3.2
Total region 424.2 21.5 66.1 10.1 20.2
Zemgale region
Dobele district 44.4 18.7 63.7 0.9 2.0
Jelgava district 39.1 21.3 61.1 0.9 1.7
Bauska district 55.9 14.3 68.4 0.9 2.8
Aizkraukle district . . . . . 44.5 • • 16.6 • 73.7 • 0:8 2.4 •
Jdcabpils district** 61.0 27.1 61.6 1.8 2.7
City of Jurmala* 60.6 42.1 44.2 2.8 1.9
City of Jelgava* 74.1 34.7 49.7 2.8 2.7
Total region 379.7 26.3 59.1 11.0 16.2
Vidzeme region
Iimbari district 41.1 8.0 85.4 0.4 2.5
Valmiera district 62.7 14.3 78.5 1.0 3.5
Valka district 37.4 17.4 74.3 0.7 2.0
Aluksne district** 28.9 18.2 75.0 0.6 1.6
Riga district** 150.9 29.5 58.1 4.9 6.3
Cesis district 64.3 12.8 81.3 0.9 3.8
Gulbene district 29.9 15.5 79.8 0.5 1.7
Ogre district** 65.8 20.1 70.5 1.5 3.3
Madona district* * 49.5 12.4 82.3 0.7 2.9
Total region 530.5 19.0 72.5 11.1 27.7
Latgale region
Balvi district** 33.9 24.5 71.8 0.9 1.8
Rezekne district 43.4 41.7 53.3 2.0 1.7
Ludza district 42.5 38.4 53.4 1.8 1.6
Preili district 46.0 29.9 63.5 1.5 2.1
Daugavpils district 47.1 40.8 35.9 2.1 1.2
Kraslava district 41.5 27.4 43.2 1.3 1.3
City of Rezekne* 42.5 55.0 37.3 2.6 1.1
City of Daugavpils* 124.9 58.3 13.0 8.0 1.2
Total region 421.8 43.4 39.4 20.2 12.0
City of Riga*** 910.5 47.3 36.5 47.5 23.9
Total 2666.6 34.0 52.0 100.0 100.0
* These cities are independent administrative units (municipalities). The population numbers in
these cities are not included in the figure for the population in the geographical districts 
surrounding them.
** District borders do not fully correspond with region borders. The districts are listed in the
region where the majority of the population lives (see Map 3, Appendix 1).
*** In this table the City of Riga is treated separately from the other regions.
Source: Data compiled from 1989.gada \issa\ien fbas tautassJcaitisuias rezu lteti 
(Part I), pp. 127-132.
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Table 5.2: Geographical Distribution of Russians and Latvians in
Latvia: Urban and Rural Areas
Total population Population 
in urban areas
Population 
in rural areas
Urban
(%)
Rural
<%)
Russians
(%)
Latvians
(%)
Russians
<%)
Latvians
(%)
Kurzeme region
Ventspils district 
Talsi district 
Kuldlga district 
Tukums district** 
Liepaja district 
Saldus district 
City of Ventspils* 
City of Liepaja* 
Total region_____
Zemgale region
Dobele district 44.4 55.6 24.1 60.6 14.4 66.1
Jelgava district 20.8 79.2 30.0 56.6 19.0 62.2
Bauska district 28.4 71.6 16.9 70.8 13.3 67.5
Aizkraukle district 54.8 45.2 22.0 68.7 10.2 79.9
Jicabpils district** 57.3 42.7 35.5 51.3 15.9 75.4
City of Jurmala* 100.0
City of Jelgava* 100.0 34.7 49.7
Total region 62.6 37.4 33.2 53.0 14.8 69.3
Vidzeme region
Limbari district 43.0 57.0 9.5 84.5 6.9 86.2
Valmiera district 57.9 42.1 17.4 76.1 10.0 81.9
Valka district 51.1 48.9 24.0 67.1 10.4 81.9
Aluksne district** 43.4 56.6 21.8 70.0 15.4 78.8
Riga district** 26.5 73.5 34.1 52.3 27.8 60.1
Cesis district 37.6 62.4 16.5 78.2 10.7 83.1
Gulbene district 34.6 65.4 27.7 66.6 9.1 86.8
Ogre district** 62.5 37.5 26.8 62.3 8.9 84.1
Madona district* * 39.3 60.7 15.0 80.2 10.7 83.6
Total region 41.6 58.4 22.5 68.9 16.5 75.1
Latgale region
Balvi district** 
Rezekne district 
Ludza district 
Preili district 
Daugavpils district 
Kraslava district 
City of Reekne* 
City of Daugavpils*
41.4
17.8
41.0 
47.2
9.2
38.0
100.0 
100.0
58.6
82.2
59.0
52.8
90.8
62.0
37.4
48.6
46.8
40.6
33.5
30.8 
55.0 
58.3
57.1 
44.6 
44.8
51.1
43.5
38.5 
37.3 
13.0
15.4
40.2 
32.6
20.3
41.5
25.3
82.2
55.2 
59.4 
74.6
35.2 
46.0
Total region 58.9 41.1 51.7 28.3 31.6 55.3
City of Riga*** 100.0 47.3 36.5
Total 70.8 29.2 40.7 44.0 17.5 71.5
* These cities are independent administrative units (municipalities). T le population numbers in
these cities are not included in the figure for the population in the geographical districts 
surrounding them.
** District borders do not fully correspond with region borders. The districts are listed in the 
region where the majority of the population lives (see Map 3, Appendix 1).
*** In this table the City of Riga is treated separately from the other regions.
Source: Data compiled from 19S9. gndu rissa rieaibustautasskaitxsanasrezultuti,
(Parti) pp. 127-132.
7.6 92.4 1.4 96.4 8.8 85.1
46.9 53.1 5.1 89.4 4.8 90.2
50.2 49.8 12.7 79.0 3.3 89.8
44.5 55.5 19.2 70.4 6.4 86.0
34.8 65.2 9.6 80.8 8.9 78.4
40.7 59.3 12.6 78.4 .3.2 82.2
100.0 39.4 43.0
100.0 43.1 38.8
64.0 36.0 30.2 55.6 6.0 84.8
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and has a developed industry which has attracted many Russians. Secondly, 
Daugavpils is situated in the Latgale region, which we have already seen is the part of 
Latvia where most Russians traditionally have lived. The table shows that the second 
largest Latgalian city, Rezekne, also has a larger proportion or Russians (55 per cent) 
than cities situated in other parts of Latvia. In the cities of the Kurzeme region the 
proportion of Russians is also relatively high (Liepaja 43 per cent and Ventspils 39 per 
cent), taking into account the low number of Russians living in this region. These cities 
are both important sea-ports with large immigrant populations. There have also been a 
large number of military personnel living in these cities, and even though people 
serving in the army have normally not been included in the census, their family 
members and also civil employees providing services for the army have usually had 
residence permits, and have therefore been included. In the capital, where 31.3 per cent 
of the total population of Latvia live, there are also more Russians than Latvians. They 
make up 47.3 and 36.5 per cent respectively.
The districts listed in the tables all contain smaller cities or towns, with 
populations varying, from less than 400 to about 40,000. In these urban areas Russians 
comprise only 23.9 per cent of the population. The regional variation is significant, as 
can be seen from Table 5.2. In Latgale more than 30 per cent of the urban population is 
Russian (Daugavpils and Rezekne not included). The proportion of Russians is 
particularly high in urban areas in the districts of Rezekne (48.6 per cent) and Ludza 
(46.8 per cent). There is also a high proportion of Russians in smaller cities and towns 
in other regions, particularly where there is a developed industry. One example is the 
city of Olaine, not far from Riga, where there is a big chemical plant. 47 per cent of the 
population is Russian and only 33 per cent Latvian. Very few Russians live in smaller 
urban areas in the Kurzeme (Courland) region in the west, and in the districts of 
Ventspils and Talsi the Russian proportion of the urban population is only 1.4 per cent 
and 5.1 per cent respectively.
In rural areas the proportion of Russians is usually very small. In such areas 
Latvians are in a clear majority, with a share of 71.5 per cent compared with a Russian 
minority of 17.5 per cent. There are the same regional variations as for the population 
in smaller cities and towns. The proportion of Russians is larger in the rural parts of 
Latgale than in rural areas of other regions, and in this respect the difference between 
Latgale and Kurzeme is striking. Whereas the proportion of Russians in Latgalian rural 
areas in total is more than 30 per cent, and more than 40 per cent in the districts of 
Daugavpils and Rezekne, Russians make up less than 10 per cent in rural areas of all 
districts of Kurzeme and less than 5 per cent in the districts of Kuldiga, Saldus and 
Talsi. In the northern and central parts of Latvia, Vidzeme, the proportion of Russians 
in rural areas varies from 6.9 per cent in limbazi to 27.8 per cent in the rural district of
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Riga. In Zemgale in the south the proportion of Russians in rural areas varies from 
10.2 per cent in Aizkraukle district to 19 per cent in Jelgava district.
The fact that Russians make up a large proportion of the population in Latgale 
does not mean that the majority of Russians live in this region, as can also be seen from 
Table 5.1. Almost half the Russians (47 per cent) live in Riga, and 71 per cent live in 
the seven largest cities. Further, 14 per cent of Russians live in smaller cities and 
towns, and only 15 per cent in rural areas. The Latvian population is less urban; only 
36 per cent of Latvians live in the seven largest cities, 24 per cent live in smaller urban 
settlements, whereas 40 per cent of the Latvian population lives in rural areas.
There is also some variation between the regions in terms of the share of the 
Russian population living in each region. The largest proportion of Russians (Riga 
excluded) live in the region of Latgale (20 per cent), and the rest are relatively equally 
distributed between the three other regions, with slightly more than 10 per cent of the 
Russian population in each. The fact that more than 10 per cent of the Russians live in 
Kurzeme is caused by the relatively large proportion of the population living in the two 
large cities of that region. Less than 3 per cent of all the Russians in Latvia live in 
Kurzeme's other districts.
In order to ensure a representative sample of the Russian population in Latvia 
for our survey, we used the information about the geographical distribution of Russians 
from the census. Since we assume that region and type of settlement can be decisive 
factors in determining attitudes and ethnic identity, we needed a sample where the 
geographical characteristics correspond with the characteristics of the Russian 
population as a whole. Appendix 1 gives more details about the principles and practical 
measures that were employed to secure a geographically representative sample.
The census provides no exact data on the length of stay of Russians living in 
Latvia, but there is information on the birthplace of Russians, saying that of the 
905,000 Russians living in Latvia in 1989, almost 500,000, or 54 per cent, were born 
in the republic (see Table 5.3). More than one third (36 per cent) were born in the 
Russian Federation, whereas the majority of the remaining 9 per cent were bom in the 
two other Slavic-dominated former Soviet republics, Ukraine and Belarus. The share of 
ethnic Latvians bom outside the republic is naturally much lower (3 per cent). Still, 
compared for example to Ukrainians and Belarusians, among whom only 19 and 31 per 
cent respectively were bom in Latvia, the share of Russians bom in the republic must 
be considered relatively high. In our survey, which covers only the population in age 
groups from 15 years and upwards, the percentage reporting to have been bom in 
Latvia is naturally somewhat lower. 49 per cent of our respondents said they had been 
bom in the republic.
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Table 5.3: Birthplace of Russians Living in Latvia
(1000s) (%)
Latvia 496 54.7
RSFSR 328 36.2
Ukraine 22 2.4
Belarus 20 2.2
Caucasian Republics 4 0.4
Central Asia 16 1.8
Moldova 1 0.1
Lithuania/Estonia 12 1.3
In other places/Not reported 6 0.7
Total 906 100.0
Sources: Data compiled from 1989.gada vissaviem bas tautas skiu tisiaasrezu ltad  (Part II), p. 30.
In the survey there was also a question about when the respondent and his or 
her family came to take up residence in Latvia. The replies are illustrated in Table 5.4. 
Almost one in six reported that their family took up residence in Latvia before the mid- 
1940s, while 19 per cent came in the second half of the 1940s and 24 per cent in the 
1950s. Moreover, 29 per cent reported residence in Latvia from the 1960s and 1970s, 
whereas only 12 per cent had moved to Latvia in the 1980s or beginning of the 1990s. 
It should be noted that 6 per cent of the respondents did not answer this question, and 
they were usually people who reported that they were born in Latvia and therefore 
probably thought that this question did not apply to them. As many as 84 per cent of the 
Russians in the survey had lived in Latvia for more than 15 years, 11 per cent from 5 to 
15 years and only 3 per cent of the respondents had moved to Latvia during the last 5 
years.
Table 5.4: Arrival in Latvia
Survey Question: When did you and your family take up residence in Latvia?
Before 1945-1949 1950s 1960s or 1980s
N = 554 mid-1940s 1970s
(37 missing) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All respondents 16 19 24 29 12
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
There are also some regional differences in terms of length of stay in Latvia. 
Russians in Latgale appear to have lived in Latvia for a longer time than Russians in 
other parts of the country. The proportion of Russians in Latgale who had come to 
Latvia before the 1940s was more than 30 per cent. While 60 per cent of the Russians 
in Latgale said they had been bom in Latvia, the corresponding percentage for the 
country as a whole was 42 per cent.
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The respondents were not only asked to indicate whether they and their families 
had been bom in Latvia but also, if they had not, to indicate where they moved from 
when they took up residence in the republic. A majority of those who had not been 
born in Latvia had moved from the Russian Federation (42 per cent of the 
respondents), and the others came predominantly from the two other Slavic republics (3 
per cent from each). While 42 per cent of the respondents reported that their families 
had moved to Latvia from the Russian Federation, 5 per cent had moved from Belarus 
and 4 per cent from Ukraine.
The reasons for taking up residence in Latvia have been many, and the 
respondents were asked why they had moved to the republic according to an already 
prepared list of possible reasons (see questions 155 to 169 in Appendix 2). Three of the 
fifteen alternatives were chosen more frequently than the others. The first of these was 
that respondents had moved to Latvia in their childhood with their parents. A 
substantial number had been directed to work in Latvia after finishing their education. 
The third large group had moved to Latvia because they had married people living 
there. Some alternatives were also quite commonly chosen, although not as often as the 
three mentioned above. These include moving to Latvia because of invitations to work 
in enterprises, ministries or the civil service, invitations from family and friends, 
remaining in Latvia after studies in the republic, or moving to (or remaining in) Latvia 
after demobilisation from the Soviet Armed Forces. Relatively few indicated orgnabor 
(organised recruitment of labour) as their reason for taking up residence in the republic. 
Moreover, only very few respondents reported the higher material standard of living, 
greater opportunities for cultural development, or favourable climatic conditions to be 
such reasons.
In 1992 the Latvian authorities started to register the population living in Latvia, 
and during this registration it was established for each individual whether or not s/he 
would be considered to be a citizen according to Latvian regulations on citizenship 
(people were regarded as citizens if they had been citizens of the Republic of Latvia in 
1940; so were their direct descendants, with a few exceptions, see Chapter 4). At the 
beginning of 1994 there were 2,410,800 people who had gone through this 
registration, while the State Statistical Committee of Latvia operated with a population 
of 2,566,000 living in Latvia. This means that approximately 96 per cent of the 
population had been registered.4 Of the registered population 1,720,302 (71.4 per cent) 
were citizens, while the rest were classified as "foreigners”. In the following I shall use 
the neutral term "non-citizen" instead of the negatively loaded "foreigner".
Although some information had been published on the population during the 
process of registration, in January 1994 the aggregated figures for the different 
nationalities were published for the first time in the newspaper Diena. 5 Table 5.5 is 
based on information from the Diena article. The table shows that most of the Latvians
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living in Latvia are citizens, and that Latvians make up almost 80 per cent of Latvia's 
citizenry at present. There are, however, more than 22,000 Latvians who did not fulfil 
the requirements for citizenship according to the regulations (or practices) at the time of 
their registration. They are usually Latvians who lived or have (grand)parents who 
lived outside Latvia (usually somewhere in Russia) in the independence period, but 
who have returned or come to Latvia at a later stage and are not now automatically 
entitled to citizenship of Latvia.
Table 5.5: Distribution of Citizens and Non-Citizens According to
Nationality
Registered 
population 
in 1000s
Citizens
(%)
Non­
citizens
(%)
As proportion of 
all citizens in 
Latvia (%)
Latvians 1377 98.4 1.6 78.8
Russians 722 38.5 61.5 16.2
Poles 62 61.4 38.6 2.2
Belarusians 103 19.8 80.2 1,2 . . .
Ukrainians 64 6.2 93.8 0.3
Lithuanians 33 21.2 78.8 0.4
Jews 15 45.1 54.9 0.4
Others 34 31.4 68.6 0.6
Total 2,410 71.4 28.6 100.0
Source: Calculations are based on E. Vebers and P. Kamups: " Arvalstnieku problema ir Rigas lieta", 
Diean, 26 January 1994, p. 4.
Less than 40 per cent of the Russians living in Latvia are citizens, according to 
the registration results. The registration shows that the number of Russians in Latvia 
has been reduced from more than 900,000 in 1989 to 722,000 in 1994, although there 
are expected to be quite a few Russians among the estimated 4 per cent of the 
population who have not been through registration. While Russians, according to the 
registration data, make up 30 per cent of the registered population, they amount to only 
16 per cent of Latvia's current citizens.
The registration data also reveal some interesting information on the distribution 
of citizens and non-citizens among the other larger nationalities living in Latvia. The 
Poles tend to be more strongly rooted in Latvia than any of the other non-indigenous 
nationalities, which is reflected in the fact that more than 60 per cent of the registered 
Poles fulfilled the requirements for citizenship. The proportion of citizens was also 
higher among Jews than it was among Russians. Russians, however, had a 
significantly higher proportion of citizens than had Belarusians, Ukrainians and 
Lithuanians.
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The article in Diena also contained data on the distribution of citizens and non­
citizens in the various administrative cities and districts of Latvia, and Table 5.6 was 
compiled on the basis of these data. The nationality breakdown of each of the districts 
was not yet available (March 1994). Nevertheless, if one compares this table with Table 
5.1 showing the percentage of Russians and Latvians in each of the municipalities, one 
can see that there is a systematic correspondence between the proportion of citizens and 
the proportion of Latvians in each of the districts (see also Map 3 in Appendix 3). The 
proportion of citizens is naturally highest in the rural districts of Kurzeme and in some 
of the rural districts of Vidzeme, while it is noticeably lower in most of the Latvian 
cities. The relationship is not perfect, however. It is noteworthy that even though many 
of the districts of Latgale have a relatively large number of Russians, the percentage of 
the populaton in these districts who are citizens is still relatively high. Taking into 
account the large non-Latvian population in the cities of Rezekne and Daugavpils, the 
proportion of non-citizens there is also lower than could have been expected. This 
seems to confirm that Russians in Latgale on average have stayed longer in Latvia than 
Russians in other parts of the country; in the cities in particular.
It must be emphasised that the number of non-citizens is particularly large in the 
capital, where more than 330,000 persons were not entitled to Latvian citizenship at the 
time of their registration. They comprise almost half the non-citizens of the whole 
country. There is one city where the proportion of citizens is still lower, however, and 
that is the port city of Liepaja, the largest city of Kurzeme, where only just over half the 
population are citizens. The proportion of citizens is likely to increase in the future, as 
most non-citizens will try to obtain Latvian citizenship. The speed of the increase, 
however, will depend on future citizenship legislation and the terms of naturalisation of 
non-citizens, as well as on the factors which determine the rate of departure of non- 
Latvians from the country.
5 .2 .  Age and Sex Distribution, Marital Status and Intermarriage
In 1989 the average Russian in Latvia was 34.4 years of age, whereas the 
average Latvian was almost three years older. Table 5.7 shows the age structure of the 
Russian and the Latvian population. Whereas 57 per cent of the Russians were of 
working age6, the corresponding proportion of Latvians was 54 per cent. However, 
when looking separately at the age distribution in urban and rural settlements one finds 
that the difference between Latvians and Russians living in the cities is small: 58 per 
cent of Russians and 56 per cent of Latvians living in the cities are of working age, and 
the average age is 34.3 and 35.7 years respectively. In the countryside the share of 
Russians of working age is 55 per cent, whereas the share of Latvians is 50 per cent.
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Table 5.6: Geographical Distribution of Citizens and Non-Citizens in
Latvia
Total
registered
population
Citizens Non-citizens
(1000s) (1000s) <%) (1000s) (%)
Kurzeme region
Talsi district 50.4 47.7 94.6 2.8 5.4
Kuldiga district 38.8 36.0 92.8 2.8 7.2
Tukums district** 55.4 48.0 86.6 7.4 13.4
Saldus district 38.5 32.4 84.2 6.1 15.8
liepaja district 47.3 42.6 90.1 4.7 9.9
City of Liepaja* 93.5 47.7 51.0 45.8 49.0
Ventspils (city and district)* 53.4 36.5 68.4 16.9 31.6
Total region 377.3 290.9 77.1 86.5 22.3
Zemgale region
Dobele district 40.4 30.5 75.5 10.0 24.5
Bauska district 54.2 40.3 74.4 14.0 25.6
Aizkraukle district 43.5 36.2 83.2 7.3 16.8
Jekabpils district** 60.1 48.7 81.0 11.4 19.0
City of Jurmala* 53.0 33.6 63.4 19.4 36.6
Jelgava (city and district)* 105.1 .68.9 . . . 65.3. . . 36,2 . - . 34.7 - •
Total region 356.3 258.2 72.5 98.3 27.5
Vidzeme region
Limbazi district 41.2 37.0 89.8 4.2 10.2
Valmiera district 62.1 52.4 84.4 9.8 15.6
Valka district 37.0 29.7 80.3 7.3 19.7
Aluksne district** 27.1 24.6 90.8 2.5 9.2
Riga district** 137.7 99.8 72.5 37.9 27.5
Cesis district 61.3 53.5 87.3 7.8 12.7
Gulbene district 29.7 26.8 90.2 2.9 9.8
Ogre district** 62.3 51.2 82.2 11.1 17.8
Madona district* * 48.3 44.9 93.0 3.4 7.0
Total region 506.7 419.9 82.9 86.9 17.1
Latgale region
Balvi district** 33.8 31.3 92.6 2.6 7.4
Ludza district 39.5 34.8 88.1 4.7 11.9
Preili district 44.9 40.8 90.9 4.0 9.1
Daugavpils district 42.9 34.0 79.3 8.9 20.7
Kraslava district 40.0 32.3 80.8 7.7 19.2
City of Daugavpils* 116.4 72.3 62.1 44.1 37.9
Rezekne (city and district)* 83.7 73.8 88.2 9.9 11.8
Total region 401.2 319.3 79.6 81.9 20.4
City of Riga*** 769.5 432.3 56.2 337.2 43.8
Total 2410.8 1720.3 71.4 690.5 28.6
* In the data published in Diem  , based on electoral districts (and not municipalities), only 4 of the 
7 largest cities were treated as individual administrative units. The others were added to the 
adjacent (rural) district.
** District borders do not fully correspond with region borders (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).
*** The City of Riga is still treated separately from the other regions.
Source: Calculations are based on E. Vebers and P. Karnups: " Arvalstnieku problema ir RJgas beta", 
Diena, 26 January 1994, p. 4.
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This can be explained by the larger share of the Latvian population being in the older 
age-groups. An interesting feature is that the share of Belarusians and Ukrainians who 
are of working age is much higher than both for Latvians and for Russians. For both 
these nationalities the proportion of the population which is of working age is higher 
than 67 per cent.
Table 5.7: Age Structure by Nationality
Russians Latvians
(1000s) <%) (1000s) (%)
0-9 years 146 16.1 215 15.5
10-19 years 126 13.9 195 14.0
20-29 years 138 15.2 191 13.8
30-39 years 150 16.6 168 12.1
40-49 years 105 11.6 177 12.8
50-59 years 106 11.7 178 12.8
60-69 years 85 9.4 131 9.4
70-79 years 37 4.1 83 6.0
80 years + 13 1.4 50 3.6
Total 906 100.0 1388 100.0
< working age 222 24.5 330 23.8
of working age 520 57.4 745 53.7
> working age 164 18.1 313 22.6
Source: Data compiled from I989.gada wssaiiem bastautasskattx& m asrezultati(Part II), p. 31.
Since we know the distribution of Russians in the different age-groups, there is 
also adjustment for age in the survey. The number of Russians in different age-groups 
in the survey corresponds with the actual age distribution of Russians in the 
population.7
Mostly as a result of the Second World War and the deportations after the war 
there are more women than men living in Latvia. In 1989 the population was 46.5 per 
cent male and 53.5 per cent female. The gap is somewhat larger for Latvians (45.8 per 
cent / 54.2 per cent) than for Russians (46.8 per cent / 53.2 per cent) (see Table 5.8). 
The tendency that a higher share of an immigrant population is usually male than female 
is either not the case for Russians in Latvia, or the tendency is outweighed by an 
already predominantly female Russian population in the republic.8
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Table 5.8: Sex Distribution by Nationality
Total Russians Latvians
(1000s) (1000s) (%) (1000s) <%)
Men 1238.8 423.8 34.2 635.0 51.3
Women 1427.8 481.7 33.7 752.8 52.7
Urban areas
Men 869.6 357.2 41.1 373.9 43.0
Women 1019.0 412.4 40.5 457.3 44.9
Rural areas
Men 369.2 66.7 18.1 261.0 70.7
Women 408.8 69.3 17.0 295.5 72.3
Source: 1989.gada w ssaviem bastautasskaidsanasrezultati(Part II), pp. 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39.
The pattern described above is also reflected in terms of marital status. Whereas 
66.8 per cent of Latvian and 67.6 per cent of Russian men over 16 are married, the 
corresponding proportions for women are 53.3 and 58.2 per cent. (Table 5.9) The 
percentage of men who have never been married is 21.4 per cent for Russians and 22.1 
per cent for Latvians, whereas for women the percentages are 13.4 per cent and 17.4 
per cent respectively. There are insignificant differences between Russians and Latvians 
in terms of number of divorces. Both Russians and Latvians have a lower number of 
married people than do the other major nationalities in Latvia, and compared for 
example to Belarusians and Ukrainians, this difference is significant.
Table 5.9: Marital Status by Nationality
Total
(1000s)
Married
(%)
Never been 
married
(%)
Widow(er)s
<%)
Divorced
<%)
Men (16 years old and older)
All nationalities 930 67.8 21.4 3.2 7.3
Russians 310 67.6 21.4 2.6 8.0
Latvians 467 66.8 22.1 3.7 7.1
Others 153 71.1 19.3 2.8 6.4
Women (16 years old and older)
All nationalities 1130 56.0 15.4 17.7 10.7
Russians 373 58.2 13.4 16.1 12.0
Latvians 590 53.3 17.4 19.1 10.0
Others 167 60.4 12.5 16.6 10.1
Source: Data compiled from 1989.gada vissaviem bastautasskaitisanasrezultad(Part II), p. 40.
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Mixed marriages can be seen as one of the most important components of ethnic 
processes, because ethnically homogeneous marriages tend to enhance the stability of 
the ethnic group through the transfer of language, culture and social values. Children in 
ethnically mixed marriages, on the other hand, tend to adopt cultural characteristics of 
both parents, and such marriages can thus serve as a bridge between different 
nationalities and reduce interethnic tensions. The census of 1989 does not provide 
information about mixed marriages, and Table 5.10 is based on the registration of new 
marriages in the years of 1978 and 1988. The table shows that mixed marriages are 
much more common among Russians than among Latvians. As many as 37.4 per cent 
of those Russians who married in 1988 chose a partner of a different nationality, 
whereas the corresponding proportion among Latvians was 19.9 per cent. There were 
only minor differences between men and women in this respect. In 1988 mixed 
marriages among Russians had become more widespread as compared to 1978, but in 
the same period there was a weak tendency among Latvians more often to marry within 
their nationality.9
Table 5.10: Intermarriage by Nationality
1978 1988
Newly
registered
marriages
(1000s)
With partner 
of different 
nationality
(%)
Newly
registered
marriages
(1000s)
With partner 
of different 
nationality
<%)
Russians 19 35.0 18 37.4
Latvians 23 20.5 24 19.9
Women
Russians 10 35.1 9 37.6
Latvians 12 21.0 12 20.0
Men
Russians 10 34.8 9 37.1
Latvians 12 20.0 12 19.7
Source: Demograficheskii ezhegodnik 1989, Moscow: Finansy i Statistika (Goskomstat), 1989.
A. I. Kholmogorov has studied the phenomenon of mixed marriages in Latvia 
in somewhat more detail.10 His findings are based on data about mixed marriages from 
the 1960s, which implies that some of the findings could be dated. Nevertheless, one 
can believe that the main tendencies are still valid. Kholmogorov's data suggest that 
Russian men have a greater tendency to marry Latvian women than Russian women to 
marry Latvian men. Of those who married a person of a different nationality, 37.9 per 
cent of Russian men and 41.2 per cent of Russian women married another Slav, and 
40.6 per cent and 25.1 per cent respectively married a Latvian, whereas 18.2 per cent 
and 33.7 per cent married partners of some other nationality. Mixed marriages were
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more common in towns and cities than in rural areas, and Kholmogorov found that age, 
occupational structure and density of a nationality in a certain area were the factors most 
strongly correlated with the frequency of mixed marriages.
In our survey 62 per cent of the respondents were married, 6 per cent were 
widows/widowers, 11 per cent divorced and 19 per cent had never been married. 
Those who were married were asked to indicate the nationality of their husband or 
wife. The results, which are illustrated in Table 5.11, provide the main trends in the 
pattern of intermarriage among the Russian population. More than 70 per cent of the 
married respondents had a Russian spouse, just under 10 per cent were married to a 
Latvian, while the remaining 20 per cent had a spouse of a different nationality (mostly 
Belarusian or Ukrainian). Although there was a slightly greater tendency for women to 
marry a Latvian, the difference between men and women was relatively small. It is, 
however, noteworthy that younger Russians were less likely to have a Latvian spouse 
than were Russians in the older generations. On the other hand, marriage to a person of 
a non-Russian but Slavic nationality was most common in the younger age groups. 
Specialists (spetsialisty) were more likely than both manual workers and professionals 
(sluzhashchie) to marry a Latvian, but income level and level of education did not seem 
to affect the choice of nationality of the spouse. When looking at different geographical 
areas separately, some quite interesting trends could be observed. Intermarriage 
between a Russian and a Latvian was least common in the Latgalian cities, and only 6 
per cent of the respondents here were married to a Latvian. This is not unexpected, 
taking into account the small number of Latvians living in these cities. However, the 
largest proportion of Latvian-Russian marriages was not to be found in those rural 
districts where Latvians make up a clear majority, but in the Latgalian rural districts. 
Only just over half the married respondents there had the same nationality as their 
spouse. Moreover, respondents who themselves were the offspring of mixed Russian- 
Latvian parents were naturally much more likely than others to marry a Latvian spouse. 
In fact, one quarter of our respondents who had either a Latvian mother or a Latvian 
father were married to a Latvian.
Table 5.11: Nationality of Spouse
N = 452 Russian Latvian Ukrainian Belarusian Other
(139 not married 
or missing) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Married respondents 71 10 8 6 5
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
The survey further contains information on the nationality of the parents of the 
respondents. These findings confirmed the main trends for mixed marriages. Three 
quarters of the respondents had both a Russian mother and a Russian father, while the
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remaining quarter had parents of different nationalities. However, only six per cent of 
the respondents had a Latvian mother or father, so that in most cases both parents were 
of a Slavic nationality. Although it was slightly more common to have a Latvian father 
than a Latvian mother, the difference was very small. The smaller share of Russians 
having a Latvian-parent than spouse can probably be explained by the fact that many of 
the parents of the respondents had married before they arrived in Latvia, when the 
likelihood that they would marry a Latvian was very small. Naturally, Russians who 
were bom in Latvia had a much greater likelihood of having a Latvian parent than 
Russians who had arrived in Latvia at a later stage. More than 15 per cent of those 
respondents who were bom in Latvia and whose family was also bom there had a 
Latvian mother or father, while the same was true of less than 2 per cent of those who 
were not born in the republic. Moreover, there has also been a weak tendency for 
children of mixed Russian-Latvian marriages to choose the Latvian nationality at the age 
of 16, which naturally reduces the likelihood of a Russian having a Latvian parent.
Although there are a large number of mixed marriages in Latvia, our survey 
confirms that there is a clear tendency among Russians to marry Russians or other 
Slavs rather than Latvians. Had the nationality of one partner in a marriage been 
independent of the other partner's nationality, one could have expected that about half 
the married respondents would have been married to a Latvian. In this perspective the 
number of Russian-Latvian marriages must be considered to be relatively low.11
5.3 .  Education, Occupational Status, Standard of Living
The census of 1989 differentiated between seven levels of education: higher, 
higher incompleted, specialised secondary, secondary, secondary incompleted, 
primary, and lower than primary. In order to make the material more comprehensive, in 
Table 5.12 these levels are divided into four categories. The table shows that the level 
of education is higher among Russians than Latvians. Whereas 14.3 per cent of 
Russians have completed higher education, this applies to only 9.6 per cent of the 
Latvians. There are also more Russians than Latvians who have either completed 
specialised secondary education or started higher education without completing it. At 
the same time, there are more Latvians than Russians who have uncompleted secondary 
education or lower. When treating urban and rural areas separately, one finds that 
Russians in cities and towns have more education than Latvians, suggesting that the 
larger proportion of Russians with a higher education cannot solely be explained by the 
larger share of Latvians living in rural areas. In rural areas, on the other hand, there is a 
slightly larger proportion of Latvians with a higher education compared to Russians. 
Thus, there seems to be a greater difference among Russians than among Latvians in 
urban and rural areas in terms of education.
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Table 5.12: Education in Latvia by Nationality
Education among age group 15 years +
higher
(%)
uncompleted 
higher or 
specialised middle
(%)
general middle 
(%)
uncompleted 
middle and lower
(%)
All nationalities 11.5 19.1 29.8 23.4
Russians 14.3 20.1 32.0 19.4
Latvians 9.6 18.5 27.8 27.1
Source: 1989. gada lissaw eiribas tautas steuti& w asrezultati(Part II), pp. 43-44.
Although there is not always an association between level of education and 
qualifications for a particular job, the fact that Russians, at least according to the 
census, have a higher level of education than Latvians suggests that the Russian 
population in Latvia should not be seen as a huge mass of unskilled workers. The 
situation is, as these figures indicate, more nuanced. It is open to question whether the 
higher level of education among Russians should be interpreted as a result of better 
access to educational institutions due to a privileged position in Latvian society; a better 
command of Russian, which we have seen has been a requirement for obtaining higher 
education; or whether the differences can be explained by cultural differences, for 
example in terms of attitude to education. Similarly, the census operates with broad 
categories, and naturally does not problematise the question of the quality of different 
types of education; higher techical education, which typically has had a high proportion 
of Russians, is juxaposed with higher education in the humanities, where Latvians 
usually have made up a larger share. It could therefore be argued that the fact that 
relatively many Russians have Soviet-type higher education should not lead us to 
conclude that their educational level is very high. Without discussing these questions in 
more detail here, it should be noted that the level of education in Latvia (as defined in 
the censuses), regardless of nationality, has been higher than in most other Soviet 
republics, the RSFSR included.12
The census of 1989 also classifies the population according to main source of 
income (see Table 5.13.). Paid work, either in the form of employment by the state or 
self-employment, was the main source of income for 56 per cent of Russians and 53 
per cent of Latvians. In 1989 there were fewer Russians than Latvians receiving 
pensions, scholarships and other state benefits (18 and 22 per cent respectively). This 
can be explained by the difference in age structure between the Russian and the Latvian 
populations, Russians having a larger share of people who are of working age.
149
Cha pter  5
Table 5.13: Main Source of Income by Nationality
Employed
work
<%)
Individual
work
<%)
Pensions and other 
state benefits
(%)
Rely on other 
people’s income
(%)
All nationalities 54.7 0.2 20.0 24.0
Russians 55.5 0.2 17.6 26.6
Latvians 51.9 0.6 21.9 25.5
Urban areas
All nationalities 57.2 0.05 18.5 24.1
Russians 56.4 0.03 16.8 26.7
Latvians 55.3 0.1 20.0 24.4
Rural areas
All nationalities 48.7 1.3 23.8 26.0
Russians 50.7 1.0 21.6 26.4
Latvians 46.9 1.3 24.6 27.1
Source: Data compiled from 1989. gada \lssa  \iem bastautasskaitlsaiiasrezultatl. (Part II), p. 45.
In Soviet statistics the population has traditionally been classified into three 
groups; blue collar workers, white collar workers and collective farmers. This 
classification is also used in the 1989 census, but there is also a fourth category for 
people who either are self-employed, or in other ways do not fit into any of the three 
main categories. Table 5.14 (see next page) shows that, in comparison with Latvians, a 
larger proportion of Russians is classified as blue- and white collar workers, whereas 
relatively few Russians are collective farmers. Some of these differences are less clearly 
marked when adjustments are made for settlement in urban and rural areas, and there 
are only minor differences in cities and towns. In rural areas, however, there are more 
workers and fewer collective farmers among the Russian than among the Latvian 
population.
The traditional Soviet classification of classes has been criticised for not always 
reflecting the actual type of work in which an individual is engaged. The 1989 Latvian 
census also operates with another classification of the working population; people 
whose work is predominantly of an intellectual kind, and people who are engaged in 
some form of physical work. Table 5.15 shows that there are more Russians than 
Latvians whose work is classified as intellectual. However, the difference is not large, 
and can probably largely be explained by the greater share of Latvians working in 
agriculture.
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Table 5.14: Occupational Composition of Population in Latvia by 
Nationality (Soviet Typology)
Workers
<%)
Employees
<%)
Collective fanners 
(%)
Others
(%)
All nationalities 56.7 33.7 9.4 0.2
Russians 59.1 37.4 3.3 0.2
Latvians 54.6 31.0 14.2 0.2
Urban areas
All nationalities 59.8 38.6 1.4 0.2
Russians 59.2 40.2 0.5 0.2
Latvians 60.3 37.0 2.5 0.2
Rural areas
All nationalities 48.0 19.7 32.1 0.2
Russians 59.0 20.3 20.5 0.2
Latvians 44.6 20.4 34.9 0.2
Source: Data from 1989. gada \issa ilenlbastautassJciutisanasrezultatl (Part II), p. 45.
Table 5.15: Type of Work by Nationality
Total Share of Share of Share of Russians Latvians
work workforce Russians Latvians among among
force engaged in engaged in engaged in those those
engaged in engaged in
(1000s) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Mainly intellectual work 516 35.4 37.8 33.8 36.8 47.2
Mainly physical work 943 64.6 62.2 66.2 33.2 50.6
Source: Data from 1989gada \issa lien ibastautasskalttsanasrezultatl(Part II), pp.51-52.
The census data also provide information on the distribution of nationalities in 
different occupational sectors. Table 5.16 shows the number of Russians and Latvians 
working in the different sectors, the national composition of each of the sectors (only 
Russians and Latvians included), as well as the percentage of the total Russian and 
Latvian populations working in these sectors. An average sector consists of 34.5 per 
cent Russians and 49.4 per cent Latvians. It follows from the table that although many 
sectors have a national composition which is close to the average, this does not apply to 
all of them. Thus, Russians have a greater than average proportion working in 
industry, transport and administration, and in all these sectors the proportion of 
Latvians is relatively low. In fact, in all these sectors the number of Russians is higher 
than the number of Latvians, even in absolute terms. There are particularly few 
Latvians working in administration, a sector where they make up only 28 per cent. 
Russians, on the other hand, have a lower-than-average representation in sectors such 
as agriculture, forestry, and culture and art, in all of which Latvians dominate.
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Relatively many Latvians worked in communist party and social organisations, but 
Russians are not as underrepresented as many of the other nationalities in this sector.
Table 5.16: Occupational Sector by Nationality
Total
work
force
(1000s)
Share of 
working 
population 
in sector
<%)
Share of 
working 
Russian 
population 
in sector
(%)
Share of 
working 
Latvian 
population 
in sector
(%)
Russians 
as share 
of sector
(%)
Latvians 
as share 
of sector
(%)
Industry 448 30.7 37.0 25.2 41.5 40.6
Agriculture 221 15.1 6.8 21.9 15.5 71.5
Forestry 9 0.6 0.2 0.9 11.1 81.5
Transport 99 6.8 8.6 5.1 43.5 37.2
Communications 21 1.4 1.3 1.5 32.8 53.8
Construction 125 8.6 8.7 8.3 34.9 47.2
Commerce and catering 120 8.2 8.5 8.2 35.8 49.5
Municipal services 38 2.6 2.7 2.6 35.4 49.6
Health sector 78 5.4 4.7 5.8 30.4 53.4
Education 107 7.3 6.8 8.1 32.0 54.6
Culture and art 24 1.7 1.0 2.3 21.2 69.2
Science 33 2.3 2.5 2.3 37.7 49.1
Administration 61 4.2 6.0 2.4 49.0 28.2
Party/Social organisations 7 0.5 0.4 0.6 30.2 59.5
Others 67 4.6 4.8 4.7 35.8 49.8
Total 1458 100.0 100.0 100.0 - -
Average Sector - - - - 34.5 49.4
Source: Data from 1989. gada rissa\ieMfbas tautas skm tisanasrezultati(Part II), p. 46.
Even though a large proportion of Russians work in industry (37 per cent, as 
compared with 25 per cent of Latvians), Table 5.16 nevertheless shows that the 
majority of Russians work in other sectors, and that there is a significant degree of 
variation among Russians in terms of their sector of work. The Russian population in 
Latvia should therefore not be seen as a homogeneous mass of industrial blue-collar 
workers.
The fact that Latvians have dominated the 'creative' sector, culture and art, is 
undoubtedly of great importance both for Russians and for Latvians. In the case of the 
Latvians, this has made them less susceptible to cultural Russification or 
Sovietisation.13 Russians, on the other hand, have, as we shall see, suffered from the 
absence of a local creative elite rooted in Russian culture.
There are few indications in the census data regarding occupational status that 
Russians as a group in 1989 had a privileged position in Latvian society. However, 
there may be differences between the nationalities that are not discernible in the census
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material. Since there is little information on the criteria for classification into different 
"classes" or types of work, one would suspect that such a classification could be rather 
arbitrary. No statistics are available to classify the population according, for example, 
to position in the occupational hierarchy as superiors and subordinates. Some 
indications of an advantageous position for Russians were referred to in Chapter 3. 
Even though social and economic advantages are not necessarily the only 
considerations taken into account when choosing one's nationality, one would expect 
that if Russians were in a clearly advantageous position people born into mixed 
Russian-Latvian marriages would tend to choose Russian rather than Latvian nationality 
at the age of 16. The tendency has, however, rather been that such children have 
chosen Latvian nationality, although this trend does not seem to have been very 
strong.14
Even though there is little material to indicate if there are any differences in 
terms of standard of living between Latvians and Russians, the "Russians in Latvia" 
survey of 1992 contains substantial information on the living conditions of the Russian 
population in Latvia. It should, however, be emphasised that the survey was conducted 
at one particular point of time, characterised by, among others, high inflation and 
energy shortages, and the findings cannot be interpreted as an objective evaluation of 
the long-term economic conditions under which Russians in Latvia live. The material 
suggests that there are differences in terms of economic status within the Russian 
population, although relatively few Russians seem to be economically prosperous, and 
even fewer on the verge of starvation.
The respondents were asked to report their monthly household income divided 
by the number of members in the household, and the results can be found in table 5.17. 
One should not, of course, consider the rouble salary as the only measurement of 
standard of living, since it is well known that economic well-being in Latvia has been 
highly dependent also on other factors, such as connections and access to goods 
through one's place of work. However, by the time the survey was conducted in the 
spring of 1992, money had gained a much more decisive role in the economy as the 
means by which to obtain consumer goods. The money necessary for a basic existence 
(prozhitochnyi minimum) for one person at the time when the survey was conducted 
was set by the government at 1200 roubles a month.15, and this should at least give 
some idea of the purchasing power of the rouble. The difficult economic situation of the 
average Russian is indicated by the fact that more than two thirds of the respondents 
reported an income under this minimum. Only 6 per cent of the respondents reported an 
income per each household member of 2000 roubles or more. It should be noted that in 
surveys of this kind respondents are likely to report only their official income, whereas 
unofficial sources of income tend not to be revealed. Since a large share of family
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income is likely to have been obtained from sources outside the official economy, the 
actual incomes were probably higher than indicated by the respondents in our survey.
Table 5.17: Income
Survey Question: What is the average monthly income per capita in your 
household (the total of all incomes of all members of your household divided by 
the number of members of your household, including children)?
Less 200- 300- 500- 700- 1000- 1500- More
than 300 rbs. 500 rbs. 700 rbs. 1000 1500 2000 than
N = 577 200 rbs. rbs. rbs. rbs. 2000 rbs.
(14 missing) <%) <%) <%) <%) <%) <%) <%) <%)
Total 2 2 13 20 27 17 14 6
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
It is noteworthy that men indicated a significantly higher level of income than 
did female respondents. Since the respondents were asked about their household and 
not individual income, the difference is too large to be accounted for by the income 
differences between males and females in single households. It seems that men and 
women have different conceptions of household income, which could be due to, for 
example, differences in terms of information about the income of each family member. 
One explanation could be that male respondents are better informed about, or are less 
reluctant about including, incomes which stem from the unofficial sector. There were 
also significant regional differences, with Russians in Latgale (both urban and rural 
districts) reporting the lowest incomes, Russians in Riga in an intermediary position, 
and Russians in the rest of the Latvia reporting the highest incomes. The length of stay 
in Latvia did not influence income levels, but there was a tendency for Russians with a 
good knowledge of Latvian to live in households with a higher income than had other 
Russians.
The respondents were further asked to report which of the statements listed in 
Figure 5.1 gave the best description of the financial situation in their family. A large 
percentage reported, as can be seen from the figure, that they have enough money only 
to buy food, but only 3 per cent reported that they live from hand to mouth. 6 per cent 
of the respondents had so much money that they did not have to economise.
A majority (80 per cent) of Russians live in separate flats, according to the 
results of the survey, whereas 6 per cent have their own house. Moreover, 3 per cent 
live in one part of an individual house, while 5 per cent live in so-called "communal 
flats" (kommunal'nye kvartiry), where they share kitchen and toilet facilities with a 
number of tenants. An additional 3 per cent live in student flats or some type of hostel.
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Figure 5.1: Perception of Household Economy
Survey question: Which of the following statements would you say gives the best 
description of your household economy?
There is not enough m oney even for 
food: we live from hand to mouth
We have enough m oney only to buy food and clothes
There is enough money only to buy food
We live very econom ically, and manage to set 
aside m oney only for important purchases
We live econom ically, but usually 
we have enough money
We have quite enough money and 
do not have to econom ise  
T r
30
1  % o f  respondents
4 0  N = 586
(5 m issing)
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992
The respondents were also asked to evaluate their housing conditions: 38 per 
cent characterised them as good or fairly good, whereas 22 per cent found them to be 
poor or unbearable. The largest group, though, (40 per cent) reported average housing 
conditions. For control purposes, in another place in the questionnaire the respondents 
were asked to indicate to what degree they were satisfied with their housing conditions, 
and the results confirmed the trend as indicated above. Almost 20 per cent were 
completely satisfied with their housing conditions, and one third of the respondents 
tended to be more satisfied than dissatisfied. At the other end of the scale there were 11 
per cent who were completely dissatisfied and 24 per cent who said they were more 
dissatisfied than satisfied. There were also 11 per cent who found this question too 
difficult to answer.
Information about the purchase of articles of consumption tends to be more 
reliable than income as a measurement of standard of living, and the survey gave the 
following indication of the availability of certain consumer goods: almost 30 per cent of 
the respondents disposed of a car in their household, 96 per cent had access to a 
refrigerator, 83 per cent had a colour TV at home, whereas 11 per cent had some video 
equipment in their family.
The survey gave more information about material living conditions among 
Russians in Latvia (see the questionnaire in Appendix 2), but I shall not go into more
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detail in this thesis.16 The utility of such information is limited for our purposes, as 
there is no reference group with which the Russians can be compared, and will 
therefore become more useful after a similar survey conducted at another point of time, 
which will give the opportunity for time series analysis.
5 .4 .  Language Fluency and Religion
The census of 1989 reveals some interesting information on language fluency 
among the different nationalities living in Latvia. People were asked to indicate their 
"native language" (rodnoi yazyk) as well as a second Soviet language they were fluent 
in (svobodno vladeet / brfriparv&tdfy • Table 5.18 shows that the overall majority of 
both Russians and Latvians reported the language of their nationality as their native 
language. This tendency was somewhat stronger for Russians than for Latvians. Only 
.1.1 per cent of Russians regarded Latvian as their native language, and this percentage 
was higher in rural areas (3.2 per cent) than in towns and cities (0.8 per cent). On the 
other hand, the 2.6 per cent of Latvians regarding Russian as their native language lived 
predominantly in urban areas. It is noteworthy that the number of Russians and 
Latvians reporting a third language as their native language is negligible. The other 
nationalities living in Latvia also usually regard the language of their nationality as their 
native language, but of those who in 1989 reported another language as their native, the 
majority reported the Russian language. The percentage of Russians reporting their 
native language to be different from Russian decreased slightly from 1959 to 1989. In 
the same period the number of Latvians adopting Russian as their native language 
increased, but the rate of change was rather moderate.
From 1970 Soviet censuses also included information about fluency in a second 
Soviet language. The table shows that the percentage of Latvians fluent in Russian is 
much higher than that of Russians fluent in Latvian. In 1989 only 22 per cent of 
Russians living in Latvia reported fluency in Latvian either as their first or as a second 
language. The proportion of Latvians fluent in Russian was then 68 per cent. The 
percentage of Latvians with no fluency in Latvian is small (1.3 per cent), but larger than 
the percentage of Russians not fluent in Russian (0.1 per cent). Three quarters of 
Russians and one third of Latvians reported fluency only in one language. The table 
also shows that a higher percentage of Russians tend to know Latvian in rural than in 
urban areas, whereas the percentage of Latvians knowing Russian is higher in urban 
areas.
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Table 5.18: Native Language and Fluency in Second (Soviet) 
Language* by Nationality
Total
number
Native language Fluency
langua
is second 
ge in...
Fluency only 
in native
Russian Latvian Other Russian Latvian language
(1000s) (%) (%) (%) <%) <%) <%)
Russians 906 98.8 1.1 0.09 1.1 21.1 76.0
Latvians 1388 2.6 97.4 0.06 65.7 1.3 32.6
Urban areas
Russians 770 99.1 0.8 0.09 0.8 20.1 77.3
Latvians 831 3.4 96.6 0.06 71.3 1.8 26.5
Rural areas
Russians 136 96.7 3.2 0.1 2.7 27.1 68.9
Latvians 557 1.4 98.6 0.06 57.3 0.6 66.1
* People were asked to indicate fluency only in one language other than their native language. 
Source: Compiled from 1989.gada \issa\iem bastautasshutisanasrezultiiti(Part II), p. 42.
Some changes in terms of language fluency among Russians and Latvians took 
place in the period from 1970 to 1989.17 The proportion of Russians fluent in Latvian 
(including Russians who reported Latvian as their native language) increased from 17 
per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 1989. In the same period the proportion of Latvians 
fluent in Russian increased much faster, from 45 per cent in 1970 to 68 per cent in 
1989.
Some caution should be applied when analysing the figures for language 
fluency in the censuses. First, the census form constrained people to report fluency in 
only one second language, which to a certain extent may underestimate the degree of 
language fluency. Second, what is reported in the census is a subjective interpretation 
of language fluency, and there may be individual differences as to how much 
knowledge of a language is required for one to say that one speaks it fluently. There 
could even be differences between the nationalities in this respect. Third, language 
policies have been subject to many controversies in Latvian society, and it could be that 
some people have secondary motives when answering these questions in the census, 
and particularly the question about second language. There may, for example, have 
been Latvians who refused to admit fluency in Russian in reaction against what they 
considered to be Russification policies.
The "Russians in Latvia" survey also contains questions about language 
fluency, and this material has three advantages compared to the material in the census. 
Firstly, the figures are more up to date, as the survey was conducted just before the 
new language law was implemented in May 1992. Secondly, the scale is more detailed 
in the survey than in the census, and whereas the census operates with only two 
categories for language fluency, the survey makes it possible to estimate the degree of
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language knowledge by operating with six different categories. Finally, by the use of 
the survey results one can establish if other characteristics, such as age, type of 
settlement, length of stay in Latvia etc., correlate with the degree of language fluency.
Let us first take a look at the degree of language fluency in the Russian 
population as a whole. The six categories by which the respondents could classify their 
knowledge of Latvian are listed in Figure 5.2 , as is also the distribution of the replies. 
There are, as we see, only 5 per cent who report that they are absolutely fluent in the 
language, but there is also a low number (10 per cent) reporting absolutely no 
knowledge of Latvian. If we add up the number of people speaking and reading 
Latvian, even with some difficulty, we find that this applies to 36 per cent of the 
respondents. More than half the respondents know some Latvian, but their knowledge 
is very limited, and seems to be of a kind where it is impossible to use it for personal 
contacts or other purposes.
Figure 5.2: Language Fluency
Survey question: Please indicate to what degree you know the Latvian language
Do not understand at all
Hardly speak at all, and understand very little
Speak and understand with great difficulty
Speak and read with som e difficulty
Speak and read relatively fluently
Speak, read and write com pletely fluently
r
20 30
% o f respondents
N =586
(5  m issing)
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
From the survey results it seems that age does not have a strong effect on 
language knowledge. People between 15 and 30 did not report a higher knowledge of 
Latvian than did other age-groups. Since we did not distribute questionnaires to people 
under 15 we cannot say anything certain about people below that age. Neither was level 
of education a decisive factor for language fluency, although people with very little 
education reported less knowledge of Latvian than others. One could expect that people 
who have lived in Latvia fora long time know Latvian better than others. This also 
seems to be the case. More than half of those whose family had moved to Latvia before
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the mid-1940s speak and read Latvian, although many them with some difficulty. It is, 
however, quite remarkable that as many as 21 per cent of Russians who have lived in 
Latvia all their life speak practically no Latvian and/or do not understand Latvian at all.
There are also great geographical differences in terms of language 
knowledge. The most important factor seems to be the density of the Russian 
population in the area in question. Russians living in areas with a large Russian 
population are less likely to know Latvian than Russians living in Latvian-dominated 
areas. One example is the district of Talsi in Kurzeme, the district with the lowest 
proportion of Russians in the whole of Latvia (5 per cent). Here only 18 per cent of our 
respondents reported that they could understand very little or no Latvian, compared 
with an average of almost 40 per cent.
It was expected that people married to Latvians would be more likely to know 
the Latvian language than others, and the survey confirmed that this was the case. On 
the other hand, it was quite surprising to find that more than one in four Russians 
married to a Latvian understood very little or no Latvian. Respondents with a Latvian 
parent fared somewhat better: one in eight knew very little or no Latvian, whereas 40 
per cent had a good knowledge of the language.
It is also of some interest to examine the degree of language fluency in 
languages other than Latvian in order to find out whether there is a correlation between 
knowledge of Latvian and knowledge of other languages. Our hypothesis is that there 
is such a positive correlation, so that people with a knowledge of foreign languages are 
more inclined also to know Latvian. On the basis of the findings referred to above, one 
would expect that the low level of knowledge of Latvian among the Russian population 
in Latvia is also reflected in a similar low degree of fluency in other foreign languages.
The survey confirmed this hypothesis. A very small proportion of Russians are 
fluent in foreign languages such as English, German, French, Polish, Lithuanian and 
Estonian. Only 3 per cent reported that they could speak, read and write fluently in 
English, and between 0 and 1 per cent in all the other languages listed above. 
Moreover, 15 per cent of the respondents were able to speak, understand and write in 
English only with the use of a dictionary. The corresponding percentage for German 
was 6 per cent, but for all the other listed languages was negligible. Respectively 20 
and 17 per cent of the respondents could speak and understand some English and 
German with great difficulty, whereas the rest of the respondents either reported no 
knowledge of the listed languages or did not answer this question on language fluency.
The respondents in our survey were further asked to indicate for which 
purposes they regarded knowledge of Latvian to be essential. The majority (71 per 
cent) thought that knowledge of Latvian was necessary for social purposes. The second 
and third most frequently mentioned purposes were respectively to improve the cultural 
level of interethnic contacts (40 per cent) and to carry out tasks and duties related to
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work (37 per cent). More than one third of the respondents further thought it to be 
essential to know Latvian in order to watch programs on TV in the Latvian language. 
Less frequently mentioned were purposes such as reading newspapers and journals (24 
per cent), taking part in organisational and political life (22 per cent), reading Latvian 
fiction (15 per cent), and reading specialised literature in Latvian (13 per cent). Only 6 
per cent saw it as necessary to know Latvian in order to take part in individual cultural 
activities.
Two questions were put only to respondents without fluency in Latvian. First 
they were asked to report whether or not they were studying Latvian at the present time 
(the spring of 1992). It should be noted that this was just before the implementation of 
the new language law (referred to in more detail in chapter 4), which implied that many 
were expecting to take language examinations in the near future in order to be sure of 
keeping their jobs. A total of 43 per cent of those answering this question were 
studying Latvian at that time, whereas 57 per cent were not. However, the respondents 
were also asked whether they wished to study Latvian, and 72 per cent of those who 
gave an answer to this question claimed to have such a wish, while 28 per cent admitted 
that they did not wish to study Latvian.
We have already seen that the Russian population in the interwar Latvian 
republic was relatively evenly distributed between Russian Orthodox and Old 
Believers. The antireligous campaigns of the Soviet regime and the general 
secularisation of society are, however, likely to have changed this picture. In recent 
years there has been a religious revival in most regions of the former Soviet Union, as 
well as a new focus on religion as a carrier of national identity. It is therefore of great 
importance to examine to what extent Russians in Latvia are influenced by this religious 
revival, and to study the links between religious affiliations and ethnic identification.
The census of 1989 does not provide information about religious affiliations, 
but there were two questions in the survey related to the subject of religion. First, the 
respondents were asked to state to which religious community they belong. The 
majority of Russians in Latvia are Russian Orthodox; 55 per cent of the respondents 
reported adherence to this church. According to the survey, 8 per cent belong to the Old 
Believers' Church and 3 per cent belong to other religious communities. More than one 
third of the respondents classified themselves as non-believers.
The respondents were also asked how often they go to church. The results, 
which are illustrated in Figure 5.3, show that the Russian population, as a rule, does 
not visit church on a regular basis. Only 2 per cent of the respondents claimed to go to 
church every week or more often, 10 per cent visit the church monthly or more often, 
whereas a majority of 63 per cent visit their church less than once a year or do not go to 
church at all.
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Figure 5.3: Frequency of Church Visits 
Survey Question: How often do you visit church?
Never
Once a year or less often
A few times a year
Once every month
2-3 times every month
O nce a week or more often
—1 % o f  respondents
40 N = 574
(17  m issing)
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992
There are significant differences between men and women in terms of religious 
affiliations and activities. Whereas half the Russian men regard themselves as non­
believers, the same is true of only 21 per cent of Russian women. Women also visit the 
church more regularly than men, and the probability that a woman will visit a church at 
least a few times every month is twice as big as the probability that a man will do the 
same. Age has a small effect on religious affiliations and activities, and the proportion 
of non-believers is evenly distributed between the age-groups. The results show, 
however, that the youngest and the oldest generations have the largest proportion of the 
most frequent churchgoers, but the oldest age-group also has a larger proportion among 
those who virtually or absolutely never visit the church.
Our survey shows, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, that Russians in urban 
areas are no less religious than are Russians in rural areas. In fact rather the reverse 
seems to be the case. Whereas 68 per cent of Russians in the cities reported affiliation 
to a religious community, only 59 per cent of Russians in rural districts reported the 
same. Moreover, Russians in the cities go to church more regularly than do Russians in 
rural areas. There is also significant regional variation. Russians in Latgale have a 
greater tendency to be affiliated with a religious community than Russians in other 
regions, and this is the case for cities as well as for rural districts. In Latgale one also 
finds the largest proportion of Russians belonging to the Old Believers' church. 
According to our estimates, approximately a quarter of Russians living in Latgale are 
Old Believers, which is more than three times the proportion of Old Believers in Latvia 
as a whole.18
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5 .5 .  Conclusions
So far in this chapter we have referred to census and survey data which, it is to 
be hoped, provide some useful information about the social characteristics of the 
Russian population in Latvia. The chapter contains a large number of figures, and 
although such figures can sometimes speak for themselves, on most occasions some 
form of evaluation and interpretation is also required. Thus, at this stage it seems 
appropriate to ask what all the figures which have been presented actually convey about 
the position of Russians living in Latvia, and why they are of significance for an 
understanding of Russian ethnic identity in the country.
The most important conclusion to be drawn is that there is a great diversity 
among Russians in terms of their social characteristics. Russians, far from being a 
homogeneous group of people, differ widely when it comes to characteristics such as 
regional settlement; length of stay and reasons for moving to Latvia; occupation and 
level of education; language knowledge; and religious affiliation and practice. Russians 
in Latvia therefore have very different, experiences, which will influence their 
perception of their position in Latvian society. A person with a mixed Latvian-Russian 
family background, who has lived in Latvia all his/her life and has a fluent command of 
the Latvian language cannot be expected to share the outlook of a recent Russian 
immigrant who came to Latvia only because of better work prospects and who has 
interacted only in a Russian-language environment.
We have also compared some of the social characteristics of Russians with 
those of ethnic Latvians, and seen that there is a relationship between a number of such 
characteristics and ethnicity. Apart from the obvious differences in terms of language 
and religion, the most important trend is that Russians more often than Latvians live in 
large cities where they sometimes even make up a majority. It can therefore be argued 
that the Russian question in Latvia first of all can be seen as an urban concern. Most of 
Latvian industry is concentrated in the cities, and the occupational structure among 
Russians and Latvians differs significantly. Most notably, Russians dominate in 
technically related professions, while they have a very low proportion within the 
creative intelligentsia. There is reason to assume that the differences between Latvians 
and Russians are large enough for them to have different roles in Latvian society, and 
ethnicity is therefore likely to be one of the important factors at work in the social 
stratification in the country.
Social characteristics will be decisive for future integration and/or assimilation 
of the Russian population, and information about these characteristics is crucial in order 
to assess the prospects for such processes. In the final chapter there will be a 
discussion of whether Russians in Latvia are likely to become assimilated, and some of 
this discussion will be based on considerations of the materials referred to in this
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chapter. Similarly, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, Russian attitudes and 
outlooks, which are more thoroughly discussed in other chapters, are analysed by 
checking for relationships between the responses to such questions and social 
characteristics examined in this chapter. Thus, apart from age and gender of the 
respondent, we also check for variables such as ethnic composition of the family; 
length of stay in Latvia; income level; language fluency; and place and type of 
residence. Therefore, if one wants to know the actual distribution of Russians in the 
various categories, information from this chapter should be of use.
1Such census data Were published in 1989. gada xissaxdenibas tautas skaittsanas rezu ltati. L atviajas 
PSR, Riga: Latvijas PSR Valsts statistikas komiteja, 1990. Some of the data are compiled from Part 
I of the publication called "Demogafiskie raditaji", while the rest are from Part II: "AtseviSku tautibu 
iedzivotajus raksturojosie raditaji".
2There seem to be some diverging views on the actual borders of the four Latvian regions. My division 
is based on information received from the sociologists who took part in organising the survey. Other 
scholars apply a slightly different administrative division, e.g. Vebers and Karnups (1994).
3Me2s (1992) has a thorough discussion of the developments in the ethnic composition of Latvian 
cities and rural districts with emphasis on the Latvian ethnos. See also ZvidrinS and Vanovska (1992), 
pp. 44-67.
4As explained in the previous chapter, there were certain categories of the population that were not 
allowed to register, while others refused to go through the registration process.
5Vebers and Karnups (1994).
6Defmed as 16 - 60 years for men and 16-55 years for women.
7 For a more detailed description of these adjustments, see Appendix 1.
8The same adjustments as for age are made for sex in order to secure a representative sample. See 
Appendix 1.
developments in the proportion of mixed marriages among different nationalities in Latvia in the 
period from 1959 to 1980 are presented in a table in ZvidrinS (1986), which shows that the share of 
mixed marriages increased somewhat for most nationalities in this period. Among Ukrainians, 
Belarusians, Lithuanians and Poles living in Latvia only between 10 to 20 percent married 
homogeneously in 1980. The proportion was much larger for Jews. However, after the Latvians the 
Russians had the greatest tendency among the largest nationalities living in Latvia to marry a person of 
the same nationality.
1 °Kholmogorov (1970).
1 ^here are diverging views among scholars on the importance of mixed marriages in Latvia. While 
Dreifelds (1990/91) holds the view that mixed marriages in Latvia are widespread and serve to minimise 
ethnic tensions, Rudenshiolds (1992) sees the Latvians' tendency to endogamy (resistance to marriage 
outside one's nationality) as one of the main reasons for the low level of interaction between some of 
the ethnic groups in Latvia.
12Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989 g., Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1990, p. 180.
13See G. Smith (1990).
14See Karklins (1987), pp. 37-38. 
l5Diena, 5 March 1992, p. 5.
1 d h e  large number of questions related to material living conditions were requested by the Latvian 
sociologists participating in the survey, whose primary aim was to evaluate the living conditions of 
Russians in Latvia.
17In 1959 the question about second language fluency was not asked.
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18An interesting point is that respondents indicating affiliations with the Old Believers' Church report 
less frequent visits to church than do respondents of other religious communities.
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6. 'Russians in Latvia' or 'Latvian Russians'?1
The redefined position of Russians in Latvia has significant implications for 
their ethnic identification. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the 
Latvian state were very unlikely to leave Russians unaffected. Although it was still 
possible for Russians to believe that political developments would bring about a revival 
of a Russian-dominated empire, they nevertheless had to recognise that the present 
authorities no longer treated them as the "elder brother" of the other nationalities, at 
least for the time being. A Soviet or international identity could still exist, but such an 
identity was seriously challenged by the rapid geopolitical changes in the new post- 
Soviet polities, with a new and different stratification of the ethnic groups.
Although the ethnic identification of Russians was likely to change, the 
direction, speed and content of such change would not be uniform. The Russians were 
not a homogeneous group of people, and their reactions to changes taking place would 
therefore vary. In this chapter I will first look at factors determining the way in which 
Russians perceived their new role, and by discussing different groups of Russians I 
will show that Russians had varied interests and prospects in an independent Latvian 
state. Next I will use survey material to look at the level of integration of Russians into 
Latvian society, and also examine the links they have with Russia. This will lead on to 
the final section where I shall use survey results to examine the meaning of 'Latvia' and 
'Russia' to Russians living in Latvia.
6 .1 .  Classification of the Russian Population
In a paper dealing specifically with the question of Russian diaspora identity in 
the new states of the former Soviet Union Pal Kolst0 differentiates between two 
dimensions of identity: cultural self-understanding and political loyalty, and argues that 
there may be a discrepancy between these two dimensions in the case of ethnic 
minorities.2 A diaspora has the choice between three cultural identities: It can adopt the 
culture of the larger society in the state (assimilation); identify with its ethnic core group 
outside the state; or it can develop a self-understanding of its own. Diaspora 
populations also have three options of political identity: political loyalty towards the 
state of residence; loyalty to another state (usually the historical homeland of the ethnic 
group or the state in which the majority of the core group lives); or the creation of new 
states of their own. By dichotomising the two dimensions Kolst0 introduces a typology 
of different identity positions which Russians in the new states may adopt.
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In the case of the Russian diaspora there is the complication that the historic 
homeland, Russia, may mean different things to different Russians, as is also stressed 
by Kolst0. Some Russians identify with the present-day Russian Federation, whereas 
others look back to the Tsarist Empire and do not recognise what has happened since 
then. A third group may identify only with the Soviet Union. There are even those to 
whom Russia is nothing but an abstract idea which has never existed in reality. 
However, as we have seen, different forms of identification are not mutually exclusive, 
and a Russian may well identify with the Russian empire, the Soviet Union and the 
Russian Federation and see them all as expressions of the Russian idea.
Kolst0's typology can be used to identify different categories of Russians in 
Latvia. Russians may, for example, identify both culturally and politically with Russia 
(or the Soviet Union), and thereby refuse to adopt an identity as citizens of Latvia. 
These Russians may not even recognise the existence of a Latvian state, or they may 
see themselves as nationals of a foreign state and not as a national minority. Russians 
who adopt a political identity as citizens of Latvia but retain their traditional Russian 
cultural identity are described by Kolst0 as an integrated minority. Russians may 
further adopt Latvian culture, and gradually forget their mother tongue, and then, 
although their sense of being Russians may continue to exist, they are likely to become 
assimilated to the Latvians. There are also Russians who see themselves as Russians, 
but Russians of a special kind and distinct from the core group, although they may 
identify politically with the Russian homeland or the new state.
As we see, Russians have many options for identification in the new 
geopolitical circumstances. Which factors will determine their choice? There are strong 
reasons to assume that much will be decided by the attitudes and actions of the 
dominant ethnic group, the Latvians. The way the Latvian authorities deal with their 
"Russian question" will be crucial here. There are few, if any, examples in the modem 
world where there has been successful forced assimilation of ethnic minorities, and 
experience shows that such attempts more often have had the opposite effect, with 
ethnic identity being intensified. Political and social developments in Latvia are 
nevertheless of vital importance for Russian identification. While it is difficult to force a 
cultural identity upon people, a political identity is more likely to be influenced by 
political actions, and the way Latvian authorities deal with issues such as, for example, 
decisions about who should be entitled to Latvian citizenship, will have a major effect 
on the political identification of Russians living in Latvia. Political integration can make 
cultural assimilation more likely, and it is hard to conceive the cultural assimilation of a 
group of people which has not first been integrated politically. However, although 
political integration seems to be a precondition for assimilation, a politically integrated 
minority does not necessarily lose its distinctive cultural identity.
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There are also other factors which are likely to be significant in determining 
identification among Russians. Individual Russians will tend to be influenced by the 
choice of other Russians in their milieu. The compactness of Russians in the region is 
thus likely to be a significant factor. Russians who live in relative isolation from other 
Russians in Latvian-dominated areas would tend to be more likely to assimilate to the 
dominant ethnic group, while it is easier for Russians who live in Russian-dominated 
areas to retain their cultural identity. At the same time, Russians who live in a region or 
city where the density of Russians is particularly high are likely to feel more secure and 
less vulnerable, which may lessen the importance to them of ethnic difference.3 
Moreover, Russians from ethnically mixed marriages would be expected to integrate 
and assimilate more easily than do Russians who interact with other people only in a 
purely ethnic Russian (or Slavic) environment.
The length of stay in Latvia is also likely to be a very important factor in 
determining the reactions of Russians to their redefined position and also influencing 
ethnic identification. Russians who have iived in Latvia for a long time would be 
expected to have developed closer attachments to the territory than have newcomers to 
the republic. One should, however, emphasise that there are likely to be many 
exceptions, and the reasons for moving to Latvia may be just as important as the actual 
length of residence in the republic. People who came in the late 1940s with the army or 
as party or state functionaries would often seem to have much greater problems 
adapting to new political and social conditions than Russians who moved to the region 
in recent years but with the awareness that they were moving to a different country.
The Russian population is, as has already been stressed, far from being a 
homogeneous group of people. It can, for analytical reasons, be useful to classify 
Russians in Latvia into a few major groups, and the level of integration would be the 
variable that would best serve our purposes. A classification would necessarily be 
broad, and some important dimensions and individual positions.would have to be 
ignored.4
The first group consists of Russians who are well integrated into Latvian 
society, speak the Latvian language, and identify with and see their future in an 
independent Latvian state. Russians belonging to this group usually have roots in 
Latvia going generations back in time, but they may also have moved to Latvia later. 
The most significant feature characterising these Russians is that they have chosen to 
link their future to Latvia and the Latvian people. It has to be emphasised that these 
Russians need not necessarily be sympathetic to all the transformations taking place in 
Latvian society.
The second group consists of Russians who are less well integrated into Latvian 
society, but still have a sense of identification with the place where they now live and 
are interested in its prosperity. This group would mainly consist of immigrants who
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came to Latvia on their own initiative or were recruited to work in Latvian industry 
because there was a need for their skills and labour.
A third group of Russians is not integrated into Latvian society at all. It is made 
up of people who moved around in the Soviet Union searching for a good life. They 
would often be people who found work in large, centrally-run enterprises, and they 
would normally be willing to move if there were prospects for a better life in another 
region. This group not only is not well integrated into Latvian society, but it also has a 
weak sense of ethnic or regional identity linking them to one particular area. They are 
Russians who "just happened to be" in Latvia when the republic became independent.
Finally, the fourth group of Russians consists of people who came to, and 
continued to live in, Latvia in the role of representatives of "the centre". This group 
consists of military personnel, functionaries in the Communist Party, the KGB, and 
other Soviet institutions. They are people who usually had very negative attitudes to the 
independence movement, and were also opposed to all other changes which represented 
a threat to their privileged position in the republic. Instead of integrating into Latvian 
society they made an effort to spread an 'internationalist' outlook, to which Latvians 
and Russians alike were expected to conform.
Reactions of Russians to new realities would necessarily be different for 
Russians belonging to each of the four groups. The boundaries between these groups 
of Russians need not be fixed, and may change with time, depending on future social 
and political developments. It should therefore be possible for people who would now 
be classified in, for example, the second group to become completely integrated and 
acquire the characteristics of the first. However, the opposite trend is also possible, 
where so-called 'integrated Russians' may become alienated from Latvian society, and 
one could even have a scenario where Russians in all four groups are amalgamated into 
one, single, Russian community. The possible implications and dangers involved if this 
should happen have been seriously discussed by Latvian and Russian political leaders.5
Two ways of classifying the Russian population have now been presented. 
Firstly, Russians were classified according to their ethnic identity, in the way Pal 
Kolst0 suggested in his typology of Russian diaspora identities. Secondly, they were 
classified according to their level of integration into Latvian society. Although there will 
be no attempt in this chapter to pigeon-hole the Russian population into completely 
different classes or groups, it will be useful to keep these distinctions in mind when we 
now proceed to examine and discuss results from the survey dealing with related 
issues.
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6 .2 .  The Survey and Russian Integration
6 .2 .1 .  Selection of Mass Media
Mass media have an important role in the process of forming public opinion, 
and it is clear that the choice people make in terms of selection of information from 
newspapers, TV and radio is crucial for their perception of political and social 
processes. In Latvia people have a wide choice of newspapers, TV and radio 
programmes by which to be informed about events taking place in society. These mass 
media often have a very different outlook and represent fundamentally opposed political 
views. Thus, people who keep informed about political developments only by, for 
example, reading one newspaper or listening to one radio programme will tend to be 
influenced by the way political views are presented in that particular mass medium.
For Russians in Latvia there is the additional element that they can receive 
information both from sources both in Russia and Latvia. In the Soviet period Russians, 
could subscribe to and buy the major Moscow newspapers, and they were also able to 
watch Soviet central TV. When Latvia became independent, however, newspapers 
from Russia became much more expensive, and it also became more difficult for non- 
subscribers to obtain such newspapers. Transmission of Russian TV programmes 
continued, but there was a constant threat that they would be stopped because the 
Latvian authorities were no longer willing to or able to pay in hard currency for Russian 
programmes in an already difficult economic situation.6 Plans to cut down on TV 
transmissions from Russia raised protests from many Russians who still felt strong 
links with Russia and political and social developments there.7
The selection by Russians of the mass media they use can be seen as an 
indication of the level of integration of Russians into Latvian society. Russians who 
received all their information from Russian and, although to a lesser extent, Latvian 
Russian-language newspapers, journals, radio and TV were less likely to be familiar 
with the issues which were of most concern to ethnic Latvians Such issues naturally 
tended to be presented more thoroughly in the Latvian-language than the Russian- 
language media whether printed in Riga or Moscow. However, Russians in Latvia did 
not need to know the Latvian language in order to obtain information about local issues. 
Latvian TV and radio put a strong emphasis on supplying information to the Russian- 
speaking population about events taking place in the country through their Russian- 
language programmes. So, of course, did the Latvian Russian-language press, 
although their information did not always accord with the taste of the Latvian 
authorities.
The "Russians in Latvia" survey which was conducted in the spring of 1992 
shows the break-down of the Russian population in Latvia in terms of their selection of
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mass media at that time.8 Let us first look at how frequently Russians selected the 
various TV channels and radio stations, as illustrated in Table 6.1. The table shows that 
the groups of listeners to Latvian radio in the Russian language and to Russian radio 
were approximately the same size. More than one third of the respondents answering 
this question said that they listened to these radio stations daily. Programmes in the 
Latvian language were less popular, and only one in four respondents listened to 
programmes in the Latvian language once a week or more often; the majority of these 
were fluent in Latvian.9 Other radio stations were, as the table shows, less popular.
Table 6.1: Radio and TV Transmissions
Survey Question: How often do you listen to or watch the following radio and TV 
transm issions?
N = 591
Daily
(%)
3-6 times 
a week
(%)
1-2 times 
a week
<%)
Less 
than once 
a week
(%)
Do not 
listen/ 
watch
(%)
No
answer
(%)
Latvian radio (in Latvian) 10 5 10 8 36 32
Latvian radio (in Russian) 35 16 17 8 14 9
Russian radio 34 16 12 6 17 15
Radio Liberty 4 5 5 10 46 30
BBC Russian service 2 1 3 4 55 35
Latvian TV (in Latvian) 11 7 12 11 31 28
Latvian TV (in Russian) 43 18 19 6 6 7
Russian TV 66 13 6 1 5 8
TV from other states 11 4 6 3 40 36
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
However, when it comes to TV, the survey clearly shows that programmes 
from Russia had a larger number of Russian viewers than locally produced 
programmes. Two thirds of the respondents said that they watched Russian TV on a 
daily basis. Still, Latvian TV also had a relatively large number of viewers, although 
most of the respondents watched programmes only in the Russian language. Eight out 
of ten respondents watched Latvian TV in Russian at least once a week, while for 
Latvian TV in the Latvian language the same was true of only three in ten respondents. 
Programmes in the Latvian language were, of course, most popular among Russians 
who had a good command of the Latvian language, and likewise, Russians with a 
Latvian mother or father, or married to a Latvian, were more likely to watch these 
programmes than were other Russians. These characteristics did not, however, affect 
the viewing frequencies of TV from Russia, which was watched by a majority of the 
respondents regardless of their knowledge of Latvian or the ethnic composition of their 
family.10 However, Russian TV was watched more often by respondents in the cities
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(especially in Riga) than in rural areas, and also tended to be most popular with the 
older generations.
The survey confirms that if an end was to be put to the transmission of TV 
programmes from Russia in Latvia this would strongly affect the viewing habits of the 
Russian population living there. One could argue that since a majority of Russians, 
through their viewing habits, show that they prefer Russian TV to Latvian TV, this 
could retard their integration into Latvian society. However, it should also be stressed 
that only a small minority of Russians watch Russian TV only (3 per cent, according to 
our survey). The overwhelming majority of the respondents watch programmes both 
from Russia and from Latvia. Some Russians themselves argue that the fact that there 
are higher viewing figures for Russian than for Latvian TV should be an incentive to 
Latvian TV to make more programmes of real interest to Latvia's large Russian- 
speaking community.
Table 6.2: Presentation of Russians on Radio and TV
Survey Question: In your opinion, how are Russians presented in the programs 
o f...
N = 591
Usually
objectively/
truthfully
(%)
It varies/ 
hard to say
(%)
Usually biased/ 
distorted
(%)
No answer 
(%)
Latvian radio (in Latvian) 4 47 19 30
Latvian radio (in Russian) 18 57 14 11
Russian radio 24 47 7 22
Latvian TV (in Latvian) 5 42 22 31
Latvian TV (in Russian) 18 54 14 14
Russian TV 31 51 5 13
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
Respondents in the survey also give Russian TV stations a more positive 
evaluation than Latvian stations in terms of their presentation of Russians in their 
programmes (see Table 6.2). When taking only the responses of those who answered 
the questions into account11, one finds that more than one third of the respondents 
thought Russian TV usually presented Russians in an objective and truthful way. Only 
6 per cent thought the presentation of Russians in Russian programmes tended to be 
biased or distorted. The opinion about Latvian TV in Russian was more neutral, while 
Latvian TV in Latvian received the most negative evaluation. Only 7 per cent of the 
Russians in the survey who answered this question thought Latvian TV programmes in 
Latvian gave a truthful and objective presentation of Russians, while one third thought 
the opposite. The pattern was almost identical for radio stations, with Russian radio 
being evaluated as giving the most truthful presentation of Russians, while Latvian
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radio programmes (especially those in the Latvian language) were thought to give the 
most distorted presentation. It seems to be a paradox, however, that 13 per cent of 
those who claimed not to understand Latvian at all still had the opinion that Latvian 
radio in the Latvian language presents Russians in a distorted way.
Table 6.3: Most Popular Newspapers and Journals among Russians in
Latvia.
N = 591
Read
newspaper/joumal
(%)
Subscribe to 
newspaper/journal
(%)
Latvian newspapers1
SM segodnya 55 39
Diena2 25 6
Rigas Balss2 12 4
Panorama Latvii 9 3
Russkii Put' 6 3
Zemlya 3 2
Local newspapers • 1 7 - • 2
Newspapers in Latvian 1 1
Russian newspapers
Argumenty i fakty 25 25
Izvestiya 12 10
Komsomol'skaya pravda 11 8
Trud 7 7
Pravda 4 3
Sem'ya 4 3
Megapolis EXPRESS 3 1
Sovetskii sport 3 3
Journals3
Rabotnitsa 14 13
Krest'yanka 11 12
Ogonyok 8 3
Zdorov'e 7 7
Literature journals4 7 6
Smena 6 4
Nauka i zhizn' 5 4
1 If not otherwise stated, the newspapers are in the Russian language.
2 This newspaper/journal has both a Russian and a Latvian edition.
3 Most of the popular journals were published in Russia.
4 Published either in Latvia (for example, Daugava and Rodnik) or in Russia.
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
The respondents were also asked in an open question to list the newspapers and 
journals they respectively read on a regular basis or to which they were subscribers. 
The responses to these questions have been systematised and are illustrated in Table 
6.3. One can see from the table that newspapers which were published in Latvia were 
both being read and subscribed to more often than newspapers from Russia. However,
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Russians had a clear tendency to prefer newspapers in their own language. Although 
some of the newspapers on the list have both a Latvian and a Russian edition, one can 
assume that the overall majority of Russians read the Russian edition. This must be the 
conclusion when taking into account that other important newspapers which were 
published only in Latvian were listed only by a very small proportion of the 
respondents.12
The tables show that newspapers identified with the Communist past or Soviet 
ideology were not particularly popular among the Russian population. Of course, in 
1992 the publication of many of the former newspapers belonging to the Communist 
Party of Latvia (Sovetskaya Latviya ) or Interfront (.Edinstvo ) were prohibited. 
However, there were still newspapers regarded as representing the same political 
outlook (such as the newspaper Panorama Latvii), but they did not have very many 
readers. This tendency is also confirmed when it comes to Russian newspapers. The 
liberal Argumenty ifakty , for example, had a much larger number of readers than the 
hard-liner papers such as Pravda . The newspaper with most Russian readers, SM- 
segodnya - according to the survey it was read regularly by more than half the Russian 
population in Latvia - deserves some attention. The newspaper (which had changed its 
name from Sovetskaya molodezh ) had been famous for its critical attitude to the 
authorities, and was one of the most outspoken newspapers in its critique of the 
Communist Party in the early Gorbachev era. It was then very popular among Latvians 
and Russians alike. As the Popular Front became more influential in Latvian politics, 
the newspaper started to criticise what it regarded as increasing ethnocentrism in the 
movement and in Latvian politics in general, and it thereby soon became a mouth piece 
for segments of Latvia's Russian-speaking population. The newspaper was 
subsequently criticised by many Latvians for giving a distorted picture of Latvian 
political developments.
The second most popular republican newspaper among Russians was Diena, 
which was often regarded as a government newspaper, although it became independent 
and privately owned in April 1992. One in four Russians read this newspaper 
regularly, according to the survey. The weekly newspaper of the major Russian society 
in Latvia, Russkaya Obshchina Latvii, was read by 6 per cent of the respondents. The 
survey further indicates that while many newspapers published in Latvia were through 
retailers, Russian newspapers were mainly received through subscription. This seems 
to confirm the observation that Russian newspapers were generally hard to obtain at 
newsagents.
Although newspapers published in Latvia had a larger circle of readers than 
newspapers from Russia, the opposite was the case with journals. The four journals 
which had the highest number of readers were all published in Russia. This can 
probably be explained by the fact that few journals in the Russian language are
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published in Latvia and that those that exist tend to have a specialised focus so that they 
attract only a small circle of readers. Russians in our survey did not generally read 
journals in the Latvian language.
6 .2 .2 .  Private Libraries
Russians in Latvia seem to have relatively large collections of books13, but their 
collections only to a minor degree reflect the fact that they live in Latvia. While 84 per 
cent of the respondents reported that they had many books by Russian authors in their 
book collection, only 13 per cent had many books by Latvian authors. This must be 
regarded as a small proportion, taking into account that 30 per cent of the respondents 
had many books by English-language authors, and there were only slightly more 
respondents who said they had many books by Latvian authors than respondents who 
said they had many books by German authors. However, when taking into account 
those who reported that Latvian authors were at least represented in their book 
collection, this percentage was considerably larger than the percentage who reported 
that they had books by German authors. The conclusion must nevertheless be that 
Russians seem to be very strongly orientated towards Russian literature.
When we take a closer look at various groups of Russians in terms of their 
book collection, we find that the groups which one would expect to be the most likely 
to have a large number of Latvian books do indeed have more such books than other 
groups. For example, the likelihood of having a large number of books by Latvian 
authors was almost three times higher among Russians married to a Latvian than among 
other Russians, and Russians with a Latvian mother or father were also more likely 
than others to have many books by Latvian authors. The level of language knowledge 
was also of importance, but did not correlate as strongly as the ethnic composition of 
the family. Russians in Latgale, and especially in the rural districts, had more books by 
Latvian authors than Russians in other parts of Latvia, which again is an indication of 
the tendency of these Russians to be better integrated into Latvian society than others. 
However, when checking for such factors as place of birth and length of stay in Latvia, 
these did not seem to be of such major importance as could have been expected for 
determining the number of books by Latvian authors among the Russian population.
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6 .2 .3 .  Contacts with Relatives
Most Russians in Latvia have relatives in non-Latvian regions of the former 
Soviet Union with whom they keep close contacts. Almost three in four respondents in 
our survey reported that they had close contacts with relatives in Russia, 19 per cent 
with relatives in Ukraine, 15 per cent in Belarus and 11 per cent in the two other Baltic 
states; while 8 per cent reported having relatives in other parts of the former Soviet 
Union. Less than 13 per cent of the respondents did not have close contacts with 
relatives in any regions outside Latvia.
One of the most serious concerns of Russians in Latvia has naturally been how 
to maintain these close links with relatives after Latvia has become an independent state. 
A number of practical problems have emerged. Price increases on all forms of transport 
have made it more difficult to visit relatives who, without moving, suddenly live 
'abroad'. Moreover, many Russians have problems with adjusting to the new rates for 
mail, and telephone calls, which (even when taking inflation into account) have 
increased many times. There seems, however, to be some understanding among 
Russians of the necessity of these changes, and a willingness to cope with the new 
circumstances. What really has upset many Russians is the introduction of a strict visa 
regime between Latvia and the CIS states, whereby Russians will have to apply and 
pay in hard currency for a visa in order to visit relatives, and the majority who are non­
citizens must in addition obtain a permit to return to Latvia.14 Moreover, Russians in 
Latvia cannot expect to have many visitors from Russia, because of the comparatively 
high prices for a visa due to the low value of the Russian rouble, and the time- 
consuming procedures for first obtaining the visa from the nearest Latvian embassy or 
consulate, of which there are not many in Russia. One of the main arguments in favour 
of a strict visa regime between Latvia and Russia was to stop some of the illegal traffic 
of goods and labour over the border. It has been argued, however, that the main 
victims have become ordinary 'citizens' (in fact, most of those travelling from the 
Latvian side of the border are non-citizens) travelling to see relatives abroad. Visa 
regulations are, however, still subject to negotiation, and there could be prospects for 
an agreement between the two countries which will make it easier for relatives to cross 
the Latvian-Russian border.
6 .2 .4 .  Interethnic Attitudes
It seems to be a common view among both Russians and Latvians that ethnic 
relations on an everyday level are relatively good.15 Indeed, one of the most remarkable 
features of the transition towards restored Latvian statehood has been the absence of 
inter-ethnic violence. There are, on the other hand, also indications that people in Latvia
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tend to interact predominantly with people belonging to their own ethnic group, or 
groups that are culturally and/or linguistically close to their own. Attitudes of Russians 
to other ethnic groups would be of vital importance for the question of the integration of 
Russians into Latvian society; in particular Russian attitudes towards the majority ethnic 
group in Latvia, the Latvians, would be crucial.16 Instead of asking Russians directly 
about their opinion of Latvians, we chose to ask how Russians would react in certain 
social situations involving interaction with Latvians. Thus, Russians were asked 
questions related to having Latvians as neighbours, co-workers, friends, and sons- or 
daughters-in-law. The responses would indicate whether Russians were inclusive or 
exclusive when it comes to contact with Latvians, and what forms of social relations 
with Latvians they regarded as acceptable and unacceptable.
Although one has to take into account that some respondents may have given 
what they thought to be the 'correct' responses to these questions, it nevertheless seems 
that Russians are not very exclusive when it comes to social interactions with other 
nationalities. Table 6.4. shows how the respondents replied to the four questions on 
this issue. As can be seen from the table, only 8 per cent of the respondents said they 
would react in a negative way if their son or daughter married a Latvian, and a majority 
said they would react positively. This result could indicate that Russians do not put 
very much emphasis on the nationality of their sons- or daughters-in-law, or it could 
simply be a reflection of Latvians having a relatively high status among Russians in 
Latvia. Other surveys carried out among Russians in former Soviet republics indicate 
that the latter is the case, since Russians in the Baltic region and Transcaucasus were 
usually not against their relatives marrying representatives of the indigenous 
population, whereas they were generally much more negative to such marriages in 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan.17
In the next question the respondents were asked whether nationality 
composition in an area would be of importance if they were to choose a different place 
of residence, and nationality was here not specified. While 45 per cent of the 
respondents did not find nationality composition of the area to be particularly important, 
there were also 28 per cent who attached at least some degree of importance to the 
nationalities factor. Approximately the same percentage agreed with the view that it was 
best to work with colleagues of one's own nationality. However, people were less 
concerned with the nationality of the people with whom they spend their free time. In 
the question asking whom the respondents preferred to spend their free time with, as 
many as 82 per cent replied that nationality was not important to them.
A closer examination of how the responses to these questions correlate with 
other variables reveals some interesting information. It can, for example, be observed 
that people who work in close contact with Latvians are much less likely than others to 
agree with the view that it is better to work in a mono-ethnic environment. While 19 per
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cent of respondents in this category agreed or tended to agree with such a view, the 
same was true of 35 per cent of those Russians who only sometimes, or never, worked 
in close contact with Latvians. This seems to indicate that Russians who work with 
Latvians generally have positive experiences with inter-ethnic contacts at the workplace.
Table 6.4: Nationality relations
Survey Question: What would your reaction be if your daughter or son married a 
Latvian?
N = 591
Very
positive
(%)
Positive
(%)
Hard to say / 
no answer
(%)
Negative
(%)
Very
negative
(%)
All respondents 7 47 38 5 3
Survey Question: If you were to choose a different place of residence 
national composition of the place be important for your choice?
would the
. N = 591 . .
Very
important
. (%)
Important
(%)
Hard to say / 
no answer
- (%) •
Not very 
important
• {%)
Completely
unimportant
• (%)■
All respondents 8 20 27 19 26
Survey Question: To what extent do you share the view that it is best to work 
with colleagues only of one's own nationality?
N = 591
Fully
agree
(%)
Tend 
to agree
(%)
Hard to say/ 
no answer
(%)
Tend 
to disagree
(%)
Completely
disagree
(%)
All respondents 9 17 35 31 18
Survey Question: With whom do you prefer to spend your free time?
Predominantly 
with people of 
own nationality
With Latvians Nationality not 
important
No answer
N = 591 (%) (%) (%) (%)
All respondents 17 1 81 1
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
Russians with a Latvian parent or spouse tend to be more tolerant than others in 
terms of interaction with people of other nationalities. The importance of interethnic 
marriage as a bridge between ethnic groups seems to be vital. The overwhelming 
majority (97 per cent) of Russians who had married a Latvian said they would be 
positive to their son or daughter doing the same. Other Russians married to a person of 
a different nationality (usually Slavs) were also more positive than Russians in 
monoethnic marriages to the idea of their children marrying a Latvian. However, these 
same Russians were more likely than others to agree with the opinion that it was best to 
work only with people from one's own nationality. Russians with Russian parents 
were generally much more negative than Russians with a Latvian parent and somewhat
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more negative than Russians with a parent of a different, but non-Latvian, nationality, 
to the four types of interaction examined in the survey.
Level of knowledge of the Latvian language was another factor of significance 
for the attitudes of Russians towards interaction with other nationalities. Russians with 
a fluent or good command of the Latvian language were particularly positive to the idea 
of their children marrying a Latvian. Length of stay in the republic was also of some 
importance; in particular, Russians who had arrived in Latvia over the last 15 years 
tended to be the least enthusiastic about socialising with Latvians. Although the place of 
living was not as significant as some of the other variables, there was still a tendency 
that Russians in Latgale's rural districts were the Russians who put the least emphasis 
on nationality differences, while Russians in Riga tended to be more-than-averagely 
concerned with the ethnic composition of the place of residence, and were also more 
likely to agree that it was best to work with fellow Russians.
The more education a respondent had had, the more likely s/he was to regard 
the ethnic composition of his/her place of residence as very important. While, for 
example, 17 per cent of Russians with only primary education in the survey were 
concerned with the nationality composition of their new place of residence, the 
corresponding percentage for Russians with a higher education was 35 per cent. 
Similarly, manual workers were less concerned than specialists and professionals with 
the ethnic composition of their place of residence.
The following were the most typical characteristics among those who preferred 
to spend their spare time with fellow Russians: they had moved to Latvia during the last 
15 years (and were, consequently, not bom in Latvia); they did not work in close 
contact with Latvians; they had a poor or non-existent knowledge of the Latvian 
language; they were married to another Slav (not necessarily a Russian); they had an 
average income; they were male and aged somewhere between 15-54 years, working as 
a professional; both their parents were Russian; they lived in Riga (or some other urban 
area); and they had higher education.
6 .2 .5 .  Interethnic Relations
There were several questions in the survey dealing with the quality of 
interethnic relations in Latvia. Russians were, for example, asked to compare ethnic 
relations at the time of the survey (the spring of 1992) with the situation in the mid- 
1980s. As expected, and as has also been indicated in other surveys18, most 
respondents (almost 80 per cent) thought interethnic relations had deteriorated. Only 1 
per cent of the respondents said that ethnic relations had improved. When asked to 
characterise ethnic relations as seen at present, only 1 person out of the 591 
respondents characterised them as very good. There were, at the other end of the scale,
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very few who characterised ethnic relations as very bad (8 per cent), but almost half 
the respondents thought that interethnic relations were bad rather than good (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5: Evaluation of Inter-ethnic Relations
Survey Question: How would you evaluate inter-ethnic relations in Latvia today 
as compared with such relations in the mid-1980s?
N = 591
Improved
(%)
The same 
<%)
Deteriorated
<%)
No answer 
(%)
All respondents 1 19 79 1
Survey Question: Could you please give a characteristic of inter-ethnic relations 
in Latvia at the present time?
Very good Good rather Hard to say/ Badrather Very bad
than bad no answer than good
N = 591 <%) (%) <%) <%) (%)
All respondents 0 11 33 48 8
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
The perceived deterioration of interethnic relations probably has many causes. 
Latvian politicians often argue that the main reason for present tensions is that Russians 
are not willing to give up their privileged position in Latvian society and come to terms 
with their new social role as an ethnic minority.19 The continued presence of the 
Russian army and what is seen as Russian interference in Latvian affairs are other 
factors causing Latvian resentment which can be directed towards the Russians living in 
Latvia.20 Moreover, the deteriorating economic situation, where Russians, due to their 
predominance in unprofitable and vulnerable industries, are likely to become most 
affected by increasing unemployment, is also likely to be an important factor in 
explaining interethnic tension. In this situation political initiatives which are perceived 
to favour one ethnic group at the expense of others tend to aggravate interethnic 
relations.
Our survey, however, confirms the impression that interethnic tension in Latvia 
is primarily of an impersonal kind and that conflicts are more common among strangers 
than among people who know each other. When Russians were asked to characterise 
where and how often ethnic incidents take place, it was made clear that most of them 
take place in public places, such as public transport, in services, state institutions and 
so on. Very few reported ethnic tension in their work-place or among neighbours.
6.2.6.  Nationality Discrimination
Almost half the Russians claimed that they, or members of their family, had 
experienced some form of infringement of their rights in Latvia because of their 
nationality. These infringements were first of all related to promotion at work, but also
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(as Table 6.6. shows) concerned education and the acquisition of property. People with 
higher education were more inclined than others to say that they had experienced 
discrimination because of their nationality, which could indicate that they were more 
aware of their "rights" than others. Similarly, young people reported more 
infringements than people in the older age groups: 57 per cent of people under 30 
indicated that they had experienced infringements of some kind, while the same was 
true of only 35 per cent of people over 55. There were also some regional variations, 
with Russians in Riga being clearly overrepresented among those claiming to have 
experienced at least one form of the infringements which were asked about in the 
survey. The ethnic composition of the family did not correspond with the responses to 
these questions, but Russians who had lived in Latvia all their life and whose family 
was also from Latvia were least likely to have experienced discrimination because of 
their nationality. Finally, the better their command of the Latvian language, the less 
likely Russians were to report having experienced any infringements of their or family 
members' rights.
Table 6.6: Discrimination because of Nationality
Survey Question: Have either you or any members of your family encountered 
episodes in Latvia where your rights have been infringed because of your 
nationality?
N = 591
Promotions 
at work
(%)
In obtaining 
education
(%)
In acquiring 
property 
(%)
In obtaining a 
place to live
(%)
In obtaining a 
higher salary
(%)
All respondents 24 18 17 13 11
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
6 .2 .7 .  Remain in Latvia, or Leave?
Dissatisfaction with the political situation and with their uncertain future 
prospects does not necessarily imply that most Russians intended to leave Latvia. In 
fact, when asked whether they intended to leave, taking into account the economic and 
political situation in Latvia and the CIS, only 4 per cent of the respondents in the survey 
said that they had decided to leave Latvia. Not more than 9 per cent were more likely to 
leave than to stay, whereas a significant number were undecided (Table 6.7.). The 
majority of respondents were, as illustrated in the table, more likely to stay than to 
leave. If we calculate the number of Russians who would leave from the 13 per cent 
who said they had decided or were most likely to leave Latvia, we find that just over 
100,000 would leave the country. One should, however, not see these figures as exact 
estimates of how many Russians will actually leave Latvia, since it is easier to say in a 
survey that one wants to leave than it is in reality to do so. Moreover, changing
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conditions in Latvia and/or the CIS could change the figures radically. As the former 
leader of the Department of Nationalities Affairs under the Supreme Council of Latvia 
pointed out in March 1993, the number of Russians who have said that they want to 
leave Latvia has increased dramatically, from a negligible number a few years ago to 20 
per cent of the entire Russian population of Latvia in 1993.1
Table 6.7: Intention to stay in or to leave Latvia
Survey Question: Taking into account the present political and economic situation 
in Latvia and the CIS, do you intend to leave Latvia?
Dedded More likely Hard to say/ More likely Dedded
to leave to leave than no answer to stay than to stay
to stay to leave
N = 591 C*) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All repondents 4 9 27 24 36
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
Which groups, then, are the most likely to leave Latvia? If we take the survey as 
a guide, it does not seem as though the economic position of the respondents correlates 
with plans about leaving, since the proportion of people who are relatively well off 
economically and people who can afford to buy hardly anything but food have 
approximately the same rate of potential leavers. It is noteworthy that people with 
higher education are the most decisive about leaving Latvia, and so far it is precisely 
Russians with higher education who have been leaving most frequently.2 Similarly, 
professionals more frequently reported an intention to leave than did manual workers. 
Old age pensioners were naturally those who were least likely to go. There seem to be 
two main reasons why well educated professionals were those who most often 
expressed the wish to leave Latvia. Firstly, professionals tended to be more dissatisfied 
with economic and political conditions in Latvia than were other groups. Secondly, 
professionals would tend to have more resources and therefore have a better chance of 
finding work and settling down in a new region.
The most significant determining factors for plans about the future are, 
however, the length of stay in Latvia and the nationality of the parents. None of the 
respondents who had a Latvian mother or father was likely to leave Latvia. Of those 
born in Latvia with parents (regardless of nationality) who were also born in Latvia, 
only 3 per cent indicated that they were more likely to leave than to stay. These are 
Russians who tend to be well integrated into Latvian society, and they will also 
normally be automatically entitled to Latvian citizenship. The corresponding percentage 
for those who arrived in Latvia during the last 15 years was 32 per cent. They are 
Russians who are likely to be the last to obtain citizenship, both because of their late 
arrival in the republic and because their level of knowledge of the Latvian language is 
generally low. However, although the level of language knowledge was important for
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the question about leaving, a considerable proportion of those who were fluent in or 
had a good knowledge of the Latvian language also intended to leave the republic. 
Russians who reported that they had experienced discrimination because of their 
nationality were naturally more determined to leave than others, but we also find people 
who wanted to leave among those who are generally satisfied with life in Latvia, so the 
question of whether to leave or to stay seems to be more complex than to centre only 
around general discontent with politics and the economy, prospects for citizenship and 
interethnic relations.
The situation in the CIS, and especially in Russia, is likely to be particularly 
decisive for the decision on whether to leave or to stay. Although the economic 
situation in Latvia has deteriorated, Russians are well aware that the situation in Russia 
is no better, and they seem to fear that the prospects for a recovery there are bleak. 
Parents who if they were thinking only of themselves would sometimes have been 
inclined to leave Latvia often take this into consideration when they think of where 
future prospects would be best for their children.
The overall majority of those indicating an intention to leave Latvia wanted to 
move to Russia, and for a majority of Russians this seems to be the most realistic 
alternative. There are, however, a large number of practical problems involved for 
those who decide to leave. Economic compensation for those leaving is minimal, and 
most Russians are not even allowed to sell their apartments.in Latvia. The cost of 
moving furniture and other belongings is also considerable. Most urban areas with 
living conditions similar to those in Latvian cities are inaccessible to Russians from 
Latvia because of the lack of housing and job opportunities; more likely places of 
settlement for newcomers would be Russian cities in the provinces or impoverished 
rural areas. These are usually unattractive alternatives for the predominantly urban 
Russians.23
It would, in my opinion, not be correct to explain the fact that quite a large 
number of Russians still want to leave Latvia solely as a reaction to the increasing 
pressure Russians living there are facing because the authorities want them to leave. 
There are, indeed, Russians who over the last few years have experienced an 
intensification of their ethnic consciousness and who therefore want to live in Russia 
where they have their roots and feel they belong. Both Russia, Latvia and the West 
have been criticised for not doing enough for these people.24 However, some Latvian 
national radicals want to make conditions for those Russians who are not willing to 
integrate into Latvian society so unpleasant that they will prefer to leave. It also seems 
that they have had at least some success in this respect. Since the majority of Russians 
still intend to stay in Latvia and those who leave tend to be some of the best educated 
and business-like elements of the population, one may, however, question whether the 
consequences of such policies would be in the overall interests of the Latvian people.
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6 .2 .8 .  Choice of Citizenship
Russians in Latvia were not familiar with the terms for acquiring citizenship at 
the time when our survey was carried out (the spring of 1992). They were, however, 
familiar with the terms for naturalisation which were listed in the Supreme Council 
Resolution of 15 October 1991 (and which was discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
In the survey we asked the respondents to presuppose a situation where no decisions 
had yet been made concerning who should be entitled to citizenship of Latvia. The 
respondents were then asked which citizenship(s) they would take if they were free to 
choose (leaving open the possibility of dual citizenship).
Some of the respondents said they found it too difficult to answer this question 
(11 per cent), and a few (2 per cent) did not answer it at all, but the responses for those 
who did respond were as follows: More than three in four said they would choose 
citizenship of Latvia, while 52 per cent expressed a wish to obtain Russian citizenship; 
Both figures include people who wanted dual Latvian-Russian citizenship (38 per cent 
of the respondents). Just over 3 per cent would choose citizenship of another state, and 
7 per cent would not choose any citizenship even if they had a choice.
It has been confirmed in other surveys and also during the registration of the 
population of Latvia that a majority of Russians want to obtain Latvian citizenship. 
According to the registration data, 90 per cent of those who were registered but did not 
automatically become citizens of Latvia expressed their wish to do so.25 This seems, 
however, to be an exaggerated estimation of those who actually want to become citizens 
of Latvia because, as several Russians told me when visiting registration offices in Riga 
in February 1993, it is always safer to leave all possibilities open. At the same time, by 
April 1994 only about 23,000 residents of Latvia had applied for citizenship of 
Russia.26
The majority of Russians thus wanted to obtain Latvian citizenship, and there 
are many possible reasons why this is so. The high figures have been used to show that 
Russians in Latvia are well integrated into Latvian society, or at least that they are 
interested in becoming so. This explanation seems to describe the situation of a large 
number of Russians, but there are probably other motivations that are of importance. 
The Russian-language press has pointed out several areas in which non-citizens would 
not have the same rights as citizens27, and Russians might think that they would have a 
better life if they become citizens and opted for Latvian citizenship simply out of 
security reasons. There could also be tactical considerations involved. For example, if 
most Russians express a will to become loyal citizens of Latvia, in denying them this 
opportunity the Latvian authorities are placed in a position where they would be subject
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to more criticism from abroad, which could be in the interests of many Russians who 
are opposed to the Latvian political leadership.
6.3 .  Russian Perceptions of 'Latvia' and 'Russia'
So far in this chapter some issues which in various ways give an indication of 
the level of integration of Russians into Latvian society have been discussed, and I have 
also emphasised issues which show to what degree Russians are orientated towards 
other countries, especially towards Russia. In the following section I will deal more 
specifically with the question of the self-identification of Russians in Latvia by 
examining what Latvia and Russia, respectively, mean to those Russians living in this 
country. Is it the case that to the majority of Russians Latvia is just a territory where 
circumstances have forced them to. live,, or are there.deeper and stronger attachments 
involved? Similarly, what does Russia mean to Russians living outside its territory? Do 
Russians in Latvia consider Russia their motherland, or is Russia simply seen as just 
another neighbouring state?
The respondents in our survey were asked to indicate what Latvia and Russia 
mean to them personally according to an already prepared list of alternatives. This list, 
including the percentages of Russians choosing the various alternatives, is illustrated in 
Table 6.8. When analysing the results, one should take into account that although the 
respondents were told that they could indicate more than one answer, it is likely that 
many would indicate only those alternatives which expressed what they most strongly 
associated with the two territories. When, for example, only 28 per cent of the 
respondents chose the alternative that Latvia is a state whose right to independence they 
respect, this should not, in my opinion, be seen as a suggestion that all the remaining 
72 per cent do not respect Latvian independence, but rather that just under one third of 
the respondents thought Latvian independent statehood was an important factor in their 
perception of Latvia
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Table 6.8: Identification with “Latvia” and “Russia”
Survey Question:
What is Latvia for you personally?^
N = 591 (%)
The motherland of my ancestors 17
My motherland 39
A territory on which circumstances 
have forced me to live
36
A state whose right to independence I 
respect
28
A state I will leave as soon as I find 
it difficult to live here
12
A country I will not leave under any 
circumstances
15
Historically Latvia has been and 
remains a part of Russia
23
Survey Question:
What is Russia for you personally?^
N = 591 (%)
The motherland of my parents 45
The motherland of my ancestors 37
My motherland 34
A country where my relatives live 41
A state which defends the rights of 
Russians
30
A state where I would consider 
settling down
12
A state where I would not like to live 4
Russia is just a neighbouring state 11
1 Respondents were asked to indicate for as many alternatives as appropiate.
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1 9 9 2 ...............................................................................................
The table shows that more Russians seem to regard Latvia rather than Russia as 
their motherland. The decisive factor here was whether the respondents had been bom 
in Latvia or not. 76 per cent of those bom in Latvia reported Latvia as their motherland, 
whereas the corresponding percentage for those who had lived in Latvia for more than 
15 years but were not born there was only 13 per cent. As a consequence, the 
percentage of Russians regarding Latvia as their motherland was much larger within the 
younger than the older age groups. The level of language knowledge was another 
important factor in deciding whether Russians saw Latvia or Russia as their 
motherland. According to our survey data, two out of three of those with a fluent or 
good command of the Latvian language and only one in five among those with minimal 
or no understanding of Latvian regarded Latvia as their motherland. Moreover, the 
likelihood of a person who was not bom in Latvia regarding Latvia as his/her 
motherland increased significantly with increased level of language knowledge.
Only 4 per cent of the respondents who were bom in Latvia and whose parents 
were also bom in Latvia considered Russia to be their motherland. There was a marked 
difference between Russians in urban and rural districts, with Russians in the Latvian 
cities being much more likely to regard Russia as their motherland. The exceptions 
were the two Latgalian cities of Daugavpils and Rezekne (where, as was noted in 
chapter 5, a larger share of Russians were bom in Latvia in comparison to other cities). 
There were also more men than women who regarded Russia as their motherland, 
while women were more likely than men to regard Latvia as their motherland. The level 
of education was another correlating factor. While almost half the respondents with
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higher education regarded Russia as their motherland, the same was true of less than a 
quarter of the respondents with primary (or uncompleted secondary) education.
While 17 per cent of the respondents indicated that Latvia was the motherland of 
their ancestors, 37 per cent said the same about Russia, and 45 per cent thought of 
Russia as the motherland of their parents. This indicates that Russians generally feel 
stronger historical attachments to Russia than to Latvia. Moreover, 41 per cent said that 
Russia was a country where their relatives lived. The great importance of the links with 
Russia is also indicated by the fact that only 11 per cent of the respondents thought of 
Russia as just a neighbouring state.
Relatively few of the respondents saw a link between their concept of 'Russia' 
and 'Latvia' and their preferences in terms of settlement. Only 4 per cent of the 
respondents said that Russia was a state where they would not like to live, but at the 
same time only 12 per cent said that they would consider settling down in Russia. The 
same pattern was true regarding Latvia. While 12 per cent of the respondents said that 
they would leave Latvia as soon as they found it difficult to live there, not more than 15 
per cent reported that they would not leave Latvia under any circumstances. The low 
number of responses to these questions could be a result of the way the questions were 
phrased. People who, for example, do not want to live in Russia may not have 
indicated this here because they did not see any connection between this attitude and 
what 'Russia' means to them personally.
When more than one third of the respondents said that they thought of Latvia as 
a territory on which circumstances had forced them to live, this must therefore be 
regarded as a relatively high proportion. These would tend to be people who have 
generally not chosen to live in Latvia; they often 'just happened to be living in Latvia' 
when the country became independent. They are likely to have many of the 
characteristics of the third group of Russians, the "migrants", whom we referred to 
earlier in the chapter. One would thus expect these people to have lived in Latvia for a 
short time and to have a low degree of integration into Latvian society, as indicated by a 
low level of fluency in the Latvian language and the absence of family relations with 
ethnic Latvians.
This is a picture which also corresponds with the findings in the survey. The 
decisive factor is again whether the person in question was born in Latvia or not; 
among those who were not bom in Latvia, the likelihood of a person perceiving Latvia 
as a territory on which circumstances had forced them to live increased, the shorter the 
period s/he had lived in Latvia. Thus, more than two out of three of those who had 
arrived in Latvia over the last 15 years said that Latvia to them was a territory on which 
circumstances had forced them to live. Only 3 per cent of Russians with a Latvian 
mother or father gave the same response. This way of perceiving Latvia was also much 
more widespread within the older age-groups than among younger people, most of
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whom were bom in Latvia. It was found more than three times more frequently among 
people with a poor or non-existent knowledge of Latvian than among people who were 
fluent in, or had a good command of, the language.
Although one would tend to expect that most of the 'migrants' would be found 
among manual workers, among people with a low level of income and education, this 
was contradicted by the survey results. Those who said that Latvia was a territory on 
which circumstances had forced them to live were overrepresented among people with a 
higher education and in the professional sphere, and the level of income was not 
significant.
It is hard to interpret the fact that 28 per cent of the respondents indicated that 
Latvia was a state whose right to independence they respected. There could be many 
people who respected Latvian independence but who did not see it as one of the most 
important characteristics when they were asked what Latvia was to them personally. It 
is, however, noteworthy that Russians in Riga more often than Russians from other 
regions responded affirmatively to this question. The same applies to people with a 
higher education. Length of stay in Latvia does not, however, correlate with the 
responses to this question. Moreover, people with a knowledge of Latvian were no less 
likely to indicate that they respected Latvian independence than others. Most probably, 
Russians who saw Latvia as their motherland and spoke the Latvian language did not 
find it necessary to declare that they also respected Latvian independence.
The view that Latvia has been and remains a part of Russia could be associated 
with an imperial identity, and when 23 per cent of the respondents perceive Latvia in 
this way this must be seen as an indication that such a perception of Latvia is quite 
widespread among Russians there. This also confirms the findings in chapter 3 
regarding the attitude of Russians to historical issues. It is again useful to identify 
which groups of Russians are most inclined to have what I would call an imperial 
outlook. When checking for various variables, one finds that language knowledge is of 
major significance. The likelihood that a person would respond affirmatively to this 
question was twice as high among Russians with little or no knowledge of the Latvian 
language than it was among those who knew the language well. Russians who were 
bom in Latvia were also more reluctant than other Russians to share this attitude. The 
imperial identity seems to be more prevalent in Riga them anywhere else in Latvia, and it 
was least prevalent in Latgale. Moreover, it was more often found among people with a 
higher education. People who had economic problems were more likely to have 
'imperialistic' attitudes than were respondents who were better off economically.
To many Russians Russia is not only the motherland in an abstract sense, but is 
also seen as a state defending the rights of Russians. Almost one third of the 
respondents saw Russia as a state having such a role. The pattern of responses was 
quite similar to the pattern of answers to the previous question discussed, but it is
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noteworthy that more people in the cities counted on help from Russia than did people 
in rural areas. Another interesting feature was that Russians who had lived a long time 
in Latvia were rather more inclined to see Russia as a state defending their rights than 
were Russians who had arrived in Latvia more recently.
Finally, Russians who regarded Russia as just a neighbouring state (11 per cent 
of the respondents) were overrepresented in Latgale, among people with lower 
education, among people who were bom in Latvia and among people with a good 
knowledge of Latvian.
6 .4 .  Conclusions
There are different ways of evaluating the level of integration of Russians into 
Latvian society. In the previous chapter we looked at aspects such as language fluency 
and various social characteristics, and we. saw that there, were important differences, 
between the Russian population and the dominant ethnic group in Latvia, the Latvians. 
In this chapter we have looked at other aspects which, it is hoped, have given a more 
complementary picture of the cultural orientations of Russians in Latvia. What, then, do 
the survey findings suggest about Russian identification and the level of integration into 
Latvian society? Although the findings are not unambiguous and contain certain 
contradictions, there are some important general trends that can be observed.
We emphasised the importance of the selection of mass media, where the 
survey shows that very few Russians are orientated only towards Russia, and that 
Latvian radio, TV and newspapers (although predominantly in the Russian language) 
are relatively popular among the Russian population. However, there seems to be a gap 
between Russians and Latvians in terms of their choice of mass media, and therefore 
also in terms of the information they obtain from the same media. With some 
exceptions, the most popular mass media among Russians are those which concentrate 
on dealing with the problems facing the Russian population in the republic, and through 
their selection of mass media Russians are therefore not likely to become so familiar 
with the concerns of ethnic Latvians.28 Those Russians who read newspapers with a 
larger ethnic Latvian circle of readers, or watch or listen to programmes from Latvian 
radio and TV, are usually those who are already integrated into Latvian society. They 
tend to have a better knowledge of the Latvian language and they often come from 
ethnically mixed (Russian-Latvian) families.
The survey shows that there are certain characteristics which tend to increase the 
likelihood of Russians expressing general satisfaction with important aspects of life in 
Latvia. These Russians have more interaction with Latvians and are more positive 
towards such interaction, they report fewer incidents of nationality discrimination, and
188
C h a p t e r  6
they generally have a stronger attachment to the Latvian territory. The significance of 
interethnic marriage has already been emphasised. Likewise, even moderate fluency in 
the Latvian language and familiarity with Latvian history and culture are shown to 
diminish the feeling of interethnic tension. This is probably also intensified by the 
tendency of ethnic Latvians to be more positive towards those who have lived in Latvia 
for a long time and have adopted local customs, traditions and culture. Thus, length of 
residence in Latvia is another significant factor in explaining level of integration.
The issues which have been discussed in this chapter have mostly centered 
around the question of Russian cultural identity. Pal Kolst0, as we saw early in the 
chapter, also emphasises that there is a political dimension of identity, and this 
dimension has not become less relevant seen in the light of the major political changes 
which have taken place in Latvia over the last few years. In the following chapter we 
shall deal more closely with the political dimension as we examine the reactions of the 
Russian population to their redefined position in what they used to think of as a 
privileged region of the large Soviet state, but which is now a small nation-state 
dominated by another ethnic group.
1A considerable part of this chapter is forthcoming in Aasland (1994b).
2Kolst0 (1992).
3Rothchield (1981).
4My classification is based on elements from A. Klotskin's classification of the Russian population at 
the conference 'The New Russian Diaspora” in Lielupe, Latvia, 11-13 November 1992; and my 
interview with A. Pantelejevs in Riga, February 1993.
^Interview with Pantejejevs, op. cit.
6See N. Batasheva, 'TV-93 v kadre i za kadrom”, Russkii Put', 30 December 1992, p. 6; Izvestiya, 
25 December 1992, p. 2.
7Author's interview with Vladimir Steshenko, formerly director of the Department for Nationalities 
Affairs under the Supreme Council of Latvia, Deputy editor of SM-segodnya, February 1993.
8Since then prices and accessibility of newspapers, journals, TV and radio programmes have changed, 
and the results should therefore be regarded as representative only for the particular time when the 
survey was conducted.
9In fact, one in three Russians who had a fluent or a good command of the Latvian language reported 
that they listened to Latvian radio in Latvian daily, while the same was true of less than two per cent 
among those who had a poor or non-existent knowledge of the language.
10Anatol Lieven believes that the reason for the large frequency of viewers of Russian TV is the 
relatively poor quality of the programmes in Latvian TV, which also makes Latvians watch TV 
programmes from Russia. Lieven (1993).
1 ^The figures in the tables are calculated on the basis of all respondents including those who did not 
answer the question.
12These include newspapers with a relatively large circulation, such as Nealkar %a C im, and Latvijas 
Jaunatne.
13The survey showed that more than 3/4 of the respondents had more than 50 books in their private 
book collection.
l4See article by Boris Tsilevich, "Novye Rubezhi", SM-segodnya, 29 July 1992, p. 1.
1 ^ See e.g. Apine (1994), and author's interviews with a number of politicians, journalists and ordinary 
people in Latvia.
1 ^ f  course, attitudes of Latvians towards Russians are at least as important, but since the survey 
concentrates on Russians it does not provide such information.
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17The lower social status of Russians in the Baltic region and the Transcaucasus seems to be confirmed 
by the responses of the indigenous populations in the same republics. The indigenous populations in 
these areas said they disliked Russians much more frequently than did the indigenous populations in 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Gudkov (1992).
18It is noteworthy that when Latvians have been asked the same question they tend to have a much less 
pessimistic view on the developments in the interethnic relations in the country. See e.g. Apine 
(1994).
19Author's interview with prominent Latvian politicians in March 1992, November 1992 and February 
1993; e.g. the leader of the Popular Front of Latvia, U. Augstkalns, February 1993.
20Thus, many Russian politicians who are generally critical of the Latvian government, also strongly 
support the immediate and unconditional departure of the Russian Army, since its presence has no 
positive effects for the Russian population. This view was expressed, among others, by the leader of 
the Baltic Constitutional Party, Andrei Vorontsov, in a conversation with this author in February 
1993.
21Interview with Vladimir Steshenko in Smena, (St. Petersburgh), 30 March 1993, p. 3.
22Smith (ed.) (1994b).
23Mlechin (1990).
24Interview with Pantelejevs, op. cit.
250 . F. Knudsen (1993): "Mer samling enn splittelse i Latvia”, Aftenposten, 4.6.93 
26Inf6rmatibn obtained from the Russian Embassy in Latvia, April 1994. The embassy official could 
not guarantee that the Figure was exact, because some of the applicants may have moved to Russia after 
obtaining citizenship of Russia.
27These include the right to ownership of land and other natural resources; the right freely to choose 
one's place of residence in Latvia and freely to return to Latvia; the right to possess registered weapons; 
and the right freely to take part in joint stock companies. See e.g. Opponent, no. 7, October 1992, p. 
2 .
28There is reason to believe that the same could be the case with Latvians and their information about 
the concerns of the Russian population, but we have no survey material to support this assertion.
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7. Russian Attitudes Towards Independence and Citizenship
The Latvians in Latvia took full advantage of the policies of glasnost' and 
perestroika, so that what started off as relatively modest requests for changes within the 
system soon developed into a movement for fundamental social transformation and, 
ultimately, independent statehood. There was soon general agreement among ethnic 
Latvians about the direction in which to proceed and also about the final goal, which 
was full independence from Moscow. Diverging views centred around the pace of 
reform and the tactical approach as to how to reach the goal, but the main principles 
were almost uncontested.
While ethnic Latvians tended to agree on these crucial issues, attitudes among 
the Russian population in Latvia were much less uniform. In this chapter Russian 
attitudes towards two major political issues in Latvia over the last few years will be 
examined. The first section will deal with the question of Russian attitudes towards 
independent Latvian statehood. There will be an attempt to explain why some Russians 
resisted Latvian independence so fiercely, while others supported it wholeheartedly. 
Then Russian reactions to citizenship legislation (or the lack of such) will be discussed. 
The question of citizenship was soon to become one of the most pressing issues facing 
the Russian population after Latvia gained de facto independence. More than 60 per 
cent of the Russians (see Table 5.5) did not automatically qualify for Latvian citizenship 
according to the guidelines stipulated in the Supreme Council Resolution of 15 October 
1991*, and while their status had been that of 'internal migrants', secure in their Soviet 
citizenship, they suddenly had to realise that they were in the process of becoming 
'international migrants of contested legitimacy and uncertain membership'.2 In the final 
section of this chapter I will present and discuss arguments which have been presented 
by Russian spokesmen in favour of a more liberal and inclusive citizenship legislation.
7.1.  Russians and Latvian Independence
7 .1 .1 .  Before Independence
The question of independent Latvian statehood did not appear on the Latvian 
political agenda at the start of the perestroika period. However, at the Second Congress 
of the Popular Front of Latvia in October 1989 a new programme was adopted whereby 
the ultimate goal of the popular movement was declared to be the restoration of an 
independent and demilitarised Latvian state.3 In order to understand Russian reactions
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to these developments, it is appropriate briefly to give some of the main reasons for this 
political radicalisation of the popular movement.4
Firstly, the reluctance in Moscow to support plans for economic autonomy 
seems to be an important factor in explaining why the Popular Front came to support 
outright secession from the Soviet Union. When declarations about perestroika and 
glasnost' did not materialise in practical policies for more autonomy over economic 
issues, Latvian politicians and economic leaders soon lost patience with the slow pace 
of reform and came to believe that they would be better off in an independent state.
Secondly, there were organisations and movements to the right of the Popular 
Front which put pressure on the Front to take a more radical stance on the question of 
independence. The Estonian example of organising Citizens' Committees was followed 
in Latvia, and by the first Congress of Citizens in April-May 1990 more than 900,000 
'citizens1 and 'citizen candidates' had been registered.5 As this movement gained more 
authority and support, the pressure on the Popular Movement increased.
. . . Thirdly, although the reforms did not proceed at a pace which suited Latvian 
nationalists, the policies of glasnost' undoubtedly broadened the agenda for acceptable 
political initiatives which, although often condemned in Moscow, could be stopped 
only by the use of force.6 However, employing force to stop peaceful Baltic initiatives, 
it was felt, would be unacceptable to the political leadership in Moscow, as it would 
undermine the whole idea of the reforms. There were thus activists in all the three Baltic 
republics who stretched the limits within which to operate as far as possible, which 
made for a radicalisation of the whole movement. It was not difficult for the educated 
classes in Latvian society to mobilise support for independence, since they could play 
on the threats to the ethnic survival of the Latvian nation.7
Perceived threats to the survival of the Latvian nation were not usually among 
the most pressing concerns for Russians living in Latvia. Some Russians were, 
nonetheless, inclined to sympathise with the claims of ethnic Latvians that their nation 
was under the threat of extinction. These Russians included some people with an 
ethnically mixed family background and Russians who in other ways interacted closely 
with ethnic Latvians. The same often applied to some of the integrated Russians who 
had lived in Latvia for a long time and experienced the deportations of Latvians during 
and after the Second World War, and who deplored the consequences of the 
incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union.
The first opinion polls asking about full Latvian independence showed that 
although a significant proportion of Russians supported this idea, the majority of 
Russians tended to be sceptical or strongly against it. One such opinion poll was 
published in PadomjuJaunatne in July 1989.8 In response to a question about whether 
only full independence could secure real prosperity for Latvia, only 9 per cent of 
Russians and other non-Latvians said that they fully agreed with such an opinion, while
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among ethnic Latvians the corresponding proportion was 57 per cent. There were a 
further 17 per cent of the non-Latvians who partly agreed with this opinion. However, 
more than half the non-Latvian respondents did not agree, while the same was true of 
only one in ten Latvian respondents.
In the course of the following year there was a tendency among both Latvians 
and Russians to become more supportive of the cause of independence. According to 
an opinion poll published in Atmoda in June 1990, the Supreme Council declaration of 
4 May 1990 on a transition period towards independence was supported by a clear 
majority of respondents (70 per cent).9 There were still some important variations 
between the different ethnic groups. While the declaration was supported by 92 per cent 
of ethnic Latvians, only 48 per cent of Russians and other non-Latvians gave it their 
support, according to this poll. On the other hand, 42 per cent of non-Latvians did not 
support the declaration.
A poll undertaken by a number of Latvian newspapers (some of them published 
in Russian) revealed some interesting information about the different attitudes to the 
question of independence between Latvians on the one hand and other ethnic groups on 
the other.10 While more than half the Russians supported the idea of a federation, this 
idea was supported by only 5 per cent of the Latvians. Even among those who 
supported full independence, Latvians and non-Latvians (most of whom were 
Russians) had very different ideas about how to proceed towards this goal. The 
majority of Latvians (62 per cent) thought that the Supreme Council of Latvia should 
adopt a resolution about independence at its first session (this view was shared by only 
38 per cent of those non-Latvians who supported the idea of independence), while most 
Russians and other non-Latvians (71 per cent) thought that it would be necessary first 
to secure an economic base for independence, and also that one should first ensure 
agreement from Moscow.
Latvians and non-Latvians did not have the same expectations about the changes 
which would occur if Latvia were to gain independence. The same poll indicated that 
Latvians had far more positive expectations of the implications of independence. A clear 
majority of Latvians thought that independence would increase the salaries of those 
who worked hard, that democratic rights would be broadened and also that industry 
would reach the level of the most developed countries. Non-Latvians took a much more 
sceptical view. More than two thirds of them thought that independence would lead to 
unemployment (this view was shared by only one fifth of the Latvians). There were 
furthermore clear majorities among non-Latvians who believed that non-Latvians would 
be discriminated against, that supplies of essential consumer goods would be reduced 
and that the number of people living on below-minimum incomes would increase. One 
third of the non-Latvian respondents believed that if Latvia were to become
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independent, it would no longer be possible to meet up with friends and relatives living 
in the USSR.
It was quite clear that Russians generally were much less enthusiastic about the 
prospects for Latvian independent statehood than were ethnic Latvians. As was noted in 
Chapter 3, Russians had a much stronger tendency than the other nationalities to 
identify with the Soviet Union as a whole. Many did not think of themselves first of all 
as Russians, but rather as Soviet citizens, and were indifferent to or could not 
understand the ethnic revival taking place among Latvians. Some argued the superiority 
of an 'internationalist1 rather than a 'narrow ethnic' self-understanding. One of the 
reactions was the creation of Interfront and similar organisations and movements, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
There was often a link between the defence of Soviet structures and concrete 
material interests.11 Independence represented a threat to Russians working in large all- 
union enterprises, in work related to the Soviet Army and in certain types of 
administrative or governmental work related to Soviet institutions. While ethnic 
Latvians working in the same institutions could transfer from a Soviet ideology (if they 
had ever had one) to an ideology based on the national idea, this was hardly an option 
for Russian 'colonists'.
Many Russians greatly feared the signs of increasing ethnocentrism among 
Latvian politicians and Latvians in general, and such fears were fuelled by reports in 
some of the Russian-language mass media. They consequently pinned their hopes on 
Soviet structures, on the Communist Party and the Soviet Army, which were often 
regarded as their only protection against becoming second-class citizens in an ethnic 
Latvian nation-state. An additional cause of discontent were political developments in 
Russia, where Yel'tsin, possibly out of tactical considerations, paid most of his 
political attention to internal Russian matters. He was also interested in keeping on 
good terms with the national leaderships in the union republics, which could be his 
allies in the struggle against the centre. This had the effect that many Russians felt 
betrayed by Yel'tsin, and those Russians who were looking for support from Moscow 
would most typically find such support among the most conservative elements in 
Russian politics, who tended to be the least interested in reaching compromises with the 
political leaderships in the union republics.12
There were, indeed, many Russians to whom the alliance with conservative 
forces in Moscow was intolerable, but who still could not wholeheartedly support 
Latvian independence. Political apathy and confusion were often the result. Some 
Russians, many of whom had never been politically active, tended to isolate themselves 
and tried to ignore political developments in the country.13 Some of these Russians 
focused all their attention on how to survive economically, and there were a number of 
Russians who had success in this period, setting up their own, private businesses.14
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However, opinion polls showed that there was increasing support among 
Russians for Latvian independence. This support probably reached a peak with the 
January 1991 events when a great number of Russians joined the ethnic Latvians on the 
barricades with the aim of defending democratic rule in Latvia. The January events and 
the attempts in Moscow to put the blame for what happened on the Baltic governments 
inclined many Russians to interpret relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic 
States as a struggle between dictatorship and democracy. The signing by Yel'tsin and 
Gorbunovs of an "Agreement on the Basic Principles for Inter-state Relations Between 
the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic" 13 January 1991 increased the 
prestige of the Latvian parliament among those Russians in Latvia who supported 
Yel'tsin in his struggle against conservative forces in Moscow.15
Likewise, a gradual reinterpretation of historical events opened the eyes of 
many Russians to injustices in the past. Indeed, informed about the illegality of Latvia's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union, many Russians felt morally obliged to support the 
restoration of an independent Latvian state. Also, some Russians changed their attitude 
as they became more accustomed to the idea of living away from their historical 
homeland. They might have understood that the Soviet Union was in the process of 
radical transformation anyhow, and believed that they would be better off in a small, 
politically stable Latvian state than in a Soviet Union where the prospects of political 
change for the better were much more uncertain.
Economic issues were probably even more important, and one of the main 
reasons why many Russians came to support Latvian independence was the slow pace 
of economic reform at a time when people had increasing economic expectations.16 The 
analogy with the case of political reform seems evident, in that many Russians believed 
that economic reform would be more likely to succeed in the smaller western-orientated 
Baltic economies than in the Soviet Union as a whole.
Although many Russians were fearful of Baltic ultranationalism, the mood in 
the popular movement changed from a focus on strictly ethnic concerns to paying more 
attention to general changes in economic and political structures.17 Given the 
demographic situation in Latvia, ethnic Latvians understood that if they were going to 
gain independent statehood they would have to count on support from the ethnic 
minorities. It was therefore important to promote policies that took into account the 
interests of the ethnic minorities in the republic.18 The adoption of a law on national 
cultural autonomy in April 1990 (see Chapter 4) and frequent statements that all 
permanent residents would be granted citizenship of Latvia reassured Russians that they 
would not become second-class citizens if Latvia were to become independent
Thus, when all permanent residents of Latvia were asked in a referendum (or, 
as the Latvian government preferred to call it, "independence poll") on 3 March 1991 if 
they 'supported the restoration of an independent and democratic Latvia', a significant
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proportion of Russians voted "yes".19 There are no exact estimates of the ethnic 
distribution of the votes in the poll since voters were not asked to indicate their 
nationality on the ballot paper. Approximately three out of four of the voters voted for 
independence, and when taking into account that only 52 per cent of the population was 
Latvian, this implies that a significant proportion of Russians and other non-Latvians 
must have voted for independence. There was a majority of yes votes in all the electoral 
districts of Latvia, including the cities of Riga, where Latvians made up just over one 
third of the population, and even Daugavpils, where only 13 per cent of the population 
was ethnic Latvian. Indeed, as has been pointed out by many observers after the poll, it 
was the Latvian Russians' vote for independence which clinched success for the pro­
independence forces in Latvia.
However, the majority of Russians are still likely to have voted against 
independence. One source suggests that approximately 38 per cent of Russians and 
other non-Latvians voted for independence, but it is not clear whether or not those who 
did not.take part in the vote are included in this estimate.20 Anyhow, the Russian vote 
for independence seems to have been somewhat lower than opinion polls indicated only 
weeks before the poll.21 Taagepera's suggestion of why this phenomenon took place in 
Estonia could be valid for the Latvian case as well:
There seemed to be people among the immigrants in Estonia 
who knew they ought to support independence but in the safety 
of the election booth gave vent to primordial fears and 
antipathies.22
In many respects the January 1991 events and the independence poll served to 
broaden the cleavage between those Russians who were for and those who were 
against independence. People were forced to make up their minds about the issue, and 
they were subject to pressure from both sides. A realisation that the two sides might 
even become involved in armed conflict added a new degree of seriousness to the 
question. Latvian politicians and many pro-independence observers emphasised that 
there was not really an ethnic conflict in Latvia, but that the conflict was between radical 
democrats and supporters of old-style policies.23 Russians who openly supported 
independence were naturally regarded as 'ours' by Latvians, while Russians who 
fought for the preservation of the old Soviet structures were disdained not so much 
because they were Russians, but rather because they played the game of the empire. 
Some of the main actors in the non-independence camp were themselves ethnic 
Latvians, and this served to reduce ethnic tension between Russians and Latvians.
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7 .1 .2 .  After Independence
There were several indications that support among Russians for Latvian 
independence increased in the days just after the aborted coup of August 1991. The role 
of Russian democrats in Moscow and a few other Russian cities in quelling the 
reactionary forces increased the prestige of Russians both in Latvia and in Russia.24 
Only a few Russians in Latvia had openly supported the coup, most remaining loyal to 
the Latvian authorities or deciding not to become involved. Latvians realised that their 
independence was achieved at this time largely because of Russian resistance to the 
attempted coup. At last Russians had shown to the rest of the world that they were not a 
'nation of slaves' and that they would not accept being treated as such either.
Those Russians who had been the most active in the anti-independence camp 
had, of course, a very difficult time. Many of them left Latvia for Russia because they 
realised that it would not be easy to hide their political past. All newspapers and 
organisations which had previously advocated their views were prohibited, and for a 
time the political landscape was completely dominated by the victors. Russians who 
had actively fought against independence, and who decided to stay in Latvia, 
disappeared from the political scene.
Despite the seeming harmony in ethnic relations and a generally positive, or at 
least wait-and-see, attitude among Russians towards Latvian independence at the time 
when independence was recognised by Moscow and the rest of the international 
community, the months to come were abruptly to change this picture. The Supreme 
Council resolution of 15 October on citizenship, defining as citizens of Latvia only 
those who had been citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia and their direct 
descendants, did much to increase Russian anxiety about their future in an independent 
Latvian state. When the popular movement had achieved its most important goal, it 
again turned into a more purely ethnic Latvian movement. There was no longer any 
need for the support of the Russian (or non-Latvian) population, and the time had come 
to deal with issues such as the demographic imbalance and to remove the residue of 
many decades of Soviet rule.
Still, Russians could not do anything but recognise that Latvia had become an 
independent state, at the same time as most of them had become objects, and were no 
longer subjects, in the formation of a new society.25 With a lack of organisational 
structures within which to channel frustrations and discontent, political apathy among 
the Russian population grew. Also, more and more Russians who had actively fought 
for independence and voted 'yes' in the poll in March became more sceptical about the 
turn of events. In some respects the former cleavages between Russians who were for 
and against independence became less distinct, as the Russian population faced new, 
and often common, problems.
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There was never any strong pressure in Latvia to join the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). Still, with the dependence of the Latvian economy on the 
CIS states, and particularly Russia, there were forces who thought that Latvia would be 
better off as a member of the Commonwealth. Russians in Latvia were much more 
inclined than ethnic Latvians to take such a view. To Russians there was the additional 
factor of political stability, which is likely to have played a significant role in forming 
their attitudes towards the CIS. Many Russians thought that their rights would be better 
protected under the auspices of the CIS states, and also that for Latvia to join they 
would have to reach agreements with the other CIS states on questions such as 
citizenship, education and other issues of importance to the Russian population. The 
idea of a commonwealth of independent states also attracted Russians, because in such 
a commonwealth they would not become as isolated from their ethnic homeland as they 
would in a state without any formal links with the former Soviet republics. Russian 
attitudes towards the CIS were also influenced by economic considerations, since 
Russians working in industry were aware of how dependent their factories were on 
inputs from the former Soviet states, and thought it would be easier to keep up these 
important economic links if Latvia entered the Commonwealth.
Thus, almost half the respondents in our survey, when asked to what extent 
they agreed that Latvia should have joined the CIS, either fully agreed or tended to 
agree with this opinion (see Table 7.1). Only 5 per cent completely disagreed with the 
view that Latvia should have entered the CIS, while 13 per cent tended to disagree. The 
proportion of undecided Russians was also large (one third of the respondents).
Table 7.1: Attitudes Towards the CIS
Survey Question: To which degree do you agree with the opinion that Latvia 
should have joined the CIS?
Fully agree Tend to agree Hard to say/ Tend to Completely
no answer disagree disagree
N = 591 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All respondents 28 21 33 13 5
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
There was great variety between different groups of Russians in terms of the 
responses to this question. As could have been expected, Russians with a mixed 
Russian-Latvian family background were less likely than other Russians to think that 
Latvia should have participated in the CIS. The same was true of Russians with a fluent 
or good command of the Latvian language. However, even among Russians who knew 
the Latvian language well a large proportion (20 per cent) fully agreed that Latvia 
should have joined the Commonwealth.
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Age seems to be one of the most crucial variables in determining Russian 
attitudes towards Latvia's relations with the CIS. Russians in the older age-groups 
were much more inclined than others to agree with the view that Latvia should have 
joined the Commonwealth. Thus, among respondents in the age-group of 55 years and 
older, nearly half the respondents fully agreed that Latvia should have joined the CIS, 
while the same was true of less than 18 per cent among respondents under 30 years of 
age. While the level of education did not seem to correlate with responses to this 
question, Russians with a lower income were more likely to take a pro-CIS view.
There were also considerable regional differences. Russians in the cities were 
generally much more supportive than Russians in rural areas of the idea that Latvia 
should have joined the CIS, but Russians in Riga were, perhaps surprisingly, 
somewhat less so than Russians in some of the other large cities. The exception was 
again Latgale, where urban Russians were less enthusiastic about Latvia joining the 
CIS. The fact that most of the Russians in the cities worked in industry, where the lack 
of inputs from .Russia and the other CIS states would have the. most severe, effects, is 
probably one of the main explanations why Russians in the cities were more likely to 
take a pro-CIS view than were Russians in rural districts. This corresponds with the 
findings that manual workers were more inclined to agree with the view that Latvia 
should have joined the CIS than were Russians in other professions.
There are certainly Russians in Latvia who would defend Latvia's right to 
independent statehood regardless of the political and social conditions in the country, 
and there are also Russians who would not support Latvian independence under any 
circumstances. Most Russians seem, however, to link the question of independence to 
political and social developments in the country, and particularly to issues which affect 
the conditions of the Russian population living there. Russian attitudes towards Latvian 
independence thus depend upon the way in which such issues are resolved. I will now 
proceed to examine Russian attitudes towards the most controversial and hotly debated 
political issue in Latvia: the question of who should be entitled to enjoy Latvian 
citizenship.
7.2 .  The Citizenship Issue
In Chapter 4 we discussed citizenship legislation in Latvia and examined the 
various models for a solution to this issue. This section is not intended as a 
continuation (or repetition) of the debate on the citizenship issue, but is meant to present 
the most typical position of ethnic Russians and their spokesmen in more detail. 
According to the present law on citizenship in Latvia, most Russians in Latvia do not 
automatically qualify for Latvian citizenship, since they were not citizens of the interwar
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Latvian republic or direct descendants of such a citizen.26 There can be no doubt that 
most Russians have been highly critical of the way the Latvian authorities have dealt 
with the citizenship issue. It would, however, be a simplification to say that all 
Russians have supported the so-called "zero option" model for citizenship, if by the 
"zero option" model one understands a situation whereby all permanent residents of 
Latvia are automatically entitled to Latvian citizenship.27 We have, however, already 
seen that the "zero option" contains a broader range of solutions to the problem of 
citizenship, and Russians seem to have very different views on the issue. Thus, 
although a majority of Russians have been in favour of a more liberal citizenship 
legislation than the one proposed in the Resolution on Citizenship of 1992, a significant 
proportion of Russians nevertheless seem to be in favour of certain requirements for 
obtaining citizenship which are not in accordance with a strict interpretation of the "zero 
option" solution.
It was Russian hard-liners, politically represented by the Interfront, and other 
anti-independence forces of Soviet Latvia who most fiercely came out against the idea 
of a separate Latvian citizenship outside the legal system of the USSR.28 They were 
not always against a Latvian SSR citizenship, but this citizenship was to be valid only 
in combination with USSR citizenship. This was also argued to be in accordance with 
the Soviet law "On USSR Citizenship" which in Paragraph 435 stated that every citizen 
of the Soviet republics was at the same time a citizen of the USSR. The status of the 
Latvian SSR's citizenship should thus be worked out in accordance with the laws of the 
USSR, as well as with other state regulations.
The actual "zero option" model for citizenship is linked to a separate Latvian 
citizenship, and is thus not related to the question of the USSR citizenship. The 
question of such a separate Latvian citizenship was not seriously discussed by the 
Supreme Council of Latvia until a transitional period to independence had been declared 
in May 1990. There have been, as indicated in Chapter 4, several disputed points 
regarding the "zero option" model. Firstly, there was the question of whether or not 
permanent residents of Latvia should automatically be regarded as citizens of Latvia, 
whether they wanted such citizenship or not. There were, in fact, very few Russians 
who argued the case for automatic citizenship, and most Russian spokesmen were of 
the opinion that all permanent residents should have the possibility of applying for 
such citizenship.29
Secondly, there was no agreement on whether or not dual Latvian-USSR or 
Latvian-Russian citizenship should be tolerated.30 Some Russians saw dual citizenship 
as a means by which the interests of the non-Latvian minorities could be protected, 
since dual citizenship would require negotiations on a state level concerning the rights 
and duties of citizens of both states. They tended to believe that Russians with a USSR
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(and later Russian) citizenship would feel more secure and less vulnerable, at the same 
time as their Latvian citizenship would grant them the same status as other citizens of 
Latvia. Others understood the Latvian authorities' objections to such dual citizenship, 
based on the potential conflict of loyalty which people with a dual citizenship could 
experience if the interests of the two states of which they were citizens were divergent 
(at its most extreme, in an armed conflict between the two states). There were also 
Russians who pointed to the risk that the speed of integration of Russians and other 
non-Latvians into a Latvian citizenry would slow down if they retained their Soviet 
citizenship or became citizens of another post-Soviet state.
Thirdly, whether or not to grant citizenship to personnel in the Soviet armed 
forces stationed in Latvia and their family members was a question which was not 
always clearly addressed by Russian political spokesmen, and there were also 
diverging views on this question among the Russian public. Naturally, many Russians 
protested against the 'Resolution on Citizenship' October 1991 proposing that military 
personnel, in the Soviet armed forces and their family members would be denied 
citizenship, and there was also discontent with registration practises where even civilian 
employees working at various types of military institutions were defined as military 
personnel.31 However, there were also proponents of the "zero option" solution who 
regarded the Soviet armed forces as an occupying force and who accordingly were in 
favour of excluding at least some parts of the military from the right to obtain Latvian 
citizenship.32
Fourthly, there were different ideas about the need to fulfil a number of 
requirements in order to obtain citizenship. There were Russians who said they were in 
favour of the "zero option" but who at the same time thought it should be necessary for 
citizenship applicants to have been a permanent resident of Latvia for a certain number 
of years. The logic behind this argument was that all permanent residents would have 
the chance to become citizens, although they could not all become so immediately.
As has been demonstrated above, supporters of the "zero option" citizenship 
model may have very different views regarding various questions related to the 
citizenship issue. After Latvia regained independence de facto the "zero option" has 
most typically been defined as 'the automatic granting of the possibility to obtain 
Latvian citizenship to all Soviet citizens residing within Latvian territory on or before 
August 21, 1991'.33 There is, thus, no distinction made between the legal status of 
those who were citizens in the interwar republic of Latvia and post-war immigrants. 
The status of the Soviet armed forces in this "zero option" model, however, remains 
unclear.
Russians in our survey were asked to what extent the Supreme Council 
Resolution on Citizenship of 15 October 1991 (see Chapter 4) satisfied them 
personally. The responses to this question are illustrated in Table 7.2. Very few
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Russians seemed to be satisfied with this Resolution. Only 6 per cent of the 
respondents said that the Resolution either fully or partly satisfied them, while the 
Resolution completely failed to satisfy almost half the respondents.
Table 7.2: Supreme Council Resolution
Survey Question: To which degree does the Supreme Council resolution of 
15 October 1991 about citizenship satisfy you personally?
N = 591
Fully
satisfies
(%)
Mostly
satisfies
(%)
Hard to say/ 
no answer
(%)
Mostly does 
not satisfy
(%)
Does not 
satisfy at all
(%)
All respondents 2 4 22 23 49
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
Russians in urban areas, where most of the post-war immigrants live, were 
clearly less satisfied with the Resolution than were Russians in rural areas, with 
respondents in Latgale tending to be less dissatisfied than Russians in other Latvian 
regions. Russians in Latgale, as has been pointed to earlier, tend to have lived in Latvia 
for a longer time than Russians in the other regions of Latvia, and this seems to be 
significant in explaining the responses to this question. People who were bom in Latvia 
naturally tended to be more satisfied than others with the Citizenship Resolution, and 
this was particularly the case with Russians who would be granted citizenship 
automatically according to the stipulations outlined in the Resolution.
As could perhaps have been expected, the Supreme Council Resolution, which 
stipulated language requirements for citizenship applicants, was considered to be least 
satisfactory by Russians with a poor or non-existent knowledge of the Latvian 
language. Russians married to a Latvian were also much less critical of the Resolution 
than were unmarried Russians or Russians with a Slavic spouse. The nationality of the 
parents was a further correlating factor, with Russians having a Latvian parent being 
somewhat less dissatisfied with the Resolution than were other Russians. However, 
this factor was not as significant in determining attitudes to the Resolution as was the 
nationality of the spouse. Moreover, Russians with a higher education were clearly less 
satisfied with the Supreme Council Resolution than were Russians with only primary 
education. Finally, the older the respondent, the less the Resolution tended to satisfy 
him/her.
According to an opinion poll undertaken by the Latvian opinion poll institute 
Viedoklis in the period from December 1991 to January 1992 and presented in the 
Danish newspaper Weekendavisen , three out of four Russians agreed (either fully or 
partly) with the view that all permanent residents of Latvia should have the right to 
become citizens (the "zero option").34 This view was shared by less than one third of 
ethnic Latvians. At the same time many Russians supported certain requirements in
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terms of length of residency in Latvia for obtaining citizenship. In fact 60 per cent of 
the ethnic Russian respondents agreed that one ought to have lived in Latvia for at least 
ten years in order to become a citizen. There was also a considerable percentage of 
ethnic Russians (53 per cent) agreeing with the view that there should be certain 
requirements in terms of knowledge of the Latvian language, familiarity with Latvian 
history and culture, and an oath of loyalty to the Latvian state. While more than two 
thirds of ethnic Latvians agreed that only citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia 
should have the right to Latvian citizenship at present, the corresponding proportion 
among ethnic Russians was 18 per cent.
A survey among ethnic Russians in four Baltic cities, including the Latvian 
cities of Daugavpils and Riga (making up more than half of Latvia's Russian 
population), which was undertaken in February 1993, revealed that Russian opposition 
to drafted citizenship legislation had intensified.35 In Riga nearly all respondents (98 
percent) found the citizenship laws36 unfair in relation to the Russian population, and 
although Russians in Daugavpils.were somewhat less inclined to take this view, almost 
nine in ten respondents there still thought that Latvian citizenship laws were unfair.
There was still, however, a majority of Russians in these two cities who 
supported certain residence requirements in order to obtain Latvian citizenship. Such 
requirements were supported by approximately 60 per cent of the respondents in the 
two cities surveyed. There was much less support for other requirements. The view 
that only those who knew the Latvian language should be entitled to Latvian citizenship 
was shared by 4 per cent of respondents in Riga and only 1 per cent in Daugavpils, 
where also fewer respondents had a command of the Latvian language. Only 12-13 per 
cent of the respondents in the two cities thought citizenship applicants should give an 
oath of loyalty to the Latvian state. As could have been expected, few Russians wanted 
to restrict citizenship to those who were bom in Latvia in the interwar period and their 
descendants. Only 5 per cent of respondents in Riga and 15 per cent in Daugavpils 
(where the proportion of Russians who fulfil this requirement is larger) were in favour 
of such a requirement.
The survey further revealed that only 9 per cent of the respondents in Riga and 
13 per cent in Daugavpils thought that it should be necessary to renounce citizenship of 
other states in order to obtain Latvian citizenship. Although a large proportion was 
undecided on this question, there was still a clear majority in both Riga and Daugavpils 
supporting the possibility of dual citizenship.
Various surveys about citizenship have given very divergent results, and the 
wording of the question seems to have great significance for the responses given.37 
Thus, even within the same survey there are many examples of respondents giving 
what seem to be contradictory responses, for example when they support the "zero 
option" and at the same time want language requirements for obtaining citizenship.
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There are nevertheless two major trends which appear to be common for all the 
surveys. The first is that ethnic Russians are in favour of a much more liberal 
citizenship legislation than are ethnic Latvians. The second is that Russians are 
generally not in favour of legislation which differentiates between those who were 
citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia (and their direct descendants) and post-war 
immigrants.
There are certain fairly obvious reasons why Russians tend to support more 
liberal citizenship legislation more strongly than do ethnic Latvians. Russians do not 
perceive a threat to their ethnic survival as a nation, but most Latvians do. Many 
Russians therefore have problems understanding Latvians' concern about the 
demographic situation in Latvia. As was pointed to in Chapter 2, Russians tend to 
believe that their presence in Latvia has had a positive impact on economic 
development, and contributed to the republic's prosperity. Their point of reference is 
Russia or other Soviet republics, and in comparison with most of these republics Latvia 
has indeed been much better off economically.3? They consequently see the Russian 
presence as justified, and cannot understand why Russians should be denied 
citizenship. Moreover, since the majority of Russians are post-war immigrants, or 
children of such immigrants, Russians would tend to be affected by a strict citizenship 
legislation to a much greater degree than would Latvians, who were usually citizens or 
descendants of citizens of the interwar republic.39 This is naturally likely to influence 
their attitudes concerning the citizenship issue.
It is quite clear from the survey data presented above that most Russians in 
Latvia are in favour of a very liberal citizenship legislation. Let us now proceed to 
examine arguments which have been most commonly used by Russian spokesmen in 
support of a more inclusive solution to the issue.40 Such arguments fall into three 
different groups. The first group of arguments can be labelled legal arguments. These 
are arguments pointing to the violation of legal principles which are established in 
international laws and treaties signed by Latvia, or to a lack of definition of the status of 
non-citizens. The second group are political arguments. They are arguments which look 
at the potential political consequences of a strict citizenship legislation and explain why 
these would not be in the interests of the population of Latvia. Finally, the third group 
of arguments can be called arguments of justice. These arguments centre around the 
alleged unfairness stemming from legislation according to which people who, for 
example, were bom in Latvia, pay taxes in Latvia or voted in favour of an 'independent 
and democratic' Latvia are not automatically entitled to Latvian citizenship.
Several legal arguments have been employed to show that proposed citizenship 
legislation in Latvia is not in accordance with certain legal principles. There has been 
much criticism of the way in which the restored state model has been adopted in Latvia, 
whereby the Latvian state and its citizenry are considered to be identical with that of the
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interwar Latvian republic.41 In the view of many Russians Latvia should, taking the 
time factor into account, have been established as a new, democratic republic, with a 
new Constitution. As the leader of the "Russian Constitutional Party" Andrei 
Vorontsov puts it:
B o n p o c  rpa>K,qaHCTBa - oto B c e r o  jihihb nacrb pemeHHH  
3a,qaHH nocT poeH H H  hoboh, aeM OicpaTHqecKOH /laTBHH, 
ycTaHOBJieHHH pe>KHMa «btopoh pecny6jiH K H ».42
Since the initial body of citizens is ordinarily defined by new states in territorial 
terms43, it follows from the above argument that the citizenry of Latvia should include 
all those residing on Latvian territory. Vorontsov lists some exceptions to this rule: for 
example, people who prefer to become citizens of another state should have this right if 
the other state accepts it, and Soviet military personnel should not have the right to 
Latvian citizenship.
Some Russians, and among them Mikhail Gavrilov from the Centre for a 
Democratic Initiative Party, argued that if one were actually restoring the interwar 
Latvian Republic, the logical consequence would be that the law on citizenship from 
that republic should still be in force. In 1919 (when the demographic situation in Latvia 
was radically different) the Latvian parliament adopted the "zero option" model for 
citizenship, and only five years of residence was required in order to obtain Latvian 
citizenship.44 However,
( . . . )  r o B o p s i  o  H e3aBH CH M ocTH  1918 r o a a ,  O T p m ja ioT  
aeM O K p aT H H ecK oe p em eH H e o  rpa>KflaHCTBe, npH H H T oe b  
t e  r o f lM . I lp o B 0 3 r j ia i i ia e T C S [  B o c c T a H O B J ie H H e  
He3aBHCHMOCTH HO CTaBHTCH BOnpOC O HOBOM 3aKOHe O 
r p a ^ a a H C T B e , kotophh npHHHM aTb c p a 3 y  H e >KeJiaK>T, 
3aTHrHBaioT e r o  nprntH TH e. r z j e  JiorHKa?45
The legal status of the Supreme Council of Latvia has also been disputed. As 
mentioned earlier, although the Supreme Council saw itself as competent to resolve the 
citizenship issue, the view held by the national radicals that the Supreme Council was a 
body of the occupying regime and as such was incompetent to solve issues of such 
great importance as the citizenship issue in practice gradually gained ascendancy. 
Russian deputies, however, continued to argue that the Supreme Council was elected 
democratically and recognised by the international community as the supreme legislative 
body of Latvia. It should therefore also have the power to solve all problems regarding 
state building. If it did not, this would lead to some paradoxes, as pointed to by the 
Russian deputy Vladlen Dozortsev, who originally belonged to the Popular Front 
fraction of the parliament:
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(...) HeMeflJieHHo BO3HHKai0T Bonpocbi: noneMy Torvta 
3aKOHHa ZleKJiapauHH o He3aBHCHMocm? IIoqeMy 3dKOHeH 
^OKyMeHT O BHXO,Zie H3 CCCP? IlOHeMy 3aKOHHH caMH 
MaH/iaTbi pa^HKajioB b  He3aKOHnoM napjiaMeirre? H t o  o h h  
TaM aejiaioT? noneMy o h h  B o o b i i j e  bajuiOTHpoBajmcb, a 
He 6oHKOTHpOBaJIH Bbl6opbI?46
The Supreme Council was elected by all adults living in Latvia, and this 
parliament adopted a large number of important resolutions and laws which have had 
serious implications for those living in Latvia. It has therefore been argued that the 
Supreme Council deputies actually disenfranchised part of their own electorate 
(deprived it of political rights), while at the same time retaining their own mandates.
Russians who are concerned with the legal aspects of the citizenship issue tend 
to claim that the division between citizens and non-citizens is arbitrary and contradicts 
international agreements signed by Latvia. Many Russian spokesmen are convinced that 
if the draft law on citizenship were to be implemented, it would mean systematic 
violation of human rights.47 It would, it is argued, specifically be a violation of the UN 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which was signed by Latvia in May 
1990 48 This convention, subject to certain conditions, obliges the signatory states to 
grant its nationality (citizenship) to a person bom on its territory who would otherwise 
be stateless 49 Proposed citizenship legislation would also, it is said, contradict some 
other international agreements, such as the Declaration on the Rights of the Child.
The comparison of non-citizens in Latvia with immigrants in other European 
countries is not accepted by many Russian (and also other50) legal experts. Their view 
is that while immigrants were usually aware of the fact that they would not 
automatically become citizens of the country to which they moved, most current non­
citizens living in Latvia went there as Soviet citizens in accordance with Soviet law 
which was in force in Latvia on their arrival. They therefore had no reason to expect 
that they would be deprived of citizenship at a later stage. Furthermore, some critics 
have pointed to the absurdity of speaking about "naturalisation" of people who were 
bom and grew up in Latvia. In the words of Boris Tsilevich:
If we consider the problem purely juridically it (re)presents a 
misuse of of juridical power. The present situation is "informal", 
not foreseen by any law. We are constantly dealing not with the 
formal law but some frivolous interpretation of legislative 
norms.51
Some Russians have argued that Latvia has an obligation to give citizenship to 
all its residents who want it because of Latvia's ratification of the "Agreement on the 
Basic Principles for Inter-state Relations Between the Russian Federation and the 
Latvian Republic", which was signed by Yel'tsin and Gorbunovs on January 13, 
1991.52 According to the third article of this agreement the RSFSR and the Latvian 
Republic
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6 e p y T  Ha c e 6 n  B3aHMHbie o6H 3aTe;ibCTBa rapaHTHpoBaTb 
jiHuaM , >KHBymHM Ha MOMeHT n oan n caH H H  H a cT o n m ero  
Z lorO BO pa Ha TeppHTOpHHX (PC 3>C P) H JlaTBHHCKOH 
P ecn y6jiH K H  h  h b j i h io i u h m c h  HHHe r p a ^ a H a M H  C C C P, 
npaBO  coxpaH H T b h j i h  nojiyH H T b rp a ^ a H C T B O  (PC<I>CP)
HJ1H JlaTBHHCKOH PeCIiy6.JIHKH B COOTBeTCTBHH C HX 
CBObOflHbIM BOJieH3JbHBJieHHeM.53
In the view of many Russians this can only be interpreted as a guarantee of the 
"zero option" for citizenship.54
Russians have criticised the lack of clear guide-lines as to the respect in which 
the rights and obligations of "citizens" and "non-citizens" will differ. When the 
parliament started discussing certain criteria for obtaining citizenship, most moderate 
politicians were quick to emphasise that apart from the right to elect and be elected, the 
two categories would enjoy the same rights and have the same duties. It was 
particularly stressed that "citizens" and "non-citizens" would be treated as equals in the 
economic sphere.55
However, a number of new laws were adopted (by the "illegal" Supreme 
Council) which specified different criteria for "citizens" and "non-citizens". According 
to a Constitutional Act, adopted by the Supreme Council on 10 December 1991, non­
citizens do not have the right of access to state office. Similarly, non-citizens do not 
have the right to own and dispose of land and other natural resources. There are also 
restrictions on the freedom to reside in Latvia and return there.56 The old Soviet 
propiska system is in practice maintained for non-citizens, so that they are required to 
ask for permission when they want to move within the borders of Latvia. Russian non­
citizens are also worried that they may not be allowed to return to Latvia after a holiday 
or visit abroad.57
Non-citizens also have some disadvantages in the privatisation process. The 
Law on Joint-Stock Companies of 5 December 1990 specifies certain restrictions for 
participation in private enterprise for non-citizens. After much debate the Latvian 
parliament in the autumn of 1992 adopted a Law on Privatisation of State Property, 
whereby state property would be distributed in accordance with the length of time a 
person had resided in Latvia. However, citizens were to receive 15 additional 
certificates (equal to 15 years of residence), while the number of certificates received 
by non-citizens who were not bom in Latvia was to be reduced by 5.58
In Chapter 5 we found that almost 90 per cent of the Russian population in 
Latvia had lived there for more than 15 years, which means that the proposed residence 
requirement of 16 years for naturalisation would not be problematic for most Russians 
if the draft citizenship legislation of November 1991 were to be implemented. 
However, as Russian spokesmen have pointed out, during the registration of the 
population of Latvia it was often difficult to prove residence in Latvia for 16 years. The
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notion of 'permanent resident' had never been clearly defined. Thus, 'non-citizens' 
who were bora in Latvia but left it for temporary work on the basis a of contract, for 
studies in other parts of the Soviet Union, or to serve as officers in the Soviet armed 
forces outside Latvia would be registered as permanent residents only from the day they 
returned to Latvia.59 Moreover, not only army personnel but also their family members 
were to be registered only from the date of their demobilisation from the armed forces. 
People who lived in student hostels or rented apartments in houses owned by the 
military were denied registration altogether. Examples of people registered as military 
personnel included kindergarten teachers working in kindergartens financed by the 
armed forces, music teachers and other civilian employees.60
Although substantial legal arguments have been used by Russians in their 
campaign against an exclusive citizenship legislation, it is arguments about the 
unfavourable political consequences of such legislation which have dominated their call 
for an inclusive law on citizenship. The main political argument has been that almost 
one third of the residents of Latvia in practice have been deprived of its citizenship 
rights.61 Being excluded from taking part in political decision-making, 'non-citizens' 
do not have the opportunity to protect their interests and influence political processes by 
legal means. Although there are no ethnic criteria for obtaining citizenship, the 
arguments used to justify a strict citizenship law illustrate that the issue is very much 
related to ethnicity. When only one third of non-Latvians are regarded as 'citizens', 
while almost all ethnic Latvians are defined as such, this automatically adds an ethnic 
dimension to the issue. Some Russians, thus, have argued that not only their individual 
interests but also their interests as an ethnic group risk not being protected under current 
legislation.
Most Russians are, as the previous chapter showed, not very likely to leave 
Latvia, some because they regard Latvia as their motherland and would not even 
consider living in another country, others because of the generally better living 
conditions in Latvia as compared with most places in Russia. An exclusive citizenship 
law would therefore, it is argued, mean that an integration of the Russian population 
would become much more problematic. One cannot expect that Russians, even those 
who initially were sympathetic to the demands for Latvian independence, will uphold a 
loyalty towards the Latvian state if they or their co-ethnics are deprived of political 
rights. This could, the argument goes, lead to political alienation and increasing ethnic 
tension, and could even contribute to the formation of the 'fifth column' which Latvian 
authorities so frequently warn about.
One of the consequences of present citizenship legislation could thus be that one 
creates the bi-communal society which prominent Latvian politicians, such as Andrejs 
Pantelejevs, see as one of the more serious dangers for Latvia.62 In a situation of 
economic hardship and increasing unemployment, the lack of opportunities to reduce
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frustration through legal political channels could lead to social unrest; and with the 
considerable risk that such unrest would acquire an ethnic character, the potential 
conflict could be severe.
Many Russians who cannot obtain citizenship in Latvia, or who find the 
required 'naturalisation' process humiliating or fear that they will not pass the language 
exam, might opt for Russian citizenship, which they can aquire without many 
formalities. As has been pointed out by Boris Tsilevich, the majority of Latvian 
Russians who take Russian citizenship do not intend to move to Russia; they want to 
remain in Latvia under Russian protection.63 To have a large number of citizens of a 
foreign state, and from Latvia's point of view Russia is not like any other foreign state, 
could, in Tsilevich's view, potentially be a very great destabilising factor for Latvia's 
future:
B 3 a H M o o T H o m e H H 5 i /laT B H H C K O H  P e c n y 6 j m K H  c  
cobcTBeHHHMH pyccK oroBopH iitH M H  rpaiacflaHaMH - 3 7 0  e e  
B H yT p eH H ee aeno, h  o n e H b  H e n p o cr ro  6 m jio  6 h  o n p a B /ja T b
...........................K a K o e - J iH b o .  B M e u ia T e j ib C T B o  b  o t h  o T H o n ie H H H  0 0
CTOpOHbl POCCHH. OTHOIIieHHe >Ke K >KHByiItHM B JlaTBHH 
poccHHCKHM rpa>KflaHaM - o t o  coBceM apyroe aejio, 
aa>Ke BecbMa )*cecTKHe rnarH, HanpaBJieHHbie Ha 3autHTy hx 
HHTepeCOB, MOryT 6bITb IIOHHTbl H npHHHTbl MHpOBHM 
COObmeCTBOM (...).64
If conditions for non-Latvians were to be so unpleasant that a larger number of 
Russians started leaving Latvia, it would be intellectuals and businessmen who would 
be most likely to leave because of their higher mobility.65 These are, it is argued, 
Russians whom Latvia should be most anxious not to lose, because of their 
significance for the Latvian economy.66 Elderly people and those who could not easily 
find work in Russia would be most likely to remain in Latvia, so the Russian 
"problem” would be far from resolved. One radical solution to the citizenship question, 
which has been proposed only by the most extreme wing of the right-wing nationalists, 
would be to define all post-war immigrants as foreigners who reside illegally in Latvia 
and demand their departure, but by introducing such measures Latvia would most 
probably face severe consequences in terms of reactions from the Russian government, 
the rest of the international community and also from those who were to be deported. 
This scenario is therefore considered realistic only by a few Russian hard-liners.
While a reasonable residence requirement was tolerated by many Russians, 
there was more scepticism about the proposed language exams for citizenship 
applicants. An underlying reason for this scepticism was, of course, that many 
Russians knew they would have problems passing such a language test. However, 
Russians who knew the Latvian language well also had objections against such an 
exam. One of the arguments was that the Latvian language should not be required in 
certain regions where the Russian-speaking population dominated numerically and had
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done so for centuries. Only about 20 per cent of ethnic Russians were fluent in Latvian 
in pre-war Latvia, but their right to citizenship had never been questioned.67
Furthermore, language exams had already started to take place for employees in 
certain professions after the amended Language Law was adopted in May 1992. There 
were many complaints from Russians about arbitrariness and lack of correspondence 
between the language level required for the job of the employees and the knowledge 
required in order to pass the exams.68 Many Russians thus feared that the same could 
take place in language exams for citizenship, since the required level of achievement 
would tend to be based on subjective criteria. It was further pointed out that people 
working in the exam commissions received low salaries and that they often accepted 
such work because they were 'patriots' with the aim of saving the Latvian nation from 
extinction.69
The third category of arguments was referred to as "arguments of justice". In 
newspaper articles, letters to the editors, radio and TV interviews and in demonstrations 
Russians have appealed to common sense in order to show that the proposed 
citizenship legislation is unfair with regard to the Russian or Russian-speaking 
population of Latvia. The main argument is that it is unfair that Russians who have 
lived in Latvia for a long time, who have worked and paid taxes and contributed to the 
Latvian economy, and maybe even were bom there, are suddenly being deprived of 
citizenship simply because they were not citizens of the interwar republic or 
descendants of such citizens. These people, it is claimed, had no reason to believe that 
they were not the equal of others living in the republic, but now they are in danger of 
becoming second-class citizens or "aliens" whose well-being will be dependent on the 
good will of the authorities. At the same time the authorities, it is argued, are all the 
time moving in a more restrictive direction, broadening the range of areas where the 
rights of citizens and non-citizens differ. Since one cannot blame Russians collectively 
for the crimes committed during the Soviet period, individual Russians who have lived 
in Latvia in accordance with the law and used their freedom of movement as citizens of 
the Soviet Union to settle down in Latvia should not become new victims in an attempt 
to rectify former mistreatment of Latvians. If there is a conflict between individual 
human rights and the collective rights of an ethnic group, then the individual rights 
should have priority, goes the argument.
There is another aspect which Russians often refer to when they argue that an 
inclusive citizenship law is the only fair solution in relation to the Russian-speaking 
population. The argument is that Russians assumed a liberal citizenship law would be 
adopted because of a number of statements from leading Latvian politicians on the issue 
in the period leading up to independence. Latvian authorities soon understood that in 
order to gain independence it would be necessary to have the support of national 
minorities, including the Russians. Russians were, thus, encouraged to join the
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Popular Front and to vote for Latvian independence, and there was a general informal 
agreement that Russians would all be given the option of initial citizenship in return. 
Those who argued for a more restrictive citizenship solution were said to be a small 
minority without any possibility of determining the political outcome in their favour. On 
the eve of the referendum Diena published an interview with the Supreme Council 
deputy and secretary of its Constitutional Committee, Rolands Rikards:
Tpa>K flaH e C C C P, KOTopbte 3 M apTa n p o r o j io c y iO T  3a  
C BoboflH yio, zteMOKpaTHHectcyK) h  He3aBHCHMyio JlaTBHio, - 
n o T em jH a jib H b ie  r p a a c a a H e  J \ p ,  c b o h m  OTHOineHHeM  
3acBHTeTejibCTBOBaBinne JioHJibHOCTb k r o c y a a p c T B y  (.)70
Consequently, Russians who voted for a free, democratic and independent 
Latvia often felt betrayed, and they have often claimed that the Latvian authorities have 
not kept their promise. As soon as Latvia had gained independence, the need for 
Russian support was no longer so acute, and slogans such as "For your and our 
freedom" and "Latvia - our common home" were replaced with "A Latvian Latvia" and 
"Desovietisation, Decolonisation, DeoCcUpation".
7.3.  Conclusion
While various groups of Russians had different views and interests regarding 
the question of Latvian independence, most Russians were in favour of a more liberal 
and inclusive citizenship legislation than proposed by the Latvian parliament. However, 
while all Russians had a say on the question of independence, it was left to the new 
Saeima, elected by citizens of the Latvian pre-war republic, to adopt a new citizenship 
law. Since approximately one third of the non-Latvians were citizens and had a vote, 
and since some Latvians had a more moderate view on the citizenship and other issues, 
the parliament was not completely dominated by ethnic Latvians or by parties in favour 
of a restrictive legislation on citizenship.71 Nevertheless, it was already clear a long 
time before the elections that the "zero option" favoured by most Russians would not be 
accepted by the parliament or the predominantly Latvian electorate.
A great number of parties had been established which, although their 
programmes differed in respect to the terms of naturalisation of new citizens, all 
accepted the restored state model with initial citizenship being granted only according to 
the pre-1940 principle. Russian and other non-citizens were, however, not allowed 
membership in political parties, and there were few parties claiming to represent their 
views. In the following chapter we shall examine the Russian political response to this 
situation, and particularly look at the organisational structure within which Russians 
could articulate and mobilise support for their interests.
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iThe official title of the resolution is: "On the Renewal of the Republic of Latvia Citizenship Rights 
and the Main Principles of Naturalisation", but it will here be called the Resolution on Citizenship, 
which is also the name it is known by in Latvia. An English translation of the law was published in 
the pamphlet About the Republic of Latvia by the Standing Commission on Human Rights and 
National Questions under the Supreme Council of Latvia, Riga, 1992, pp. 51-53. The draft law on 
citizenship of November the same year was published in the same pamphlet, pp. 54-62.
2Brubaker (1992), p. 269.
3Sandstrom (1991), p. 37.
4The general radicalisation of the popular movement on the question of independence should be kept 
separately from the discussion of the ethnopolitical radicalistion in Latvia which was discussed in 
Chapter 4, although some of the reasons coincide.
5Muiznieks (1990).
6See Eglitis (1993).
7See Zaslavsky (1992).
8PadomjuJaunatne 27.07.89, p. 4. The opinion poll was conducted by the Centre of Research of 
Public Opinion at the Institute of History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Latvia.
9Atmoda 26.06.90, p. 11. This poll was conducted by the Latvian Sociology Association.
1 QSovetskaya molodezh, 27 April 1990, p. 1. This cannot be seen as a representative survey, but 
nevertheless tendencies seem to be reliable. The poll seems to be in accordance with other polls, taken 
up at the same time in that 92 per cent of Latvians and 45 per cent of Russians and other non-Latvians 
supported independence.
1 Starikov, E. (1993).
12Kolst0 (1993), p. 200.
13See Russkii Put', 26 September 1992, p. 3.
14Indeed, it was generally acknowledged that Russians (and Jews) dominated private business in Latvia. 
See e.g. Ekspress, no. 47, 5-11 December 1992, p. 4.
15Diena, 25 January 1991, p. 1.
^See G. Smith (ed.) (1994b).
17Tsilevich (1993).
18Dreifelds (1990/91).
1 ^ or the results, see Bungs (1991) and (199lb).
20Brigita Zepa cited in Bojars (1993), p. 144. The Latvian ambassador to the Russian Federation 
suggested that half the Russian-speaking population in Latvia voted in favour of independence, but it is 
not clear which sources his estimates are based on. See Rossiiskie Vesti, 1 July 93, p. 7. One western 
source, Anatol Lieven, calculated that the non-Latvian vote in favour of independence was probably in 
the range of 27 to 38 per cent. Lieven (1993).
21In early March 38 per cent of the non-Latvian population were reported to be in favour of 
independence according to a survey conducted by L atvijas sodalopetiju m u  centrs (Latvian Centre for 
Social Research). Zepa (1992).
22Taagepeera(1992), "Ethnic relations in Estonia, 1991", Journal o f Baltic Studies, Vol. XXIII, no. 
2, p. 127
23Juris Bojars expressed this view in an interview with the author in August 1991.
24This author was in Riga during the Coup and took part in the celebration of Baltic independence in 
front of the Freedom Monument on 23 August. Those speakers who greeted the Russian democratic 
movement and who emphasised the role of all nationalities in gaining independence received more 
applause than speakers who saw independence as a victory of the Latvian ethnos. The meeting was 
suddenly interrupted by intense applause. We soon realised that a person carrying a large Russian 
tricolour was moving down the main road of Riga and approaching the meeting. Short interviews with 
people in the streets of Riga in those days also seemed to suggest that Latvian independence was not 
supported by ethnic Latvians only.
^Author’s interview with Boris Tsilevich, February 1993.
26In Chapter 5 we saw that while 38 per cent of the Russian population were citizens of Latvia 
(according to statistics from the registration of the Latvian population), 62 per cent were not. See 
Vd>ers and Kamups (1994) and Table 5.5.
27Lane (1993), p. 39. See Chapter 3 for a more thorough analysis of the citizenship issue.
28Kvemr0d, M. (1993).
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29Bojars has argued that the "zero option" implies that permanent residents automatically become 
citizens of Latvia, which he, rightly, argues would be an infringement of the rights of those who do 
not want citizenship of Latvia. This is, however, a somewhat questionable interpretation of the "zero 
option" model. Many supporters of the "zero option" model, for example, favoured the Lithuanian 
solution, whereby those who were citizens of the interwar republic would be granted citizenship 
automatically, while others would have to apply within a certain time period to obtain it. See Bojars
(1993).
3 Oln the previous chapter we saw that 38 per cent of the respondents in our survey would have opted 
for dual Russian-Latvian citizenship if there had been such an option.
3 ^ ee  SM-segodnya, 22 August 1992, p.l.
32E.g. the leader of the Russian Constitutional Party, Andrei Vorontsov. See Diena, 22 December 
1992, p. 2.
33Atmoda (English edition), no. 19, October 1991.
34Weekendavisen, 13.-19 March 1992, p. 18. There were 1000 respondents in the survey.
35Smith, Aasland and Mole (1994).
36The question which was asked was: Chto kasaetsya nyneshnykh grazhdanskikh prav, schitaete li yy, 
chto spravedlivy po otnosheniyu k russkomu naseleniyu v Latvii? [Authors' translation: Regarding 
citizenship laws, do you think they are fair in relation to the Russian community in Latvia?] See ibid. 
A fuller discussion of this survey is forthcoming in G. Smith (ed.) (1994b).
3 7For some other surveys on the citizenship question, see Kvemrdd (1993) op.cit.
3 ^ Aasland (1991).
39Only 22,000 Latvians - most of them so-called "Russian Latvians" whose (grand)parents lived in 
Russia during Latvian independence in the interwar period - are registered as "foreigners" or non­
citizens. See Table 5.5 (Chapter 5).
40Since I in this chapter focus on the views of ethnic Russians, there is the danger that some of the 
argumentation in this section may seem somewhat biased, as certain counterarguments (which are less 
frequently referred to by Russians) are not thoroughly presented. I would therefore like to stress that the 
overrepresentation of arguments in favour of more liberal citizenship legislation should not be seen as 
insensitivity of this author towards the concerns of ethnic Latvians. The most important arguments in 
favour of strict legislation on citizenship were, however, presented in Chapter 4.
4 ^ Tor a discussion of the restored state model and the new state model, see Brubaker (1992), op. cit. 
42Diena, 22 December 1992, p. 2.
43Brubaker, op. cit., p. 277.
44SM segodnya, 27 November 1991, p .3.
4 3Diena, 22 January 1993, p. 2.
4^Diena, 26 January 1993, p. 2.
47Seef .ex. Opponent, no. 4, 1992.
48Tsilevich, B. (1993b).
49The counterargument is that the persons would not be statesless, because Russia, as the legal 
successor state of the USSR, has guaranteed citizenship to all former USSR citizens who want i t  
50In this thesis I do not look in detail at evaluations by international experts of Latvian citizenship 
legislation, and it suffices here to say that such evaluations have been rather contradictory. Thus, 
participants in the citizenship debate with diametrically different views have been able to find support 
in their argumentation from various reports written by international experts and organisations. Kolst0
(1994) lists some of them.
51Tsilevich (1993), op.cit., p.9.
52See, for example, Russkii Put' , no. 9 (December 1991), p. 2.
53Diena, 25 January 1991 (prilozhenie).
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^There are three main reasons why Latvian politicians claim that this agreement does not bind them 
to adopt the "zero option" model for citizenship. Firstly, they claim that the statement which has been 
cited was qualified by the fourth article of the agreement where all people living in the territory of the 
signatory states are guaranteed "vybor grazhdanstva sog lasno  za k o n o d a te l's tvu  strany  
p ro zh iva n iya  (author's italics) i Dogovoru, zaklyuchennomu mezhdu [RSFSRJ i Latviiskoi 
Respublikoipo voprosam grazhdanstva." This has been interpreted as if Latvia is free to define its 
own citizenship legislation. In response, Russians argue that domestic law cannot modify the substance 
of the treaty commitment, but only regulate minor issues of procedure. Secondly, it has been argued 
that since die disputed article makes a reference to the USSR, a state which no longer exists, the 
agreement cannot have legal force. The counter-argument is that the USSR was not a party to the 
treaty, and this should therefore not influence the essence of the agreement. Thirdly, the treaty has not 
been ratified by the Russian parliament, and until it has been ratified by both parts, it cannot be said to 
have legal force. Fourthly, if it were to be ratified, there would still be the argument that the Supreme 
Council of Latvia was not a legitimate body of representation of the Latvian republic. See Kvemr0d, 
op.cit.; Kolst0 (1994), op. cit.
55The prime minister, Godmanis, for example was against citizens and non-citizens being treated 
differendy in the economic sphere. See SM segodnya, 4 September 1992, p. 1.
56Originally the Law on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Stateless Persons on the Terrirtory of 
Latvia was intended to concern only those persons who did not permanendy reside in Latvia at the 
moment of its adoption (June 1992). The resolution envisaged.a special law regarding permanent 
residents by December 1992, but no such law has been adopted as of yet.
57For more restrictions in the rights of citizens as listed by a Russian-language newspaper, the 
mouthpiece of the Equal Rights fraction in the Latvian parliament, Opponent, no. 7, October, 1992, 
p. 2. See also Russkii Put', no. 9, December, 1991, p. 2.
38See SM segondya , 4 September 1992, p. 1.
59See Russkii put' , no. 4. 1993, p. 4.
60For more on this, see Tsilevich (1993b).
6 ^ ee for example SM segodnya, 27 November 1991, p .3.
62This point has been argued for example by Abrams Klotskins, head of the Department of 
Journalism, Russian-language section, University of Riga, at the conference 'The New Russian 
Diaspora" in Lielupe, Latvia, 11-13 November, 1992.
63For a more thorough exposition of this argument, see SM segodnya, 9 May 1992, p . 1-2.
4^ibid.
65See Krickus (1993).
66 Interview with Abrams Klotskins in February 1993.
67Personal interview with representatives of the Russkaya Obshchina Latvii in Daugavpils, February 
1992.
68G. Smith (ed.) (1994b).
^Author's interview with Miroslav Mitrofanov, journalist in the Daugavpils newspaper Dinaburg and 
local politician, February 1993.
7°Diena, 2 March 1991, p. 1.
7 ^ or the June 1992 election results, see Bungs (1993) or Diena, 18 June 1993..
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8. Russian Organisational Life in Latvia
Although Russians in early 1994 made up more than 30 per cent of the 
population in Latvia, they did not have any representatives in the Latvian government. 
All ministers but one were ethnic Latvians, although Latvians made up only 57 per cent 
of the country's population according to data from the registration of the population of 
Latvia.1 Ethnic Latvians also dominated the new parliament, the Saeima, elected in 
June 1993 (only about 7 out of 100 deputies are non-Latvians) and in local 
government.2 Against this background one could argue that the interests of Russians 
and other minority ethnic groups after the elections to the Saeima were poorly 
represented.3
Despite poor representation of Russians in the most influential political 
positions in Latvia, there is still some political activity among the Russian population in 
Latvia. This chapter has two main aims. Firstly, it seeks to provide an overview of 
predominantly political organisations in Latvia in which Russians participate. Secondly, 
and closely interlinked with this, the chapter discusses what role ethnicity plays in the 
organisational life of Russians in Latvia. While carrying out research on these issues I 
have found that relatively few Russians are now taking an active part in organisations 
which are dominated by ethnic Latvians, or in organisations where the ethnic 
composition of the membership reflects the ethnic composition of the population as a 
whole. After the disintegration of the Popular Front, most organisations have become 
more monoethnic in character, or at least there is a division between organisations 
dominated by, respectively, Latvians and non-Latvians. The focus in this chapter will 
thus be on organisations which are dominated by Russians, or at least in which 
Russians play a prominent role. Other organisations will, with one important exception 
regarding the multi-ethnic "Latvian Support Foundation" of Janis Jurkans, be 
overlooked.4
Some of the organisations which will be discussed have a cultural profile, but 
most of them have at some point or other become involved in politics, whether this has 
been intentional or not. Purely cultural organisations are many in number, but most of 
them have a very low membership, and will therefore not be discussed in great detail. 
The same applies to the Orthodox and the Old Believers' Churches, which are both to 
be considered large Russian-dominated organisations; their influence is discussed 
elsewhere.
The first section of this chapter will deal with organisations which are no longer 
present on the political scene in Latvia, but which were important and very visible in the 
period leading up to the August 1991 coup. I am here first of all thinking of the 
Communist Party of Latvia (on the CPSU platform) and Interfront. Section two
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provides information about the spectrum of Russian or Russian-dominated 
organisations in Latvia as of the summer of 1993 (some of the organisations were 
prohibited in October 1993 due to alleged anti-constitutional activities), and there will 
also be some information about the level of support for some of these organisations 
among the respondents in the survey. There are different opinions among Russians in 
Latvia on whether there is a need for a "Russian" political party in Latvia, and the third 
section will refer to some of the arguments put forward in this debate. It will look more 
closely at the most recent attempt at founding such a party and the experiment of 
preparing a "Russian" electoral list for the 1993 elections to the Saeima. A few other 
political parties or movements which seem to have considerable appeal among Russians 
will also be presented and compared. Although the chapter will show that there is a 
large number of Russian-dominated organisations in Latvia, this should not 
overshadow the fact that the activity level among the Russian public is generally very 
low, and much lower than among their ethnic Latvian neighbours. I shall therefore 
conclude the chapter by presenting some of the major factors which may serve to. 
explain this lack of interest in cultural and political organisation.
8.1.  Soviet "Loyalist" Organisations
8 .1 .1 .  The Communist Party of Latvia
Developments in the Communist Party of Latvia were in many respects different 
from developments in the two other Baltic republics. While the majority of Communist 
Party members in Estonia and Lithuania came to support the independence cause and a 
split with the central party organisation, in Latvia the opposite was the case. In April 
1990 a minority (approximately 25,000 members) consisting predominantly of ethnic 
Latvians, broke off from the central organisation and formed the Independent 
Communist Party of Latvia, later to be renamed the Latvian Democratic Labour Party. 
The remaining majority (more than 100,000 members5), loyal to the central party 
structures in the USSR, was to become even more dominated by Russians and other 
Slavs than it had been before the split.6 This majority took control over the party 
apparatus and the property of the party. A significant number of ethnic Latvians 
remained in the party, however, such as the leader of the party, Alfreds Rubiks. The 
party, thus, never acquired the image of being a party only for ethnic Russians or the 
Russian-speaking population. Rather it became a mouthpiece for forces interested in the 
preservation of Soviet power in Latvia, forces which for reasons which have already 
been discussed tended to be of Slavic origin.
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With its developed organisational structure, financial resources, and links with 
the central party organisation in Moscow, the Communist Party of Latvia remained one 
of the most important bastions of Soviet power in the republic until the August 1991 
coup. The Communist Party claimed to support the interests of the Russian-speaking 
population, but many Russian-speaking observers argued that the party was more 
concerned with preserving Soviet structures which were in the interests of the party 
itself than the rights of the Russian-speaking population. It thus used the Russian 
question as a card whereby it could increase support from large segments of the 
population by trying to convince it that Russian rights would be protected only through 
the centre and the Soviet president .7
In a survey in May 1990, 4 per cent of ethnic Latvians and 35 per cent of 
Russians and other Slavs were reported to support the Communist Party of Latvia.8 
The Communist Party had received considerable support in the Supreme Council 
elections of 18 March 1990, and 59 of the 200 deputies remained Communist Party 
members when they were elected. In the parliament Communist Party deputies 
participated in the minority Ravnopravie (Equal Rights) faction (to be discussed in the 
last section), and although it considered the Supreme Council to be a democratically 
elected legislative body, it nevertheless took the view that the Supreme Council had 
passed discriminatory laws against minorities, and that much of its legislation violated 
Soviet law. One of the main goals thus became to defend, or renew, the Soviet 
Constitution in Latvia.9
The Communist Party took a very negative view of Latvian independence. It 
never recognised that the incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union had been in 
violation of international law. It was stated in Party documents as late as in July 1990 
that
(C)OHHaJIHCTHHeCKHH B bl6op  6oJIbIUHHCTBa JiaTbiiiiCKoro 
H a p o a a  JieTOM 1940 r o /ta  HMeji 3aKOHOMepHHH x a p a ic r e p , 
h bh jic h  pe3yjibTaTOM  M H o ro jiem eH  6 o p b 6 H  TpyztH iim xcH  
3 a  c b o h  co itH a jib H b ie  h  nojiH T H H ecK H e n p a B a . Mbi 
O T B epraeM  aH TH H ayqH bie, cnexyjiH T H B H K e TpaKTOBKH 
cob b iT H H  1940 r o f l a  b y r o a y  cenapaTH crcK H M , 
aHTHCOUHaJIHCTHMeCKHM CHJKLM.10
However, as the party gradually lost more and more support, it adopted 
programmes which to a greater extent reflected the general mood of reform in society 
and in the central party organisation in Moscow. It supported the idea of a "Latvia 
which is sovereign, governed by the rule of law and internationally recognised, but 
remaining a part of the USSR on the basis of a new Union Treaty".11 A decision about 
secession from the Soviet Union was not ruled out, at least not in theory, but the party 
believed it would have to take place through a referendum in which all inhabitants of 
Latvia should have the right to vote. The party emphasised that the most important
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principle was the protection of human rights, which would have priority over the 
interests of particular classes, nationalities or other social groups.12 Although the party 
acknowledged that the Latvian language should be the "state" language in Latvia, it 
advocated that the Russian language should also have the status of an official language. 
Students in Latvia should, according to the party programme, have the right to receive 
secondary and higher education in the Russian language.13
During the dramatic events in August 1991 the Central Committee of the Latvian 
Communist Party was one of six organisations in Latvia which sent out a leaflet to the 
population with a number of statements showing that it supported the attempted coup:
Hpe3BHMaftHoe nojio>KeHHe - 3 t o  He y r p o 3 a  cyB epeH H T eT y  
/laT B H H , a  n y T b  k cn p aB e/y iH B O C T H , c o r j ia c m o  h  
paBHonpaBHio B c e x  JiioaeH, H acejinioiuH X p e c n y b jm ic y . (...)
Mh npH3HBaeM Bcex k Bbmep^xe, cnoKoficTBy, 
cobjiiofleHHK) TpeboBaHHH 3axoHa o qpe3BwqaHHOM 
noJio)fceHHH!14
As a consequence, shortly after the coup failed the party was officially declared 
unconstitutional through a parliamentary decree.15
8 .1 .2 .  Interfront
An organisation which shared a political platform with the Communist Party on 
many issues was the International Workers' Front of the Latvian SSR, or "Interfront", 
which appeared on the Baltic political scene in the autumn of 1988. Its founding 
congress was held in Riga on 7-8 January 1989.16 Interfront leaders argued that there 
was a need for this organisation because the population wanted to take part in the 
perestroika process more actively. In addition, many Interfront spokesmen believed 
that the organisation should be a mouthpiece for the Russian-speaking population and a 
defender of their interests, since these interests were not, it was said, sufficiently 
protected through the policies of the Popular Front, the Supreme Council or the CPL.17
The CPL was thought by many Interfront activists to be too passive.18 Many of 
them wanted to see Interfront as a counterweight to the Popular Front of Latvia, which 
had been founded three months earlier.19 Although leaders stressed their support for 
perestroika, it was clear from the start that Interfront understood this concept very 
differently from the Popular Front. Issues on which the two movements had 
diametrically different views included the questions of the leading role of the 
Communist Party, the indivisibility of the Soviet Union and the defence of socialism in 
Latvia.20 Interfront spokesmen argued that the Popular Front movement represented a 
threat to the Russian-speaking population, because it was a movement for national 
(ethnic) awakening and national (ethnic) revenge.21
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Although the programmes of the CPL and Interfront were almost identical, CPL 
leaders nevertheless initially looked upon the formation of a separate political 
organisation with a certain degree of scepticism.22 Relations between the two 
organisations, however, improved after the CPL split in April 1990.23 To a large extent 
they also had an overlapping membership. The new party leader, Alfreds Rubiks, 
spoke of Interfront in much more positive terms than his predecessors had done, and he 
even suggested that the CPL and Interfront should form a bloc before the next elections 
to the Supreme Council. The CPL and Interfront cooperated on organising a number of 
demonstrations, and they often succeeded in mobilising rather large masses of people to 
come to protest against the threats against the Soviet constitution in Latvia. Most of the 
demonstrators were Russian speakers, which could be clearly seen from the language 
used on the banners.24
It has been claimed that Interfront opposed the idea that Latvian be made the 
state language of the republic.25 This may be true about some of the Interfront activists, 
but is not representative of the policy of the organisation, where in the statutes it was 
stated that
H d> (HHTepcJjpoHT) oflobpneT c ia iy c  JiaTHincKoro H3HKa 
KaK rocyaapcTBeHHoro 26
And in the words of a prominent Interfront spokesman, Belaichuk, in his speech at the 
founding congress:
M m  npH 3H aeM  npaBHJibHbiM  p eiu eH H e o  npH3HaHHH  
JiaTbHHCKOrO 5I3H K a rO C yaap C T B eH H M M  H3HKOM 
p ecn yb jiH K H . M m  c o n n a c H H  c TeM , m to  H eobxoflH M o  
nocTeneH H O , coxpaH H H  uyBCTBO paBHOBecroi, pacnm pH Tb  
c $ e p y  npHM eHeHHH J iaT H in cK oro  H3bnca b H arnefl 
p ecnybjiH K e 27
The organisation, however, did not approve of the way in which language policies 
were being implemented in Latvia. A common argument was that one could not expect 
people to know the Latvian language if they had never had the chance to learn it. It was 
consequently argued that much greater resources should be assigned to language 
instruction:
M b I ( . . . )  CHHTaeM, HTO H e o b x O f l H M O  COCpeflOTOHHTb 
OCHOBHMe CHJIH, OCHOBHbie aCCHTHOBaHHfl Ha 
npeno,qaB aH H H  J iH T ep aT yp H oro  JiaT H incK oro H3MKa b 
aeTCKHX c a a a x ,  b uiKOJiax, b B y3ax  h  texH H K yM ax.28
Interfront also strongly opposed any policy which sought to diminish the role of the 
Russian language in Latvia. Russian should, according to the Interfront programme, 
have the role of an official (but not necessarily state) language.
Certain groups of Russians were more inclined than others to be sympathetic to 
Interfront's programme and activities. Interfront often came out with criticism of the 
way in which the Soviet armed forces in Latvia were treated, and one of its main tasks
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soon became to improve the conditions for officers, war veterans and retired personnel 
from the armed forces, and their families. Interfront thus came to enjoy wide support 
among these groups. In addition, Interfront seemed to appeal to workers and managers 
in all-union industries, where the opposition against Latvian independence was 
particularly strong. All-union factories were also the centre of the United Council of 
Work Collectives (OSTK), which can be said to have been the "workers' arm" of 
Interfront and whose activities were directed against attempts to remove these all-union 
factories from the control of Moscow.29 OSTK had considerable support in these 
factories, but their attempts to organise political strikes were only minimally successful.
It is not easy to give an exact estimate of the degree of support Interfront 
enjoyed among Russians in Latvia. Such support seemed to fluctuate with political and 
economic developments in the republic, as well as with the activities of the organisation 
itself, and Interfront never had a stable membership. The Interfront leadership claimed 
more than 300,000 members and approximately 600,000 supporters in the spring of 
. 1989.39 This was undoubtedly an exaggeration, for many Russians had a wait-and-see 
attitude towards the organisation when it was founded. However, as Interfront came 
more and more to form an alliance with hard-line political groupings in the rest of the 
USSR, a large number of Russians gradually came to distance themselves from the 
organisation. Interfront's position during the January 1991 events in particular made 
many Russians take a much more sceptical view of Interfront.
Interfront did not fare too well in the March 1990 elections to the Supreme 
Council, when only one of its nominated candidates was elected a deputy. Public 
opinion polls nevertheless showed that the organisation enjoyed considerable support 
among non-Latvians. While only 3 per cent of the ethnic Latvian respondents said that 
they supported Interfront in a poll conducted in the spring of 1990, 30 per cent of non- 
Latvians reported support for the organisation. This was, however, less than the 
percentage supporting the Popular Front (34 per cent).31 One year later a similar 
opinion poll showed that Interfront still enjoyed less support than the Popular Front 
among Russians and other non-Latvians. Only 4 per cent of the ethnic Russian 
respondents said that they fully supported Interfront, while 23 per cent supported it 
generally. The corresponding percentages for the Popular Front were 5 and 37 per cent 
respectively.32
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8 .2 .  The Landscape of Russian-dominated Organisations in Latvia
8 .2 .1 .  The Russian Society in Latvia (ROL)
In November and December 1990 a series of articles was published in the 
Russian-language newspaper SM-segodnya to facilitate the formation of an interest 
organisation of Russians in Latvia; "Russians" meaning 'all those who regard 
themselves as such1.33 The author of the articles, Edgard Smekhov, who at the 
founding congress of ROL (Russkaya Obshchina Latvii) in March 1991 was elected 
the organisation's first president, argued that Russians were being manipulated by 
various political forces; there was, in his view, no doubt that there was a need for an 
organisation which would express the interests of Russians in Latvia. His question was 
whether it would be possible to find a basis for the organisation which would make it 
possible to unite the heterogeneous Russian population.
In Smekhov's view, this problem could not be solved through the formation of 
a Russian political party, since Russians, like all other nationalities, did not and never 
would share the same political platform; they would consequently join different political 
parties and blocs reflecting their political views and interests. Religion could not 
become a unifying force either, not only due to the fact that Russians belonged to 
several different confessions, or that many Russians had lost their religious belief, but 
also, as Smekhov saw it, because all religions were, per definition, international, and 
should not be used as a means of national unification. Moreover, Russian consolidation 
should not be sought through the idea of "cultural autonomy", according to Smekhov. 
A very small number of Russians had joined the existing cultural societies in Latvia, 
and Smekhov believed this was a result of the difficult psychological state that Russians 
were in at the present time:
ZlO KyJIbTypHHX JIH obllteCTB pyCCKHM B JlaTBHH B 
HaCTOfllltHH MOMeHT, eCJIH HH OflHH H3 HHX B nOJIHOH M epe  
He y B e p e H  b C B oeft b y a y m e n  c y a b b e ?  E c jih  jiio jih  
OKOHOMHHeCKH pa3flp o6jieH N  H pa306m eH H , eCJIH He 3HaiOT,
KTO OHH B JlaTBHH: TO JIH MHrpaHTW’, TO JIH OKKynaHTbT,
to  jih , n o  n o c jie z m e ft BepcHH, ’kojiohhctw ' 34
Smekhov's idea was therefore a unification of Russians according to another 
principle, which he described as the ability of Russians in hard times to forget about 
internal differences and consolidate themselves for the sake of a common goal:
3 t o  - c n o c o b H o c T b  o b b e a H H H T b c n  Ha n p H H m m a x  
B3aHMOnOMO!UH, 3TO - CObopHOCTb £JIH npHHTHH  
OTBeTCTBeHHHX peUieHHH B H H T ep ecaX  B c e x ,  3TO - 
apTeJIbHOCTb H oblltHHHOCTb. 3TO - oblUHHa.
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In his article, Smekhov stipulated what he thought should be the main principles of 
ROL, but he made it clear that ROL would be a democratic organisation, and would be 
open for suggestions from others.
Smekhov's initiative was well received by a number of Russians who did not 
see Interfront as a true representative of the Russian population in Latvia, but who still 
believed there was a need for a Russian organisation which dealt not only with the 
cultural demands of the Russian minority. At the founding congress in March 1991, the 
goals and organisational structure of ROL were defined in the ROL statutes.35 One of 
the main goals was to help ROL members to adapt to the dramatic socio-economic 
changes taking place in Latvian society, where, as the leader put it, 'Russians found 
themselves at the epicentre of the national awakening of another nation'.36 A number 
of ROL activities were suggested at this congress. The organisation was to be based on 
mutual help and support among its members, and membership fees would be regulated 
in accordance with the income of the members. It was further hoped that the 
organisation, would, become involved in business and receive income from such, 
activities, and ROL would also rely on Russian companies supporting the organisation. 
Another important part of the programme was to work for a spiritual and cultural- 
educational revival of the Russian nation, and in this connection ROL took the initiative 
to open a private university in Riga. This university, where the main language of tuition 
would be Russian, was to be sponsored by ROL and Russian business and would also, 
when possible, be financed through contributions from the students themselves and 
their parents.37
ROL soon opened offices in Riga, started to publish its own newspaper, 
Russkii Put\ and arranged a number of conferences and seminars with topics related 
to the Russian community in Latvia in the past and present. The organisation also had 
its own sociological section dealing with public opinion among the Russian population. 
However, it was soon to become clear that although ROL had more members than other 
Russian organisations in Latvia, it would never become so all-inclusive as some of the 
initiators had been hoping. According to some sceptics, ROL would not have the means 
required to support its members financially, and some were critical of the economic 
administration of the organisation 38 Moreover, although this was long hidden from the 
public, ROL suffered from serious tensions within its leadership and among its 
members.
Such tensions were openly expressed at the third conference of ROL in June 
1992, just over a year after the founding congress. There was considerable 
dissatisfaction with the style of the leadership, and especially with that of the president, 
Smekhov, who was thought to be too authoritarian.39 Without going into more detail 
about the reasons for the grievances, the conference ended up with ROL splitting up 
into two factions, both of which regarded themselves as representing the authentic ROL
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organisation. There can be no doubt that the crisis in ROL was a serious blow to the 
idea of a Russian interest organisation in Latvia, although both organisations have 
managed to continue some of their activities, and the newspaper Russkii Put’ was still 
being published.
Although ROL had its centre in Riga, ROL representatives from other regions in 
Latvia demanded more autonomy from the central organisation. In the Latgalian city of 
Daugavpils, for example, ROL took a more active part in local politics than in other 
Latvian regions, and after the split at the third conference ROL in Daugavpils sought 
more independence from Riga and became involved in forming a political opposition to 
the local government in the city.40 Some of the leaders of ROL in Daugavpils had been 
deputies in the dissolved Daugavpils city council, and there were also activists from 
Interfront and the Soviet-loyalist wing of the Communist Party.
Although ROL had been associated with pro-Soviet sympathies and activities, 
especially among certain Latvian politicians with a right-wing or nationalist political 
platform, the leading spokesmen in the organisation had always emphasised the 
importance of cooperation with the existing elected government bodies.41 There is 
strong reason to believe, however, that after Interfront had been forced off the political 
scene, some Interfront activists hoped to continue their political struggle from within 
ROL. The general mood in the organisation also became more pessimistic and 
confrontational during the autumn of 1991 and the spring of 1992, due to the lack of 
support for the organisation by the Latvian authorities and a turn to the right on 
questions of citizenship, language legislation, and so on 42
In our survey we asked the respondents about the degree of their support for 
four of the typical Russian organisations in Latvia (see Table 8.1 on the next page, 
which also includes the Russian support for other organisations and movements in 
Latvia). A larger percentage of respondents were able to express their view on ROL 
than was the case with the three other organisations to be discussed below. This 
seemed to confirm the general observation that most Russians in Latvia were at least 
somewhat familiar with the objectives and activities of ROL. ROL also received more 
media attention than other Russian organisations in Latvia, at least at the time when our 
survey was conducted. Nevertheless, 17 and 27 per cent of the respondents 
respectively did not answer this question or did not have an opinion about ROL.
If any one of the Russian organisations could claim to be representative of 
Russians in Latvia in the spring of 1992, that organisation was ROL, which enjoyed at 
least some degree of support from 45 per cent of the respondents in our survey. Only 
one in ten respondents either tended not to support ROL, or did not support the 
organisation at all.
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Table 8.1: Support for Organisations and Movements
Survey Question: To what extent to you support the activities of the following 
political parties, social organisations and movements?
Q\IIZ
Fully
support
(%)
Tend to 
support
(%)
Hard to 
say/no 
answer
(%)
Tend 
not to 
support
(%)
Do not 
support 
at all
(%)
Latvian Popular Front 1 3 35 21 40
Latvian Farmers' Union 2 9 68 7 14
Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK) 0 1 46 6 47
Latvian Democratic Workers' Party 2 6 62 8 22
Congress of Latvian Citizens' Committee 1 3 48 7 41
Club for Environmental Protection 14 17 48 4 17
Latvian Social Democratic Labour Party (LSDSP) 0 1 70 8 21
Latvian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) 0 2 71 7 20
Centre for a Democratic Initiative 6 13 67 2 12
Russian Community of Latvia (ROL) 23 23 44 1 9
. Balto-Slavic Society 8 20 57 4 11
Latvian Society for Russian Culture (LORK) 14 17 52 4 13
Latvian Association for a Rebirth of Russia (LAVR) 9 16 61 4 10
Source: "Russians in Latvia" survey, 1992.
ROL was more popular among Russians in urban than in rural areas, and the 
organisation enjoyed most support among Russians in Riga. An interesting feature is 
that manual workers tended to be less supportive of ROL than were specialists and 
professionals, and the more education a respondent had, the more likely s/he was to 
indicate support for ROL. Russians with a good knowledge of the Latvian language 
might have felt so secure in Latvia that they did not feel the same need for a Russian 
interest organisation; they tended to be less supportive of ROL than those with a poor 
language knowledge. Similarly, the organisation enjoyed more support from Russian 
immigrants than from Russians who had been bom in Latvia, and especially when 
compared with Russians whose family also came from Latvia.
8 .2 .2 .  The Latvian Society for Russian Culture (LORK)
One of the first new Russian organisations to be formed in Latvia in the wake of 
the Atmoda (awakening) process was the Latvian Society for Russian Culture 
(LORK). The organisation was founded on 4 March 1989. The organisation was, 
according to the statutes, open to anyone, independent of nationality, who valued 
Russian culture and the Russian language.43 One of the main principles of the 
organisation was not to confuse
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B03po>K fleH H e p y c c K o f t  HauHOHajibHOH K y jib T y p u  H 
p y c c K o r o  H a p o a a  c  npoTHBOfleficTBHeM  HauHOHajibHHM  
qa^HHHM a p y r n x  H apo/joB , b HacTHOcTH jiaTH incK oro.44
The organisation, thus, actively supported the Popular Front of Latvia and adopted the 
LFT programme as its political platform. For example, on many occasions it came out 
with open support for full political independence for Latvia.45 The main aims of the 
organisation were to develop Russian national identity and Russian spiritual culture, to 
organise Russian national schools, to defend human rights and to support charities.
LORK representatives always tended to emphasise that in order to coexist with 
the Latvians, Russians in Latvia would have to show respect for Latvian culture and 
traditions. As one of the most prominent LORK spokesmen, the writer Yurii Abyzov, 
put it,
Mbi cym ecT B yeM  b cneitH$HHecKHX ycjioBHHX, H a x o a n c b  b  
HHiu e  JiaT H incK oro H apo,zja. Beflb t o jib k o  JiaTbimcKHH 
H ap ofl x<HBeT 3 tfecb  Ha CBoefi h ck o h h o h  3eM Jie, b  CBoeft 
HCTOpHH, CO CBOHM H3WKOM, CO CBOHMH IiepCIieKTHBaMH.
Hama xyjibTypa 3a npeaejiaMH sto h  3eMJiH, TaM Haiim 
flcHan IlojiHHa, MorHJia /locroeBCKoro 46
The organisation mostly consisted of intellectuals, writers, publicists and academics, 
and it was often assumed that the organisation enjoyed only minor support from, for 
example, Russian manual workers.
There can be no doubt that it was LORK's association with the LFT which 
caused the most controversy among Latvian Russians. The Interfront newspaper 
Edinstvo soon published two articles which both contained fierce criticism of the 
political platform of the organisation 47 Neither did Interfront representatives approve 
of LORK's claim to represent the interests of the Russian population in Latvia. 'How 
can LORK, whose membership covers not more than 0.03 per cent of the Russian 
population in Latvia, claim to represent the interests of Russians better than does 
Interfront, which has a membership of 300,000 and 600,000 supporters?', they asked. 
LORK's support of LFT language policies was also attacked in the same articles:
K ax M oxceT 710PK Ha3biBaTb c e 6 n  o6m ecTBO M  p y c c K o fi  
K yjib T yp w , ecjiH  BH CTynaeT npoTHB p y c c x o r o  H 3bixa b 
/ laTBHH?48
Despite many critical articles about LORK in some of the Latvian Russian- 
language newspapers, according to our survey more Russians seemed to be ignorant 
about the organisation than actually opposed to it. As can be seen from Table 8.1, when 
asked to indicate the degree of support for LORK, more than half the respondents in the 
survey either skipped the question or indicated that they found it too difficult to answer. 
Only 16 per cent were inclined not to support LORK, while 31 per cent either fully 
supported or tended to support the organisation. Thus, although LORK could not claim
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to represent all Russians living in Latvia, the organisation was at least supported by a 
greater share of the Russian population than indicated by their membership figures.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, LORK did not enjoy much stronger support 
among Russians with higher education, and neither was there a significant correlation 
between the level of language fluency and the degree of support for the organisation. 
LORK had about the same proportion of supporters among manual workers as among 
professionals. Females, however, tended to be more supportive of LORK than males. 
There was also significant regional variance, with Russians in Riga and other large 
cities (except in Latgale) being most inclined at least to express an opinion on the 
organisation; Russians there also tended to give a more negative evaluation of LORK 
than did Russians in other Latvian settlements. Russians from a mixed Latvian-Russian 
family background were also more likely than others to express their opinion about the 
organisation; taking into account LORK's emphasis on respect for Latvian culture and 
traditions, these Russians were naturally more likely to support LORK than Russians 
from an ethnically homogeneous Russian family.
8 .2 .3 .  The Latvian Association for the Revival of Russia (LAVR)
A nother Russian organisation in Latvia Latviiskaya Assotsiatsiya 
Vozrozhdeniyu Rossii (LAVR) was quite different from the Russian organisations in 
Latvia described above in that its activities were concentrated not so much on how to 
improve the conditions for Russians living in Latvia as on how Russians in Latvia 
could contribute to a revival of Russia itself.49 However, LAVR spokesmen also saw 
the fate of Russians in Latvia as contingent upon a successful solution to the question 
of the Russians living in Russia. The background to the formation of LAVR was that 
some Russians in Latvia had found the state of Russia after 70 years of communist rule 
devastating. Thus, in November 1989 they resolved to form an organisation which 
would contribute to the revival of Russia, the rodina (motherland), so that it could 
regain its former strength. Solzhenitsyn's pamphlet Kak Nam Obustroit' Rossiyu 
(How to Rebuild Russia) served as a model for how to rebuild the Russian state. 
According to V. Tikhomirov, the president of LAVR,
h c t h h h o  pyccKHH, (...) icyaa 6 h  h h  3a6pacMBajia e r o  
cyflbba, h o c h t  P o c c h io  b cepaue, TafiHO CTpaaan 3a e e  
cyabby h, npn nepBOH b o 3 m o > k h o c th ( cnocobcTByn e e  
BH3£OpOBJieHHK) .50
LAVR spokesmen thus criticised ROL for a lack of interest in Russia's fate. 
One example which was mentioned were the January 1991 events. According to LAVR 
spokesmen, ROL should then have come out in open support of Latvian independence, 
but they kept silent. Another incident was in February/March the same year, when
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LAVR openly supported El'tsin in his struggle against 'reactionary forces' in Moscow, 
while ROL allegedly did not take a stance. Although LAVR was primarily a non­
political organisation,
eCTb B  HCTOpHH MOMeHTbl, K O rfla JIHIUb COBeCTb £OJDKHa 
o n p e ^ e j iH T b  T B o e  n o B ez te H H e , K o r ^ a  CM OJinaTb - s t o  
TO)fCe II03fflJHfl 51
ROL was therefore thought by many LAVR activists to be an Interfront-inspired 
organisation, although of a more 'mature' kind.
In line with LAVR objectives, the organisation actively offered assistance to 
Russians who wanted to move to Russia.52 LAVR was particularly involved with some 
projects which aimed at resettling Russians from Latvia in Russian rural districts.53 Its 
spokesmen argued against the opinion that Latvian Russians, who tended to be city- 
dwellers, would not be able to settle in the Russian countryside.54 They could provide 
many examples of families who belonged to the Russian urban intelligentsia who had 
settled successfully in the district of Novgorod.55
One of the main aims of LAVR was thus to work for a mechanism whereby 
people who, of their own will, had decided to move from Latvia to Russia would be 
supported socially, materially, and technically. One idea as to how to arrange this was 
to create an exchange of Russians who wanted to move to Russia with Latvians who 
wanted to live in Latvia. On many occasions the organisation was accused of running 
errands for Latvian nationalists, since it had supposedly given in to pressure and 
provided help to those who wanted a Russian exodus from Latvia.56 LAVR activities 
were not, however, confined to supporting Russians who wanted to leave Latvia. The 
organisation also promoted a cultural programme with emphasis on a revival of Russian 
cultural traditions in Latvia.
LAVR has never enjoyed a very large membership among Russians in Latvia, 
and interviews with Russians seemed to indicate that many of them had hardly heard of 
LAVR or its activities. This was confirmed by our survey, where LAVR was one of the 
four Russian organisations of which we asked for an evaluation. Almost one quarter of 
the respondents did not answer this question, while 38 per cent indicated that it was 
difficult to answer it (see Table 8.1). However, of those who had an opinion about 
LAVR, more respondents were supportive of the organisation than were not. There 
were 23 per cent who fully supported LAVR, 41 per cent tended to support it, while 
respectively 10 and 26 per cent either tended not to support, or did not support the 
organisation at all. Russians in the capital were not only more likely to have an opinion 
on LAVR, but they were also more positive than other Russians in their evaluation of 
the organisation. This again probably had to do with the fact that this organisation too 
had its centre in Riga, and that its activities had been focused upon more often there 
than in other parts of the country.
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More than half the respondents who came from an ethnically mixed family 
background found it difficult to answer this question. The same was true of Russians 
with a fluent or good command of the Latvian language. To them the question of the 
revival of Russia did not seem to be a priority. These groups of Russians were 
nevertheless not much more negative than others in their evaluation of LAVR. The most 
negative evaluation of LAVR came from Russians who were bom in Latvia, and 
whose parents also had been born there, while Russians who were born in other 
republics, notably Russia, but had arrived in Latvia more than 15 years ago were the 
most positive. To the latter the state of Russia and Russian culture seemed to be a much 
more acute problem than to Russians who had never lived in Russia.
8 .2 .4 .  Other Organisations and Movements
All the organisations which have been discussed above have in some way or 
another become involved in politics, whether this was one of the main objectives of the 
organisations or not. There are, however, also a number of Russian organisations, 
predominantly of a cultural kind, which stress their apolitical nature. One of these is 
Balto-Slavyanskoe Obshchestvo (Balto-Slavic Society - BSO), an organisation which 
was founded in the summer of 1988 and set itself the task of reviving the cultural 
heritage and national pride of the Russian people in Latvia, of helping those who had 
settled in the republic recently to adapt themselves to its conditions, and to promote 
mutual enrichment of cultures of all the nationalities living in Latvia.57 The organisation 
has, however, not avoided controversies and different opinions among members about 
the activities on which BSO should concentrate and about whether or not to take a 
stance on political issues.58 Moreover, although the organisation was meant to keep 
away from politics, there were members of the organisation who, without speaking in 
BSO's name, openly criticised the policies of the Latvian government. This made many 
Latvian politicians suspicious about the organisation, and BSO (like ROL) had, 
allegedly, even been accused by the Latvian minister of defence of being a base for 
anticonstitutional activities.59
BSO was supported by 28 per cent of the respondents in our survey, whereas 
15 per cent did not support it. The rest of the respondents either did not answer this 
question (23 per cent) or did not have an opinion about BSO (34 per cent). This 
indicates the same lack of interest in, or familiarity with, BSO among Russians as was 
the case with most of the other Russian-dominated organisations which were discussed 
above.
One should also take into consideration the local variations characterising the 
landscape of Russian organisations. For example, Balto-Slavyanskoe Obshchestvo in
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Daugavpils was completely different from BSO with headquarters in Riga. In 
Daugavpils BSO was the name of an organisation which was founded in the winter of 
1991 with the aim of acting as a counterweight to Interfront and other Soviet-1 oyalist 
forces in the city; the initiators wanted to show the Latvians that there were many 
Russians in Daugavpils who supported the Popular Front and the idea of Latvian 
independence. However, in an interview in February 1993, Lyudmila Koroleva, the 
head of BSO in Daugavpils, told the present author that the organisation could now 
proceed to concentrate first of all on cultural issues, as the political struggle for 
independence was ended.60 While both ROL and BSO in Daugavpils took an active 
part in the political life of the city there was also a third "Russian" organisation there, 
Rusichi, which did not want to become involved in politics and was engaged mainly in 
cultural activities.61
While there was a number of other, usually locally based, Russian 
organisations with a predominantly cultural profile (one of the most significant was 
Rizhskaya Russkaya Obshchina (The Russian Community in Riga), there were also a 
few other organisations which, although numerically rather small, should be mentioned 
because of their special character. One of these organisations, which was briefly 
referred to in the previous chapter, is Assotsiatsiya Rossiiskikh Grazhdan Latvii (the 
Association of Russian Citizens of Latvia), which was founded in January 1992 in 
order to defend the interests of those who decided to become citizens of Russia.62 To 
become a Russian citizen while remaining in Latvia was seen by many as more 
attractive than going through the process of becoming a citizen of Latvia. As an 
observer in SM-segodnya put it:
He BblCHHTWBaHTe, CKOJIbKO JieT hjih MecHueB BaM 
ocTajiocb jxo Hejienoro 16-JieTHero ueH3a, He KoimTe 
aeHer Ha b3htkh h3wkobhm h npoqHM komhcchhm, He 
jie6e3HTe, He 3aHCKHBaHTe. CraHOBHTecb rpa>KflaHaMH 
Pocchh (hjih YKpaHHbi, hjih EejiapycH) h He OTpeicaHTecb 
o t  npoKJiHHaeMoro Tyr cJiaBHHCKoro pojiy-iuieMeHH 63
It was thought that Russian citizens in Latvia would need an organisation which could 
defend their political and economic interests vis-a-vis the Latvian and Russian 
authorities. The organisation was highly critical of the Latvian government and initiated 
actions of non-violent protest which aroused negative reactions in the Latvian-language 
press.64
There were also organisations with a clearer pro-communist, or rather pro- 
Soviet, profile. Two of them deserve to be mentioned here, as they were quite often 
referred to in the Latvian mass media. The Union of Communists (Soyuz 
Kommunistov) and the Society for the Protection of the Rights of War Veterans 
(Obshchestvo Zashchity Prav Veteranov) were more or less identical in terms of 
programmes and activities, and I shall not differentiate here between the two.
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Information about the two organisations is rather scarce. They worked for a renewal of 
the Soviet Union and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. When the Communist Party 
of Latvia and related pro-Soviet organisations had to bring their activities to an end after 
the August 1991 coup, the two organisations in question continued to work for the 
same goals. Since most of the former communists realised that their time was up, most 
of them disappeared from the Latvian political scene. However, a few of the most 
astute spokesmen for the Soviet cause continued to be politically active, and they were 
most often people who had little to lose by doing so. According to one source, both 
organisations consisted for the great part of veterans from the Second World War and 
retired officers.65 These people had lost many of their former privileges, and their 
future in Latvia looked rather bleak. However, both of the organisations seemed to 
enjoy very little support among the larger segments of the Russian population, 
particularly among the youth.
In connection with the October 1993 events in Moscow, the Latvian authorities 
claimed that the two organisations, above, as well as the Assotsiatsiya Rossiiskikh 
Grazhdan Latvii, had discredited themselves by organising anti-constitutional 
activities. At a press conference the Latvian minister of the interior, Qirts Valdis 
Kristovskis, referred to 22 occasions during the preceding six months when these 
organisations had allegedly been pursuing activities directed against the Latvian state by 
openly calling for actions aimed at renewing the old communist system and the Soviet 
Union. They were also said to maintain close links with ultra-nationalist forces in 
Russia, whose main goal was to restore the Soviet empire. On these grounds the three 
organisations were prohibited.66 Members of the three organisations reacted with 
astonishment and fury to this decision. The leader of the Society for the Protection of 
the Rights of War Veterans, Al'bert Lebedev, characterised it as a serious provocation 
and asserted that his organisation had not committed any criminal offence. "Or can they 
not allow us to express our views?", he asked rhetorically.67
Grazhdanskoe Soglasie (Civil Accord, GS) was a completely different type of 
organisation which consisted of people of different nationalities, although Slavs 
predominated. As the name of the organisation indicates, GS sought first of all to 
promote ethnic harmony and the formation of a civil society in Latvia. A majority of the 
activists were intellectuals - journalists, scientists and politicians - and they were very 
active in public debates in Latvia, although usually in an individual capacity. However, 
on some occasions the group published joint statements on what it regarded as 
particularly important issues.68 GS was, for example, strongly in favour of the zero- 
option solution to the question of citizenship, and believed the citizen/non-citizen 
differentiation to be artificial. Although the group was one of the most consistent 
defenders of the rights of non-citizens in Latvia, and sought to internationalise the
230
CHAPTER 8
whole issue, it did not enjoy much support in leading political circles, and was also not 
very well known among the Russian public in general.69
8.3 .  "Russian" Political Parties in Latvia?
As seen in Chapter 2, during the Latvian independence period all the larger 
ethnic minorities had one or more political parties to represent their interests in the 
Saeima. Thus, the Russians were represented by 5 different political parties, which all 
had deputies in the Latvian parliament. Not all Russians voted for these so-called 
"Russian parties", however, and many Russians, in particular supported the Latvian 
social democrats. Over the last few years there have been several attempts at forming 
"Russian" parties in Latvia.70 I shall concentrate here on the last and most serious 
attempt, the foundation of the Baltic Constitutional Party (Baltiiskaya Konstitutsionnaya 
Partiya, BKP, more commonly known as the "Russian Party"), which was founded in 
the autumn of 1992.71 In the June 1993 elections to the new Saeima this party and the 
Party of the Centre for a Democratic Initiative (Partiya Tsentr Demokraticheskoi 
Initsiativy, PTsDI) joined forces and formed a common electoral list, called the 
"Russian National Democratic list" or the "Russian list". However, the party is not 
represented in the Saeima, since the list received well below the minimum 4 per cent of 
the total votes necessary for the candidates to be eligible for a seat in the parliament.72 
There are divergent views on the question of whether there is a need for a Russian party 
in Latvia, and this section will examine some of the main arguments which have been 
put forward from both sides in this debate. The reasons why the Russian list was not 
more successful in the 1993 elections will then be discussed, and in this connection it 
can also be useful to look at some other political organisations which are likely to have 
received a larger share of Russian votes.
The idea of creating the "Russian Party" came from one of the journalists on the 
Russian-language newspaper SM-segodnya, Andrei Vorontsov. In two articles in 
September 1992 he outlined the main reasons why he thought there was a need for a 
Russian Party and explained how he envisaged the programme and functions of such a 
party 73 When Vorontsov talked about a Russian party, he did not have in mind a party 
where membership would be reserved for ethnic Russians:
ZIjih  MeHH «pyccKafl napTHH» - o to  noHHTHe, 
onpeflejiniomee t o t  odbeflHHHiomHH CTep>tceHb, kotopmh 
MO)fceT cnjiOTHTb HejiaTbimeft Ha co3,qaHHe cHJibHofi 
nojiHTHHecKOH opraHH3auHH, Bbipa>KaK)meH hx HHTepecw.
According to Vorontsov, all existing political parties in Latvia, regardless of their 
slogans and political programmes, were in effect mono-ethnic (Latvian).
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The creation of a Russian Party was seen as a necessary response to the 
ethnocentrism characteristic of Latvian politicians and as the only possible way to 
defend the interests of non-Latvians who after the August 1991 coup found themselves 
without political protection. Vorontsov thought it to be particularly important to protect 
those who were not citizens, or direct descendants of citizens, of Latvia before 1940, 
who not only confronted the threat of not becoming citizens in the future, but who 
according to Latvian legislation were also likely to lose out in the important first phase 
of the privatisation process. According to Vorontsov, the non-Latvian population 
should take control over its own fate and stop believing that Russia, the West or 
Latvian democrats would come to their rescue.74
The fear that the formation of a "Russian Party" would split the population of 
Latvia into two halves was seen as irrelevant by Vorontsov. Such a split had already 
taken place, in his view, and he blamed organisations such as the Popular Front and the 
LNNK and their politicians in the parliament for this:
UpHHHM aeM bie cerotfHH 3aKOHN n p o B O ^ H T . M e > K y ......................
HauHOHajibHoro pa3jiejieHHfl no c a M O M y  cepnny 
JIaTBHH.75
Despite the efforts of Latvian politicians to give another impression, Latvian politics 
and political parties had in effect become mono-ethnic, in Vorontsov's opinion. He 
nevertheless emphasised that the Russian party should operate within the framework of 
Latvian legislation and the Latvian constitution. Vorontsov also distanced himself from 
the idea that the Russian party would become a mouthpiece of Russian chauvinism:
K oraa r  imury c jio b o  «pyccK aH  napTHH», r  HMeio b Bmry 
He HeKyio opraHH3aiiHio, Bbicrynaiom yio 3a n p ecjioB yT yio  
p y c c K y io  H fleio  h j ih  a o b H B a io m y io c H  KaKHX-TO 
IHOBHHHCTHHeCKHX IjeJieH 76
Instead of using the word "Russian" in the name of the party, Vorontsov 
thought that the name should reflect one of the main aims of the party; to work for a 
new Latvian constitution reflecting the situation in the 1990s. Moreover, a united Baltic 
in a united Europe was believed to be in the interests of the non-indigenous population 
of the Baltic states, and the party would seek to speed up the integration of the three 
Baltic states; hence the name of the party: the Baltic Constitutional Party. However, 
Vorontsov left no doubt that the party was in effect a party for Russians:
BceM HaM cjie^yeT npe^zte Bcero noMHHTb o to m , h t o  
MH npHHaflJie>KHM K OflHOH oblllHHe - C OflHHaKOBHMH 
npobjieMaMH, 6eaaMH h TpedoBaHHHMH. (. . .) PyccKan 
obmHHa flOJDKHa omyTHTb ce6fl ch jio h  77
Vorontsov had quite clear ideas about how Russians should behave in the 
difficult situation in which they now found themselves. One of the slogans he 
advocated was "loyalty in return for rights" (loyal'nost' v obmen na prava). As long as
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Russians were given the same political and economic opportunities as the indigenous 
population, they should, in Vorontsov's opinion, be loyal towards a democratic Latvian 
state and obey its laws. However, if they were treated unfairly, as second-class 
citizens, Russians should use all possible legal means to express their disloyalty 
towards such a nationalist authoritarian regime. Possible methods of expressing such 
disloyalty could include various forms of political protests, strikes and demonstrations, 
the export of capital out of the state, and so on. The strongest way of expressing 
disloyalty towards the regime would, according to Vorontsov, be to take the citizenship 
of a neighbouring state. This would cause instability in Latvia and could even threaten 
its independence.78
According to Mikhail Gavrilov, leader of PTsDI, by the winter of 1993 the 
consolidation of the Russian part of the population had only just begun. In his opinion, 
it had started
K a x  p a 3  n oT O M y, h t o  J iaT bin icK afl obm H H a x a x  6bi 
BbrrecHHJia H ejiaTbm ieft H3 c B o e f i c p e f lb i79
Gavrilov hoped that Russians would vote for "their" parties, but he thought that taking 
into account the heterogeneous character of the Russian population, and particularly of 
the relatively small group of Russian citizens who would be able to vote in the 
elections, it would be better to have at least two "Russian" electoral lists. In this way 
Russians could reach the goal of 20 of "their own" deputies in the Saeima, he believed, 
implying that these deputies would cooperate on questions vital for the Russian 
population.
There were also spokesmen for the Russophone population who did not 
support the idea of a "Russian party".80 One of the most active critics of this idea was 
the self-proclaimed "cosmopolitan" intellectual and journalist Boris Tsilevich. 
According to Tsilevich,
(...) TaKOH m ar 03H anaeT  n ojiH yio  K anH Tyjm m uo, npuHHTHe 
H aB H 3N B aeM b ix  HaM npaB H Ji n r p w , c o r j i a c H e  c 
HaimoHajiHCTHHecKOH KOHitenitHeft paaH K ajioB, c TeM, h t o  
HMeHHo STHHHecKoe n p o H c x o K fle m te  h b j ih c t c h  rjiaBHOH 
6a30H  o6T>ez(HHeHHH 81
Thus, Tsilevich did not believe that the formation of a "Russian party" was a 
constructive idea. He feared a situation where a candidate's ethnicity, and not his/her 
professional or moral qualities, would become the decisive factor when people made up 
their minds about whom to vote for. Moreover, in Tsilevich's view one should rather 
fight for general human rights for all nationalities than for the rights of one particular 
ethnic group. Tsilevich argued that the formation of a strong Russian party would show 
that Russians had accepted the ethnic division of society and that their main concern had 
now become to make their own position in this society a little more comfortable. This 
could, he feared, deepen the tendencies to apartheid in Latvian society.
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Similar arguments were put forward by an observer in the Russian-language 
newspaper Baltiiskayagazeta when it was clear that the BKP and PTsDI had decided 
to form a joint electoral list, "the Russian National Democratic list", for the 1993 
elections to the Latvian Saeima. 82 Zalman Kats characterised this decision as a blind 
alley. He acknowledged that it was hard to be a Russian speaker in Latvia. However, 
Russian speakers were in fact very different people, belonging to different ethnic 
groups, and with different religions and ideological outlooks, and Kats believed that 
forming a political block for the Russian-speaking population was a step in the direction 
of creating a bi-communal society (dvukhobshchinnoe obshchestvo), which all people 
in Latvia should seek to avoid. Kats, thus, did not believe in the idea that "together we 
are a force":
K t o  - BMede? H npoTHB Koro BMecie? H, HaKOHeu, 
rjiaBHoe: 3a h t o  mh - pyccKOH3HHHHe - BMecTe? 3a 
noBTopeHHe o iu h 6 o k  HapoaHoro (JjpoHTa, HbmeuiHero 
CefiMa h  b y z r y m H x  npaBo-HaimoHaJibHbix 6 j io k o b ?83
The Russian list received only just over 1 per cent of the votes in the elections to 
the Saeima in June 1993, and since Russians and other non-Latvians were estimated to 
constitute about a third of the voters in the elections, this means that the Russian list 
must have received below 5 per cent of Russian votes. There are several possible 
reasons why the Russian list performed so poorly.84 Firstly, it can be seen as an 
indication that Russians did not approve of the idea that non-Latvians necessarily had 
the same interests, problems and demands. Few Russians seemed to believe that 
Russians should vote for one particular party merely or largely because of their ethnic 
affiliation. As such the election results were a victory for those who had argued against 
political organisations based on ethnic principles. It was made clear that Russians and 
other non-Latvians did not share the same political outlooks and economic interests, 
and this was also reflected in their voting behaviour.
Secondly, the Russian list may have received less votes because most of its 
front-line figures were non-citizens who were thus unable to stand for election. The 
Russian list contained very few candidates who were well known to the public, and the 
leaders of the coalition themselves admitted that this was a severe problem.85 Oleg 
Vovk, one of the leaders of the PTsDI, thought that this problem could be solved if the 
more experienced and well-known leaders asked their supporters to vote for the 
Russian list, and thereby serve as a form of political guarantors.86 However, in Latvia, 
as is also the case in many of the other post-Soviet states, people have a tendency to 
vote for names rather than political programmes, and since the Russian list contained 
very few names familiar to the electorate, many voters seem to have had doubts about 
whether the candidates on the list would have the necessary competence and experience
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to be an effective deputy in the Saeima. Many thought it safer to vote for better-known 
candidates on other lists.
Thirdly, one cannot exclude the possibility that the results would have been 
more promising, seen from the perspective of the "Russian list”, had non-citizens been 
allowed to participate in the elections. Our survey results show that non-citizens tended 
to take a more confrontational position towards Latvian policies and the leading political 
forces in the country, and the "Russian list” had a programme emphasising the rights of 
this group of people. It is therefore possible that the "Russian list" would have had 
more appeal to non-citizens than to citizens. There were, however, other political forces 
which were also very critical to policies conducted by the Latvian leadership. It could 
well be that Russian non-citizens, had they had the right to vote, would also have been 
reluctant to give their vote to parties or movements which saw themselves first of all as 
defenders of the interests of particular ethnic groups.
Although very few Russians voted for the Russian list, their voting behaviour is 
likely to have been very different from that of Latvian voters. There are two lists in 
particular which seem to have received the overwhelming majority of Russian votes. 
Although their candidates, in contrast to those on the Russian list, emphasised that they 
would work for the interests of all people in Latvia regardless of their ethnicity, the 
focus in their electoral campaigns was directed at issues which tended to be of greater 
concern to the non-Latvian part of the population. This was particularly the case with 
the movementRavnopravie (Equal Rights).87
Ravnopravie was well known to the whole population of Latvia, since it had 
been one of the factions of the Supreme Council in the period leading up to Latvian 
independence and also after independence had been gained.88 Many of its spokesmen 
were former members of the Communist Party of Latvia (including its notorious leader, 
Alfreds Rubiks), whereas others had joined the movement at a later stage and were not 
to the same extent compromised by their communist past. The movement did not enjoy 
much support among ethnic Latvians, in particular because it had opposed the idea of 
Latvian independence 89 To many Russians and other Russophone people, however, 
Ravnopravie was considered the firmest and most consistent defender of their rights. 
On the citizenship issue Ravnopravie was a strong advocate of the "zero option", and it 
emphasised the problems faced by a non-Latvian registering as a resident or citizen of 
Latvia90 Ravnopravie was also concerned with the language issue and the problems 
faced by people who did not know the Latvian language, for example concerning job 
security. As part of their programme they therefore recommended that language courses 
should be organised and financed by the authorities.91
Although Ravnopravie did not see itself as the representative of any particular 
ethnic group, it did not overlook the relevance of ethnicity in Latvian politics. In one of 
the declarations of the movement it was claimed that state-building processes in Latvia
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had been carried out in a way such as to strengthen the privileged position of the 
indigenous population:
3 a  n o c j ie f lH H e  flB a  r o a a  BC (B epxoB H H H  C o b c t )  h  
npaBHTe;ibCTBo c /te jia jiH  B ee  B03M oxcH oe co3,aaH H fl 
noom pniom H X  peoM H rpam no HeBHHOCHMbix ycjioBHH >*ch3hh 
Win H exop eH H oro HaceJieHHH JlaTBHH 92
The division between citizens and non-citizens was also explained in ethnic terms, as a 
way of putting psychological pressure on non-Latvians to leave the country as well as 
preventing them from taking part in the elections to the Saeima. Ravnopravie believed 
that confidence in the future of all national groups in Latvia could not be established 
without pursuing policies of national concord; such policies were seen as the only way 
of solving the national question in Latvia.93
The second political movement which enjoyed substantial support among 
Russian voters was the Latvian Support Foundation (Latvijas Atbalstu Fonds), which 
was founded in November 1992 by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janis 
Jurkans; The foundation, which also went under the name of "Jurkans's Foundation”, 
was set up as a charity which would sponsor specific projects aimed at solving some of 
the major problems of the country.94 Its financial means were to come from various 
firms in Latvia which were sympathetic to the activities of the foundation. The greater 
part of these firms were owned by non-Latvians.
In January 1993 it became clear that Jurkans intended to run for the elections to 
the Saeima and that his foundation would draft a political programme and present a list 
of candidates. The list was called "Concord for Latvia - Rebirth for the Economy” 
(SaskanaLatvijai-atdzimSanatautsaimniecibai), and its programme seemed to appeal 
first of all to non-Latvian voters. The main slogan of the movement was "Food, 
Heating and Security for Every Inhabitant of Latvia"95, and although the movement 
was in favour of a restoration of the interwar Republic of Latvia, it advocated inclusive 
citizenship legislation and harmony among the various nationalities living in the 
republic. The group was in a much better financial position than BKP, PTsDI and 
Ravnopravie, supported as it was by donations from prosperous Latvian firms. The 
connection between the foundation and Latvian business was a factor which was also 
exploited by other groups when they were trying to persuade the electorate that their 
position was more independent, as they were not involved in financial speculations. 
However, Jurkans and his companions did not make any secret of the firms from 
which the foundation had received financial support.96
While the Russian National Democratic List received only an insignificant share 
of the votes in the June 1993 elections, both Ravnopravie and "Concord for Latvia" 
fared much better. Ravnopravie won 7 seats (out of 100) in the Saeima, and "Concord 
for Latvia" won 13, with respectively 6 and 12 per cent of the votes.97 The election
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results also showed great regional differences. In Latgale, where a larger proportion of 
the population is Russian, the "Russian list" obtained almost 3 per cent, Ravnopravie 
16 per cent, and "Concord for Latvia" 23 per cent of votes cast.98
The turnout of about 90 per cent must be considered to be remarkably high.99 It 
implies that a clear majority of Russian citizens took part in the elections. The election 
results further indicate that although a considerable share of the Russian electorate gave 
their vote to Ravnopravie, the "Concord for Latvia" list most probably received a much 
larger share of Russian votes. The political past of Ravnopravie prevented many 
Russians, and also those who in principle agreed with the new programme of the 
movement, from voting for the list. Politicians from Ravnopravie who had not only 
opposed Latvian independence, but also supported the military intervention in January 
1991 and even the August 1991 coup, still occupied leading positions in the movement, 
and were not seen as trustworthy by many. This discredited the movement in the eyes 
of many Russians with more liberal attitudes. There are, however, strong reasons to 
suggest that Ravnopravie would have obtained a greater proportion of Russian votes 
had non-citizens enjoyed the right to vote in the elections. Russian non-citizens, as a 
rule, were more likely to identify with the Soviet past and less inclined to see Latvian 
independence as a goal than were the better integrated citizens. To many non-citizens 
the most important thing was that Ravnopravie was, like the Communist Party earlier, 
seen as the most consistent and uncompromised defender of the rights of the Russian- 
speaking population.
If Jurkans's foundation enjoyed more support, this can partly be explained by 
the personal authority and popularity of the leader himself, particularly among non- 
Latvians. In his capacity as Latvia's minister of foreign affairs, Jurkans had advocated 
a more lenient citizenship law and worked for the normalisation of bilateral relations 
with Russia. This cost him his place in the government, but increased his popularity 
among Latvian Russians. There were also many Russians who hoped that the fact that 
his foundation received support from some of the most prosperous businesses in Latvia 
was an indication that Jurkans actually could achieve something in the economic 
sphere, which seemed to be the greatest concern for the majority of Russians. 
Moreover, there were many Russians, and also Latvians, to whom the appeals for 
ethnic harmony and a civil society found resonance. These people also tended to be 
sympathetic to the fact that "Concord for Latvia", to a greater extent than other electoral 
lists, contained Latvian and non-Latvian names in approximately equal numbers. On the 
other hand, there were also Russians who had become sceptical about judgements of 
liberal Russian and other non-Latvian politicians (Jurkans himself is an ethnic Pole) 
who stood at the centre of the struggle for independence. Many thought that these 
Popular Front activists had been much too optimistic about what the future in an 
independent Latvia would bring for the non-Latvian population, and would not give
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them their vote once again.100 However, as the election results show, such sentiments 
cannot have been too widespread, at least among Russian citizens.
8.4 .  Conclusions
While clearly there is a high level of discontent amongst the Russian population 
in Latvia, some of which is directed against the citizenship legislation, this is not 
translated into organised political opposition. In this regard the large number of social 
organisations with a predominantly Russian or Slavic membership in Latvia gives a 
misleading impression of the activity level of the Russian population in the country. As 
we have seen, there is a broad range of institutions, ranging from religious and cultural 
organisations to more politically orientated parties, organisations and movements. Most 
of them have a very small membership, and the number of people taking an active part 
in their activities is also very small. Many of the existing organisations do not cooperate 
with one another, some even work against the Others, even though the main aims are 
often the same. The low political activity level among the Russian population was also 
confirmed by our survey.
It would seem that there are a number of reasons for the low activity level and 
the lack of unity among Russian-dominated organisations. Firstly, Russians in Latvia 
are far from being a homogeneous group of people, and their historic origins and 
attitudes to their future in the Latvian state differ widely. People belonging to various 
sub-groups of the Russian population have different interests and have few reasons to 
unite. To a "migrant” worker the main concern may be how to avoid unemployment 
and feed family members; a peasant Old Believer might see the revival of his confession 
and his culture as the main concern; while a retired officer may be preoccupied with the 
problem of who will pay him a pension and how to keep his previously free 
accommodation.101 The few concerns uniting them are the Russian language, their self- 
identification as Russians (although "Russian" may have a variety of meanings), and 
the fact that they live in a post-Soviet state outside Russia. It is doubtful whether this is 
enough to instil within the Russian population a great sense of unity. Indeed, as has 
been demonstrated in this chapter, many Russians argue strongly against political 
organisations based on ethnicity, since they fear that this will increase the significance 
of ethnic differences and stand in the way of political integration.
Secondly, there is the lack of an intellectual, humanitarian elite among Russians 
in these three states. Such an elite, integrated into Latvian society, existed in Latvia 
between the world wars, but suffered great losses during the deportations and Stalin 
years.102 This had serious implications for the continuity of Russian culture in Latvia. 
Russians in Latvia, as seen in Chapter 5, did not have a lower level of education than
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9. Russian Identity and Ethnically Divided Societies
The preceding chapters have looked at the Russian population in Latvia from a 
variety of angles, but the focus so far has, for the greater part, been on empirical 
findings. It is now time to return to the framework which was outlined in the first 
chapter of the thesis in order to systematise these findings and put them into a more 
theoretical context. Instead of treating nationality as something given, which has been a 
common practice in Sovietology, we must again problematise questions related to 
ethnic identity, such as the questions of the intensity and content of Russian ethnic 
identity in Latvia, ethnic boundaries and fluctuating ethnicity. These crucial questions 
will be addressed in the first section of this chapter.
The chapter also has another and, perhaps, more ambitious aim. A recurring 
theme of the thesis has been the past and present ethnopolitics in Latvia, with an 
emphasis on the underlying principles and motives behind the policies conducted in this 
area. In the second section of this chapter I shall explore the utility of various models of 
conflict regulation in ethnically divided societies and assess their applicability to the 
situation in Latvia.1 As a polity still in transition, the emerging political system in Latvia 
does not lend itself to easy labelling or classification. The tendencies in this area have 
so far pointed in different directions. What is clear, however, is that the mere size, 
background and special characteristics of the Russian population in Latvia are factors 
which have had and will continue to have a strong impact on ethnic policies in the 
country, regardless of whether or not Russians themselves will be directly involved in 
forming such policies. Although Latvia was never de jure a part of the Soviet Union, 
there is also a Soviet legacy which will have an impact on the ethnic situation in Latvia 
for decades to come. Particularities of the Soviet experience, which have also been 
examined in this thesis, must therefore be taken into account when we discuss the 
utility for Latvia of the models.
9.1.  Russian Ethnic Identity - Main Findings
Perhaps the most important finding of the thesis has been that the Russian 
population in Latvia, far from being a homogeneous community of people, consists of 
individuals with a very large degree of variation in terms of a number of crucial 
characteristics, including their affiliations to the state in which they live and to their 
ethnic homeland, Russia. Our findings suggest great differences, regarding both the 
intensity and the content of ethnic identity, while social transformations at a political 
level have had the effect of shaking established identities and bringing former identities 
into flux. While it is not yet clear which form Russian ethnic identity will take in the
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future, theories which have been developed in the field of ethnicity can be useful as 
tools in the interpretation of ethnic processes.
In the following I shall apply three models which are relevant for the discussion 
of Russian ethnic identity in Latvia. The first model, developed by McKay and Lewins 
and presented in the first chapter, deals with questions of intensity of ethnic 
identification and structuration. I shall use this model as the framework for a discussion 
of the intensity of Russian ethnic identification and structuration in Latvia. The second 
model, Pal Kolst0's typology of diaspora identities, which was briefly presented in 
Chapter 6, will be applied for a discussion of the content of such identification. Finally, 
I shall, by applying Phillipe van den Berghe's list of factors conducive to assimilation, 
discuss whether Russians in Latvia are likely to retain their ethnic identity as Russians 
or are more likely to assimilate to the Latvians.
9.1 .1 .  Intensity of Ethnic Identification and Structuration
In Chapter 1 we presented an ethnic typology developed by McKay and Lewins 
which emphasised the dimensions of ethnic structuration and identification among 
ethnic groups.2 Although there will be no attempt to classify the Russian population 
strictly into one of the four cells in Figure 1.1, it is still interesting and relevant to 
discuss the level of identification and structuration among Russians living in Latvia.
The findings in this thesis seem to support the view which is now most 
commonly held by scholars on ethnicity that ethnicity tends to be transitory and 
situationally defined. Most Russians have been aware all the time that they possess 
certain ethnic characteristics. However, while this has provided them with a sense of 
ethnic identity, they have simultaneously held a variety of other identifications: with 
families, villages or towns, regions, age and sex groups, classes and religious 
communities, and others. Such affiliations have been invoked for different purposes 
and on different occasions. Thus, the relevance of ethnicity has varied from one person 
to another, and for the individual changed with time and situation.3
There is much evidence that ethnicity has become more relevant for a majority 
of Russians living in Latvia over the last few years. This can probably be explained 
largely by the sudden and marked rise in the ethnic consciousness among ethnic 
Latvians, which required some form of response from non-Latvians in the population. 
The politicisation of ethnicity which took place as a result of the change of the relative 
status of the Russian population in relation to ethnic Latvians is another important 
factor. The response has, to a considerable extent, taken the form of an ethnic revival 
and increased level of ethnic (or communal) identification among Russians. Russians 
have become more aware of their ethnic affiliations, their history, culture and
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traditions.4 Russians have also gradually become politically more assertive when it 
comes to defending their interests from a Russian or Russophone (and not 
"internationalist") position. Ethnicity has indeed become a legitimate basis for the 
articulation of interests.
The findings of our thesis, however, suggest a great variation concerning the 
level of ethnic identification among Russians in Latvia. A large number of people who 
have been treated as Russians in this thesis see nationality simply as a category which 
they have to report to the census-takers, but which lacks practical content to them 
personally. Many of them continue to see themselves as "internationalists" and consider 
ethnic nationalism to be an evil. However, it is important to stress that although 
ethnicity is determined by one's own self-identification, this self-identification tends to 
be strongly influenced by the way in which one is identified by other people. When 
people are treated as different, they usually soon come to look upon themselves as 
different as well. Thus, intensified ethnic identity among Russians in Latvia has often 
been a response or reaction to the Latvians' stress on ethnic affiliation which became 
more pronounced in the atmoda period.
The cultural, political and economic differentials between groups in Latvia have 
increased over the last few years, which has made Russians and Latvians alike more 
self-conscious about their ethnic bonds and interests. It could, perhaps, have been 
expected that those Russians who had lived in Latvia for a long time and especially 
those who personally gained from the changes would be better off renouncing their 
ethnic identity and assimilating or integrating more fully into Latvian society. Although 
some Russians are better integrated into Latvian society than others, there are, 
however, no indications that these Russians are in the process of losing their ethnic 
identity. Most of the well integrated Russians are far from supportive of proposed 
citizenship legislation, because they regard it as unfair to the Russophones in the 
country, and they have also been very reluctant to join Latvian-dominated political 
parties and movements.5 This seems to confirm the theory that an ethnic group is not 
simply a transitory association created to pursue members' material and political 
interests. There seem to be certain non-rational or deeper sentiments involved.6 It 
suggests that the widespread feeling of deprivation and victimisation among a large 
number of Russians has also affected Russians who themselves are not affected by the 
changes, by strengthening their group identity and contributing to a sense of collective 
interests, regardless of status in Latvian society. One should, however, not disregard 
structural reasons for this, such as the institutionalisation of ethnicity in Latvian society, 
as well as the additional factor that Latvians themselves are not always willing to accept 
Russians as "one of us".
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The analysis of intensity of ethnic identity is centred on the individual, and 
collective identities are seen as composed of aggregates of individual identities.7 Let us 
now proceed to consider the level of the collective by focusing on the second dimension 
in McKay and Lewins's typology: the level of ethnic structuration among Russians in 
Latvia. In order to assess this level it is necessary to look at the group cohesiveness of 
the Russians and the ties within the ethnic group.
Our findings seem to suggest that the ties among Russians are relatively, 
although far from extremely, strong. We have found that Russians do have a feeling of 
collective identity which is based on cultural traits and life ways, and which matter both 
to the Russians themselves and to other ethnic groups in Latvia with whom they 
interact.8 Some indications point in the direction of a high level of ethnic structuration. 
It could be argued, for example, that there is a tendency to endogamy among Russians 
in Latvia (resistance to marriage outside their nationality). This was confirmed by the 
survey, where we found that only a small number of Russians had a Latvian spouse.9 
There are also other findings which seem to suggest relatively strong group affiliation 
among the Russians. Russians interact mostly in a Russian-language environment, and 
almost all Russians have retained Russian as their mother tongue. Their interpretation 
of social and political processes is formed by their selection of mass media, and since 
Russians mostly read Russian-language newspapers and watch Russian TV, their 
perception of the world and political outlooks tend to be different from those of ethnic 
Latvians. In addition, Russians usually live in areas where there are many other 
Russian speakers, send their children to Russian-language schools and, if they have not 
been completely secularised, belong to one of the two Russian church communities in 
Latvia.
However, the fact that Russians tend to distinguish between themselves and 
ethnic Latvians does not necessarily imply that ethnicity is the most salient factor for 
group formation. There are also indications that the boundaries between communal 
groups in Latvia do not so much go between the ethnic groups living there, but rather 
between two socio-linguistic communities: the Latvians and the Russophone 
population. However, the latter is numerically and culturally dominated by ethnic 
Russians, so that many of the smaller ethnic groups living in Latvia have adopted many 
of the cultural traits of the Russians, most importantly the language. It must be stressed 
that the majority of those who live in Latvia and are neither Latvians or Russians are 
eastern Slavs and, thus, belong to ethnic groups which culturally are closer to the 
Russians than to the Latvians. There are several findings showing that most Russians 
do not differentiate so strongly between a Russian and a Ukrainian or a Belarusian. 
Although, as was stated above, Russians rarely find a Latvian spouse, they do not 
necessarily prefer fellow Russians to other eastern Slavs when they choose a partner to 
marry. It could, of course, be argued that these Slavs to a considerable extent have been
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russified in Latvia, and that their official ethnicity does not reflect their ethnic 
identification. One could, when taking such considerations into account, perhaps 
further argue that the Russian-speaking population should be defined as a distinctive 
ethnic group.
There are, however, several arguments against doing so. Although the 
Russophone population has some of the features of an ethnic group, there are also 
signs that more narrowly defined ethnicity is in the process of becoming a more 
relevant marker for some of these dispersed ethnic groups, and that ethnic boundaries 
in the future will be more clearly defined and become of greater importance.10 This also 
affects the Russian population. The ethnic revival in the post-Soviet states has, as 
already noted, made many people, to whom ethnicity was only something they reported 
to census takers but without much significance for their actual life, more interested in 
finding their roots and taking up the traditions and learning the language of their own 
ethnic group. One result is that group ties within the ethnic groups are in the process of 
being strengthened. Interaction and organisation between co-ethnics also seem to 
acquire a greater significance. Ethnicity among smaller ethnic groups has already 
become more important in organisational life in Latvia.
The ethnic revival has also affected the Russians. A number of Russian 
organisations have emerged on Latvia's cultural and political scene. However, while 
most other ethnic groups define their membership in strictly ethnic terms, Russian 
organisations are normally open to representatives of all nationalities who share a sense 
of affiliation with Russian culture. The numerical dominance of ethnic Russians in such 
organisations is evident, but there are also people who officially belong to other ethnic 
groups who have joined these Russian organisations. In this respect the Russian ethnos 
is open and inclusive, which can probably be explained by the lack of a sense of threat 
to the survival of the Russian ethnos which often manifests itself among smaller ethnic 
groups, including the Latvians, and which makes them more defensive and closed to 
"outsiders". At present it has become more urgent for Russian activists to define the 
content of Russian ethnic identity than to define strict group boundaries.
The Latvian authorities also have some influence in determining the 
structuration of ethnic groups in Latvia. Ethnic or communal groups tend to be 
politicised through policies which have diverging effects on the ethnic groups living in 
the state. As Ted Robert Gurr notes:
In general, any actions or policies that seem likely to alter the 
balance of power and well-being among groups provide one or 
both affected parties with an impetus to conflict, the 
disadvantaged seeking to improve their lot, the advantaged 
aiming to consolidate theirs.11
With the political changes that have taken place in Latvia and the rest of the former
Soviet Union, the political and economic status of both Latvians and Russians would
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be affected by any change of policies, whether the new policies were designed 
specifically to protect or improve the status of a certain group or not. In Latvia the 
authorities have taken measures explicitly aimed at improving the status of ethnic 
Latvians, who are thought to have been discriminated against during the period of 
Soviet rule in Latvia. This has had the effect that ethnicity, or communality, has indeed 
become politicised in Latvia in the period which has been studied in this thesis. There 
can be no doubt that Russians in Latvia have suffered from a relative deterioration in 
their living conditions in relation to the Latvians in Latvia since the atmoda 
(awakening) got underway. Such developments have induced a higher level of ethnic 
(or communal) structuration among the Russians and Russophones.
Latvian politicians have tended to be more reluctant to deal with a great 
Russophone group with strong internal ties and with great political and economic 
claims than with smaller groups of ethnic minorities. This is likely to have been one of 
the reasons why the Latvian authorities have been so active in supporting the 
establishment of national cultural organisations for smaller minorities who formerly 
tended to identify with the Russians or the Russophones, such as the Jews, the Poles, 
Belarusians, Ukrainians, etc.12 They have also had some success in establishing 
institutional links between themselves and such organisations. The authorities have, 
however, been less enthusiastic about, and often shown signs of ignoring, the more 
politicised organisations which have a strong support base among the ethnic minorities, 
and particularly organisations which have expressed objections against the nationalities 
policies being conducted in Latvia.
The institutionalisation of ethnicity in Latvia through the practice of officially 
registering nationality in passports and other official documents has resulted in attention 
being focused on ethnicity rather than on other forms of group formation, with the 
result that ethnicity has become one of the most important identifying factors. The 
recurrent practice of stressing the dramatic changes which have taken place in the 
proportion of ethnic Latvians in Latvia has also contributed to this phenomenon. Such 
practices work against assimilation of ethnic minorities to the Latvians and can thus 
strengthen the boundaries between Latvians on the one hand and the other nationalities 
living in Latvia on the other. This further impedes national integration across ethnic 
divisions.
9 .1 .2 .  The Content of Russian Identity in Latvia
While McKay and Lewins focus on the important question of the intensity of 
ethnic identification and structuration, one cannot discuss the question of Russian 
identity in Latvia without going into more detail regarding the content of this identity.
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As has been suggested throughout this thesis, being "Russian" has meant and continues 
to mean different things to different people. Pal Kolst0's typology of Russian diaspora 
identities, which was introduced in Chapter 6, seems in this respect to be very 
relevant.13 We referred in that chapter to Kolst0's distinction between the cultural and 
political dimensions of identity, and pointed to Kolst0's emphasis on the political 
dimension which scholarly works on the subject have had a tendency to ignore.
What Pal Kolst0 understands by political identity, or 'political loyalty', which is 
the concept he uses, has less to do with political sympathies and attitudes than with the 
recognition of belonging to a political structure, whether this structure actually exists at 
present or not. In Chapter 6 some of the of political "identity options" open to Russians 
were presented. Russians have the option of continued political loyalty towards the 
historic fatherland, they can identify with their state of residence, or they can seek to 
create a state of their own.14
Cultural identity can also take various forms. Russians can first of all retain (or 
regain) a traditional Russian self-understanding. It should, however, be emphasised 
that culture is not a static concept, and what Russians understand by traditional Russian 
culture is likely to vary considerably over time and from person to person. Russians 
can also seek to adopt the culture of the dominant nationality, the Latvians. In order to 
do so they would first have to adopt the Latvian language, preferably making it the 
mother tongue of their children. They could do so through sending their children to 
Latvian-language schools, which could speed up assimilation processes. As a third 
alternative, Russians can 'develop a self-understanding of their own'.
Pal Kolst0's typology is useful as a tool for a further discussion, based on the 
findings in the thesis, of the different forms Russian identity in Latvia may take. Nine 
theoretically possible positions or 'identity options', according to which the Russian 
population can be classified, can be identified. These positions are illustrated in Figure 
9.1. We shall now make an attempt to evaluate the relevance of the suggested categories 
for the situation in Latvia.
Our findings suggest that most Russians in Latvia are to be found in positions 
A1 or A2, while B2, C l and C2 also seem to have a certain degree of relevance. Other 
positions can either be considered to be unrealistic (B1 and B3), or they are not 
characteristic for a significant number of Russians in Latvia.
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Source: Pill Kolstp (1992).
T here  are  few indicat ions that a large num ber  of  Russians have adopted or are in 
the process  o f  adop t ing  a Latvian  cul tural  ident i ty (B).  R us s ians  still tend to have 
Russian as thei r mother  tongue,  they read newspapers  and listen tc> radio  and watch T V  
progr ammes predominan t ly  in their ow n  language,  and their dom est ic  l ibraries consist  
largely o f  Russ ian  literature. However ,  accul turat ion and ass imi la t ion (see  below) can 
take place through ethnically mixed marr iages , where the trend now is that  the chi ldren 
take the nat ional i ty  o f  the indigenous  parent  and a lso  tend to ado pt  h i s /he r  e thnic  
ident ity.  A l th o u g h  a Russ ian  cul tural  ident i ty  is the mos t  c o m m o n ,  the conten t  and 
intensity o f  this ident ity seem to vary.  S o m e  seek their cultural  impulses  f rom Russia,  
rely on the Russ ian  mass  m ed ia  and contacts  wi th their re la t ives there (A) ,  whereas  
others  have becom e  "Latvian  Russians" w h o  ident ify firstly wi th the Latvian territory 
and feel fore ign when  they go  to Russia (C).  I Iowevcr,  there do es  not s eem  to be a 
co m m o n  Russ ian identity a m o n g  all (or  even a majori ty)  o f  Russians  in Latvia to make  
it plausible to suggest  that the Russian (or  Russ ian-speaking)  populat ion in Latvia on an 
aggregate  level has acquired a separate,  d is t inguishable identity.
O ne  will find that persons  w h o  arc to be found in ca te gory  B2  (but  of ten  are 
La tv ian ,  an d  not  Russ ian ,  by  nat iona l i ty  acco rd in g  to o u r  oper a t iona l  def in i t ion  
presented in Chap te r  1) usual ly have an ethnically mixed family ba ckgro und .  In such 
mixed famil ies  parents  of ten  want  to help  their chi ldren to up w a rd  social  mobil i ty .  
S o m e  parents believe that if they send their children to Lalvian- language schools,  where  
they learn to speak Latvian  f luently and interact  in an e thnic  Latvian env iro nm ent ,  this 
will improve  the future pos it ion o f  thei r chi ldren in Latvian  society.  L a n g u a g e  is, o f  
course,  the first s tage in the ass imi la tion process.
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While most Russians have retained their cultural identity as Russians (A), 
usually with a certain element of a separate regional identity as 'Russians in Latvia' (C), 
their political identity has proved to be much more elastic and thus more difficult to 
categorise. The lack of compactness in the Russian settlement makes Russians aware of 
the futility of demanding territorial autonomy within the Latvian state. There have been 
certain suggestions that Daugavpils or Riga should opt for independence from Latvia, 
but such proposals have never been taken seriously by any political actors and not by 
Russians living in these cities themselves. It has therefore never been a viable option 
for Russians in Latvia to seek to create a state of their own (row 3 in Figure 9.1). The 
main difference is therefore between those who see Russia (in some form) as the 
territorial unit with which they identify (1), and Russians who have come to identify 
first of all with the Latvian state (2). There are, however, also Russians who identify 
first of all with a certain region or city (for example Latgale or Riga) and do not have 
any strong sense of belonging to any existing state.
Our survey disclosed that a significant number of Russians continued to believe 
that Latvia had been and would remain a part of Russia. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to 
assert that the present political loyalties of Russians with such imperial attitudes are 
most unlikely to lie with the present, independent Latvian state. There are, on the other 
hand, many Russians who see Russia just as another neighbouring state and who are 
determined that their future should be linked to Latvia only. The largest number of 
Russians, however, seem to be unsettled and are difficult to categorise into one of the 
two positions. Their political identity over the last years has fluctuated in response to 
the dramatic political developments which have taken place in Latvia and the rest of the 
(former) Soviet Union. The unstable political situation in Russia, and insecurity about 
the future status of many Russians in Latvia itself, make it unlikely that the political 
component of the Russian identity in Latvia will end its fluctuation in the near future. It 
is, for the same reasons, too early to predict whether most Russians will be found in 
position A1 or A2, and much will depend on future developments in Russia and the 
other CIS states, as well as on domestic ethnopolitics in Latvia.
What is clear, however, is that the question of Russian political loyalties is 
likely to become one of the most important factors in determining the degree and form 
of Russian integration into Latvian society. Many Russians at present continue to 
regard themselves first of all as Soviet, or former Soviet, citizens. To many of them 
being Russian has only a secondary significance or is thought to be relevant only for 
official purposes. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union this form of identification 
is, however, likely to change, although it might be a slow process. The findings of this 
thesis suggest that Russian allegiances in the future are likely to remain unsettled.
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9 .1 .3 .  Prospects for the Future Assimilation of Russians in Latvia
In the two preceding sections I have briefly touched upon the question of 
whether or not it is likely that Russians in the future will assimilate to the Latvians. In 
this section I will attempt a more thoroughgoing analysis of the prospects for such 
assimilation. Before this discussion there should be a brief clarification of the concept 
of 'assimilation' and the related, but not identical, concept of 'acculturation'. The latter 
concept is usually defined as the modification of the culture of a group through contacts 
with other groups. It implies the acquisition or exchange of cultural traits.15 
Assimilation, on the other hand, involves an originally distinct group losing its 
subjective identity and becoming absorbed in the social structure of another group.16 
Acculturation is typically the first of the assimilative processes to occur, and 
acculturation is, indeed, a necessary condition for assimilation. However, complete 
assimilation involves more than acquiring the language the moral and religious ideas 
and the customs of the dominant group. A subjective element is involved - a feeling of 
identity with the core society. Thus, assimilation occurs when the core society becomes 
an important positive referent for members of the ethnic group in question.
The following is an attempt to assess the prospects for assimilation of Russians 
in Latvia by pointing to a number of conditions conducive to assimilation and 
discussing whether or not such conditions are present in Latvia. Philippe van den 
Berghe has presented a list of conditions which he argues are favourable for 
assimilation. Some additional factors which are of importance for the special case of 
Latvia will also be presented. Van den Berghe employs a reductionist model of 
assimilation, assuming that individuals make 'selfish cost/benefit calculations based on 
alternative strategies of ethnic nepotism versus assimilation'.17 The question of 
assimilation tends to involve a tension between what van den Berghe calls the ethnically 
centripetal force of kin selection and the centrifugal force of fitness maximisation 
through other means. Assimilation takes place, according to van den Berghe, when the 
balance favours the centrifugal force.
The first factor conducive for assimilation listed by van den Berghe is related to 
the physical features of the ethnic groups. According to van den Berghe, the greater the 
phenotypic resemblance between groups, the more likely assimilation is to take place. 
Groups that are more or less indistinguishable from the dominant group are more 
readily accepted than groups looking very different from this group.
Not much material and data is available to evaluate the physical resemblance 
between Russians and Latvians. Many people, both Russians and Latvians, claim that 
they can easily discern a Russian from a Latvian without knowing the person. Russians 
and Latvians are therefore not completely indistinguishable. However, it seems that 
differences in dressing, hair-style, make-up and conduct more often act as criteria for
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identification than physical features or phenotype. The relatively large number of mixed 
marriages in Latvia implies that few people can be regarded as 'pure' Russians or 
Latvians. Identification of a person's nationality based on physical features is not 
always an easy task, and if a person speaks the Latvian language without a Russian 
accent, he and she will automatically be regarded as Latvian, regardless of a 'Slavic' 
appearance. The physical differences between Russians and Latvians can therefore not 
be seen as a major obstacle to assimilation.
Assimilation becomes more likely the greater the cultural similarity between the 
groups, according to the second point in van den Berghe's list. Such a similarity makes 
it easier for subordinate groups to acculturate, which, as was argued above, is a 
precondition for assimilation. Culturally similar groups also tend to be more easily 
accepted by the dominant group. There are, indeed, evident cultural differences 
between Russians and Latvians in Latvia, to which both groups tend to assign 
considerable significance. Most importantly, there is the difference of language. 
Particularly the Latvians, but also many Russians in Latvia, attach more significance to 
language than to any other cultural characteristics. In order to assimilate, Russians need 
not only to learn the language - we saw that only a minority of the Russians
have a good command of the Latvian language - but it also needs to work as their native 
tongue. The overall majority of Russians consider Russian, and only Russian, to be 
their mother tongue. Even if a greater proportion of Russians are likely to learn Latvian 
in the future, this does not necessarily mean that Russians will be more likely to 
assimilate. It has already been argued that while many Latvians became fluent in 
Russian as knowledge of that language was a requirement for upward social mobility, 
only very few of them lost their native language or their ethnic identity as a result, and 
there is no reason to assume that Russians necessarily will be very different.
It is well known that the long history of coexistence in Latvia has not obliterated 
other cultural differences between Russians and Latvians either. The importance of 
religious affiliation should not be underestimated, even in the rather secularised Latvian 
society of today. Although most Russians, as our survey indicates, do not visit the 
Church on a regular basis, the norms and traditions of Orthodoxy will undoubtedly 
continue to have an impact on the identity of Russians. Russians and Latvians also have 
different traditions in literature and folklore, in way of living and social norms. It is on 
the other hand important to stress that culture is in a constant state of flux, and the 
content of both Russian and Latvian culture has changed and will continue to change in 
the future.18 At present, however, there are few signs of cultural assimilation among 
Russians, except among people from an ethnically mixed family background, and the 
tendency over recent years has been that the number of mixed marriages has fallen. An 
important question is to what extent Russians will be able and willing to preserve their 
specific cultural traits if the pull towards assimilation is strong. This question will,
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however, depend on factors to be discussed below. The conclusion must be that the 
cultural differences between Russians and Latvians are of such an order that, seen in 
isolation, they are likely to work against assimilation.
The next factor in van den Berghe's list of factors favouring assimilation 
concerns the size of the ethnic group in question. The smaller the group is in relation to 
the rest of the population, the more likely assimilation is to take place. With more than 
30 per cent of the population of Latvia, Russians make up a large and visible minority 
as seen both from the point of view of the Latvians as well as the Russians themselves. 
Such a large number of Russians would, if van den Berghe's proposition is correct, 
clearly work against assimilation. Even though the proportion of Latvians might 
increase in years to come, our survey results show that it is very unlikely that a major 
exodus of Russians will take place, at least in the short run. Thus, Russians will make 
up a considerable minority in Latvia even if the official policy towards national 
minorities changes. Another factor which is of importance here is the great number of 
Russians living in Russia. Although the extent of contacts with Russians in Russia will 
depend on, among other factors, the relations between the two countries on a 
governmental level, Russians in Latvia are likely to be able to receive books and 
newspapers, watch Russian television programmes and maintain personal contacts with 
Russians living in Russia, which will make it easier to preserve a Russian identity 
while still being a part of Latvian society.
Lower-status groups are, according to van den Berghe, more likely to assimilate 
than high-status groups. Assimilation is likely to take place if this involves prospects 
for upward class mobility. The Latvian census data do not provide much evidence 
suggesting that the status level among Russians and Latvians in 1989 was very 
different. In 1989 Russians had a high level of education and were well represented in 
most occupational sectors. There can be no doubt, however, that the relative status of 
Russians in Latvia since then has fallen. This is a factor which may work in favour of 
assimilation. There are relatively more Russians than Latvians among blue-collar 
workers, and van den Berghe argues that working classes are more motivated than 
others to shed their ethnicity. The lower number of Russians among the creative 
intelligentsia, in art, culture and the media is also of importance, since the maintenance 
of ethnic identity often requires an active creative elite within the ethnic group.19 
Further, the policies of the Latvian parliament and government, as well as autonomous 
processes in society, can alter the social status of the Russian population even further. 
Factors such as privatisation of property, higher rates of unemployment, or fewer 
opportunities to obtain an education in Russian may all affect the position of Russians 
in Latvian society. If the economic advantages to be derived from merging are 
substantial, there is a greater likelihood that at least some Russians will assimilate. We 
have, however, seen that this outcome is not automatic. Loss of ethnic power can lead
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to ethnic mobilisation also among people who personally would have the option to 
assimilate and who would gain from planned economic or political changes.
Van den Berghe further asserts that when an ethnic group is widely dispersed it 
is more likely to assimilate than when it is concentrated in one geographical area. This 
proposition seems to be confirmed by Latvian census data and the findings in our 
survey. In areas where the density of Russians is low, there are more Russians who 
report Latvian as their native language, and/or report no fluency in Russian. The 
concentration of Russians is relatively high in all parts of Latvia, although there is 
significant variation from one region to another as well as from urban to rural areas. 
Compared to for example Estonia, where Russians to a large extent are confined to the 
northern parts of the country and make up islands of non-Estonian geographical areas, 
Russians in Latvia usually do not live in Russian 'ghettos'. Even in Latvian cities 
where the number of Russians is large, there is normally also a substantial number of 
Latvians. One exception is the city of Daugavpils, the second largest city, where 
Latvians, as we have seen, make up only 12 percent. However, although Russians in 
Latvia to a large extent are territorially dispersed, the concentration of Russians is still 
relatively high in most Latvian regions, and in most cases high enough to prevent 
assimilation.
Finally, van den Berghe argues that immigrant groups are more likely to 
assimilate than native groups. According to van den Berghe immigration normally 
involves geographical dispersion and a reduction in the network of intraethnic ties. 
Also, immigrants are normally at a disadvantage vis & vis natives and rely heavily on 
them. In the case of the Russians in Latvia these factors must be somewhat modified. It 
has been asserted throughout this thesis that a very considerable number of Russians 
are immigrants. However, Chapter 3 showed that Russian immigrants in Latvia had a 
status which in many respects differed from the status of immigrants in most other 
countries. Russians moved to areas where many Russians already lived, and a 
reduction in the network of intraethnic ties did not occur or was not seen as a major 
problem. There were usually no requirements about (or need for) learning the local 
language, and moving to Latvia did not involve any major change in the way of 
living.20 Thus, the immigration of Russians into Latvia did not have the effect that 
Russians were assimilated.
In the late 1980s, however, changes in Latvian and Soviet society made it more 
legitimate to question the high rate of migration to Latvian territory. The status of the 
immigrant population subsequently changed, as described elsewhere. Thus, immigrants 
in Latvia became more vulnerable.
In order to assess the prospects for the assimilation of Russians in Latvia it is 
important to take the time factor into account. Assimilation is unlikely to take place in 
the near future, since cultural ethnic identification normally does not change quickly.
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Time is required both for an individual to erase the memory of his or her past, and also 
for individuals of the core society to forget that certain other people used to belong to a 
distinct ethnic group. Thus, in practice, assimilation is most likely to take place through 
intermarriage, where a rational choice is made by parents in mixed marriages to 
socialise their children in the culture of the dominant nationality.
It is also important to stress that it takes two to assimilate, and that for 
assimilation to take place there must be both the desire of the subordinate group and 
acceptance by the dominant group. Such an acceptance does not seem to exist in Latvia 
at present, at least not at the political level. Nationality is likely to continue to be 
registered and written into Latvian passports, which can have the effect of intensifying 
ethnic identity and strengthening ethnic boundaries. This is not unexpected, taking into 
account the concern which has been demonstrated by the Latvian authorities about the 
'threatened position' of the Latvian nation, its culture and language.
The passport system is not the only area where official policies can have an 
effect oh the rate of assimilation. The argument that politics has an impact on ethnicity 
has already been argued for in Chapter 1. Legislation and policies of the Latvian 
parliament and government will be of major importance for deciding whether a large 
number of Russians will become assimilated. There are, as we have seen, many 
controversial political issues in Latvia, and the way they are dealt with by the Latvian 
authorities can affect the desirability as seen by Russians to assimilate. The attitude of 
the Latvian authorities to assimilation is, of course, very significant. It must again be 
emphasised that there is an interaction between the political sphere and ethnicity, so that 
the policies that will be conducted by the Latvian authorities will also depend on ethnic 
processes taking place in Latvian society. Thus, the factors that have been examined in 
this chapter, such as the size and social characteristics of the Russian, Latvian and other 
nationalities, will all be taken into account by the authorities when devising a nationality 
policy.
Some other characteristics of the ethnic group are also of significance for the 
question of assimilation. The cohesiveness of the ethnic group is dependent on the 
degree of ethnic institutionalisation. The more institutional completeness present, the 
stronger the maintenance of ethnic identity, and the more unlikely assimilation 
becomes. When an ethnic group has many different types of separate institutions, this 
usually correlates with a large number of social ties within the group and fewer outside 
the group. In Latvia Russians and Latvians share the same state institutions, and the 
parliament, state bureaucracy and governmental positions are not officially distributed 
in accordance with ethnic affiliations. In practice, however, such institutions tend to be 
dominated by ethnic Latvians. The most important form of ethnic institutionalisation in 
Latvia is the school system, where there tends to be a strong correlation between the 
ethnicity of the children and the schools' language of instruction. I shall not here
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discuss whether the separation of Russian and Latvian schools is good or bad, but there 
can be no doubt that it is not conducive to assimilation.
Chapter 8 showed that there is a large number of different types of 
organisations in Latvia claiming to represent the interests of the Russian or Russophone 
population in Latvia. The large number of such organisations cannot, however, be 
taken as evidence of a high level of Russian participation. The vast majority of 
Russians are neither members of nor actively involved in any of these organisations. 
The organisational structure in Latvia is, however, strongly affected by ethnicity. Both 
membership and support of political parties are, for example, usually strongly related to 
ethnic affiliations, although formally all parties are open to members of any nationality. 
It has also been demonstrated that Russians so far have been reluctant to support 
attempts to establish a Russian party in Latvia. Whether this is a rejection of the whole 
idea of a Russian party, or should be seen more as a lack of support of the leaders or 
programmes of the concrete parties or as a reflection of Russians relying more on other 
parties or movements to diefend their interests, has been open to different 
interpretations.
There are also a number of other factors which will be decisive in determining 
the rate of assimilation among Russians. Economic and political developments in 
Russia itself will, of course, be crucial. A politically stable and prosperous Russia 
would be more likely to seek to maintain friendly relations with her Latvian neighbours, 
and it would be more difficult for Latvian politicians to play on the potential threat of 
Russian "fifth columnists" in Latvia. However, the opposite scenario could also prove 
to be conducive to assimilation: if Russians in Latvia see that they are much better off in 
Latvia than they would be in Russia, they could decide to associate their own and their 
children's future with Latvia, with Russia becoming less relevant to them as a point of 
reference.
The discussion above suggests that the factors unfavourable for assimilation 
carry more weight than do the favourable factors, so the prospects of assimilation of a 
large number of Russians in Latvia in the foreseeable future look very slim indeed. 
However, even if most Russians are likely to retain their cultural identity, there is still 
the potential for a higher level of political identification by Russians with the Latvian 
state. This will, among others, depend on future Latvian ethnopolitics, and this takes us 
to the next section of this chapter, where I shall look at different ways in which states 
deal with their ethnopolitical problems and how these affect the political integration of 
the various ethnic groups in society.
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9.2 .  Latvia and the Regulation of Inter-Ethnic Conflict
9 .2.1.  Four Models of Conflict Regulation in Ethnically Divided 
Societies
In this section I shall discuss the applicability to Latvia of some models of 
conflict regulation (or prevention) in ethnically divided societies. Before doing so, 
some assumptions must be made. Firstly, Latvia is regarded as an ethnically divided 
society with substantial cultural differences and with (potential) conflicts which there is 
a need to accommodate or prevent from developing. The preceding chapters should 
have made it clear that ethnic differences in Latvia are salient and politically relevant. 
One could discuss whether Latvia is a bi-communal society or a society with one 
dominant nation (the Latvians) and a plurality of ethnic groups. However, it here 
suffices to assert that there indeed are marked cultural differences between the ethnic 
Latvians, on the one hand, and other ethnic groups living in Latvia, on the other, that 
these cultural differences have been politicised over the period which has been analysed 
in this thesis, and that there is a potential for ethnic conflict.
Secondly, it will be assumed that ethnic problems in Latvia will be dealt with 
within the confines of the Latvian state. This assumption is, perhaps, more 
problematic. The Latvian government could pursue policies which, if not directly 
forcing Russians and representatives of other nationalities to leave Latvia, have the 
intended effect that they decide to leave. Our findings suggest, however, that relatively 
few Russians are ready to leave Latvia, taking into account conditions in the Russian 
Federation and other CIS states. Even if a larger number of Russians were to choose to 
leave, ethnic minorities would still make up a large proportion of the population in the 
country. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that ethnopolitical issues would not 
disappear even with a considerable exodus of non-Latvians.
Thirdly, we assume that Latvia will aim at being recognised as a democratic 
state or, at least, that it will possess the formal institutions associated with a democracy. 
This assumption seems plausible, since most states in the world today acknowledge the 
supremacy of democratic principles, at least in theory. The geographic location of 
Latvia, its size and its dependence on links with west European states are also factors 
which are likely to make the Latvian authorities interested in preserving a democratic 
image. It should be stressed, however, that we do not assume that all inhabitants of 
Latvia will necessarily have the right or opportunity to participate fully in political life. 
Democracy is seen more as a continuum than as a dichotomy. What is important for our 
concerns is that the state justifies its monopoly on the legal use of force by referring to 
itself as the legitimate representative of the 'people'.
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Taking the three assumptions above into account we can ignore alternatives 
employed to accommodate communal conflicts such as genocide, forced removal, 
territorial partition, imposed assimilation and involuntary segregation.21 All the four 
models for conflict regulation (or avoidance) which will now be presented bear some 
resemblance to democracy, but I shall start with a model which in its nature is anti­
democratic, despite the presence of elected political institutions.
A 'herrenvolk democracy1 is a model of a state in which democracy is limited to 
the dominant ethnic group and forcibly denied to other groups. According to such a 
model, ethnic minorities are excluded from integrating fully into the body politic on the 
basis of ethnicity (or race). The hegemony of the core nation is preserved through 
denying political, civil and social rights to people belonging to ethnic groups other than 
the dominant nation. The state is identified with and serves the core nation, which 
perceives itself as the owners of the state. Such a 'herrenvolk democracy' is 
characterised by a system of social apartheid, and South Africa before 1990 is a typical 
example of a state which seemed to fit well with this model. Not only is such a model 
regarded as unacceptable in the contemporary world, it is also more likely to suppress 
rather than to resolve interethnic conflict.
A second model is that of liberal democracy. What is characteristic of this state 
model is that ethnicity is privatised, and ethnic affiliations are ignored by the state. All 
individuals enjoy equal civil and political rights and are judged by merit. Ethnic groups 
are free to choose whether to keep or drop their sub-cultures, whether to live apart or 
mix. However, the state provides the conditions for acculturation and assimilation. 
Integration of the various ethnic groups living in the state is sought through policies 
aimed at nation-building. Thus, the state tends to forge a 'common language, identity, 
nationalism and national institutions for its citizens'.22 The goal is a society where the 
citizens, irrespective of ethnic background, are mobilised into a national political 
community.
However, while individual rights in a liberal democracy are maximised, the 
state tends to ignore the importance of collective rights. Although ethnic groups are free 
to form their own organisations and even political parties, the state authorities are under 
no obligation to recognise these communal organisations as representatives of the ethnic 
group as a whole. For a liberal democracy to work, the state must thus be successful in 
its nation-building efforts, so that the most important social values are shared by all 
ethnic groups living in the state. Otherwise the result will often be a sense of 
deprivation among groups which perceive themselves as disadvantaged or have other 
rules for social organisation. The rules of social mobility will often favour some, but 
not all, ethnic groups, and ideologies of equality may serve to justify inequality where 
they fail to account for cultural differences 23 Thus, one inherent danger with the model
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of liberal democracy is that it is often perceived as a 'tyranny of the majority', in which 
certain ethnic groups find themselves permanently disadvantaged.24
In a "consociational democracy" ethnicity is incorporated as a structural element 
in the political organisation of the state. The state is not associated with any of the 
constituent groups, and one of its tasks is to reconcile differences between them. 
According to Lijphart, who considers this model to be the best fitted to solve problems 
of extreme 'cultural pluralism', consociational democracy is based on the following 
institutional arrangements25:
1. A 'Grand Coalition' in the government of the state,
consisting of representatives of all the segments (for our
purposes 'ethnic groups'). This is otherwise known as 'elite 
accommodation', since it is the leaders ('elites') of the segments 
who come together at the centre of the state to settle disputes.
2. A proportional representation electoral system, and a 
proportional system for sharing public expenditure and public 
employment amongst the segments according to the size of each.
3. A 'mutual veto' system, whereby a segment can veto 
government decisions in matters of vital concern to it.
4. Autonomy for each segment, either through a territorial 
government in a federal or devolution system, or through 
institutions (e.g., educational) which confer some self- 
government on the segment.26
Lijphart has also provided a list of conditions which work in favour of
consociational democracy, and it can implicitly be understood that if too many of these
conditions are not fulfilled, it becomes difficult for a consociational democracy to 
function.27 The size of and proportions between the ethnic groups involved are crucial 
factors: a multiple balance of power among the ethnic groups is seen as more conducive 
to consociational democracy than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of the 
ethnic groups. As Lijphart notes, if
one segment has a clear majority its leaders may attempt to 
dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority. And in a 
society with two segments of approximately equal size, the 
leaders of both may hope to win a majority and to achieve their 
aims by domination instead of cooperation.28
Other structural factors which Lijphart believes are favourable to consociational 
democracy include the following: the country's size is small rather than large; the elites 
of each of the segments have the power to acquire the acceptance by their followers of 
the process of 'elite accommodation'; the segments are homogeneous and isolated 
rather than internally divided and scattered; and there is a sense of loyalty to the state 
beyond the loyalty to the segments.
Liberal democracies and consociational democracies have in common the factor 
that the state retains an ethnically-neutral position. Sammy Smoha has argued that there
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is another model of multiethnic democracy which he ceills 'ethnic democracy' in which 
the state sides and is identified with one of the ethnic groups, and the dominance of this 
group is institutionalised.29 An ethnic democracy encapsulates three characteristic 
features. Firstly, the core nation is accorded institutionalised dominance over the state. 
Such dominance reaches beyond the numerical proportion of the majority in the 
population. Secondly, individual civil and political rights are enjoyed universally. Such 
rights would include the right of assembly and association, freedom of the press, an 
independent judiciary, a multi-party system, and free and fair elections. Thirdly, certain 
collective rights are normally extended to ethnic minorities.30
Thus, in contrast to a 'herrenvolk democracy', political and civil rights are 
extended to the entire population. However, it is typical for an ethnic democracy that 
non-dominant groups are thought to have a relatively lesser claim to the state and are 
sometimes even regarded as not fully loyal.31 The dominant group in such a state tends 
to Fill all, or nearly all, the highest offices, and the symbols, official language, religion 
and immigration policy also usually reflect the ethnic dominance of this group. By 
combining elements of political and civil democracy with explicit ethnic dominance, an 
ethnic democracy attempts to preserve ethnopolitical stability based on the 
contradictions and tensions inherent in such a system.
After this brief presentation of each of the models, it is now time to proceed to a 
discussion of the applicability of each of these models to the case of Latvia.
9.2.2 .  Latvia - An "Ethnic Democracy"?
Of the four models described above, there are in my view several reasons to argue that 
Latvia comes closest to resembling an "ethnic democracy". The applicability of the 
other three models is, as we shall see, more problematic, although all of them have, or 
could have, some relevance for the situation in Latvia. In the discussion below I shall 
first look at the situation in Latvia and point out why Latvia could be labelled an "ethnic 
democracy", but I shall also give examples of features from the other models which can 
be found in Latvian ethnopolitics. I shall then point out some of the reasons why Latvia 
is developing into an ethnic democracy and why the other models of conflict resolution 
are less likely to gain ascendancy.
The way the citizenship issue has been resolved (or rather not been resolved) in 
Latvia has made some observers - in the West, in Russia and in Latvia itself - argue that 
the state has introduced, or is in the process of introducing, a system of apartheid 
designed to secure ethnically more homogeneous polities. Accusations of 'ethnic 
cleansing', 'fascism' and 'gross violations of human rights' are commonly directed 
against the Latvian authorities. If such accusations were true, one could, indeed, argue
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that the model of 'herrenvolk democracy' would be an apposite description of the 
Latvian state.
However, in reality the situation is much more complex. While a 'herrenvolk 
democracy' would imply that ethnic minorities are excluded from citizenship or other 
political or civil rights because of their ethnic affiliations, membership of the citizen- 
state is based not on ethnic criteria but on citizenship of the interwar Republic of Latvia 
or on being a descendant of a citizen from that period. Russians and other non-citizens 
who do not qualify for citizenship according to these rules have the potential to become 
citizens with time and on acquiring a basic knowledge of the Latvian language. With a 
few exceptions, they are not excluded from the body politic for an indefinite future. It 
can also be argued that Latvia cannot take on the whole responsibility for the large 
Russian-speaking population which was sent in from Russia or other Soviet republics 
(it is often implied with russification or sovietization purposes) in the absence of any 
agreement between the de jure always existing independent Latvian state and an 
occupying regime. If one accepts these premises and holds that present-day citizens 
constitute the legitimate citizenry of Latvia, there is no differential treatment of ethnic 
groups in Latvia, at least in what concerns political and civil rights.
Whether or not to accept the premises above, however, seems to be the core 
issue. As was argued in a previous chapter, and has been acknowledged by both sides 
in the citizenship debate, the citizenship issue has important ethnic connotations. It has 
been claimed that the division between citizens and non-citizens is a civilised way of 
reducing the influence of Russian-speakers in Latvian society. The fact that some 
Russians are entitled to citizenship according to present rules cannot conceal the fact 
that the majority of non-citizens are made up by non-Latvians. The ethnic division is 
therefore a salient one. Even though it would be difficult to argue that Latvia is a 
'herrenvolk democracy' according to a strict definition of the term, if one believes that 
all residents of Latvia should be automatically entitled to immediate citizenship it seems 
plausible to argue that Latvia has some of the features of this model, in that political and 
certain civil rights are enjoyed only by one part of the population, whereas a large 
group of residents are deprived of such rights.32
The consociational model has been rejected as applicable to Latvia by the 
Latvian authorities, although there are some features characteristic of this model which 
have been applied by the state in its treatment of its ethnic minorities. An underlying 
principle of this model is that deep divisions and disputes cannot be eliminated and 
therefore should be taken as givens. The fact that different ethnic groups can have 
differing interests and political outlooks has been recognised by the authorities in 
Latvia.33 As referred to in Chapter 4, the formation of a Nationalities Council has been 
provided for in Latvian legislation. However, even if such a council were to be 
established, it is designed only to have a consultative function. There are no signs of
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political power-sharing in Latvia. Ethnic groups are assigned a certain degree of self­
management over cultural, educational and religious affairs, but political institutions are 
completely dominated by ethnic Latvians.
Some conditions conducive for consociational democracy were presented 
above, and it should be clear from the list that Latvia is not a state where 
consociationalism would be likely to be very successful, at least at present. The only 
condition which seems completely to fit with the situation in Latvia is the size of the 
country. According to Lijphart, a small size enhances a spirit of cooperativeness and 
accommodation and reduces the burdens of decision-making, rendering the country 
easier to govern.34
There are, however, many factors which seem to be unfavourable for the 
establishment of a consociational democracy. The first, and probably most important, is 
related to the size and special status of the Latvian nation. While some spokespersons 
from the Russian-speaking population have argued that there are two almost identically 
large segments, or socio-ethnic communities, in Latvia, the division is presented by the 
Latvian authorities rather as that of ethnic Latvians and a number of smaller ethnic 
groups. The special status of the Latvians is never questioned by the dominant ethnic 
group in the country, and there is no reason to believe that the Latvians would be 
willing to give up their dominant position. It can be useful to refer to the important 
difference between homeland and immigrant ethnic groups which has been referred to 
elsewhere. It has been asserted that the definition of these terms is subjective rather than 
factual35, but although Russians may perceive themselves differently, ethnic Latvians 
as a rule look upon the Russians in Latvia as an immigrant population, with fewer 
claims to the state than those of the Latvians themselves. That Latvians would be 
willing voluntarily to give up their dominant position and institutionalise a system of 
power-sharing with Russians or the Russian-speaking population can be regarded as 
highly unrealistic.
Although a majority of Russians in Latvia live in cities, they live geographically 
scattered all over the country, so that a consociational structure based on the 
geographical distribution of the various ethnic groups would not be feasible in Latvia. 
The heterogeneous character of the Russian population has been emphasised in 
different places in this thesis, and this heterogeneity would be another obstacle to 
institutionalised power-sharing. Chapter 8 showed how difficult it has been for 
Russians to organise themselves according to an ethnic principle, largely because of 
their lack of common interests, a variety of political outlooks and different levels of 
identification with the Latvian state. Latvians, on the other hand, were much more 
successful in consolidating themselves for the common cause of Latvian independence. 
There does not seem to be any such common cause that would have the potential to 
unite the Russian population in the same way as ethnic Latvians joined forces in the late
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1980s. However, the radicalisation of Latvian ethnopolitics since the autumn of 1991 
has caused a great degree of resentment among the ethnic minorities and had a certain 
unifying effect on people who in the independence struggle had taken up diametrically 
different positions.
The lack of an identifiable Russian elite is probably another factor in explaining 
why a Russians consolidation in Latvia has not taken place. For reasons explained in 
Chapter 8, the Russian cultural intelligentsia is very small and tends to be detached both 
politically and socially from the predominantly working immigrant population. The 
Russian technical intelligentsia was often linked to the large, centrally run, enterprises, 
and such links tend to serve as a drawback under present conditions. Moreover, the 
lack of rewards for and restrictions set on entering into political life have made many of 
the more progressive younger Russians inclined to devote themselves to business - 
often quite successfully - rather than to pursue an uncertain political career.
At present there is also a lack of overarching loyalties to the Latvian state among 
Russians in Latvia. Many Russians seem to identify more with Russia or the (former) 
Soviet Union than with their state of residence, although, as has also been stressed, 
more Russians see Latvia, rather than Russia, as their motherland.36 A critical question 
in this connection is whether Russians would have been more loyal to the Latvian state 
if all permanent residents of Latvia had been given equal status and full political rights. 
There have been many Russians who have argued that one cannot be loyal to a state 
which is not loyal to oneself. The Latvian argument is that while Russians might seem 
to be loyal towards Latvia at present, often because this is regarded as beneficial to 
them personally, the only chance Russians would have to show their 'true' loyalties 
would be in a crisis situation, for example in a conflict between Russia and Latvia. In 
such a situation there are many Latvians who fear that Russians in Latvia would side 
with the Russian state.
Some scholars have argued that the presence of the conditions discussed above 
are not necessary for a consociational democracy to work.37 It can further be claimed 
that the introduction of a consociational method of segmental autonomy would increase 
the segmental isolation and homogenisation which again would be conducive for 
consociational democracy. Taking these considerations into account, our conclusion 
must nevertheless be that consociational democracy is both an unrealistic and unfeasible 
method of conflict regulation in Latvia.
There are some indications that Latvia in the future could develop into a liberal 
democracy, but there are at the same time several reasons why the Latvian state should 
not be classified in these terms at present. The most important objection would be the 
fact that the Latvian state is far from ethnically neutral. As we have seen, it is almost an 
exception when political leaders in Latvia in political statements do not in some way or 
another touch upon the difficult demographic position of the Latvian ethnos, and
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Latvians as an ethnic group, as opposed to citizens of Latvia, are mentioned in a 
number of legislative acts. There may be good reasons why this is so, and I shall 
discuss some of them below. I could provide additional arguments here against 
classifying Latvia as a liberal democracy, but I shall present these arguments when I 
explain why I find Smoha's model of ethnic democracy particularly applicable to 
Latvia.
Latvia, indeed, has many of the characteristics of an ethnic democracy. One 
ethnic group dominates the state and is identified with the state. According to Latvian 
legislation, the Latvian ethnos has the status of a nation, whereas other ethnoses are 
referred to as national or ethnic groups.38 These ethnic groups are seen as having less 
claim to the state than ethnic Latvians and should adapt themselves to the conditions 
stipulated by the Latvians. Ethnic minorities, or large segments of these minorities, are 
further not considered to be loyal to the state. The present Minister of Justice, Egils 
Levits, considered to be a centrist Latvian politician, sums up the present state concept 
in Latvia in an interview with the Russian-language newspaper SM-segodnya:
/laTBHH - oto rocy /ja p cT B eH H o e  o6pa30B aH H e JiaTwiucKOH 
HaUHH. ECTb npeflCTaBHTeJIH HaiJHOHaJIbHblX MeHbUIHHCTB, 
npH 3H aioinH e 3 t o  r o c y a a p c T B O  h oco3H aiom H e cboio  k 
HeM y  npHHaflJieacHocTb. A ecT b  qacT b 6 h bu ih x  r p a ^ a H  
CCCP, fljiH  k o t o p h x  3 t o  r o c y a a p c T B O  - qy>K oe. Oh h  k 
HeM y  HeJioHJibHbi, a  qacT b  h x  aa>Ke aKTHBHO npoTHB H ero  
B bicT yn ajia  h  B bicT ynaeT . (... H)e;iorHHHO npeaocT aB JiH T b  
rpa>K£aHCTBo TeM, kto  k HeMy He JionjieH.
The Latvian state is institutionally dominated by ethnic Latvians, far beyond the 
numerical proportion of Latvians in the population, regardless of whether or not non­
citizens are counted. Not only are the Latvian government and parliament almost 
exclusively made up of ethnic Latvians; Latvians are also 'over-represented' in local 
government, in ministries and in other influential positions within the state. Although 
there is no proviso guaranteeing a majority of ethnic Latvians in governments at the 
local or republican level, as had been suggested in the first Popular Front programme, 
there are other mechanisms which ensure a Latvian majority without such a clause. The 
regulations that only citizens will have the right to vote and be elected in local elections, 
which have been adopted by the Saeima, should ensure Latvian political dominance at 
all levels, at least in the foreseeable future.
Some Russian-speaking politicians complain that gerrymandering has taken 
place in Latvian politics with the aim of constructing electoral districts ensuring a 
Latvian dominance. Since Russians and other non-Latvians live predominantly in the 
cities, rural districts outside the cities have been included in elections to the city council, 
and such rural districts were, allegedly, even allotted a greater number of seats than 
their share of the population would justify.40 If this has been the case, one would
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assume that the need for gerrymandering should be reduced when non-citizens no 
longer have the right to vote in local elections.
The Latvian state is considered to be the expression of the national aspirations 
of the Latvian nation. State symbols, the national anthem, national holidays and the 
state language are all manifestations of the superior status of the Latvians. There are 
several examples of Latvian officials making public statements and identifying 
themselves first and foremost with one part of the population.41 The continuing practice 
of registering an official nationality (which it is difficult to change) in Latvian passports 
and other official documents can also be seen as evidence that little attention is given to 
nation-building processes through emphasising territorial and civil values, since the 
focus is still very much on ethnicity and ethnic issues.
Political and civil rights are accorded to all citizens of Latvia regardless of 
ethnicity. The question of citizenship is, of course, problematic. However, taking into 
account the specific historical circumstances in Latvia, and since most non-Latvians 
(except certain categories which were mentioned in Chapter 4) will have the chance to 
become citizens in the future, I am inclined to argue that such rights are enjoyed 
universally.
My argument should not, however, be taken as an indication of my support for 
Latvian citizenship legislation. It must also be qualified by the uncertainty in which 
non-citizens in Latvia have found and still find themselves, because of the lack of 
guide-lines regarding their rights and duties and opportunities for obtaining citizenship 
in the future, and the restrictions of rights which were earlier declared to apply to all 
residents of Latvia and which have been changed so that they now relate only to citizens 
of the republic. In addition, it now seems that naturalisation of citizens might take place 
according to a quota system, according to which the Latvian government, because of 
the demographic situation in Latvia or for other reasons, at any point of time in the 
future can reduce the size of the quotas and thereby restrict naturalisation of candidates 
who according to the stipulated requirements qualify for citizenship. If a large 
proportion of the Latvian population remain non-citizens and without any certainty of 
ever becoming citizens, there is, in my view, a risk that Latvia could slide into a mild 
form of a 'herrenvolk democracy', where citizenship, rather than ethnicity, would be 
the key for entering into the body politic.
However, characteristic of an ethnic democracy is also its provision of certain 
collective rights to ethnic minorities. In Latvia the "Law on the Free Development of 
National and Ethnic Groups..." (see Chapter 4) stipulates a number of collective rights 
which are enjoyed by ethnic minorities in Latvia regardless of the citizenship status of 
the individual. Such rights are, as we have seen, typically confined to the cultural 
sphere, and should not be confused with the extensive collective political rights and 
power-sharing provided for in a consociational democracy. There have been attempts
266
Ch a pte r  9
by certain nationalist groups in the parliament to change the text of the above-mentioned 
law in order to limit certain rights only to citizens of Latvia. A proposal from the 
TevzemedunBii\ibai (For the Fatherland and Freedom) faction in parliament specified 
a number of rights that according to the faction should be guaranteed only to citizens.42 
They included the right not to be exposed to nationality discrimination; the right to 
choose one's occupation in accordance with one's abilities and qualifications; the right 
to set up national social organisations; the right to preserve national traditions; the right 
to use national symbols and celebrate national holidays; the right to maintain contacts 
with co-ethnics in the historical homeland; and the right to obtain higher education in 
the native language outside Latvia on the basis of inter-state agreements. However, this 
proposal was voted down by the Latvian parliament, so that these and a number of 
other rights are still enjoyed universally - at least on paper - by all inhabitants of Latvia, 
irrespective of citizenship status.
Let us now consider some of the reasons why the model of ethnic democracy 
seems to be the most useful in describing the situation in Latvia. The form of 
nationalism which is characteristic of East European countries seems to be conducive 
for ethnic democracy to develop. As has been noted by Smooha and Hanf:
Since nationalism in Eastern Europe tends to be integral and 
exclusionary as opposed to Western nationalism which tends to 
be open, inclusive and coterminous with citizenship, there is a 
strong possibility for some of the democratisising states there to 
become ethnic democracies.43
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, according to the ethnic conception of the nation which
is characteristic of a number of non-Westem countries and typical for Eastern Europe,
emphasis is put on the nation as a community of birth and native culture. The nation's
right to self-determination is, thus, interpreted as the right of a specific ethnic group,
usually the dominant or titular one, to full expression through the formation of its own
state. Moreover, the ethnic concept of the state was not weakened during the Soviet
period. On the contrary, the continuing identification of the union republics with the
titular nationality living there made the titular nation the subject in the struggle for
national independence.
The historical geography of ethnicity in Latvia is an important reason why so 
many characteristics of the ethnic democracy model have been adopted in that country. 
Ethnic Latvians as a homeland ethnic group tended to possess a more intense ethnic 
identity than the majority of immigrant Russians. This was soon to be expressed in 
patterns of political organisation.44 As we showed in Chapter 4, both the real and the 
mythical historical attachment of Latvians to the Latvian land have been stressed in 
Latvian accounts of the history of the country, while links with Russia and the 
Russians have tended to be overlooked or interpreted as something which was imposed 
against the will of the Latvians. Russians, on the other hand, have usually not seen
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themselves as newcomers to Latvia, because of the long history of Russian settlement 
in, and traditions of Russian political control over, Latvian territories. To them the 
period of independent Latvian statehood has often been seen as a short and insignificant 
interruption of legitimate Russian rule in the region. Such sentiments have been seized 
on by many Latvians who were thereby confirmed in their conviction that Latvian 
independence can be secured only through ethnic Latvian dominance over state 
institutions.
Another factor which one should always bear in mind when discussing Latvian 
ethnopolitics is the dramatic demographic changes which took place in the country 
during the period of Soviet rule. The continuing fall in the proportion of Latvians in the 
republic in combination with the restrictions which the regime put on expressing most 
forms of national feeling indeed made Latvians insecure about their future as an ethnic 
group. In the course of 50 years the Latvian state had been transformed almost beyond 
recognition. Experience has made many Latvians convinced that a future without any 
threat to the survival of the Latvian natioil (ethnos) can be secured only through political 
hegemony. These sentiments are often exploited by Latvian politicians in their 
campaigns for votes and supporters.
Many Latvian politicians believe it is their duty to ensure that the non-Latvian 
share of the population does not exceed 25 per cent, which is commonly regarded as 
the maximum share of 'aliens' which a national state can tolerate in order not to develop 
into a bi-communal or multi-communal society. Ethnic Latvians made up 79 per cent of 
the electorate to the Saeima which was elected in June 1993.45 The citizenship issue is 
therefore seen as crucial in preserving ethnic Latvian hegemony. By granting 
citizenship to those who have been married to citizens for more than 5 years, the share 
of Latvians among the electorate would be reduced to 71 percent, and this is as far as 
many Latvian politicians would go in granting citizenship to present non-citizens 46
Ethnic democracy and the characteristic features of an ethnic democracy are 
usually not seen as goals in themselves, but as necessary in order to create a national 
state. Since it is thought to be impossible to integrate (read assimilate) the large number 
of Russians living in Latvia into a Latvian environment, the only way of preserving the 
desired national character of the state is to restrict entrance into its citizenry. There are, 
indeed, Latvian politicians who emphasise nation-building and integration of Russians, 
but they are at present in a minority. And there is hardly any doubt about what non- 
Latvian citizens are to integrate into: not only are people expected to know the Latvian 
language, language examinations require knowledge of Latvian history, cultural 
traditions and symbols, which clearly illustrates the links between the Latvian ethnos 
and the Latvian state.
Finally, let us also not overlook the question of power-relations between the 
ethnic groups living in Latvia. Ethnic democracy is not only a way of securing the
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cultural survival of the Latvians, but can also be seen as a way of increasing the 
prospects of upward social mobility for one particular group (citizens who are 
predominantly ethnic Latvians) at the expense of other groups living on the same 
territory. The introduction of language requirements for most influential positions has 
been a way of ensuring Latvian hegemony over the political, administrative and 
economic elites of the country.47 Some economic privileges are restricted to citizens. It 
could be and has been argued that Russians can learn Latvian and become citizens, and 
that they can then compete on equal terms with the Latvians. The problem is that 
Russians are likely to fall behind in the crucial first stages of the transition to a market 
economy. Many Latvians perceive the Russians as inseparable from the nationality 
which enjoyed a privileged role during Soviet colonial rule. Such a perception can serve 
as a justification for why the roles should now be reversed, with Russians in a 
subordinate position. It seems to be acknowledged among most Latvians and Latvian 
politicians alike that many, or most, of the Russians should not personally be blamed 
for the crimes of the Soviet regime, as they to a large extent were victims themselves of 
this regime. The collective right of the Latvian nation to political dominance does not, 
however, seem to be questioned by the same Latvians.
9.3 .  Conclusions
What, then, are the prospects for regulating interethnic relations in Latvia? I 
believe there are several factors that will be decisive. It could be argued that the absence 
of interethnic violence in the country in itself is a sign of interethnic harmony, and 
indeed, when looking other regions on the same continent, and also in a post-Soviet 
context, it may seem irrelevant to focus so much attention on interethnic relations in 
Latvia and the two other Baltic states, where the situation must be considered to be 
idyllic in comparison. When some observers use terms such as "ethnic cleansing", 
"apartheid" or "gross violations of human rights" to describe the situation in Latvia, 
they either have not studied the realities, or they have some secondary motives.
Still, as this thesis has shown, the ethnopolitical situation in Latvia is quite 
complex, and the absence of violence does not imply that there is no tension between 
the ethnic groups living in Latvia, at least on a political level. Although it is quite 
common to refer to unproblematic relations between the various nationalities in Latvia, 
most people would agree certain difficulties do exist, although some would see the 
demographic situation in Latvia as the root of the problem, while others would focus on 
the rights of ethnic minorities. Although Latvia now is in a process of state-building 
and nation-building, ethnopolitical developments will to a large extent be determined by 
events which have taken place in the past, and I believe there are three main factors,
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which can all be seen as legacies of the Soviet period, which will continue to shape 
interethnic relations in Latvia in the future.
Firstly, as has been stressed before, one cannot ignore the demographic 
developments which started after World War II and which are very important in 
explaining ethnic Latvian attitudes towards Russians and other immigrants. History 
knows many examples of peoples which have disappeared, and although it has been 
argued that the Latvian nation is more strongly consolidated today than it was in 
194048, there can be no doubt that many Latvians feel a perceived threat not only 
against the survival of the nation, but, perhaps more importantly, against not being able 
to be and feel "Latvian” in Latvia. The Soviet legacy is visible in terms of the state of 
the economy, industry, housing and work morale, and it is natural that many see all this 
not only as a consequence of the Soviet system, but blame Russian immigration for 
many of the present deficiencies. The demographic situation in Latvia will surely 
continue to be taken into account by Latvian politicians when devising future policies, 
and ambitious politicians who look for leading positions will have to show their 
commitment to protect the interests of the Latvian nation.
Secondly, the special status of the Russians in the Soviet empire, which has 
been analysed in this thesis, is likely to impede Russian integration, because it will take 
time before they are treated by the Latvians just like any other nationality, at least as 
long as many Russians themselves do not look upon themselves as a national or ethnic 
minority in Latvia. Many Russians do not accept the fact that the Soviet Union has 
disintegrated, or they hope for some form of a resurrection of the Russian empire with 
a prominent role for the Russian nation. To them Latvian independence is seen only a 
temporary, and unfortunate, phenomenon. As long as attitudes like these are 
widespread among the Russian population, they are likely to be identified with the 
Russians as a group, and to a certain extent stigmatise them. Some Russians have lived 
a privileged life in Latvia, and when the privileges are taken away from them, it is 
difficult to adjust to the new situation. At the same time, there are Latvians who think 
that they, as the state-bearing nation, are entitled to preferential treatment by the state.49
Thirdly, the institutionalisation of nationality (ethnicity) in Latvia, which was 
strengthened during the Soviet period, is another factor which is likely to slow down 
integration processes. The fact that Latvia has chosen an ethnic (not civic) concept of 
the nation is largely a legacy from the past, and this is reflected not only in legislation, 
but tends also to be almost universally recognised and accepted by representatives of all 
the ethnic groups living in Latvia. Many Russians, however, see Latvia not as state of 
and for the Latvian nation (read ethnos or Latyshskaya natsiya) only, but as a state of 
and for the "Latvian people" (Latviiskii narod), of which they consider themselves to be 
a part. Even though the ethnic concept of the nation has been accepted by most 
Russians in Latvia, there is no universal agreement on whether it is this nation or the
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whole "people of Latvia" which is the foundation of the state, and there are also many 
Latvians who emphasise civic values as fundamental for Latvian statehood. The tension 
between the accent on ethnic and civic aspects in the state-(re)building process is likely 
to continue in the future, but at present, for reasons discussed above, it is the ethnic 
concept of the state which seems to have gained ascendancy.
Although ethnopolitical developments in Latvia to a large extent will be 
influenced by these legacies of the past, there are also other factors which will be 
crucial for determining the ethnopolitical situation in Latvia in the future, and I will here 
point to some that to me seem to be the most important. Economic developments and 
the success in transforming the Latvian economy are likely to be decisive in this regard. 
Russians have been overrepresented in many of the large, unprofitable industries which 
are now threatened by bankruptcy or great reductions in staff. If these Russians cannot 
find alternative employment and the government fails in bringing economic prosperity 
for its "citizens" (including residents who are, in strictly legal terms, non-citizens), the 
risk that ethnic unrest may develop would be likely to increase. There are, on the other 
hand, also those who have argued that economic hardship brings people closer 
together, because ordinary people allegedly have common interests.50 If one group of 
the population is likely to suffer more than others, however, this does not seem 
conducive to interethnic harmony. Economic stability is also required for the Latvian 
state to take on its responsibility for financial support to the cultural development of the 
Russian and other ethnic minorities. Russians, however, seem to be more active in 
defending their economic interests than in the struggle for greater financial support for 
their cultural needs.
Developments in Russia and the attitudes and actions the Russian government 
takes towards the Russian population in the post-Soviet states in general, and in Latvia 
in particular, will also influence ethnopolitical developments in the country. There is no 
reason to doubt that many Russian politicians have a genuine concern for Russians and 
other former Soviet citizens who suddenly find themselves in the diaspora, and often 
perceive it as a duty to protect their interest. At the same time there are also forces 
which are more inclined to use the Russian population in the post-Soviet states as a 
political card and as a means by which Russia can retain influence in the post-Soviet 
polities. Responsible politicians are subject to constant pressure from forces on the far 
right (or left: the distinction is often hard to draw) to take tougher measures in order to 
support Russians in Latvia who, it is argued, are subject to discrimination and 
violations of their rights. Many Russians in Latvia also want a greater involvement 
from Russia, while others are sceptical of any form of Russian pressure, which they 
believe will only serve to exacerbate the situation. The tendency to make a troop 
withdrawal from Latvia conditional upon an improvement in the treatment of Russian 
residents in the country is an indication that the Russian president and government have
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not, in reality, fully recognised Latvian independence, which could cause distrust 
among Latvians about the loyalty of Russians, were a more serious threat to Latvian 
independence to develop. The state of the bilateral relations between Russia and Latvia 
is therefore likely to be of great importance.
The West has only limited opportunities to influence ethnopolitical 
developments in Latvia, but these opportunities should also be considered in a 
discussion of what will determine future Latvian ethnopolitics. Leading political forces 
in Latvia have more than once expressed their intention to seek a closer Latvian 
integration into European economic and political structures, and in order to do so they 
seem to be determined to comply with certain standards for the treatment of ethnic 
minorities. Citizenship legislation, for example, is subject to evaluation by the Council 
of Europe. One of the problems in this respect is insufficient familiarity with the 
Latvian ethnic scene among many European politicians, so that European 
recommendations do not always consider the particularities of Latvian and Soviet 
history. Without intimate knowledge of the unique ethnopolitical situation in Latvia, 
there is the danger that so-called expert missions may become discredited in the eyes 
both of the Latvian authorities and minority groups in Latvia, or their findings exploited 
by the same groups. Another problem is that it is not possible for the international 
community to find universally applicable norms for how to deal with ethnic issues, and 
many western countries themselves have ethnic minority problems which they have not 
been able to solve.
As we have seen, there are many factors which to various degrees will 
determine future ethnopolitical developments in Latvia, and many of these factors will 
not, or will only indirectly, be influenced by the Russian population itself. Russians in 
Latvia have to live with the legacies of the past, and they can, of course, not be 
expected to have a major impact on political developments in Russia or the rest of 
Europe. With the, at least temporarily, limited opportunities for most Russians to 
participate in political life in Latvia, their impact on political developments there may 
also be restricted. However, whatever the political situation and conditions for 
Russians in Latvia, there will, on an individual level, be a number of decisions to be 
made for each Russian. Some of the most important of these for many Russians are 
whether to stay in Latvia, or perhaps leave the country; whether to opt for citizenship of 
Latvia, for Russian citizenship, or not to opt for any citizenship at all; whether to join 
political or social organisations or movements, or to stay outside politics; whether to 
learn the Latvian language and try to integrate into Latvian society; and how to define 
their personal relationship with Russia. In this thesis I have discussed some of the 
factors which are likely to determine the choice the individual makes to these questions. 
It is, however, also important to stress that the choices Russians make on an aggregate
272
Ch a pter  9
level are likely to affect the ethnopolitical situation in Latvia, and thereby the conditions 
under which Russians there are going to live in the future.
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Appendix 1: Survey Methodology
Three different institutions were involved in the survey: The Latvian 
sociological firm SOCIO, The Technological University of the Russian Society of 
Latvia (ROL) and the University of Glasgow. The survey design had therefore to be 
adjusted to the needs and requirements of all three institutions. The wording of the 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 2. Since the institutions differed somewhat 
regarding the particular areas of interest to their research, some of the questions were 
included in the questionnaire because of a request from one or both of the two other 
institutions, although they have not been considered to be relevant for a thorough 
analysis in this thesis.
A number of important decisions were made in order to ensure a representative 
sample and valid survey results:
1. A pilot survey was carried out on 10 respondents in order to test the 
prepared questionnaire, and some corrections were introduced in order to clarify a few. 
questions.
2. The sample design was based on the census of 1989 which gave 
detailed information about the distribution of different nationalities living in the various 
administrative districts of Latvia at that time. The census was seen as adequately reliable 
for sampling purposes, and it represented the most up-to-date source of information 
about the population to which we had access.
3. Since we did not have the financial means to carry out the survey in all 
the administrative units of Latvia, we had to make a selection of geographical units. 
This selection should reflect the distribution of Russians in Latvia in terms of type of 
settlement (rural/urban), density of Russians in the area and special historical 
circumstances. Since the great majority of Russians in Latvia (67 per cent) live in one 
of the seven largest cities (which are all independent administrative units), it was natural 
to include all these cities in the survey. In the subsequent analysis we chose to keep the 
capital separate, due to its size and particularities. The Latgalian cities of Daugavpils 
and Rezekne were treated as one unit in the analysis because of the historical role of 
Latgale which distinguishes this region from other areas of Latvia and because of the 
density of Russians (Russians making up more than 50 per cent of the population in 
both cities). In the analysis the four remaining large towns have been referred to as 
'other cities'. The rural districts (which include smaller cities) were selected according 
to similar principles. We decided that six rural districts would suffice. Two of them 
should be in Latgale (Daugavpils and Kraslava) because of the regional factors 
mentioned above, the other four were to be selected according to the principle of 
density of Russians in the respective district. Two districts were selected where
275
APPENDIX 1
Russians made up from 10 to 30 per cent of the total district population (Riga and 
Valka), the other two were districts where they made up less than 10 per cent (Ventspils 
and Talsi).
4. The number of respondents in each city or district was chosen so that 
there would be a representative distribution of respondents in each unit which would 
reflect the distribution in Latvia as a whole when taking into consideration the factors 
mentioned above. Since 48 per cent of all Russians live in Riga, 48 per cent of the 
respondents should also be selected from this city. Similarly, since about 10 per cent of 
Russians in Latvia live in the rural districts of Latgale, the percentage of respondents in 
our survey from such districts should be the same, and they were distributed in 
accordance with the size of the Russian population in the two selected districts.1 The 
number of questionnaires was originally much larger (more than 2000), due to the 
specific interests of the researchers in SOCIO. They required a larger number of 
respondents in some of the cities where they carried out case studies. The final sample 
.which is used in this survey consists of 591 respondents, and they were selected 
randomly out of this larger number by the computer, taking into account not only the 
geographical distribution of the respondents, but also their age and sex distribution. 
The number is large enough to compare the different types of settlement, although the 
number of respondents in rural areas where less than 10 per cent of the population are 
Russians is too small to be treated separately, so that in the analysis we normally make 
a distinction only between Latgalian and other rural districts.
5. The field work took place in March and April 1992. Various methods 
were used in order to select respondents to the survey. Most respondents were 
approached in their homes, while some were approached at their place of work. Since 
the sociologists with whom I cooperated had previously carried out similar surveys, 
they had more information than I had about the distribution of the population within the 
various geographical units. We also used local sociologists in some of these units to 
assist in drawing a map of the population in each unit. The selection of respondents 
required a certain degree of subjective judgement, since there was no information about 
the Russian population in each unit which made it possible accurately to establish where 
they lived and worked. Respondents were thus approached in different types of 
settlements and work places in each geographical unit. With some geographical 
variation, in the residential areas (never less than five areas in any unit) a system of 
random selection of flats/houses was established. At work places similar methods were 
employed. In rural districts with few Russians, there was a need for assistance from 
local inhabitants in order to find Russians. All in all, although our sampling method 
does not provide a completely random sample, it can be considered the best possible 
method with the available statistics and financial means, and when compared to the
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population as a whole, our sample proved to be representative on all important 
parameters.
6. It was decided that only Russians should be approached, and every 
respondent was told that it was a survey among Russians in Latvia only. However, 
when we received the questionnaires, there were always many respondents who had 
filled in the questionnaire but reported a nationality other than Russian (few of them 
were Latvians, but there were many Ukrainians, Belarusians or Jews, while some did 
not report their nationality). Such questionnaires were subsequently removed, and the 
analysis is based exclusively on respondents who reported Russian as their nationality. 
There are some problems involved here which are discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 1.
7. Since we did not have the capacity to arrange time-consuming personal 
interviews with a large number of respondents, the questionnaires were distributed to 
each individual respondent by local distributors (usually students) who had received 
training and were familiar with the questionnaire. Each respondent was first given some 
guidance by the distributor as to how to fill in the questionnaire properly. They were 
then left with the questionnaire until the distributors later came to collect them. Any 
problems which the respondents had encountered while filling in the questionnaire 
could be addressed at this stage. All the distributors were native Russian speakers, 
which was deliberate, as other studies have shown that Russians sometimes do not 
trust ethnic Latvian interviewers and see them as representatives of the state, and 
therefore are less willing to participate and to answer the questions frankly. We also 
made a point of emphasising the Glasgow University connection, which seemed to 
have the effect that people took the survey more seriously and were less suspicious 
about how the results would later be used. The response rate was very satisfactory: 
more than 90 per cent of the respondents approached were willing to take part in the 
survey.
8. The data entry took place in Latvia by specialists working for SOCIO, 
with this author present only in a control function. Cleaning of the data was also 
executed in Latvia, before the disc with the data file was handed over to me. The data 
were run on SPSS for Macintosh, version 4.0. The statistical significance of all 
correlations referred to in this thesis has been tested by using significance tests2, and if 
there are relationships which are not statistically significant (the significance level 0.05 
was chosen), they have been treated as non-existent.
F^or the distribution of Russians in each administrative unit in Latvia, see Table 5.1, Chapter 5.
2Tests that were used are the chi-quadrat test, the phi coefficient test, and the Pearson's r test.
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Appendix 2: The Questionnaire
The wording of the questionnaire was as follows:
5 A T B H E C K H K  H C C 5 E 5 0 B A  TE 5 B C K H 0  1IEHTP «C O U H O »
T E X H O 5O rinE C K H 0 yHHBEPCHTET FYCCKO0 OBIUHHH JIATBHH
THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
npoeoflflT coBMecTHoe MccjieaoBaHMe, ue i^bK) KOToporo flB^aeTCfl M3yneHMe 
pea^ibHoro TTOJioweHMfi pyccKMX b HacTonujee bpbma b 5aTBMM. AHKeTa 
a HO HUM Ha ST, <f>aMM,71MS1 M MM SI He yKa3blBaH)TCfl.
IIpocb6a k BaM - 3ano7iHMTb aHKeiy. BHMMaTe^ ibHO npoHMTam-e KarcjabiM 
BOTtpoc m npezMorceHHbie BapnaHTbi o tb s to b .  Bbi6paB Han6o7iee 
npneMTieMbiki zyisr Bac o tb c t ,  oSeeflMTe Kpy >kkom uiM^ p. Ec^mhm oamh m3 
npefl7io>KeHHbix BapnaHTOB oTBeTOB He OTpawaeT Bame MHeHMe, to  
HaTTMUJMTe CBOM OTB6T B COOTBeTCTBytOLljeM MecTe.
IIpOCMM BblCKa3blBaTb TOJlbKO CBOKI JlMHHyfO TOHKy 3peHMST.
P k ir a ,  Glasgow - 1992
H A 3 0 B H T E , J IO 5 K A 5 Y 0 C T A , H C T O H H H K H  C P E 5 C T B  C Y H 1ECTBO BA H H SI B A IU E 0  
C E M b H :
5 a
1. Pa6oTa Ha TTpeanpMSTTMM, b yHpeacaeHMM 1
2. Fa6oTa b KO,nxo3e 1
3 . Fa6oTa y npeflTTpuHMMaTe^iq 1
4. 5MHHoe TTOflCOfiHoe X03STMCTBO 1
5. CaMOGTO HTe,7ib Ha sr npeflTTpn HMMaTe i^bCKa sr paSoTa 1
6 . ITOMOUJb CO CTOpOHbl poflMTe^ieM 1
7. Ctmtt6H£|mst 1
8 .JIeHCMsr 1
9. £ p y rn e  mctohhmkm_____________________________  1
(Ha30BMTe MX)
OTMETBTE, nO3KA^Y0CTA, KTO KPOME BAC H BAI1IE0 3KEHH (MY3KA) E I1IE 
JIP03KHBAET B BAI1IE0 CEMBE?:
5a
10. MaTb (Teuja, CBexpoBb) 1
11. OTeu (TecT, CBexop) 1
12. Ba6yujKM 1
13.5ezjyniKM 1
5a
14.5eTM 1
15. TeTKM, flflflbq 1
16.5pyrM e____________  1
(HaTTMUJMTe)
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17. KaxoB cpeflHeMecflMHbiM a o x o z j  Ha o z jh o to  '•me Ha Barnett ceMbki (cyMMy 
flOXOflOB B cex  HTieHOB ceMbM pa3fle7IMTe Ha XOTlklHeCTBO H^ieHOB CeMbkl, 
BKTiHDHafi MajnoTieTHMx aeT ett) ?
- £ o  2 0 0  p y 6 . 1 - o t  700  zjo 1000 p y 6 . 5
- o t  2 0 0  flo  300 p y 6 . 2 - o t  1000 flo  1500 p y 6 . 6
- o t  3 0 0  flo  500 p y 6 . 3 - o t  1500 flo  200 0  p y 6 . 7
- o t  50 0  flo  700 p y 6 . 4 - 6o^ iee 2000  p y 6 . 8
Ectim 6 o7 iee  2000  - HanmiikiTe, CXOTlbXO
18. K a x o e  M3 n p e z m a r a e M b ix  cy w a e H k itt  n o ^ m e e  B c e r o  x a p a x T e p n 3 y e T  
pacnpeaeTieHkie a e H e r  b Bawett ceM b e?
- ile H e r  bttotih© XBaTaeT, cneunaJibH O  He bxohommm. 1
- XkiBeM 9 k o h o m h o , h o  a e H e r  otfbHHO XBaTaeT. 2
- JKkiBeM oneH b b x o h o m h o , Ha BawHbie n oxyn xk i c
TpyaoM oTKsTiazjbiBaeM aeHbrki. 3
- HaM TOTibKo ki X B aiaeT  zieH er Ha e a y  ki o n e w a y . 4
- JIo>Ka7iytt, aeHer XBaTaeT k^iiiJb Ha eay. 5
- £ e H e r  He XBaTaeT flaw e Ha e a y ,  jkmbcm B n p o r o jio a b . 6
19. Kax 6bi Bbi oueHkmki c b o m  WMJiMiiiHbie ycTiOBMfl?
- BnOvHHe xopouikie 1 - Jlowa y^tt, He Ba)KHbie 4
- Tlowajiytt, HenTioxkie 2 - IlJioxkie, HeBbmockiMbie 5
- CpeflHkie 3
20. ZIonycxaeTe tim Bw B03M0>KH0CTb Toro, h t o  6e3pa6oTkiua xocHeTca timmho 
Bac?
£a - 1 TpyflHO cxa3aTb - 2 HeT - 3
2 1 . Kax, n o  BaiueM y MHeHkiw, M3MeHH7ikicb cero z iH a  n o  cpaBHeHkiw c  
CepeflklHOM 80-X  TOflOB OTHOLUeHMSl MOKfly ,71KlflbMM pa3Hbix
Haukio HaTib HOCTett, npojKkiBaroiukiMki b  JIaTBkikicxoki P e c n y t f w x e ?
1 - yTiyMUJkl^ MCb
2 - ocTa^ikicb Ha npe>KHeM y p o B H e
3 - yxyaujkiTikicb
22. JIonbiT akrrecb, no>Ka>7iyttcTa, ziaTb o u e H x y  OTHOiueHkiM M e w a y  JuoflbMM  
p a3H b ix  HauMOHaTibHOCTeki b JIaTBkikicxoki P ecn y 6 ^ ik ix e  b H a c T o a m ee  BpeM fl:
OneHb Cxopee TpyziHO Cxopee OneHb
xopouikie xopouikie, cxa3aT b  n^ ioxkie, MeM n^oxkie
M6M n o^xkie xopouikie
1 2 3 4 5
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r £ E  H KAK HACTO JIHHHO Y BAC BO3HHKAI0T KOH4>7IHKTH 
ME 2KH AHHOH A JIbH O rO  XAPAKTEPA?
HacTo PeziKo HnKoraa
23. B rocyaapcTBeHHbix yHpe)KfleHMflx 1 2  3
24. B TpyaoBOM (ynefihOM) KOJiJieKTMBe 1 2  3
25. Ha yTinue, b TpaHCTTopie 1 2 3
26. B c<f)epe fibiTOBoro o6c,ny)KMBaHMfl, b
ToproBJie 1 2  3
27. B yHpe)KfleHMqx 3flpaB<>oxpaHeHMfl 1 2  3
28. Ho MecTy >KMTe^bCTa 1 2  3
29. B ap y ru x  MecTax  1 2 3
(HanMLUMTe,rfle)
C^HTAETE J IK  B H  TIPABHTIbHHM JIFE/IOCTABJIEHHE JIIOtfSIM nPEHM YUlECTB 
B 3A BHCH M 0CTH  OT HX HAUHOH A /IbH O CTH ...
^ a , 9to /la, b o t - TpyziHO Hex, sto
npaBM^ib- fle^ibHbix GKa3aTb Heaonyc- 
ho cjiynaflx tmmo
30.
31.
B TtOTiy HBHMkl o6pa30BaHMfl 
B o6ecneMeHMM 
6s7iaroyCTpoeHHblM )KM71beM 
B CTiy>Ke6HOM, npo^eccno- 
HaTlbHOM pOCTe 
B TTo%7iy MeHMM 6o7iee 
BbicoKoro 3apa6oTKa 
34. B npno6peTeHMM co6ct-
BBHHOCTM
JIpn Bbi6opax b npeacTaBM- 
Te,7ibHbie opraHbi B i^acTM 
Hpn BbiflBkDKeHMM b fleny- 
TaTbi BepxoBHoro CoBeTa 
JIpn Ha3HaHeHMM Ha pyxo- 
BOflflujne aflMMHkiCTpa- 
TMBHbie flOTDKHOCTM 
IIpM BblflBPDKeHMH Ha Bbl- 
SopHbie flOTDKHOCTM B 0 6 - 
LyeCTBBHHblX opraHM3aunflx
32.
33.
35
36.
37
38.
39. K ax Bbi ou eH M B aeT e aeyrreT ibH ocT b B e p x o B H o r o  C oB eT a JlaTBMMCKoPi 
Pecny6jiM KM  n o  p a3 p a 6 o T K e 3axoHOB?
IlpMHflTbie
3aKOHbl
XOPOLUM
B OCHOBHOM, TpyflHO 
npMHMMaroTCfl CKa3aTb, MHe
Hen i^oxne
33KOHbl
TpyflHO
CyflMTb
IIpMHflTO 
M H oro c jia -  
6bix, H e- 
yaaHHbix 
3aKOHOB
JIOHTM Bee 
TTpMHflTbie 
33KOHbl CJia6bl 
n HeyaaHHbi
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40. B KaKoPi M epe Bbi TTOflaepjKMBaeTe n o ^ m n K y ,  up oboe MMy to Cobbtom 
MmHMCTPOB JIaTBMMCKOM FeCTTy6,71MKM?
JIOJlHOCTbW HaCTMMHO TpyaHO CoBceM He
noflflepjKMBaro noaaep)KMBaHD CKa3aTb noflflepjKMBaro
1 2 3 4
41. CoiviacHbi j\v\ Bbi c MHeHneM, hto ttpm HopM a Jib hom ofiujecTBeHHOM CTpoe 
6e3pa6oTnua flBTiaeTCfl HeM36e)KHbiM 3jiom?
jZta - 1 TpyflHO cKa3aTb - 2 HeT - 3
B KAKO0 CTEITEHH BH IIORR EP 3K HB AE TE /I EH TE Jib HOC Tb CJIEZiyKHlIHX 
HOJIHTHXECKHX IIAFTH0, OBIUECTBEHHHX 5BHJKEHH0 H OFrAHH3AUH0?
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
h o j ih o - Cxopee TpyflHO CKopee CoBep-
CTbK) noazjep- CKa3aTb He TTOfl- WeHHO
nofl- jKMBaro, aep)KM- He TTOfl-
flep>KM- H6M He Baro,HeM aep>KM-
Baw nozjflep- TTOflflep- Baro
)KMBaK) JKMBaK)
HapOflhbIM <$pOHT JIaTBMM 1 2 3 4 5
COM3 CeJlbCK0X03flMCT-
BeHHMKOB JIaTBMM 1 2 3 4 5
ZleMOKpaTkinecKafl napTMfl
Tpyaa JIaTBMM 1 2 3 4 5
2IHHJI 1 2 3 4 5
JIaTBMMCKMM KOMMTeT
KOHrpecca rpawaaH
JIaTBMpicKOM Pecnyfi^ kiKM 1 2 3 4 5
K^ iy6 3aujMTbi cpeabi 1 2 3 4 5
PyccKaq oSuiMHa JIaTBMM
CFOJI) 1 2 3 4 5
JlaTBkiPiCKoe o6iyecTBO pyc-
CKoPi Ky^ ibTypbi (HOFK) 1 2 3 4 5
JICZIPJI 1 2 3 4 5
J lC S J l 1 2 3 4 5
HeHTp fleMOKpaTMMeCKMX
MHMUMaTMB OIJIH) 1 2 3 4 5
Ba jyto -c^ iaB a Hcxoe
o6mecTBo 1 2 3 4 5
JIaTBMpiCKaji accounaunfl
COflePlCTBMfl B03p0 )KZie HMhO
F occmm (JIABF) 2 3 4 5
ilpyroe
1 2 3 4 5
(HaTTMUMTe)
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H A H H IU H TE, J IO JK A T iy S C T A , H A 3B A H H H  T A 3 E T  H  JK Y P H A JIO B , K O T O P H E  B H  
EO JIEE H JIH  M EHEE P E rY ^ H P H O  T O T A E T E :
fa3eTbi 3KypHa^bi
H A JIH IU H T E , H O 3 K A JIY 0 C T A , H A 3B A H H H  T A 3 E T  H  JK Y P H A JIO B , K O T O P H E  
B H H H C H B  AH) TCH B A M H  H  B A IU E 0  C E M B E 0 :
ra3eTbi JKypHa^ibi
O TB ETB E n O J K A ^ Y S C T A , KAK B H  C JIY H IA ET E  H  C M O T P H T E  H E P E flA 'IH  . . .
E)K6" 3-6 pa3 1-2 pa3a Pe>Ke He
flHe- b Heae- b  Heae- 1 pa3a b c i^y-
JlaTBMkicKoro paflMO:
BHO J\tQ J\tQ HBflB^ lK) waro
56. - Ha 713T blLUCKOM q3blK6 1 2 3 4 5
57. - Ha pyccKOM q3biKe 1 2 3 4 5
58. PoccMkicKoro paziMO 1 2 3 4 5
59. PaflMo «CBo6oaa» 1 2 3 4 5
60. PyccKa q c^ iy >K6a BB C 1 2 3 4 5
61. «HeMeu,Kaq BO^ iHa» 1 2 3 4 5
62. «rOTIOC AMepMKM» 1 2 3 4 5
63. PaziMO zipyrMX rocyaapcTB 1 2 3 4 5
64. ilpyrMe paflMonepeaaMM 1 2 3 4 5
JIaTBMMCKOrO TeTieBMfleHMfl:
6 5 . - Ha TiaTblUJCKOM fl3blK6
66 . - Ha pyccKOM q3biKe
6 7 . - peTpaHCTiflUMM HOBOCTeki 
CNN Ha aHrTiMMCKOM q3biKe
6 8 . - peTpaHCTiflUMM « 3 sa t»  Ha 
HeMeUKOM A3blKe
6 9 . PoccktkicKoro TeTieBMfleHMfl
7 0 . Te^ ieBkijtie h m  q apyrkix rocy - 
aapcTB
7 1 . Cny t HkiKOBoro TeTieBkiae hm q
KAK, HO B A I1IEM Y  M H EH HIO, H 0 K A 3 H B A I0 T C H  P Y C C K H E  B nE P E flA M A X
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JlaTBMMCKOTO paflMO:
72. - Ha TiaTblLLJCKOM A3blKe
73. - Ha pyccKOM H3biKe
IIpeMMymecTBeH- 
HO ofilieKTMBHO, 
TipaBflMBO
Koraa KaK, JIpeMMymecTBeH- 
TpyflHO HO TTpeflB3S1TO, 
CKa3aTb MCKa>K6HHO
74. PoccnMCKoro pafluo
75. Paano zjpyrMX rocyaapcTB
JlaTBMkicKoro TeTieBMjqeHMfl:
76. - Ha TiaTbllUCKOM H3blKe
77. - Ha pyccK O M  fl3biKe
78. PoccMkicKoro TeTieBMfleHMfl
79. TeTieBnae hm h apytm x  rocy - 
aapcTB
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
I7IE BAIUH 5ETH HJIH Bbi JIJIAHKPYETE JIOJIYHH Tb CPE5HEE CIIEKHAJIbHOE, 
HJIH BblOIlIEE, 0BPA30BAHHE?
5a TpyflHO
CKa3aTb
HeT
80. B JIaTBMMCKOM PecnySjiMKe 1 2 3
81. B Poccmmckom e^aepauMM 1 2 3
82. B apyroM rocyaapcTBe 1 2 3
OTMETbTE, nOXtAJIYSCTA, KAKO0 H3 IIEPEHHCJIEHHHX H3HK0B 5JI3 BAC 
HBJI2ETCH P05HNM (m ojkho  yx a 3 a T b  HecKOJibKo):
83. JIaTblLUCKMM
84. PyccKMM
85. JIO^bCKMM
86. YKpaMCHKMM
5a
1
1
1
1
87. BejiopyccKMM
8 8 . JImtobckmm
89. 5pyroM____
5a
1
1
1
(HaTTMUJMTe)
90. YxajKM Te, n oaca^ yM C T a, b  K axoM  CTeneHM  Bbi B T ia a e e T e  TiaTbiiucKMM 
H3blKOM?
- CoBepiueH H O  c b o 6 o a h o  pa3roBapM Baro, HMTaro m TTMiuy 1
- Ot HOCMTe^ib h o  c b o 6 o a h o  ro B o p ro  m MMTaro 2
- TOBOPH) M HMTaro C HBKOTOpblMM 3aT pyflH eH M flM M  3
- C SoTlbLUMMM 3aTpyHe HM SIMM TOBOpW M TTOHMMaW 4
- JIpaKTM necKM He ro B o p ro  m oneHb tttioxo noHMMaho 5
- CoBepiueHHO He noHMMaro 6
B KAKHX 1IEJIHX, no  BAIUEMY MHEHHIO, HE0EX05HM0 BJIA5EHHE 
JIATbHUCKHM H3HK0M?
283
APPENDIX 2
91. 37iq B blTTOTl He HM q TTpOM3BOaCTBe H HO -TpyaOB bIX M 
npo^eccMOHa^ibHbix 3aaan
92. 37lfl ynacTMfl b oSmecTBeHHo-TTOTiMTMHecKOM >km3hm
93. C ueTibro hob biiue hm q ypoB h q KyTibTyp bi Me >k HauMO HaTib - 
Horo ofiiueHMq
94. 3 ti q y  nacTM q b x y  a o  >KecTBe h hom c a M o a e  qTeTib hoctm
95. 371 q HT6 HM q TiaT blLUCKOM XyflO )K6CTBe H HOM TIMTepaTy p bl
96. 3 ti HTeHMfl ra3eT m )KypHa^ oB
97. 37iq MTCHMfl CTTeUMaJlbHOM TIMTepaTy pbl Ha TiaTblUJCKOM q3blKe
98. 37iqo6iueHMq
99. 3 ti  q npocMOTpa TeTienepeaa h
100. 3 ti  q TToceme hm q TeaTpos, ko HuepTOB, b bicTaBOK, My3ees
C3E3yiOIlIHE BOnPOCbl T03BK0 3 3 3  TEX, KTO B HE30CTATOHHO0 CTEJIEHH 
B3A3EET 3ATHI1ICKHM H3HK0M:
101. H3ynaeTe tim Bbi b HacToquiee BpeMq TiaTbiwcKMM q3biK?
3a - 1 H eT  - 2
102. HMeeTcq tim y Bac weTiaHMe M3ynaTb TiaTbiiucKMM q3biK?
3a - 1 HeT - 2
B KAKO0 CTEHEHH BN B3A3EETE 3PyrHMH S3NKAMH?
CBOfioaHO Pa3roBapM- C SoTlbLUMM Cosep-
pa3roBapM- Baro, t t o h m - TpyaoM ro- LUeHHO
Baro, MMTaro Maro, MMTaro BOpro M TTO- He no-
m nMiuy co CTiOBapeM HMMaro HMMaro
103. A h tt im m c k m m 1 2 3 4
104. HeMeuKMM 1 2 3 4
105. <^ paHUy3CKMM 1 2 3 4
106. JIOTIbCKMM 1 2 3 4
107. 3MTOBCKMM 1 2 3 4
108. 3CTOHCKMM 1 2 3 4
109. 3pyrMM 1 2 3 4
(HanMLUMTe)
110. Bama c e M b q  )k mb ct  . . .
- B MHJJMBMflyaTlbHOM, CBOeM flOM e
- B CBOeM HaCTM MHflMBMayaTlbHOrO flOMa
- B OTaeTlbHOM KBapTMpe
- B o6ujeM (KOMMyHaTlbHOM) KBapTMpe
- B o6uje)KMTMM
- B apyroM  noMemeHMM________________
(HanMLUMTe)
111. CKOTlbKO y Bac KOMHaT?
OaHa KOMHaTa 1 
3Be KOMHaT bl 2
TpM KOMHaT bl 3
- e^Tbipe KOMHaT bl 4
- EoTiee 4-x KOMHaT 5
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112. Yi<a>KMTe, TTOKa^iyPicTa, p a3M ep  mAJ\ow TTJiomaaM, K O T opaa t t p m x  oaMTC a  
Ha o a H o r o  H e^ioseK a b BaiueM ceM be:
- 5 o 6 k b .m . 1 - 1 3 - 1 6  k b .m . 4
- 6 - 9  KB.M. 2  - 1 7 - 2 0  KB.M. 5
- 1 0 - 1 2  k b .m . 3  -  2 1  m 6 o 7 ie e  k b .m . 6
YKAXHTE, HOlKAJiySCTA, HMEETC3 5 H  B BAI1IEM 3KHJIBE . . .
5 a  5 a
1 1 3 . S jieK T pM ^eC T B O  1 118 . T a 3 1
11 4 . H e H T p a ^ ib H o e  o T o n ^ ie H M e  1 119. O^ieKTpoTTTiMTa H a n o T ib H a ^ 1
11 5 . B o a o n p o B o a  1 120. B aH H a, a y i u 1
11 6 . K aH a^M 3au M ?i 1 121. M y c o p o n p o B o a 1
11 7 . r o p a n e e  B o a o c H a 6 >KeHMe 1
HMEETCH 5 H  B BAIHE0 CEMbE . . .
5 a 5 a
122. ^epHO-fie^ibiM  Te7ieBM 3op 1 131. Me6e7ibHbiM rapH M T yp 1
12 3 . UB6THOM T67ieBM 30p 1 1 3 2 . K o sp b i 1
1 2 4 . P aa M o a T m a p a T y p a  1 133. C nopT M B H oe, TypMCTM-
12 5 . <£o t o - K M H oannapaT ypa 1 n e c K o e  CHapqjKeHMe 1
12 6 . B M a e o a n n a p a T y p a  1 1 3 4 . OxOTHMbe, pblfio^lOBHOe
12 7 . My3blKas71bHbie MHCTpyMBHTbl 1 CHapa)KeHMe 1
12 8 . XOJlOaM^b HMK 1 135. 5erKOBOM aBTOMo6M^ib 1
12 9 . CTMpa^ibHafl MaiUMHa 1 136. M o T o p H a a  J io a x a , KaTep 1
130. IllBekiHafl, Bfl3a7ibHafl MaiukiHa
137 . E cT b  j\v\ y  B a c  a o M a iu H flf l  6n 67iMOTeKa?
- 5 o M au JH e k i 6n 67ikioTeKM HeT 1 - Ot  2 0 0  a o  5 0 0  khmt 4
- 5 o  5 0  KHkir 2  - E o ^ e e  5 0 0  KHur 5
- Ot  5 0  a o  2 0 0  KHMr 3
OTM ETbTE, K O JK A 5y0C T A , KAKHE K H H rH  HMEI0TCH B B A M E 0 EH E5H 0TEK E?
M H o ro  M a^io Ho h tm
HeT,
M71M HeT
138. PyccKMX nMcaTe i^eM 1 2  3
139. JlaTbimcKMX TTMcaTe e^M 1 2  3
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103. AhT,71MMCKMX TTMCaTeTieM
104. HeMeuKpix uncaTeTieM
105. IlOJlbCKMX TTMCaTeTieM
106. 5pyrMX______________
(HaTTmunTe)
YKA5KHTE, nO}KAJIY0CTA, HMEET JIH BAIUA CEMbE . . .
144. CazjoB biM y nacTOK, zja ny
145. Oropozi
146. Ilpnycazje6 h biM y MacTOK, mtim 3eMe,7ib h biM 
ynacTO K  c ttoctpomkom
147. HuMero hbt, ho xotcji 6bi MMeTb
148. Hunero hbt, m He xoTe^ i 6bi MMeTb
5 a
1
1
1
1
1
149. B KaKOM Mepe Bbi yflOBTieTBOpeHbl )KM,71Mll|HblMM yCTlOBMflMM?
IIoTiHocTbK) CKopee yzioe- SaTpyzi-
yaoB^eTBo- zieTBopeH, hbm Hflwcb
peH . . He.yZJOBTieTBO.- . OTBeTMTb 
peH
1 2 3
Cxopee He 
yflOBTieTBO- 
. pen, neM. . 
yaoB^ieTBopeH
4
CoBepiueHHO 
He yaoBJieT- 
. . eopeH .
X0TE5H Bbi Bbi HMETb JKH5bE B CBOE0 COEC TBEHHOC TH?
150. /Ia, Hy>KeH BbiKyn jKMTibfl y rocyaapcTBa
151. 5a, b pe3y7ibTaTe 6e3B03M63flH0M (6e3 
BbixyTTa) nepeziaHM >KM7ibfl
152. 5a, XOTeTl 6bl nOCTpOMTb CBOM flOM
153. He xony MMeTb >KM7ibe b CBoeM coficTBe h hoctm
5 a
1
1
1
1
154. Yxa>KMTe, nowaTiyMCTa, c xaxoro BpeMeHM Bbi m Bama ceMbfl npoacMBaeTe 
B JIaTBMM?
5o cepezjMHbi 1940 roaa
C cepeziMHbi 1940 rozia ao KOHua 40-x roziOB
C 50-x roflOB
C 60-x - 70-x roziOB
C 80-x - Hana^ ia 90-x tozjob
O T M E T b T E , H O 5 K A JIY 0 C T A , J IF H T O H H  C B O E rO  J lE P E E 3 flA  H A  JK H T E JIbC T B O  B
JIA T B H IO  (m o w h o  yx a 3 a T b  H ecx o z ib x o  ttpmmmh):
CM^ bHa^  C^ iaSafi 3to He
155. JIpMrziaiue HMe pozicTBe h hmkob, 
zipy3eM
156. y  Me6a b H TY, Tex HMKy Me, BY3e
157. JIpMrziameHMe npezjTTpMATMM, 
MM HMCTepCTB, BeflOMCTB
npMHMHa npMHMHa npMHMHa
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158. HanpaBTieHMe Ha pa6oTy nocTie
o k o  h Ma hm a y ne6 Horo 3aBeae hm a 1 2 3
159. IIepee3fl b aeTCTBe c poflMTeTiJiMM 1 2 3
160. JIpMe3Zi no oprHafiopy 1 2 3
161. OcTaTicfi (npMexaTi) nocTie
ZjeMo6MTlM3aUMM 1 2 3
162. B pe3yTibTaTe 3aMy>KecTBa,
)K6HMTb6bl 1 2 3
163. IIOCTie OKOHMaHMSI cpoKa
3aKTlHJHeHMfl 1 2 3
164. H3-3a KT1MM3TM MeCKMX yCTlOBMM 1 2 3
165. JlyMLUMe MaTepMaTlbHbie yCTlOBMfl
)KM3HM 1 2 3
166. Jly MLUMe ycTiOBMfl KyTibTypHoro
pa3BMTMq 1 2 3
167. BOTIblUMe B03M0 >K HOCTM
npo<|)eccMOHaTibHoro pocTa 1 2 3
168. BoTiee LUMpOKMM Bblfiop pafioTbi 1 2 3.
169. Zlpyroe
(HanMLUMTe) 1 2
170. Kax TIM MHO Bbi OKa3aTlMCb B TIaTBMM?
- H 3£|ecb pOflMTlCfl 1
- 03 Poccmm 2
- C YKpaMHbl 3
- H3 BeTiopyccMM 4
- C 3aKaBKa3bfl 5
- H3 Ka3axcTaHa m CpeflHeM A3mm 6
- H3 flpyrMX MecT 7
(HanMLUMTe, oTKyaa)
KAK BAI1IA CEMB3 OKASAJIACb B JIATB00?
171. 3ziecb pOZlMTlMCb
172. 03 Poccmm
173. C YxpaMHbi
174. H3 BeTiopyccMM
175. C 3axaBKa3bfi
176. 03 Ka3axcTaHa m CpeflHeM A3mm
177. 03 zjpyrMx MecT
(HanMLUMTe, OTKyjqa)
178. KaK a o T ir o  tim m ho Bbi npo>K M B aeT e b  JIaTBMM?
- Ro 5 TieT 1 - BoTiee 15 TieT 4
-5-10TieT 2 -Cpo)KfleHMfl 5
- 11-15 TieT 3
YKA3K0TE, JIOJKATIYftCTA, B KAKHX MECTAX BHE 7IATB00 BH 0MEETE 
PO£CTBEHH0KOB, C KOTOPBIM0 JIOMEP3K0BAETE TECHHE CB030?
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£a
179. B P occm m ckom  # e f le p a u n M  1
18 0 . H a Y x p a M H e  1
181. B E eT iap ycM  1
18 2 . B JlM TBe, B c to h m m  1
183. B z ip y ro M  p e r n o H e ______________________________________________  1
(HanMLume)
184. CorTiacHbi tim  B n  c MHeHMeM, h t o  xopoiuee npaBMTeTibCTBO HMKoraa He 
flonycTMT 6e3pa6oTMuy b  csoeM rocyaapcTBe?
£ a  - 1 T p yziH O  GKa3aT b  - 2  H eT  -  3
B CJIYHA-E JIO T E P H  P A E O T H  H  C B O E O flH  B b lE O F A , K A K  B b i E Y tfE T E  CEBH  
B EC T H  (MOJKHO OTMCTMTb HeCKOTlbKO BapMaHTOB) ?
185. Eyay McxaTb paSoTy TOTibKo b  c o o t b c t c t b m m
£a He
3 Haw
HeT
186.
CO CBOBM KBaTlM(|)MKaUMeM M CTTeLLMaTIb HOCTbK) 
CorTiaceH Ha paSoTy c npeflBapMTeTibHbiM
1 2 3
nepeofiyneHMeM 1 2 3
187. Eyay )KMTb Ha nocoSMe t t o  6e3pa6oTMue 1 2 3
188. CorTiaceH Ha TiroSyro paSoTy 1 2 3
189. SaMMycb npeanpMHMMaTeTibCKOM aeflTeTibHOCTbro 1 2 3
190. Jlepeeay m 6yay pafioTaTb b  ceTibcxoM xo3fiMCTBe 1 2 3
191.
192.
JIonbiTarocb ycTpoMTbcn Ha pa6oTy 3a rpaHMueki 
Eyay ynacTBOBaTb b axuMflx npoTecTa
1 2 3
193.
(MMTMHrax, 3a6acTOBKax m T.n.) 
Zlpyroe
1 2 3
(HanMLUMTe) 1 2 3
1 9 4 . C H M T aeT e tim  Bbi npM eM TieM biM  a t ia  c e f i q  npM  H e x o T o p b ix  
o 6 cT O A T eT ib C T B a x  npM SerH yT b k  TaxoM  $ o p M e  6 o p b 6 b i 3a c b o m  n p a B a , x a x  
3a6acTOBKa?
Ee3ycTioBHO, BnoTiHe TpyzjHO B p q fl tim  HeT,
fla  B03M05KH0 CKa3aTb HMKOTfla
1 2 3  4  5
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195. B xaxoPi cieneHM JIocTaHOBzieHMe «0 rparcziaH C T B e* o t  15 o x t a 6 p a  
199 lr., upMHAToe BepxoBHbiM CoseTOM JIaTBMpicxoPi PecnySTiMKM, Bac i^mhho 
yzioBTieTBopfleT?
llOTlHOCTbK)
yaoB^ieTBO-
paeT
Cxopee yaoB- 
JlBTBOpfleT, 
neM hb yaoB- 
jneTBopfieT
SaTpyzi-
HflWCb
OTBCTMTb
Cxopee He 
yaoBTieTBO- 
pneT, neM 
yaoBTieTBo- 
paeT
4
CoBepiueHHO 
He yjqoBTieT- 
BopaeT
196. B KOHue 1991 roaa HeKOTopbie 6biBiune pecnyS i^nKM CCCP co3ZjaziM 
Cozjpy >KecTBo He3aBMCMMbix rocyaapcTB (CHD. B ziaHHoe cozpyacecTBo He 
boujtim rocyaapcTBa EaziTMM. B xaxoPi Mepe Bbi coiviacHbi c MHe HMeM, mto 
TIaTBMfi ziozi>KHa 6bMa 6bi BXOflMTb b CHr?
HoTiHocTbro Cxopee TpyziHp Cxopee H.e . . . KaTero-.
coiviaceH coiviaceH, neM cxa3aTb coiviaceH, punecxM 
He coiviaceH HeM coiviaceH ttpotmb
1 2 3 4 5
^EM JIHHHO JUVK BAC HBaSIETCH JIATBH3 (m o jk h o  B bifipaT b  H ecx o ^ ib x o
BapMaHTOB OTBeTOB) ?
fla
197. Pozim hom  m om x npezixoB 1
198. TeppMTOpMePl, )KMTb Ha XOTOpOpi MeHfl BblHyflMTIM
oScTOATeTlbCTBa 1
199. MoePi poflMHoPi 1
200. a yBawaro npaeo JIaTBMM Ha He3aBMCMMOCTb 1
201. rocyzjapcTBOM, M3 xoToporo a  yeziy, xax TOJibxo 3ziecb
MHe CT3H6T TTJIOXO )KMTb 1
202. SeMTiePi, xoTopyro a  He noxMHy hm npM xaxMx yc^ ioBMAx 1
203. HcTopMnecxM JlaTBMA 6bvia m ocTaeTCA MacTbio Poccm m 1
^ E M  JEH^HO ZIJIH B A C  H B JISIE TC a PO C C H H ?
204. Pozimhom momx poziMTeziePi 1
205. PoflMHoPi momx npeaxoB 1
206. MoePipoflMHOM 1
207. CTpaHOpi, Tfle )KMByT MOM pOflCTBeHHMXM 1
208. rocyaapcT B O M , x o T o p o e  3aujMTMT Trpasa pyccxM X  1
209. T ocyziapcTBOM, xyzja mo >k ho yexaTb Ha ttocto a  h Hoe
MeCTO JKMTBTlbCTBO 1
210. TocyziapcTBOM, rzie 6bi a  He xoTezi )KMTb 1
211. Poccma - upocTO coceziHee rocyzjapcTBo 1
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J I F H X 0 5 H 5 0 C B  J IH  5 H H H O  B A M , H J IH  H 5 E H A M  B A I1 IE 0  C E M L H , 
C T A 3 K H B A T B C 3  Y  H A C , B 5 A T B H H , CO C 5 Y H A H M H  H A FY IH EH H H  IIP A B  H 3 -3 A  
H A H H O H A 5 B H O 0  J IF H H A 5  5 E  3KHOC TH  . . .
5 a
2 1 2 . B n o  Jiy He hmm o 6 p a 3 0 B a  hm a  1
2 13. B o 6 e c n e  He hmm f o i a r o y  C T poe h h mm )KM^ibeM 1
214. B cziy >kc6 hom, npotfreccMO Ha i^b hom pocTe 1
215. B n ojiy n eH M M  6 o ^ ie e  BM COKoro 3a p a 6 oTK a 1
2 16. B n p n o S p e T e  hum c o S c T B e  h h o c tm  1
2 1 7 . CofinpaeTecb jim Bm , yHMTbiBaa CKTiaziMBaroujyrocfi b HacTOfuuee BpeMfl 
TTOTlMTMHeCKy K) M 3K O HOMM HeCKy H5 oScTaHOBKy B JIaTBMM M B TO  CyflapCTBaX 
C H r  BbieXaTb M3 JIaTBMMCKOM PeCnySziMKM?
PeujMTi B e p o s iT H e e , T p y z iH o  B e p o f iT H e e , PeLUMJi
. y e x a T b .  . y e z iy ,  neM  c x a s a T b  o c T a H y c b ,  o c i a T b e q
o c T a H y c b  neM  y e z iy
1 2  3  4  5
C J IE 5 Y IO m H 0  B O H PO C  T 0 3 B K 0  5 5 3  TEX, KTO 5 Y M A E T  OB 0 T 'B E 3 5 E :
K Y 5 A  H M EH HO  BBI X 0 T E 5 H  BBI Y E X A T B  H 3  5 A T B H H  HA J I0 C T 0 3 H H 0 E  M E C TO  
1K H T E 5B C T B A ?
5a 5a
218. B PoccMMCKyro 4>eziepauMH) 1 226. BIHBeukiK) 1
219. Ha YKpaMHy 1 227. BTepMaHMK) 1
220. B Beziapycb 1 228. BHojibwy 1
221. B JlMTBy, 3CTOHMK) 1 229. BCIHA 1
222. B3axaBKa3be 1 230. B flpyryw CTpaHy
223. BKa3axcTaH 1 (HanMLUMTe) 1
224. B CpeZlHhOhO A3MhO 1 231. Bee paBHO xyaa 1
225. B $MH71flHZlMK> 1 232. Euie He peiUM i^ 1
J I P E 5 J I 0 J I 0  3K HM  C H T Y A 1IH H D , X T O  B E P X O B H H 0  CO B E T  5 A T B H E C K O 0  
P E C JIY E 5 H K H  EI1IE HE H P H H 3 5  JIO C T A H O B JIEH H E 0  T P A JK 5 A H C T B E , H  Y  BCEX 
3 K H T E 5 E 0  5 A T B H H  H M E E T C H  B 0 3 M 0  3K H 0C T B  BBI B O P  A  rP A 3 K 5 A H C T B A . 
KAKOE T P A 1 K 5 A H C T B 0  X 0 T E 5 H  E H  JIP H H H T B  5 H H H 0  B H  (mojkho OTMeTMTb 
HeCKOJIbKO TT0 3 MUMM npM yCZlOBMM B b lS o p a  ZIBOMHOTO r p a  JKZia HCTB3) ?
5 a
233. Tpa >Kzia hctbo JIaTBMMCKOM Pecny6 i^MKM 1
234. Tpa >Kzia hctbo Poccmm 1
235. ToajKzia hctbo zioyroro rocyziaocTBa 1
(HanMLUMTe, xaxoro)
236. TpajKzia hctbo tom pecnySziMKM, rzie poziM^icq 1
237. He xoTe^ 6 bi npMHMMaTb HMKaxoro rpa>KziaHCTBa 1
238. MHe TpyZlHO OTBCTMTb Ha 3TOT BOnpOC 1
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239. IIpMXOflMTCfl TIM BaM patfoT aT b B Tec HOM TIM H HOM KOHTaKTe C TiaTblliiaMM?
£ a  - 1 HHoraa - 2 H eT  - 3
2 4 0 . KaK Bbi O T H eceT ecb  k TOMy, h t o  B a u ia  a o n b  (mtim cb m ) BCTyTTMT b 6paK  c 
TiaTbllUOM (TiaTbllUKOM) ?
OneHb 6Tia- E T iaronpM - T pyziH o H e6T iaro - Pe3KO o t p m - 
ronpM flTHO AT HO CKa3aTb TrpMflTHO LiaTeTlbHO
1 2 3 4 5
241. ECTIM 6 bl B aM  TTpMLUTlOCb B blfiM paT b Z i p y r o e  MeCTO )KMT6 TIbCTBa, TO MMeTia 
tim 6bi zjtiji Bag 3Ha.He.HMe HauMo HaTib HocTb TTposKMBawuiMX T aM ? .....................
OMeHb BoTibiuoe TpyzjHO He6oTibiuoe He MMeTia 6bi
6oTibiiioe CKa3aTb HMKaKoro
3HaHeHMS1
1 2 3 4 5
242. B KaKOM M e p e  B bi c o r T ia c H b i c MHeHM eM o t o m ,  h t o  Tiyniue B c e r o  
p a 6 o T a T b  B KOTlTieKTMBe, COCTOJimeM M3 TTp6 flCTaBM TeTieM TOTlbKO C BoeM  
HaUMO HaTIb HOCTM?
IlOTlHOCTbK)
c o r T ia c e H
C x o p e e  
co rT ia ceH , MeM 
He corT iaceH
TpyziHo
CKa3aTb
C x o p e e  He 
co rT ia ceH , 
neM co rT ia ceH
K a T e r o -
PMM6 CKM
TTpOTMB
5
243. B KaKm x  KOMTraHMfix Bbi npezm oM M TaeTe n p o e o flM T b  c b o S o a h o c  B peM fl 
(3aHflTMfl CTTOPTOM, TiporyTIKM, Tipa3flHMKM, BblTTMBKM) ?
- C TuozibMM npeMMyujecTBeHHo CBoeM HauMo HaTib h o c t m  1
- C TiaTblliiaMM 2
- B zqaHHOM C T iy n a e  HauMo HaTib HOCTb He M M eeT 3 HaHehma  3
rEOrPASITCECKOE HOJIOJKEHHE H TEHZIEHHHH HCTOPHHECKHH JIPOHECCOB 
OnPEflEJEHJIH B3A H M O 2IE0CTBH E ^A T H IU E H  H FYCCKHX. K 0 J H H E C T B 0  H 
KAHECTBO ^A H H O rO  B 3A H M O flE 0C T B H H  OE'bHCHHIOTCH H JIOHHMAIOTCH 
-TIIO^bMH H E02IH H AK 0B0, JIOPO0 - HPOTHBOPE^HBO.
MOrJIH BH BH OTMETHTb, HTO 2IAOT FYCCKHE HOJIOlKHTEJIbHOrO flJIH 
^IATHIlIEi! H tfATBHH? HanMUJMTe, no>KaTiyMCTa.
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A H TO ,  n o  BAIUEMY MHEHHIO, HPHHECJIH PYCCKHE 0  TFHU A TEJILH O r0  M 3  
^A T H IIIE S  H JIATBHH? HaTTMUJMTe, no>KaTiyMCTa.
B KAKOfl MEPE B H  C O fJIA C H N  CO C JIEayiO inH M H  C Y M E H H 3 M H :
244 "PyccKne m Foccmh
3CMT1M
TiaTbiiueM b oziHO rocy- 
aapcTBo"
245. "PyccKne 3aTopMO- 
3MT1M 3KOHOMMHeCKOe 
pa3BMTHe JlaTBMM"
246. "PyccKMe OTpMuaTeTib- 
HO TTOBTlMflTlM Ha 
KyTibTypHoe pa3BMTne 
TiaTbiweM"
247. “PyccKMe TTOMorTiM 
JiaTblLUaM fiopOTbCfl M 
OCBofioflMTbCfl OT 
HeMeUKO -$aiUMCTCXMX 
3aXBaT HMXOB B TOflbl 
2-Oki MMpOBOM BOMHbl11
ROTlHO-
CTbW
co r^a-
ceH
1
HOTIHO-
CTbK)
corTia­
ceH
248. "nOMOLLJb pyCCKMX M 
mx npqMoe ynacTMe 
cnoco6cTBOBaTio boc- 
CTa HOBTie HMH) M flaTlb- 
HeMLiieMy pa3BMTMKJ 
9XOHOMMXM JIaTBMM"
249. "PyccKMe npMHecTiM 
TIaTBMM 6oTibiue Bpeaa, 
H6M TTOTlb3bl"
250. "PyccKMe TrpnexaTiM b 
TlaTBMHJ M )KMByT B 
Hen, 3a6oTACb o ee 
6TiaronoTiyHMM"
Cxopee TpyflHO Cxopee KaTero- 
corTia- cxa3aTb He co- pMHecxM 
cen rTiaceH He co­
rTiaceH
2 3 4 5
Cxopee TpyflHO Cxopee KaTero- 
corTia- cxa3aTb He co- pmhccxm 
ceH rTiaceH He c o ­
rTiaceH
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2 5 1 . "PyccKMe c t t o c o S c t b o  - 
BaTIM pa3BMTMH) 
KyTlbTypbl B a^TBMM"
2 5 2 . "PyccKMe HayHMTiM 
TiaTblUJeM TTMTb, a 
TiaTblUJM He HayHMTiM 
pyccKMX pafioTaTb"
2 5 3 . "PyccKM e qBTiqroTcq 
OKKyna ht aMM m a o t p k - 
Hbl TTOKM HyTb JlaTBMK)"
3 4
3 4
A TEJIEFB C O O B IU H TE, n O 3 K A J iy 0 C T A , H EKOTOFBIE CBEZIEH H 3 0  C EEE:
254. Bam ttoti: XeHCKMM My)KCKoPi
2 5 5 . Bauie o6pa30BaHMe: Hmjkc Ha naTib Horo (1-3 KTiacca)
Ha naTib Hoe (4 KTiacca)
HeTtoTiHOe cpeaHee (5-9 KTiaccoB) 
CpeflHee o6ujee
IIpo<i>eccMO HaTib ho -Tex hm necKoe
CpeziHee cneuMaTibHoe
He3aKOHHeHHoe Bbicwee
Bbicuuee
KaHflMflaT HayK
ZIoktop HayK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
256. Baiu B03pacT: 15-19 TieT 1 45-49 TieT 7
20-24 rozia 2 50-54 rofla 8
25-29 TieT 3 55-59 TieT 9
30-34 rofla 4 60-64 rofla 10
35-39 TieT 5 65-69 TieT 11
40-44 rojqa 6 70 TieT m CTapiue 12
257. HaUMO HaTib HOCTb: JlaTblLU(-Ka) 1 IIOTlflK(-Ka) 5
PyccKMM(-afl) 2 EBpePif-Ka) 6
YKpaMHeu(-ka) 3 Zlpyraq 7
BeTiopyc(-Ka) 4 (HaTTMUJMTe)
K A K O 0  H A U H O H  A  JIbH O C  TH  B A IU H  PO jU H TEJIH ?
258. MaTb: JIaTbiiUKa 1 JIOTlbKa 5
PyccKaq 2 EBpeMKa 6
YkpaMHKa 3 Zlpyraq 7
BeTiopycKa 4 (HaTTMUJMTe)
259. OTeu: JIaT blLLI 1 JIOTlflK 5
PyCCKMM 2 EBpeM 6
YkpaMHeu 3 Zlpyraq 7
BeTiopyc 4 (HaTTMUJMTe)
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2 6 0 . H a u n o  Ha^lbHOCTb
B am eM  JKGHbl (M y)Ka):
JlaTbiiij(-Ka) 1
PyccKMM(-aa) 2
YKpanHeiJi(-Ka) 3
EeTiopyc(-Ka) 4
IIo^fiK(-Ka) 
E B peP i(-K a) 
Z l p y r a q _ _ _
(HaTTmiiMTe)
2 6 1 . B a u ie  ceM eP i Hoe 
no^io)KeHMe:
C o c T o m e  b  6p a x e  
H M K o ra a  He c o c t o a ^ m  b  S p a x e  
BflOBeu, BflOBa 
Pa3BeaeH, pa3BeaeHa
2 6 2 . YKa>KMTe h m ctio  
zieTePi b  BaiueM  
ceMbe:
ZieTePi HeT 
1 peSeHOK 
2 -3  peSeH K a
4 - 5  a e T e P i 
B o T iee  5  zieTePi
2 6 3 . B a i u e B e p o -  
McnoBeaaHne:
JIp aB o c^ aB H b iP i 
C T a p o o S p q f l e u  
Z l p y r o e  B e p o M c n o B e a a H M e
H eB e p y w m n P i
(HaTTMUJMTe)
2 6 4 . KaK n acT O  n o c e -  H auje 1 p a 3a  b  H efle,m o
u jaeT e u e p x o B b ?  1 p a 3 b  H eaeT iw
2 - 3  pa3a b  M e c a u  
1 pa3 b  M e c q u  
H ecK o ^ib K o  pa3 b  r o z i  
P e r c e  1 pa3a b  r o z i  
C o B ceM  He TTOceujaK)
2 6 5 . B b ip a S o T a e T e
B TTpOM blUJTie H HOCTM 1 B c $ e p e  y n p a B T ie H M a , b
B CTpOM TeTlbCTBe 2 n p a B o o x p a  H M Te^b h b ix
H a T p a H c n o p T e 3 o p r a H a x ,  Ha on T iaH M B aeM bix
B CeZlbCKOM, M71M TieCHOM 4 flOTDKHOCTflX TTapTMMHbIX M
X03flM CTBe 5 ofiujeCTBeHHM X O praH M 3aU M M 11
B c < $ e p e  T o p ro B ^ iM 6 H a nacT H O M  npezm pM H T M M ,
B c $ e p e  o f iu je c T B e H H o ro b  000 12
TTMTaHMq 7 IleH C M O H ep 13
B c $ e p e  f ib iT O B o ro Y nau jM M cq 14
o6c7iy>KM BaHM q 8 C T y a e H T 15
B c $ e p e  K O M M y H a^ ib H o ro B a p y r o M  c $ e p e
x o 3 q P ic T B a 9 16
B c<f>epe o 6 p a 3 0 B a H M fl, ( r a e ? )
K y jib T y p w , H a y  km , 3Z ipaB O -
o x p a H e H M q 10
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266. Bbi HBTlfleTeCb:
Pa6oMHM 1 PyKOBOflMTe i^eM:
CneunajincTOM (HTP) 2 - GTpyKTypHoro TToapa3-
CnywaujMM 3 ZjejieHMq (HanajibHMK
KpeCTb fl HM HOM 4 uexa, oTZje^ia, jiaSopaTopMM
Ko 1^X03HMKOM, pa6oHMM m T.n.)
C0BX03a 5 - 6pnraflbi, ynacTKa,
PyKOBOflMTeTieM: rpynnbi m t .tt.
-ocHOBHoro TpyaoBoro
KOTITieKTMBa (flMpeKTOp,
rjiaBHbie cneuna7incTbi,
MX 3aMeCTMTe^ lM) 6
267. YpoBeHb Barnett KBa7iM<|)MKauMM:
Zina pafioHMX £Dih BOflMTe i^ett Rj\n cneuMa i^MCTOB
TapM(|)HO-KBa-
Kozj OTBeTa 71M(f>MKaUMO H H bltt KTiaCCHOCTb KaTeropMfi
pa3Pflfl
1 7-8 1 KTiacc BeayujMtt cneuMajiMCT
2 5-6 2 KTiacc 1 KaTeropMH
3 3-4 3 KTiacc 2 KaTeropMfl
4 1-2 3 KaTeropMfl
5 Be3 pa3paqa Be3 KaTeropMM
EJIArOtfAPHM 3A CO TPY5 HHTEC TBO!
The selected regions were coded as follows (the first seven are cities, the last eight are 
rural districts, rajoni):
Riga 1 Rezekne 6 Valkaraj. 11
Daugavpils 2 Ventspils 7 Kraslava raj. 12
Liepaja 3 Daugavpils raj. 8 Talsi raj. 13
Jelgava 4 Ventspils raj. 9
Jurmala 5 Riga raj. 10
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Map 1: The Period of the Teutonic Knights and the Polish
and Swedish Period (13th to 18th Centuries)
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M ap  2: T h e  P e r io d  o f th e  R u s s ia n  E m p ir e  (1914)
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